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ABSTRACT
AN UNDISTORTED PICTURE:
BROADCASTING, JOURNALISM AND THE STATE, 192 0-1941
MAY 1994
THOMAS W. ASHWELL, B.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
AMHERST
M.A. , UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Ph. D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Gerald W. McFarland
This dissertation investigates the development of
radio news broadcasting in the years between the First and
Second World Wars. Historians have long acknowledged that
radio's coverage of the outbreak of the Second World War in
Europe marked the beginning of modern broadcast journalism.
Too little attention has been paid to why the news
broadcasts Americans listened to in ever greater numbers as
war approached took the shape they did. This study attempts
to place broadcast journalism in context by examining the
evolution of radio news and information programs as one
part of the rapid development of a new industry and its
evolving regulatory framework.
Radio broadcasting emerged following the First World
War. The potential of the new technology quickly became
obvious, and both producers and consumers turned to the
government to bring stability and order to the new
industry. Private broadcasters were licensed to use the
iv
people's air in exchange for their pledge to serve an ill-
defined "public interest" standard. The "American System of
Broadcasting" which developed between the wars was the
result of this bargain.
A new kind of journalism was created for the new
medium. Responding to various commercial, regulatory,
professional and bureaucratic imperatives , the industry
sought to protect itself by repeatedly proclaiming its
commitment to fairness , balance
,
accuracy and impart ial ity
.
Yet the immediacy and emotional intimacy of radio as v/ell
as the many crises of the period made "obj ect ivity" an
elusive goal . Broadcast j ournal ists
,
industry execut ives
,
elected officials and the public constantly debated the
meaning of the word and sought to insure that the
broadcasts they produced or heard were compatible with
their diverse visions of society.
By examining the development of broadcast journalism
within the context of both the radio industry and the
times, this dissertation studies the growth of a
profession, an industry and the conflict among competing
public and private interests for control of a new
technology and, more importantly, the flow of information
in a liberal, capitalist society. The conflict was part of
the broader debate over the proper role of government and
corporations in modern society which took place during the
interwar years.
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INTRODUCTION
"THE FIRST NEW FORM OF JOURNALISM IN GENERATIONS " ^
In 1938, as the nation groped for lost prosperity and
the world stumbled toward war, millions of Americans sought
answers to their questions on the radio. Radio in the 1930s
both reported and made the news. The still new invention
played a critical role in shaping public opinion and public
policy, bringing events and issues into American homes with
unparalleled immediacy and intimacy. Broadcasters who
reported events and presented issues were as amazed as
their audience with the magic of radio as they sought the
best way to take advantage of its powers . At the same t ime
,
the future of the medium was being shaped by a continuing
debate among corporations, consumers and the federal
government over the role the radio should play in American
society.
In September of 1973, the CBS Radio Network broadcast
a thirty-part documentary recounting memorable news
broadcasts. The occasion was the thirty-fifth anniversary
of the Munich crisis, an event which foreshadowed the
Second World War and also marked the dawn of a new
journalistic age. CBS commentator Eric Sevareid told the
1 Eric Sevareid, CBS network, September 23, 1973, text
reprinted as liner notes for an album of excerpts from the
series. An Ear to the Sounds of Our History, Columbia
Special Products P12345, 1974.
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audience that 1538 "was the beginning, not of news itself
by radio, but of systematic, structured journalism in
sound, staffed by a new kind of j ournal ist
.
The chroniclers of broadcasting agree with his
assessment.^ Erik Barnouw, radio's most prominent
historian, asserted that prior to the middle of the decade,
"with rare except ions ... there was a blackout on current
problems" on the air.^ Edward Bliss, who like Barnouw
worked for many years in network radio before becoming an
historian of the industry, acknowledged that radio began
covering news events in the 192 0s but agreed that what is
today recognized as broadcast journalism began when "the
2 Sevareid, CBS network, September 23 , 1973
.
^ The standard history of American broadcasting is
Erik Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting in the United
States, 3 vols. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966,
1968, 1970). Among the most insightful contemporary
accounts is Francis Chase, Jr., Sound and Fury: An Informal
History of Broadcasting (New York: Harper, 1942) . The most
comprehensive chronicle of broadcast news is Edward Bl iss
,
Jr., Now the News: The Story of Broadcast Journalism (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1991) . David Holbrook
Culbert, News for Everyman: Radio and Foreign Affairs in
Thirties America (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1976)
,
Irving E. Fang, Those Radio Comm.entators ! (Ames: Iowa State
University Press, 1977) and David H. Hosley, As Good as
Any: Foreign Correspondence on American Radio, 1930-1940
(Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1984) focus on the
period under discussion. See also Jeffrey Ian Cole, "Born
to the New Art: CBS Correspondents and the Emergence of
Broadcast News, 1930-1941" (Ph.D. diss.. University of
California, Los Angeles, 1985) and Murray Katzman, "News
Broadcasting in the United States: 1920-1941" (Ph.D. diss.,
New York University, 1968). Much of the most interestmg
work on broadcast journalism rushes past radio to
concentrate on the television era.
4 Barnouw, History of Broadcasting, vol. 2, The Golden
Web (1968) , 17.
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networks established their news organizations in the
1930s. "5 David Culbert observed that broadcast journalism
only began to mature "after the Munich crisis in September
1938 [when] events abroad seemed so ominous that listeners
began depending on radio as a major source of news."^
Historians seeking a first example of this new form of
journalism have even designated a date: March 13, 1938. As
German troops marched in the streets of Vienna, CBS aired
its first "World News Roundup." Featuring live short-wave
pickups from across Europe and North America, the program
redefined broadcast news and, as Columbia ' s news director
at the time would recall with an ironic metaphor, marked
the moment "Frankenstein created the monster.""^ The first
"World News Roundup" is replicated each day on radio and
television stations across the country and around the world
as reports from correspondents are linked by an announcer
and presented as a seamless whole. As historian Donald
Godfrey observed many years later, the broadcast "clearly
illustrates the impact CBS Radio News had in establishing a
5 Bliss, Now the News, ix. Bliss was a news writer and
editor for CBS. Barnouw was assistant script manager for
radio plays at NBC.
^ Culbert, News for Everyman, 14; see also Robert R.
Smith, "The Origins of Radio Network News Commentary,"
Journal of Broadcasting 9 (Spring 1965), 113-22.
7 Paul W. White, News on the Air (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1947) , 45.
format that is still widely used in both radio and
television news. "®
Today's flood of electronic journalism, the lifeblood
of the information age, began on the radio, and radio news
did undergo a radical change as the Second World War
approached. Broadcasters began to think of themselves for
the first time as professional journalists, committed to
factual
,
analytical reporting of current events . Suddenly,
radio was understood to be much more than a medium devoted
to popular entertainment and advertising messages. As
Europe tumbled into war, radio became a respected and
influential news source as well . While chroniclers of
broadcasting regularly celebrate this transformation, they
fail to explain satisfactorily why it took place.
Looking back, the confluence of extraordinarily
talented individuals, world- shatter ing events, commercial
imperatives, new technology and growing audience demand for
information at a single point in time makes the development
of broadcast news in the years before the Second World War
appear either miraculously preordained or an astonishing
coincidence. Neither explanation is satisfying.
Those who were present at the creation later found it
difficult to explain what happened. The towering figure of
Columbia's Edward R. Murrow casts an impressive shadow, but
8 Donald G Godfrey, "CBS World News Roundup: Setting
the Stage for the Next Half Century," American Journalisn:
^
(Summer 1990) , 164
,
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can we believe a biographer's assertion that Murrow
"essentially fathered" broadcast journalism?^ William
Paley, the president of CBS and Murrow' s employer, invoked
the war as deus ex machina. "The war," he wrote in his
autobiography, "had transformed our once small and
inexperienced news department into a large and mature
organization. "i° Barnouw is among those who pointed to the
audience's appetite for information and radio's rush to
satisfy it. Motivated by its need to attract listeners who
would in turn attract advertisers, broadcasters had no
choice but to add more news programming to their schedules.
"News broadcasting grew," he concluded, because "it had
to.
Perhaps the answer is uncertain because we have been
asking the wrong questions. To say that radio's coverage of
the European crisis marks the beginning of broadcast
journalism ignores nearly two decades of history. More
importantly, by concentrating on the development of
^ Joseph E. Persico, Edward R. Murrow: An American
Original (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), xii. Murrow's role
as the avatar of broadcast journalism should not be
underestimated. See also Alexander Kendrick, Prime Time:
The Life of Edward P. Murrow (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969);
A.M. Sperber, Murrow: Hie Life and Times (New York:
Freundlich, 1986)
.
10 William S. Paley, Ab It Happened: A Memoir (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday, 1979), 153.
11 Barnouw, The Golden Web, 22. See also William
Stott, Documentary Expression and Thirties America
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973, 1986) . Stott
called the late 1930s and early 1940s "the 'golden age' of
radio reporting," 84.
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broadcast journalism without considering the industry as a
whole and its place in time, we avoid fundamental questions
on the relationship between the medium and society.
Communications historian David Paul Nord urged
students of the media to focus on "the internal and
external social contejcts within which mass media messages
were produced in the past." Nord argued that it is vitally
important for historians to explore both the society in
which the media existed and "the structures, processes, and
conventions of mass media organizations. " As radio
broadcasting evolved during the interwar years, an entire
industry emerged. "The most important internal story in the
history of American journalism and mass communication is
the story of growing commerc ial and organizat ional
complexity, " Nord suggested, "This is a poorly understood
story in our field, a story still obscured by the
traditional focus on individuals rather than on structures
and processes . "^^
One reason the story is poorly understood is those
"structures and processes" were not fully acknowledged or
understood by the men and women who daily worked within
them. When Columbia's "World News Roundup" went on the air
for the first time, the broadcasting industry was not yet
eighteen years old and, despite its meteoric ascent, was
12 David Paul Nord, "Intellectual History, Social
History, Cultural History ... and Our History," Journaliem
Quarterly 67 (Winter 1990), 647. Emphasis in the original
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still something of the gawky adolescent as war approached,
lacking any established sense of place. Sevareid, one of
those who had "brought into being the first new form of
journalism in generations," recalled that "to those very
early microphone reporters, including this one, it was
exhilarating, it was exhausting, it was a bit
frightening. "14 The executives responsible for putting the
reporters on the air were equally unsure of themselves. As
radio commentator Raymond Gram Swing explained, "American
radio is a product of improvisation. " There was no "blue
print drawn up by some great and inspired broadcasting
architect." Radio executives were "driven and harassed" and
made "clipped decisions at a feverish pace, with no time
whatever to philosophize."-^^
To place the development of broadcast journalism in
context, we must investigate the times as well as the
evolution of both the journalism profession and the
broadcasting industry. When the first broadcasters took to
1^ The first radio "broadcast" is a subject of
considerable debate, but KDKA's election night program in
1920 is generally acknowledged as the beginning of the
commercial broadcasting industry. See Joseph E. Baudino and
John M. Kitross, "Broadcasting's Oldest Stations: An
Examination of Four Claimants," Journal of Broadcaeting 21
(Winter 1977) , 61-83
.
14 Sevareid, CBS, September 23, 1973. Sevareid,
however, was not present at Munich. He was hired by CBS in
1939.
15 Raymond Gram Swing, talk before the Women's
National Radio Committee, New York, May 13, 1941, 1, text
in box 1, Raymond Gram Swing Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
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the air in the 19206, they did not set their medium on a
course which would inevitably place Murrow and his
microphone on a London roof top twenty years later. The
radio industry and broadcast journalism developed during a
time when the nation itself confronted the future with a
mixture of anticipation and dread. This broader cultural
context, too, helped determine the shape of broadcast
journalism.
Radio, when it began, was widely perceived as
profoundly democratic and empowering. Citizens of the late
twentieth century, awash in images and information, must be
forgiven for failing to remember just how miraculous radio
appeared to Americans of an earlier time. Messages flew
through an invisible ether which respected no property
lines and penetrated locked doors and closed windows. Radio
promised to bring enl ightenment to rich and poor al ike in
every corner of the country. Thanks to the new technology,
thousands of voices could fill the air and take part in the
debate over the nation's future. Here was a medium that
could not be controlled by the powerful few at the expense
of the many.
Radio's freedom, however, presented a potentially
fatal threat to the medium's utility. As broadcasters knew
and listeners quickly discovered, the medium's messages
could be reduced to gibberish if radio waves carrying those
thousands of voices conflicted. Like so much of the modern
industrial world, both radio broadcasting and listening
8
demanded stability and order to flourish. But could that
order be imposed without destroying the freedom and promise
of the wondrous new medium?
If we keep this question in mind as we examine the
development of radio broadcasting, the growth of the
industry becomes a metaphor for one of the fundamental
debates of the interwar years. "One of the most powerful
impulses" of the time, historian Alan Brinkley observed,
was "the urge to defend the autonomy of the individual and
the independence of the community against encroachment from
the modern industrial state. "^^ Would the nev; medium prove
to be a bastion of autonomy and independence or would it
become simply another alienating institution? Would radio
allow the people to speak, or would the people be spoken
to? The answer was far from certain in those years, and the
role the state would play was both unclear and of critical
importance
.
Historians exploring the growth of the broadcasting
industry have frequently described the struggle for control
of the medium as yet another victory for the nation's
corporate interests with the state serving as a feckless
and often willing accompl ice . ^"^ "A vast industry has grown
1^ Alan Brinkley, Voicee of Protest: Huey Long, Father
Coughlin, and the Great Depression (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1982) , xi
.
1"^ See for example Susan J. Douglas, Inventing
American Broadcasting 1999-1922 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1987), Philip T. Rosen, The Modern
Sten tors: Radio Broadcasters and the Federal Government
1920-1934 (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1980) as well
up around the needs and wishes of sponsors," Barnouw would
write in the late 1970s, "Its program formulas, business
practices, ratings, demographic surveys have all evolved in
ways to satisfy sponsor requirements." The commercial
imperatives of broadcasting had become so internalized by
the television age, he argued, that "most decision-making
swirls at levels below him, requiring only his occasional
benediction at this or that selected point. He is a
potentate of our time. "^®
The triumph of commercialism was never quite so
absolute in the age of radio. As Barnouv; himself observed
thirty years earlier, broadcasters were licensed by the
federal government because
every spot on the dial is public property. The
Federal Communications Commission, act ing for the
public, may grant this or that company a license
to broadcast at this or that frequency, and to
make a profit on it through the sale of time —
provided " the publ ic interest , convenience and
necessity" are served
.
This was the bargain broadcasters had agreed to in order to
insure order in the ether. In the years before the Second
World War, a time when Americans were unsure how to balance
as Barnouw, History of Broadcast incf, especially the first
two volumes, A Tower in Babel (1966) and The Golden Web
(1968), which carry the story up to 1953.
Erik Barnouw, The Sponsor: Notes on a Modern
Potentate (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978), 4.
1^ Erik Barnouw, ed. , Radio Drama in Action: 25 Plays
of a Changing World (New York: Rinehart, 1945), vii.
Emphasis in the original.
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autonomy and order, freedom and aecurity, the conditiono of
the compact were unclear.
"The public interest" wac a weighty and fiercely
contested phrace, and the history of broadcasting
regulation reflects that conflict.-^ At the start of the
radio age, Herbert Hoover, who as Secretary of Commerce
helped seal the bargain between broadcasters and the state,
looked back on a decade of war and revolution and ahead to
the future. He argued that what he called American
individualism - "that each individual shall be given the
chance and stimulation for development of the best with
which he is endowed in heart and mind" — would prove to be
"the sole source of progress " for the nat ion
.
Hoover's individualism was not the Spencer ian laissez-
faire of the late nineteenth century. That kind of
"unrestrained and unintelligent self-interest," he felt,
led only to dangerous and destruct ive abuses . "The probl em
of the world," Hoover believed, "is to restrain the
destruct ive inst incts while strengthening and enlarging
those of altruistic character and constructive impulse. "^^
For an overview of the regulatory system focusing
on the television age, see Erwin G. Krasnow and Lawi-ence D.
Longley, The Politics of Broadcast Recfulation (New York:
St. Martin's, 1973) . They observe regarding the Federal
Communications Commission that "few independent regulatory
commissions have had to operate under such a broad grant of
power with so few substantive guidelines." Quotation at 16.
21 Herbert Hoover, American Individualism (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday, 1922), 13.
22 Hoover , Aineri can Indi vi duali sm, 15-6.
11
Hoover
-B prescription for the modern age was redolent of
both classical liberalism's ideal of enlightened self-
interest and the centuries
-old dream of a Christian
commonwealth. It also encompassed what historian Ellis
Hawley called "the central assumptions of progressive
thought." Hoover believed "that man could rationalize and
improve human society, that he could do so within a
liberal
-capital ist framework without radical social
restructuring, and that he should utilize both public and
private agencies in the task."^^
As Secretary of Commerce, Hawley suggested,
"Hoover ... saw himself as the protagonist of a new and
superior synthesis between the old industrialism and the
new, a way whereby America could benefit from scientific
rationalization and social engineering without sacrificing
the energy and creativity inherent in individual effort,
'grassroots' involvement, and private enterprise." This
synthesis. Hoover believed, would balance freedom and order
and "meet the need for national reform, greater stability,
and steady expansion, yet avoid the evils long associated
23 Ellis W. Hawley, untitled essay, in J. Joseph
Huthmacher and Warren I. Susman, eds . , Herbert Hoover and
the CriBiB of American Capitaliew (Cambridge: Schenkman,
1973), 5.
12
with 'capital consolidations,' politicized cartels, and
governmental bureaucracies . "24
This model for a new cooperative industrial society
had been tried with success during the First World War.
Government and industry, combined in such groups as the
Committee on Industrial Preparedness and the War Industries
Board, had mobilized America to win the war to end all
wars. War collectivism blurred the lines between the public
and private sectors, creating a powerful synergy. For
Hoover and many others, these wartime organizations were
models of efficiency and progress. As historian Murray
Rothbard observed, this vision remained alive throughout
the 192 0s and would "return full-blown in the New Deal and
in the World War II economy. "^^
While the state would play a major role in developing
the cooperative state, it is important to keep government's
limited role in perspective. Hoover advocated what has come
to be called associat ionism — voluntary cooperation
between the public and private sectors — and flatly
repudiated state socialism. The Russian Revolution was to
Hoover a chilling and obvious example that socialism "has
2** Ellis W. Hawley, "Herbert Hoover, the Commerce
Secretariat, and the Vision of an 'Associative State,
'
1921-1928," CTournal of American History 61 (June 1974),
117
.
25 Murray N. Rothbard, "War Collectivism in World War
I," in Ronald Radosh and Murray N. Rothbard, eds . , A New
History of the Leviathan: Essays on the Rise of the
American Corporate State (New York: E.P. Button, 1972),
110
.
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wrecked itself finally upon the rocks of destroyed
production and moral degeneracy. "^s He sought to save
capitalism from its own worst instincts while retaining the
benefits of competition and reward.
Hoover hoped these ideals would help shape a radio
industry which truly served the public interest, but, as a
biographer noted, he "was more willing to risk the
development of private monopoly or oligopoly than federal
control." Corporations with a financial stake in advancing
the art "were essential to [radio's] rapid development. But
however logical his reasons were for relying upon this
select group of broadcasters, in doing so he fostered
monopolistic trends. "^7
Monopoly, as historian Gabriel Kolko noted, was a
concept which carried significant ideological weight in the
early years of this century. It was "a political slogan"
rooted in a hundred years of struggle and used to condemn
all forms of concentrated authority perceived as threats to
individual liberty.^® For reformers and radicals who still
26 Hoover, American Individual! em, 36.
27 Joan Hoff Wilson, Herbert Hoover: Forgotten
Progressive (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975), 112-3. The
failure of attempts to regulate industry for the common
good has been a frequent theme of historians. For an
examination of the communication industries, see Robert
Britt Horowitz, The Irony of Regulatory Reform (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1989)
.
28 Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A
Reinterpretation of American History, 1900-1916 (Glencoe,
Illinois: Free Press, 1963; Chicago: Quadrangle, 1967), 62.
/
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vividly recalled the populist rebellion and passionate
progressivism of their recent past, monopoly was
antithetical to freedom. While Hoover yearned for a benign
associationist state, others feared the overwhelming power
of capital and recalled Henry Demarest Lloyd's warning
"that a people who are slaves to market - tyrants will surely
come to be their slaves in all else... that a people half
democratic and half plutocratic cannot permanently
endure .
"
Many Marxist critics would point out that the outcome
was preordained. Louis Althusser, following Antonio
Gramsci, argued that the fine division between the public
and private sectors was "a distinction internal to
bourgeois law" because the capitalist state was in its
broadest sense an amalgam of private capital and the
governmental institutions capital established to protect
itself. Radio would inevitably become what Althusser called
an "ideological state apparatus" constructed to reproduce
the social relations of production necessary to maintain
the supremacy over the working class.
The freedom radio seemed to offer, Theodor Adorno
argued in 1938, was illusory. Forced to flee Germany,
29 Henry Demarest Lloyd, Wealth Againet Commonwealth
[1894] (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice -Hall , 1963),
173 .
30 Louis Althusser, "Ideology and Ideological State
Apparatuses (Notes towards an Investigation)," trans. Ben
Brewster, in Lenin and Philosophy and Other EBsaye (New
York: Monthly Review, 1971), 127-86.
15
Adorno was at the time affiliated with the Office of Radio
Research, one of the earliest academic centers for the
study of the medium. He did not like what he heard. For
Adorno, a leading member of what has come to be known as
the Frankfurt School, broadcasting represented an arena for
controlled and futile opposition to the dominant culture.
The radio listener exploring the ether, he said,
participated in an artificial exercise that merely
resembled freedom. The listener, Adorno wrote, "becomes the
discoverer of just those industrial products which are
interested in being discovered by him. He brings nothing
home which would not be delivered to his house." Radio
"freed" the individual to join "the public mechanism
without exerting even the si ightest influence on it . "^^
Such dour conclusions , as communicat ions theorist
Stuart Hall has pointed out, beg vital questions. By
assuming that ideology is necessarily imposed by a dominant
class, the possibility of resistance to the hegemonic
paradigm, the possibility of change, is ignored. The
reaction of the listener, Hall argued, can not be taken for
granted. Additionally, defining boundaries between the
public and private spheres and determining the mechanisms
^1 Theodor W. Adorno, "On the Fetish-Character in
Music and the Regression of Listening," trans. Maurice
Goldbloom, in Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt, eds . , The
Essential Frankfurt School Reader (New York: Continuum,
1982), 293. The Office of Radio Research was funded by a
grant 'from the Rockefeller family and established at
Princeton in 1937 under the direction of Paul F.
Lazarsfeld.
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of control is far more problematic than Althusser allowed.
How is it, Hall asked, that in developed liberal
democracies private institutions "without direction or
compulsion by the State ... reproduce ... accounts of the world
constructed within fundamentally the same ideological
categories?" The dominant ideology, Hall suggested, is
resisted and reinterpreted and can cut both ways,
ultimately limiting the ways social structures may
reproduce themselves
.
Communication theorists remain divided on whether the
emergence of the mass media is good or bad news, whether
the new media represent an extension of centralized control
or a profoundly democratic opportunity. Clearly,
proprietors of any mass medium worthy of the name —
newspapers, magazines, film, radio, television — must
possess deep pockets. As press critic A.J. Liebling
observed half a century ago, "anybody in the ten-million
dollar category is free to buy or found a paper in a great
^2 Stuart Hall
,
"Signification, Representat ion,
Ideology: Althusser and the Post - Structural ist Debates," in
Critical Studies in Mass Communication 2 (June 1985), 91-
114, quotation at 100-1. Any historical examination of the
media must take notice of cultural studies, especially the
work of Hall and others affiliated at one time or another
with the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the
University of Birmingham. For a recent survey of the field,
see Valda Blundell, John Sheperd and Ian Taylor, eds .
,
Relocating Cultural Studies: Developments in Theory and
Research (New York: Routledge, 1993)
.
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city like New York or Chicago. "33 Such discussions,
however, are too often, as cultural historian Raymond
Williams suggested, ahistorical because "there is a general
tendency to confuse the techniques themselves with the uses
to which, in a given society, they have been put. "34 The
mere existence of media do not predetermine the
consequences of their use. "If the government gets them
first, as Nazi Germany did with radio," New Age theorist
Stewart Brand pointed out, "you get a top-down bias in the
political process." If, however, advocates of radical
change control the media, the result can be quite
different. "Ayatollah Khomeini's revolution in Iran," Brand
noted, "spread by audiocassette tapes, copy machines, and
telephone; no one bothered to take over a broadcast
facility until the Shah left. "35
The struggle over the future of the new medium of
radio was in large part ideological, contested across the
terrain of American culture. 36 "The American System of
33 A.J. Liebling, The Press, 2nd ed. (New York:
Ballentine, 1975, 15. Liebling' s essay was first published
in the Dartn)outh Alumni Magazine in 1947.
34 Raymond Williams, Culture & Society: 1780-1950 (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1958, 1983), 301.
35 Stewart Brand, The Media Lab: Inventing- the Future
at MIT (New York: Penguin, 1988), 213.
3S Recent scholarship on popular culture has examined
how regulatory battles over censorship and licensing
frequently reflect deeper ideological disputes. See for
example American Quarterly 44, no. 4 (December 1992), a
special issue devoted to "Hollywood, censorship and
American culture."
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Broadcasting," the industry's trade organization explained
as the Second World War approached, "is based on the same
democratic ideals which guarantee us freedom of the press,
freedom of religion, freedom of speech. "^"^ Such words often
disguised more mundane goals, but the stirring phrases of
the nation's past were regularly invoked as they so often
are when institutions face threats to their survival. That
broadcasters who spoke of freedom of speech were equally
concerned with freedom to exploit the ether for private
profit merely reflects the nation's continuing struggle to
define itself
.
The internal context of broadcast journalism was
equally contested, A new profession was inventing itself,
creating its own standards and practices. One vital
standard of broadcast news which became increasingly
prominent in the late 193 0s and continues today is a loudly
and frequently proclaimed commitment to objective, value
-
free j ournal ism. Paley, stepping forward in the 19 3 0s as
the industry's most quoted public spokesman, pledged as war
approached that his network would "present the essence of
the news, both national and international, in a strictly
factual and objective way, devoid of bias."^^ Murrow, not
^'^ National Association of Broadcasters, The ABC of
Radio (Washington, DC: National Association of
Broadcasters, 1938)
,
n.p.
^® William S. Paley, Annual Report of the Columbia
Broadcasting- System, Inc. For the Fiscal Year Ended
December 28, 1940 (New York: Columbia Broadcasting System,
1941) , [5]
.
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yet the radio's patron saint but already the model foreign
correspondent, insisted in 1939 that he and his colleagues
labored "so far as humanly poss ible . . . to avoid the
intrusion of personal opinion" in their broadcasts and
aimed to provide their listeners with news "that is as
objective as we can make it."^^
Even President Franklin D. Roosevelt himself praised
"objective reporting" as the kind of "real news [which] has
sharpened the minds and judgment of men and women
everywhere." Radio listeners, he observed on the basis of
his experience, were becoming increasingly sophisticated
and had "learned to discriminate over the air between the
honest advocate who relies on truth and logic and the more
dramatic speaker who is clever in appealing to the passions
and prejudices of his 1 isteners . Roosevelt spoke with
considerable authority. Not only was he an acknowledged
master of the medium, he was as chief executive radio's
ultimate regulator. Clearly, his opinion on the subject
mattered.
Edward R. Murrow, testimony, Official Report of
Proceedings Before the Federal Comwuni cations Conmieeion at
Washington, DC in the matter of Commission ' s Order No. 37,
Investigation of Chain or Network Broadcasting, Monopoly in
the Broadcasting Industry and Related Matters, FCC docket
no. 5060, vol. 26 (January 13, 1939), 3251-2, box 1404,
record group 173, Washington National Records Center,
National Archives and Records Administration, Suitland,
Maryland.
40 Broadcast address, quoted in "FDR Praises Radio,"
NAB [National Association of Broadcasters] Reports 7
(November 3, 1939), 3809.
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Despite the protestations of Paley, Murrow and the
president himself, few reporters truly believed it was
possible for a journalist to be an objective observer. By
the time of the First World War, correspondents were
increasingly expected to help explain what events meant by
providing necessary background and a measure of
interpretation with their dispatches. That required
selectivity and editorial judgment. As Murrow implied, most
journalists who aspired to objectivity saw it as a goal to
be sought rather than a standard to be assumed.
Over the past thirty years, both journalists and those
who observe them have increasingly come to agree just how
elusive objectivity is. Scholars who have examined the
evolving institutions of the media and persuasively argued
that journalism's commitment to objectivity is largely a
product of cultural, political, bureaucratic and
professional imperatives which came to the fore during the
last century and a half."*^ As Gaye Tuchman explained it,
objectivity was a "ritual" practiced by journalists working
within a corporate environment. Fragments of "pertinent
information gathered by professionally validated
*! See Herbert J. Gans, Deciding- What 'b News: A Study
of CBS Evening News, NBC Nightly News, Newsweek and Time
(New York: Pantheon, 1979); Dan Schiller, Objectivity and
the News: The Public and the Rise of Commercial Journal i em
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1981);
Michael Schudson, Discovering the News: A Social History of
American Newspapers (New York: Basic Books, 1978) ; Gaye
Tuchman, "Objectivity as Strategic Ritual," American
Journal of Sociology 11 (January 1972), 660-79.
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methods when taken together, present themselves as both
individually and collectively self
-val idat ing . Together,
they constitute a web of facticity by establishing
themselves as cross
-referents to one another. "^^ Objective
news coverage, Michael Schudson contended, was another
example of relativist philosophy which developed in
reaction to the stresses modernity imposed on traditional
society. Objectivity, he noted, became "an articulate
professional value in journalism" during the interwar years
and, "like related ideals in law and social science at the
same time, was founded on a confidence that the loss of
faith was irretrievable.""^^
This faith in the loss of faith survives to the
present day. Journalists now content themselves with more
obtainable goals such as balance and accuracy . When the
newly- appointed ombudsman of the Waehington Poet wrote her
first column in 1992, she confessed that "at some point, I
gave up my devotion to objectivity. Journalism is not
stenography, and a newspaper is more than a chute running
from speaker to reader." While objectivity might be humanly
impossible "and insufficient anyway for finding meaning,
then newspapers still owe their readers fairness, balance.
42 Gaye Tuchman, Making News: A Study in the
Construction of Reality (New York: Free Press, 1978), 82,
86 .
Schudson, Discovering the News, 157, 159.
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authoritative information and coverage that is accurate,
reliable and complete . "^"^
Journalism's retreat to relativism had been under way
for years by the time modern broadcast journalism emerged
in the late 1930s. Faith in absolute objectivity had been
in full flight since the 1920s. Walter Lippmann had raised
fundamental questions about the journalist's ability to
comprehend the modern world, much less determine the truth.
Lippmann' s suggested solution included professional
standards which acknowledged the elusive nature of reality
while embracing scientific standards of evidence. As the
media became increasingly industrialized, professionalized
and prosperous, newspapers and broadcasting organizations
developed their own traditions, folkways and bureaucratic
imperatives. Since truth could not be safely defined, a
more practical model evolved along the lines Lippmann
suggested which explicitly confessed human frailty while
emphasizing verifiable standards such as balance and
accuracy.
Joann Byrd, "The Ethical Journalist, " Waehington
Post, June 28, 1992, C6
.
Lippmann' s work was especially influential because
he was himself a working newspaperman, albeit one who
operated at a more Delphic level than most of his
colleagues. See especially Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion
(New York: Free Press, 1922) and The Phantom Public (New
York: Harcourt, Brace, 1925) as well as Ronald Steel,
Walter Lippmann and the American Century (Boston: Atlantic
Little Brown, 1980) .
46 See, for example, Warren Breed, "Social Control in
the Newsroom," Social Forces 33 (1955), 326-35; Edward Jay
Epstein, News From Nowhere: Television and the News (New
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In the common parlance of the newsroom, however, such
reporting was still often described as "objective". A
standard journalism text first published in 1932 as
Reporting for Beginnere was retitled Interpretive Reporting
when it was reissued in 1938 to reflect the changing
understanding of the journalist's proper role. The author,
however, continued to maintain well into the 1960s, when
the very mention of ^the word was likely to bring a sneer to
the lips of his student -readers , "that the first step
upward in journalism is through mastery of the fundamentals
of thorough, objective reporting. "^"^
Too many academic discussions of objectivity
deteriorate into pointless arguments over how many
reporters can dance on the head of a pin. As newspaperman,
historian and critic of journalism James Boylan noted,
debunkers of obj ect ivity "were right only in the narrowest
,
debater ' s -point sense .
"
Objectivity did exist and does exist — as an
ideology, as a modus operandi, as a cultural
phenomenon. Merely to point out that news stories
are not "obj ective " in its abstract sense does
not dissipate its reality. . . .Objectivity has
gradually come to be understood not only as an
impersonal, "balanced" style of news writing
(which is the commonplace , or newsroom, sense of
the word) , but also as representing the broader
York: Random House, 1973) and Tuchman, "Objectivity as
Strategic Ritual .
"
47 Curtis D. MacDougall, "History and Purpose,"
Interpretive Reporting, fifth ed. (New York: Macmillan,
1968), viii. Emphasis added.
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claim of journalism for its position in society
- that of an impartial third party, the one that
speaks for the general interest.
That "broader claim" that journalism can be an important
and impartial contributor to the democratic discourse was
of course at the heart of Lippmann's call for reform. In
fact, in the eyes of its practitioners, it justifies the
existence of the news media.
In any discussion of objective reporting, then, it is
vital to define the term not - abstractly
,
but, as Boylan
did, within the context of j ournal ism. Basic to this
working definition of objectivity which evolved on the shop
floor are accuracy, fairness and balance. Reporters were
expected to get the names and numbers right and refrain
from overtly taking sides. Even such relatively modest
aspirat ions , however
,
begged many important cul tural and
psychological quest ions . When confronted with their sins,
journalists, well aware how problematic objectivity was,
complained they were only human and muttered that those who
raised such questions did not have to face daily deadlines.
As broadcast journalism developed between the world
wars, both the leaders of the industry and the editors and
James Boylan, "Infancy of Objectivity," review of
Schiller's Objectivity and the News, Columbia Journalism
Review, September/October 1981, 61
.
49 See for example Schiller's discussion of how the
Police Gazette' ^ crime coverage on the one hand disrupted
the complacency of society while on the other privileged
authority by citing police and court records as the source
of accurate information. Schiller, Objectivity and the
News, 96- 124 .
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reporters who actually produced news and public affairs
broadcasts repeatedly pledged to pursue objectivity. The
standards of radio news are especially worthy of
consideration because, as Godfrey aptly observed, many of
the conventions of television news are rooted in radio.
Indeed, most of the familiar faces on television newscasts
in the 1950s and 1960s belonged to men - and a very few
women - who began their careers in radio during the Second
World War. Of the many radio traditions they brought with
them to television, the most significant was the medium's
proclaimed commitment to objective journalism.
When they were attacked for failing to achieve that
goal, broadcasters reflexively defended themselves as
impartial and fair and their reports as balanced, when the
Nixon administration assaulted a radical "media elite"
which sought to undermine the traditional values of the
"silent majority," CBS News president Richard Salant
emphatically denied that television twisted the news to fit
a predetermined agenda. The goal as always, he said, was
accuracy, fairness and balance. "Our reporters do not cover
stories from their point of view, " Salant insisted, "They
are presenting them from nobody's point of view."^*^ His
critics howled at the transparent impossibility of Salant '
s
claim, but members of the journalistic fraternity knew
exactly what he meant.
50 Quoted in Epstein, News From Nowhere, epigram.
Emphasis in the original.
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An additional observation can also be made. Debates
over objectivity hinge on the broader issue of perceived
fairness. When society at large is divided, the definitions
of fairness, balance and impartiality — the pillars of
objectivity — become increasingly controversial. The
assault on objectivity during the 1960s and 1970s was
played out against the background of the societal upheavals
of the day which shattered the Cold War consensus. The
193 06 saw similar sharp divisions within American society
which intensified as issues of war and peace moved to the
fore. Consensus collapsed at decade's end, only to be
revived as the United States was drawn into the war in
1941
.
If, then, objectivity can be best understood as a
professional "modus operandi" rather than as something
which can be empirically demonstrated, two goals can be
achieved. First, protracted arguments over the absolute
truth of specific assertions can be set aside. Second,
broadcast journalism as it developed can be analyzed most
fruitfully by examining how it reflects the proclaimed
standards of the industry and the profession.
While the debate over objectivity involved all the
media including radio, broadcasting was uniquely shaped by
its peculiar nature. Unlike the printed word, radio was a
creation of the modern age. The new medium represented to
many Americans a chance to rectify past mistakes, a new
opportunity to achieve through modern means traditional
democratic goals which had for so long proven elusive. If
this opportunity were to be realized, the fundamental
question would have to be answered: Who would control the
air?
Discussions of the proper role of radio in a
democratic society took place in the context of a deeper
and more emotionally charged debate over how society should
be constructed. Did modern times make the old verities
obsolete? Senator Burton Wheeler of Montana, a leading
figure in the regulatory debate, personified the political
dislocation of the times. How could the Progressive
candidate for vice president of 1924 become the ant i -New
Deal isolationist of 1940? Wheeler maintained he was never
inconsistent. "My own feeling," he recalled, "is that while
the times, the issues, and the leaders have changed, my
basic outlook has remained the same." Wheeler confessed he
could no longer identify his allies. "I agree with the
' 1 iberals ' when they are on the side of justice for the
individual and against the concentration of economic
power," he said. "I agree with the 'conservatives' in their
opposition to the buildup of centralized power in the
federal government ." While it is tempting to dismiss
Wheeler and those who clung to the civic virtues of an
earlier era as relics of a day which had passed, it is
SI Burton K. Wheeler with Paul F. Healy, Yankee From
the West (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1962), 428.
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important to recall that in the context of the timec they
reprecented a cignificant portion of public opinion.
Radio broadcasting developed in the twilight of the
progreccive era and flourished during the New Deal. It wac
a time when government cought to reinvent itcelf and, ac
hictorian Jameo Weinctein obcerved, corporate leaderc
"Gupported political ideologiec that appealed to large
numberc of people of different cocial claGcec in order to
gain, and retain, popular support for their entrepreneurial
activity. "^^ The new broadcacting induGtry followed that
course aG well. The American Syctem of Broadcasting wac the
resul t
.
Both radio and itc critics chared the came rhetoric of
democracy and freedom while dicagreeing on what the wordc
meant
.
Radio newc wac chaped in the midct of thic debate
.
By examining how the radio indue try and itc regulat ore
attempted to reconcile their inGt itut ional and profeccional
imperat ivec with the ideology and tx'adit ional accumpt ionc
of American democracy, we can learn come thing of how thoce
traditions were understood and reinterpreted in the
interwai^ yearc .
52 James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal
State: 1900-1918 (Boston: Beacon, 1968) , xiii.
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patent rights and establishing interlocking directorships
to create pools and trusts reminiscent of late nineteenth-
century industrial cartels. The newly- empowered federal
government, eager to maintain a wartime monopoly over the
new technology, first sought direct control of the medium
and then attempted to maintain its influence by forging an
alliance with the private sector.
Others sought to fit radio into their diverse visions
of the future. Entrepreneurs, seeking the main chance,
opposed the growing power of both the state and
corporations which could stand in the way of their dreams.
Reformers of many stripes rightly saw the medium as a
powerful tool that could reshape society for good or ill
and fought to control radio's content. Through it all,
broadcasters and the public discovered together the wonders
of radio.
Ultimately, of course, each of these factions sought
power in its own way. They hoped to control the new medium,
not just for their own ends, but for what they understood
to be the good of society as a whole. Each insisted its
vision represented the best use of this miraculous new
invention. Citizens of the information age of the late
twentieth century who take for granted technologies which
allow sounds, pictures and electronic data to flow around
the world at the speed of light may underestimate the sense
of wonder and amazement with which people of a different
time greeted radio broadcasting. In the 1920s, a younger,
less jaded nation listened in awe as voices from afar
entered their homes and their lives, logically flowing
through something called the ether, a mysterious aura that
passed over, around and through everything, ignoring
national borders and private property, touching both rich
and poor, radio was truly miraculous.
A common motif used to graphically illustrate the
wonders of radio featured godlike specters floating in the
heavens, hurling bolts of lightning across the
countryside . 2 These dramatic images sent a mixed message
that tapped deeply seated hopes and fears. Radio waves were
portrayed as a natural element like water or fire. They
were powerful, and humankind could, if it proved worthy,
enjoy their benefits. The image, however, also carried a
Promethean warning. If prideful men and women abused this
gift, its power could be turned against them. Clearly radio
waves in the ether, like the fire that warmed us or the
waters of the rivers and oceans, had to be wisely used.
This new medium promised to carry us into a new day, but to
what brave new world would we be delivered?"^
3 The visual media in the 192 0s so frequently used
this image, it became a cliche. For especially elegant
examples of this motif, see the New York Times, September
12, 1926, sec. 11, 1 or the cover art for Doubleday's Radio
Broadcasting- magazine during 1926-27. In the 1930s, when
the Radio Corporation of America's subsidiary RKO was a
leading motion picture producer, the studio's films opened
with the image of lightening bolts flashing across the
globe from a radio tower. Perhaps RCA felt by then it had
taken its rightful place in the heavens.
4 The history of technology is filled with examples of
this duality: Will the new allow us to correct the mistakes
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Although radio broadcaeting was a product of the
192 06, the theoretical underpinnings and earliest
technology of radio emerged from laboratories in Europe and
America during the late nineteenth century. ^ As is often
the case with new technology, the unfamiliar was explained
by analogy. Wireless communication, as the name implies,
was first understood and promoted as a way to extend
existing telephone and telegraph service to places beyond
the reach of poles and wires. Although the human voice may
have been first transmitted through the air as early as
1892 — there are several rival claimants for the honor of
being first — wireless messages like telegrams were
typically transmitted in the dots and dashes of Morse code.
By the turn of the century, a new industry based on point-
to-point communication was taking shape.
Guglielmo Marconi, experimenter and entrepreneur, had
spanned the English Channel with wireless in 1899,
attracting popular acclaim and financial backing from
British investors. By 1910, the company bearing his name
of the old or simply give those in power new means to
exercise their control? Regarding communications, see for
example James Carey, Communication as Culture (Boston:
Unwin Hyman, 1989) and Daniel J. Czitrom, Media and the
American Mind: From Morse to McLuhan (Chapel Hill:
University of North Carolina Press, 1982) .
5 The standard histories of the development of radio
technology are Hugh G.J. Aitken, Syntony and Spark: The
Origins of Radio (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976) and
Aitken' s second study. The Continuous Wave: Technology and
American Radio, 1900-1932 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton
University Press, 1985)
.
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launched commercial wireless service between the United
States and Europe. American Marconi Company, the domestic
subsidiary of British Marconi, soon operated a network of
sending and receiving stations, controlled the majority of
the nation's radio traffic and held the rights to many
critical wireless patents. American Marconi, however, was
not alone in the field. It soon become apparent that there
was money to be made from the new technology, and several
corporate rivals took the field in hopes of carving out a
portion of the new market.
American Telephone and Telegraph realized what the
growth of radio could mean to its existing technologies and
actively pursued new breakthroughs in its laboratories.
ATScT also purchased promising patents of independent
experimenters who lacked the capital and expertise to
exploit their inventions. General Electric developed a
powerful long-distance transmitter in hopes of profiting
from the equipment needs of the new industry. Westinghouse
and other electrical firms also plunged into the wireless
technology business. Another significant player was United
Fruit Company. Eager for a way to connect its sprawling
network of plantations and cargo ships. United Fruit
developed its own wireless system, the Tropical Radio
Telegraph Company.
The federal government also took a leading role in
stimulating the growth of wireless. Radio promised to
answer the navy's traditional search for a way to
34
coordinate itG Bcattered bases and ships at sea. As the
fleet grew along with the nation's imperial ambitions,
communications kept pace. The navy installed one of GE ' s
powerful transmitters in New Jersey as the keystone of its
transoceanic wireless system. The admirals much preferred
to do business with domestic manufacturers and remained
wary of foreign-owned American Marconi, questioning the
firm's loyalty in time of international conflict.^
Major corporations and the government were not the
only radio pioneers. This was the era of inventor-
entrepreneurs such as Edison, Ford and the Wright brothers,
and scores of scientists and engineers were cloistered in
laboratories across the country in search of technological
breakthroughs which would both advance the art and make
them a fortune."^ Several of these mavericks, notably Lee de
Forest, Reginald Fessenden and Charles Herrold, broadcast
words and music long before the First World War, hoping to
drum up publicity and impress potential investors.®
Fessenden broadcast a Christmas eve concert in 19 06 from
his experimental transmitter on the Massachusetts coast
,
and Herrold was on the air in San Jose, California in 19 09,
^ Susan J. Douglas, Inventing- American Broadcaetincf
1899-1922 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
1987) , 192-240.
7 Douglas, Inventing American Broadcasting, 144-86.
® See Joseph E. Baudino and John M. Kitross,
"Broadcasting's Oldest Stations; An Examination of Four
Claimants," Journal of Broadcasting 21 (Winter 1977), 61
83 .
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at one point connecting his transmitter to the city's
street car wires to create a giant antenna. Amateur
hobbyists learned of the new technology, and soon thousands
were building crude transmitters and receivers, filling the
air with crackling dots and dashes. Hams, as the amateurs
called themselves, networked across the country and
organized the American Radio Relay League in 1915. To
demonstrate both the utility of the new medium and its far-
flung membership, the League passed a wireless message from
coast to coast.
^
As the various factions jockeyed for advantage, the
need to regulate the new medium soon became apparent. Too
much was at stake to allow the ether to degenerate into an
unintelligible jumble of competing messages. The Wireless
Ship Act of 1910 required larger sea-going passenger
^ Christopher H. Sterling and John M. Kitross, Stay
Tuned: A Concise Hietory of American Broadcasting (2nd ed.
;
Belmont , Cal ifornia : Wentworth, 1978
, 1990) , 18-47 . Amateur
radio operators apparently began calling themselves "hams"
in the earliest days of the medium. The Oxford English
Dictionary credits the coinage to American slang and cites
a 1919 reference to a ham as "a student telegraph
operator." H.L. Mencken noted in The American Language:
Supplement II (194 8) that "ham" was in common usage in the
United States in the early twentieth century to denote "any
inept or amateurish workman or other person" in a variety
of fields. While the word quickly lost its negative
connotation among radio operators, it would be logical to
assume that early wireless telegraphers encountering
interference from eager amateurs dismissed the interlopers
as "inept or amateurish." While "ham" and "amateur" have an
obvious homophonic connection, the slang meaning of the
term seems to stem from what was perhaps its earliest
usage: "ham actors." Mencken traced the derivation to the
fact that amateur stage performers used ham fat to remove
their make-up while more polished professionals used cold
cream.
36
vessels to carry wireless equipment and trained operators.
Because the Secretary of Commerce and Labor administered
the nation's maritime laws, he was also charged with
enforcing the new wireless regulations. In 1912, an
international convention in London produced a treaty
dividing the electromagnetic spectrum to regularize the use
of wireless frequencies. Congress enacted the first omnibus
domestic broadcasting law, the Radio Act of 1912, to comply
with United States treaty obligations and at the same time
directed the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to license all
wireless stations and operators. In 1913, when Congress
created a separate Department of Labor, control of wireless
remained with the Secretary of Commerce,
With the First World War, private use of the ether was
temporarily suspended. On April 7, 1917, one day after the
United States officially entered the conflict, President
Wilson invoked a section of the 1912 Radio Act which
allowed the government to commandeer wireless stations in
time of war. All stations not already operated by the
government were placed under the control of the US Navy.
Radio waves could cut through the fog of battle, and the
military had great hopes for the new technology. The navy
ordered manufacturers to pool patents and standardize parts
so a steady stream of radio sets could be sent to the
Federal Communications Commission, "Information
Bulletin: Evolution of Wire and Radio Communication,"
(Washington: Federal Communications Commission, 1988), 4
10.
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front. Hundreds of hams enlisted to operate the machinery.
Equipment improved rapidly as government contracts
stimulated research and development
.
The military remained concerned that enemies could
listen in on wireless messages but trusted that new
inventions could eliminate that unfortunate aspect of the
technology. In his 1918 report to Congress, Josephus
Daniels, Wilson's Secretary of the Navy, endorsed the
performance of the mil itary- industrial cartel. "The Navy
occupies a strong position in the commercial radio field on
account of efficient service rendered," he wrote, "and I
think presages the way for making this service entirely
governmental . "^^
At war's end, as Daniels suggested, the government
sought legislation to create a state radio monopoly. The
President would be authorized to "requisition, and take
permanent possession of , for the use of the Government
,
every radio station . . .now in existence." The proposal also
effectively foreclosed future exploitation of the ether by
the private sector. New, privately-owned stations would be
allowed on the air, but only if their signals did not cross
state lines or interfere with government transmitters or
receivers. Given the technology of the times, the exception
was rightly considered an extremely small loophole. The
11 Douglas, Inventing- American Broadcasting-, 288.
12 Quoted in Douglas, Inventing American Broadcaeting,
279 .
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Secretary of the Navy would be in charge of the new
system.
The government's bid for a monopoly was immediately
caught in a crossfire of criticism from an unlikely
alliance of anti monopolists, foes of expanding government
power, irate amateurs and businesses with a stake in the
promising new industry. Their motives differed, but they
all mobilized the language of political freedom to defend
both individual liberty and private profit. Republican
Congressman William Greene of Massachusetts warned the
navy's plan would establish a "Government monopoly,
contrary to any control that we had hoped for years to
establish under the Sherman antitrust law." If the navy's
plan became law, Greene predicted, wireless would become
"an immense trust, and it also becomes, according to my
view of it, the establishment of the Department of the Navy
in the commercial business. "^^
Amateurs protested that the ban on interstate wireless
transmissions would stifle the hams' right of free speech.
Entrepreneurs dreaming of becoming the next Edison and
corporate leaders with their eyes on the bottom line also
1^ H.R. 13159, 65th Cong., 3rd Sess., sees. 2-4 (1918)
1^ Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, A Bill to Further Regulate Radio Communication,
hearings on H.R. 13159, 65th Cong., 3rd Sess., December 12,
1918, 11. The Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries
had jurisdiction over radio legislation because the federal
government had first become involved with wireless because
of maritime safety issues.
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sounded a democratic theme. The general manager of Unit^
Fruit's radio operation feared the nation had fought "a
great war to make the world safe for democracy" only to
make the United States "unsafe for business." The navy's
plan to create a government radio system, he said, was
truly "un-American.
"
It is following the principle of autocracy rather
than of democracy .... I maintain that peace should
bring certainty to every form of legitimate
enterprise as a practical application of our
right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness rather than uncertainty under
Government ownership
.
Not surprisingly, with rhetoric emblematic of the times,
capitalism and democracy were assumed by all to be
synonymous
.
The legislation quickly sank, but Daniels' dream of a
unified radio industry responsive to government interests
survived. So too did the industry's desire for stability
and orderly growth . Overt monopoly, either publ ic or
private, appeared a political impossibility, but the
wartime alliance between the private sector and the state
provided a proven model for managed competition in the
national interest. The result was the Radio Corporation of
America
.
George Davis, testimony, hearings on H.R. 13159,
December 19, 1918, 314.
1^ Quoted in Sydney W. Head, Broadcasting in America
(2nded.; Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956, 1972), 139. The
standard contemporary account of the creation of RCA is
Gleason L. Archer, History of Radio to 1926 (New York:
American Historical Society, 1938; reprint, Arno, 1971).
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RCA, the child of the government and General Electric,
would become in 1926 the parent of the National
Broadcacting Company, the moct popular and financially
GuccesGful provider of radio programming during the
medium'G "golden age". RCA waG alGo a model example of how
corporate cooperation aided and abetted by active
governmental support could lead to domination of a new
indue try.
In 1919, Admiral W.H.G. Bullard, the navy'G director
of communicationG, returned from the VerGaillec peace talkc
to meet with General Electric officials in New York. The
admiral "appeal [ed] to [GE] on patriotic groundc not to
grant rights under itc patentG or Gell itG apparatus to the
Marconi Companies or any other foreign interests." GE *
s
powerful transmitters, Bullard said, were the best in the
world and were the company to " sel 1 these devices to the
Marconi interests, in this critical period of the history
of wireless, the result would be to fix in British hands a
substantial monopoly of world communication." He urged GE
"not to sacrifice or impair the possibil ity of establ ishing
an American Radio Company powerful enough to meet the
competition of other radio interests of the world, but, on
the contrary^ to form or cooperate in forming such a
company . "^"^ '
General Electric Company, "History of Radio
Corporation and its Relation to the Art of Radio
Communication and to the Requirements of Public
Communication," April 25, 1921, box 64, Wallace H. White,
AT&T, Westinghouse and United Fruit eagerly joined GE
in financing the new Radio Corporation. The navy had
insisted that the new corporation be a domestic one, so
American Marconi found itself on the outside looking in.
"There exists on the part of officials of the Government,"
the Marconi board informed its shareholders, "a very strong
and irremovable objection to [American Marconi] because of
the stock interest held therein by the British company. "18
By the end of 1919, its business crippled by the government
boycott
,
American Marconi surrendered.
The new partners quickly entered into a series of
mutually beneficial cross - 1 icensing
,
manufacturing and
sales agreements exploiting their own patents as well as
the inventions RCA had inherited from Marconi. The
all iance was an immediate success . Surveying the radio
business in 192 3 , the Federal Trade Commission reported
that RCA was "the most important factor in that industry"
because of the cross - 1 icensing agreements and "the dominant
factor in the communication field" because the company
served as the government's surrogate in international
communications, forging alliances with foreign governments
Jr. Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, DC, 3. Emphasis in the original.
19 Quoted in Head, Broadcasting in America, 140.
15 For a detailed summary of the origins of RCA, see
Federal Trade Commission, Report of the Federal Trade
CommieGion on the Radio Industry in Response to House
Resolution 548, Sixty-Seventh Congress, Fourth Session
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924), 9-38.
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and their state-owned wireless monopol ies . 20
instance, RCA parlayed as an equal with British
France's state
-operated CGT and Telefunken of Germany and
created an international consortium controlling all
wireless communications to and from South America. 21
Continuing to conflate public interest and private profit,
General Electric later defended itself from monopoly
charges by stating that its involvement with RCA "was urged
upon [it] by the Navy Department . "22
The wireless industry in the United States, then,
entered the 192 0s with the government and the industry's
giants in agreement. The major corporate players had worked
20 Federal Trade Commission, Report for Fiscal Year
1924 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1924) , 20.
The report itself is cited in note 19 Gupra.
21 Owen D. Young, as told to Mary Margaret McBride,
"Freedom of the Air," Saturday Evening- Post, November 16,
1929, 194.
22 General Electric, "History of Radio Corporation,"
9. RCA's founders would later claim the blessing of
President Wilson himself for their project. RCA chairman
Owen Young contended in a 1929 "as-told-to" Saturday
Evening- Post article (November 16, 1929, 16) that Bullard
made his appeal at Wilson's behest. Admiral Cary T.
Grayson, Wilson's personal physician who accompanied the
president to the peace talks, testified before the Senate
Committee on Interstate Commerce (December 17, 1929) that
Wilson asked one day at breakfast to be reminded "'...to
get in touch with. . .Bullard. I have an important message
that I want to send to Mr. Owen D. Young relative to the
protection of American rights and possibilities in radio
communication.'" Senator Burton Wheeler, an RCA critic,
contended the corporation's leaders were "patent
racketeers" and their assertion that Wilson's concern with
international postwar communications excused a decade of
monopolistic domestic practices was "the cheapest kind of
advertising bunk." See "Formation of R.C.A. Ascribed to
Wilson," New York Times, December 18, 1929, 14.
1921, for
Marconi
,
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together under the leadership of government during the war
and had been able to reconstitute that wartime alliance,
again with the help of government, when peace came. This
corporate
-governmental detente had stirred no divisive
public debate or significant congressional outrage because
international communications and the sale of powerful radio
transmitters hardly touched the everyday lives of
Americans. The moguls of the industry had, however, not
anticipated that their conception of radio would have to
change as the medium rapidly evolved. As Owen D. Young, the
GE vice president who became board chairman of RCA, later
admitted, "we had no broadcasting in our minds in 1919 and
1920. . . .It was an amazing thing, which we had not
contemplated at all . "^^
Young exaggerated only slightly. There were a few who
understood the potential of the wireless as a mass medium.
While Herrold, Fessenden, de Forest and the others were
conducting their experiments, David Sarnoff was working for
American Marconi as assistant traffic manager. Unlike the
others, he believed his future was in the corporate world,
and his rapid climb to the top of RCA soon proved him
2^ Testimony in Congress, Senate, Committee on
Interstate Commerce, A Bill to Provide for the Regrulation
of the Transmission of Intelligence by Wire or Wireless,
hearings on S . 6, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., December 9, 1929,
1115-6. If Young seems in retrospect to have overlooked the
obvious, it should be remembered that new technologies
often take unexpected courses. Many of the best and
brightest in Hollywood were equally stunned a half-century
later when they discovered that consumers preferred to rent
rather than buy video cassette recordings.
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correct. Sarnoff had joined Marconi as an office boy,
taught himself Morse code and subsequently won notoriety as
the operator who received the distress calls from the
sinking Titanic in 1912. It was a story the ambitious
Sarnoff made certain became widely known.
In 1916, well aware that voices and music as well as
corporate and governmental communiques were being heard in
the ether, Sarnoff wrote a memo outlining a possible
alternative to point-to-point communications:
I have in mind a plan of development which would
make radio a "household utility" in the same
sense as the piano or phonograph. The idea is to
bring music into the house by wireless. . . .The
receiver can be designed in the form of a simple
"Radio Music Box" and arranged for several
different wavelengths
.
American Marconi would of course manufacture the receivers.
The new product, he modestly suggested, "could yield a
handsome profit. "^^
Sarnoff 's American I-Iarconi superiors ignored his
proposal. Private point-to-point communication by wireless
fit the profitable model of existing telegraph and
telephone technology, and commercial demand for the new
service was already evident. Broadcasting was technically
feasible, of course, but they doubted there was any real
potential in the idea. The point-to-point market remained.
24 Quoted in Head, Broadcasting in America, 132. When
the Federal Communications Commission launched its probe of
network broadcasting monopolies in 1938, Sarnoff, by then
the chief executive of RCA, introduced the "music box memo"
into evidence, no doubt to solidify his stature as a
founding father of broadcasting.
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they felt, the most lucrative and safest course for the
industry. Indeed the RCA partners were so single-minded,
they initially made no provision for dividing profits from
broadcast ing
,
After the wartime freeze on private wireless was
lifted, as the government and the corporations sought to
stabilize the industry, hundreds of hams lined up for
permission to go back on the air. Many were content to
communicate by Morse key, but a growing number explored
voice transmission. These protobroadcasters transmitted
their messages to no one in particular, but spoke hopefully
into the ether for any and all to hear. Some began to
attract small but faithful audiences.
One was Frank Conrad, an engineer at the Westinghouse
factory in Pittsburgh who had been experimenting with radio
since 1912. Conrad received his amateur wireless license in
1916. When the wartime ban ended, he obtained a new license
and resumed tinkering with his transmitter. His earliest
broadcasts were descriptions of the equipment he was using
and appeals for responses from anyone who might be
listening. Tiring of this routine, he one night placed his
microphone in front of a phonograph and played records. His
invisible audience demanded more and, by the late fall of
1919, Conrad was broadcasting concerts every Wednesday and
Saturday evening. Fast running out of records, Conrad
struck a deal with his neighborhood music store. The
merchant would supply him with the latest recordings if
46
Conrad would mention they were on Bale at the store. The
merchant soon noticed new customers were visiting his store
and asking to buy records that Conrad had played on the
air
.
By September 192 0, growing interest in Conrad's
broadcasts led a Pittsburgh department store to place a
newspaper advertisement for handmade wireless receivers,
"on sale here $10.00 up," which would allow the curious to
tune in for themselves. Harry Davis, a Westinghouse vice
president who had been following Conrad's experiments, saw
a chance to cash in on what seemed to be a growing fad. The
company had a warehouse full of war surplus receiving sets
and tubes. If more radio broadcasts were available, he
figured, more people would become interested in buying
receivers. Davis asked Conrad if he could set up a more
powerful station which would offer a nightly schedule of
broadcasts . ^5
Conrad and D.G. Little, another veteran amateur radio
enthusiast, oversaw construction of the station's makeshift
studio, a shack really, on the roof of the Westinghouse
factory in East Pittsburgh. At the end of October, the
Department of Commerce granted the company a license,
assigning the call letters KDKA from a roster maintained to
identify ships and shore stations. On November 2, 192 0, the
25 KDKA Radio, It Started Hear: The HiBtory of KDKA
and Radio Broadcasting (Pittsburgh: Westinghouse
Broadcasting Co., 1970), 2-8.
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night of the Harding-Cox election, six men crowded into the
shelter beside a microphone, a 100 watt transmitter, a
couple of telephones and a hand-cranked record player. A
wire antenna ran from the transmitter to a steel pole and
then to one of the plant's smokestacks. Arrangements had
been made with the Pitteburgh Poet to relay election
results from the newspaper city room to the studio, and
company publicist Leo H. Rosenberg stood by to read the
bulletins as they were received. The phonograph was placed
near the microphone to provide musical interludes. KDKA
signed on at six o'clock to begin a broadcast which made
that election day, social historian Frederick Lewis Allen
suggested a decade later, "a date which school children may
someday have to learn. "^^
The number of listeners remains unknown but likely did
not exceed 2,000. There were simply not that many radio
receivers out there. Because Davis understood the potential
of radio broadcasting, he knew that "a broadcasting station
is a rather useless enterprise unless there is someone to
listen to it." The industry would need a boost in order to
26 KDKA, It Started Hear, 2-10; Erik Barnouw, A
History of Broadcasting in the United States, vol. 1, A
Tower in Babel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1966)
,
64-74; Frederick Lewis Allen, Only Yesterday: An Informal
History of the IS20 's{J<Sew York: Harper & Row, 1931, 1964),
64. KDKA, in its fiftieth-anniversary station history,
identifies the original station personnel as Little,
Rosenberg, William Thomas, R.S. McClelland, John Frazier
and W.W. Rodger s . Conrad was not present. He was at his
house in nearby Wilkinsburg, ready to go on the air with
his amateur transmitter in case of a malfunction back at
the plant.
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get started. "We had a number of simple receiving outfits
manufactured," he recalled, "These we distributed among
friends and to several officers of the company" who were
instructed to invite their neighbors over to listen to the
broadcast. Another, larger group assembled in the main
ballroom of the Edgewood Club in the suburbs and listened
through a pair of Navy loudspeakers Westinghouse engineers
had scrounged from the factory's supplies.
Farther afield, KDKA's broadcast was picked out of the
air by hams throughout western Pennsylvania, Ohio, West
Virginia and beyond. In Irwin, Pennsylvania, a large crowd
gathered to hear the latest returns while being entertained
by an evening of silent films. The signal was even received
by a startled Marconi operator aboard a troop ship off the
Virginia coast. The captain, fearing a hoax, refused to
announce the resul ts to the crew.
The broadcast's impact was amplified by West inghouse '
s
formidable publicity and merchandising campaign and, in the
words of broadcasting historian Erik Barnouw, "set off a
national mania. "^8 The choice of election night for the
debut was inspired. What better way to demonstrate the
utility of radio, a medium still mysterious to most
27 Laurence Bergreen, Look Now, Pay Later: The Rise of
Network Broadcasting- (Garden City, New York: Doubleday,
1980), 25; KDKA, It Started Hear, 9-10; "Wireless Success
in Broadcasting Returns One of Election Features,"
Pittsburgh Post, November 5, 1920, 16.
28 Barnouw, A Tower in Babel, 10.
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Americans, than by communicating democracy in action? The
experiment was such a success, the Pitteburgh Poet
predicted "that four years hence the radio method of
sending news of the election at that time will be almost
universally used. "29
While KDKA's election night broadcast has become a
landmark, it was neither unique nor indeed unprecedented.
Wireless pathfinders, their names and experiments lost in
the ether, had surely radioed election results from point
to point before. In 1916, de Forest had broadcast election
returns over his experimental station in New York. In 1920,
some amateurs no doubt tuned in both KDKA and experimental
station 8MK which was announcing the election's outcome to
listeners in the Midwest. The station, a project of Detroit
News publisher and dedicated radio hobbyist William
Scripps, had also transmitted the results of the Michigan
primary in August.
But KDKA's broadcast was different, different
precisely because it was a broadcast, 8MK's election night
experiment was publicized in advance by the Detroit News,
and amateur wireless operators were asked to transmit
reception reports back to Detroit. As Barnouw has noted,
8MK's effort "was thus seen as a project shared by a
brotherhood of initiates." KDKA's broadcast was, on the
other hand, "something for everyone, a social delight for
29 "Wireless Success in Broacasting Returns One of
Election Features," 16.
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home or country club." Rather than speaking to "radio
operators" huddled over "receiving stations," KDKA
explicitly intended to make radio a mass medium, available
to all without "mysterious knowledge or ritual. "^o The
radio broadcasting boom was underway.
KDKA was soon joined on the air by other broadcasting
stations, and a small but rapidly growing number of
listeners eagerly sought out their signals. At first,
listeners were not concerned with the content of the
programs they heard. The fact that they could hear voices
speaking to them from across the land was reason enough to
listen. An event that took place within months of KDKA's
debut is instructive. In April of 1921, Hans von
Kaltenborn, the editorial writer for the Brooklyn Eagle,
was also a director of the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce.
Wouldn't it be exciting, he thought, if the Chamber could
stage a demonstration of this new invention, radio
broadcasting, as part of its annual banquet? A radio
receiver would be installed at the banquet hall, and
Kaltenborn would deliver a brief speech from the studios of
RCA's WJZ across the river in Jersey City. If the
experiment worked, Kaltenborn recalled, it would be "a
wonderful stunt ,
"
I went over to New Jersey, delivered a brief
address, then hurried back to Brooklyn to see
whether it had actually been received. As I came
into the banquet room there was tremendous
^0 Barnouw, A Tower in Babel, 7 0
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applause, and I was informed that the experimenthad been a perfect success - they had heard
every word. The miracle of radio had established
Itself with the Brooklyn Chamber of Commerce
.
Kaltenborn had discovered a means of spreading his views
that far surpassed the reach of the Eagle' b editorial page,
and he would soon become a familiar voice on the radio. The
implications of Kaltenborn 's "stunt" soon became apparent
to the business people who heard him that night. The
Chamber members could certainly imagine their corporate
messages magically flowing through the ether to every home
in the borough.
By July 1922, the government had licensed 382
broadcasting stations. By the end of the year, the total
had climbed to 56 9. The most powerful were sponsored by
corporations which, like RCA, Westinghouse and General
Electric, hoped to profit from the sale of radio receivers.
Others were backed by newspapers, department stores or
hotels seeking publicity, good will and ultimately new
business by providing entertainment, sports scores and news
bulletins to listeners. Schools, colleges, churches and
state and local governments began broadcasting their
messages, adding lectures, sermons and farm market reports
to the mix. ^2 Many early stations were operated by former
amateurs who, like Conrad, were delighted to find financial
31 Quoted in "The Early Days of Radio, " American
Heritage, August 19 55, 66-7.
32 Congress, House, Committee on Merchant Marine and
Fisheries, To Amend the Radio Act of 1912, hearings on HR
11964, 67th Cong, 1st Sess., January 2, 1923, 12.
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backing that allowed them to pursue their hobby on a full-
time basis. Other, less fortunate hams upgraded their
schedules independently and created dozens of under-
financed, part-time stations which helped fill the air with
sounds
.
As broadcasting stations multiplied, radio receivers
were soon on the way to becoming the "household utilities"
Sarnoff had foreseen in 1916. Harry Davis was proven right.
If broadcasts were in the ether, people would purchase
radios to hear them. In 1922, Commerce Secretary Hoover
estimated that "over 600,000 persons possess wireless
telephone receiving sets, whereas there were less than
fifty thousand such sets a year ago."^^ Hundreds of radio
shops sprang up around the country. In 1923, consumers
spent $136 million on radio sets and parts; in 1924, the
total rose to $358 million.^'* Only one in twenty American
homes included a radio in 1924, but the trend was clear,
"Here, " as Davis would say as he recounted the story of
KDKA to a rapt audience at the Harvard Business School in
1928, "was an idea of limitless opportunity."^^
Quoted in CM. Jansky, Jr., "The Contribution of
Herbert Hoover to Broadcasting, " iJournal of Broadcasting 1
(Summer 1957) , 242
.
Barnouw, A Tower in Babel, 94.
sterling and Kitross, Stay Tuned, 656. Radio
penetration in 1924 roughly equaled television penetration
in early 1950.
Quoted in Barnouw, A Tower in Babel, 68.
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The booming broadcasting industry presented a unique
challenge to the free market system. According to accepted
doctrine, the development of a new product would attract
entrepreneurs eager to profit from newly created consumer
demand, and the marketplace would decide which ones
survived. While this model might be valid on the equipment
side, the proliferation of broadcast stations could not be
controlled by the laws of supply and demand. Technology and
international treaty agreements limited the size of that
portion of the electromagnetic spectrum which could be
devoted to broadcasting. It was fast becoming apparent that
there was not room on the air to allow all who wished to
broadcast to be clearly heard. The growing number of
stations crowding the airwaves, especially around New York
and Chicago, soon threatened to throw the broadcast band
into unintelligible chaos. The broadcasting industry could
be destroyed by its own success.
Secretary Hoover, charged with regulating radio,
determined early on that the 1912 law "was a very weak
rudder to steer so powerful a development." Studying the
situation, he was impressed, he recalled, "with three
things: first, the immense importance of the spoken radio;
second, the urgency of placing the new channels of
communication under public control; and, third, the
difficulty of devising such control in a new art." A year
after taking office, "in our usual fashion of solving
problems wherever possible by cooperation rather than law,
"
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Hoover moved to bring order to the ether by calling
representatives of the industry to Washington for the first
of what would become a series of four national radio
conferences
.
^"^
Held annually by the Commerce Department between 1922
and 1925, the conferences reflected Hoover's associat ionist
ideals. Taken together, they demonstrate an attempt to
bring rationality and order to the new medium through the
combined, cooperative efforts of the best minds in public
and private agencies. The conferences faced a formidable
task, but Hoover remained confident that, given time, a
satisfactory course for the industry would emerge. "The
situation faced is so complicated," the New York Times
cautioned as the first convened, "that it may take a week
or more to formulate recommendations to Congress. "^^ That
prediction turned out to be far too optimistic.
Each conference managed to handle only a portion of
the problem as broadcasting became increasingly popular and
complex. Reports and studies were drafted each year and
forwarded to Hoover who relied on the recommendations as he
exercised the limited controls granted him under the law.
The conferences became larger and more inclusive each year.
Forty invited delegates attended the first. By 1925, more
37 Herbert Hoover, The Mewoire of Herbert Hoover: The
Cabinet and the Preeidency 1920-1933 (New York: Macmillan,
1952) , 139 -40
.
38 "Asks Radio Experts to Chart the Ether, " New York
Times, February 28, 1922, 16.
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than 1,000 took part. Equipment manufacturers and
government officials were well represented as were radio
researchers and members of amateur groups including the
American Radio Relay League eager to protect the hams'
concerns. Broadcasters, too, allied to present a common
front. The National Association of Broadcasters was formed
by twenty station operators in 1923 and avidly supported
Hoover's efforts to bring order to the ether.
Representatives of interest groups ranging from the
National Chamber of Commerce to the American Civil
Liberties Union were also on hand. They understood that the
new medium would be a powerful shaper of public opinion.
Consumers were represented by a growing number of local
radio listeners clubs which sprang up around the nation.
These groups frequently petitioned Congress and the
Commerce Department for action to el iminate interference
.
The conferences fit Hoover's prescription for finding
solutions to pressing problems through negotiations among
voluntary interest groups
.
39 See David Mackey, "The Development of the National
Association of Broadcasters," Journal of Broadcasting- 1
(1956), 305-25. The NAB was originally formed to oppose the
American Society of Composers and Publishers' demand that
broadcasters pay performance rights fees for music played
on the radio. The NAB and ASCAP would spar for years before
reaching a court - imposed armistice in 1941.
See Edward F. Sarno, Jr., "The National Radio
Conferences," Journal of Broadcasting 13 (Spring 1969),
189-202
.
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Hoover was insistent on one thing prior to the start
of the first conference: The airwaves must belong to the
public and be policed to the extent necessary by the
government. Drawing an analogy with progressive
conservation concerns, Hoover compared the airwaves with
navigable waterways, open to all but monitored by the
state. Government officials should serve as "ether cops" to
control radio traffic, he said, so freedom of the air could
be maintained. That freedom, he acknowledged, could not
be absolute because "even if we use all the ingenuity
possible I do not believe there are enough permutations to
allow unlimited numbers of sending stations."
It becomes of primary public interest to say who
is to do the broadcasting, under what
circumstances, and with what type of
material .... There is in all of this the necessity
to establish public right over the ether
roads. . . .There must be no national regret that we
have parted with a great national asset.
Hoover bel ieved private ownership of radio channels would
create "a monopoly of enormous financial value" which he
compared "to private ownership of a water navigation
channel" and found equally inappropriate. Each of the
conferences in turn endorsed the concept of public
ownership and private use of the airwaves. In keeping with
the "cooperative spirit" that marked his philosophy.
41 "Hoover to Advise on Radio Control," New York
Times, February 10, 1922, 9.
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however, Hoover made no attempt to replace existing license
holders who were serving the public interest. ^2
By the time the first conference convened, the RCA
patent allies had established themselves as broadcasters.
ATScT proved especially protective of its patent rights,
raising fears that a monopoly might take control of the
ether. "It would be most unfortunate for the people of this
country," Hoover told the first conference, if broadcasting
"should come into the hands of any single corporation,
individual, or combination. ... whether this control arose
under a patent monopoly or under any form of
combination. ""^^ As was the case with the question of
private ownership of radio frequencies, however. Hoover
hoped a consensus could be reached. The allies, not as
patient, moved in 1922 to crack down on smaller
manufacturing and broadcasting companies who, they claimed,
were infringing on their patents. Raising high the banner
of "freedom of the air," the independents called on
Congress for protection.'^'*
They found enough support to force a House resolution
directing the Federal Trade Commission to investigate the
industry. In response to the resolution, the FTC issued a
Hoover, MewoirG, 14 0-1.
Hoover, Memoirs, 14 3
.
44 Erik Barnouw, Tube of Plenty: The Evolution of
American Television (New York: Oxford University Press,
1977) , 39-40.
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detailed report in December of 1923, followed a month later
by a formal complaint charging RCA, GE, AT£cT and the other
allies "combined and conspired for the purpose
of .restraining competition and creating a monopoly in the
manufacture, purchase, and sale... of radio devices ... and
in. . .broadcasting. "^^
A key ingredient of the cross-licensing pacts created
by the RCA allies gave AT&T the leading role in commercial
broadcasting and Western Electric, its manufacturing
subsidiary, the right to build transmitters. The telephone
company broadly interpreted commercial broadcasting,
assuming virtually every station which took to the air
ultimately had financial gain in mind. AT&T established a
chain of stations throughout the East and claimed in its
patent infringement suits that other stations were unfairly
us ing patented technology for commercial purposes . If
AT&T's suits were won, the New York World warned, a
broadcast monopoly with a unified programming policy would
control the air "and the whole national audience of radio
listeners, which now numbers at least twenty million, will
hear only what this policy dictates that it shall hear.""*^
The nation's industries had become increasingly
centralized over the past half century. The result, the
"Monopoly in Radio by Eight Concerns Charged in
Action," New York Tiwee, January 28, 1924, 1.
Theodore Edwards, "The Radio Monopoly that Menaces
the Freedom of the Air," New York World, March 16, 1924,
editorial section, 1
.
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H.B. Thayer quoir-.I in "Radio Corporation 0]>*-nn itn
Reoordfj," Nf^w York Tuut^a, drtnunry 20, \'}?A, \u .
4U M.pi,^ P/idio Trnnt , " editorial, Nr-w York Timeo,
January ^ o , i *> .I'i , i h ,
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permitted to monopolize or control the means of public
communication." When it was suggested that "perhaps the
simple moral philosophy underlying legislation and
government had finally proved inadequate to the burdens
imposed upon it by a complex and intricate mechanical
civilization," Hoover responded, "I don't think so. I
believe this problem, difficult as it undoubtedly is, can
be solved on the time -honored principles of common
justice. "^^ Hoover's dogmatic faith in cooperative,
scientific American individualism remained unshaken. As he
had confidently written at the start of the decade, "we
have erected organisms that each generation has denounced
as Frankensteins
,
yet the succeeding generation proves them
to be controllable .... Our basic social ideas march through
the new things in the end."^^
But what were those "basic social ideas" Hoover
invoked? Did the emergence of RCA represent a necessary
rationalization of competition which would lead to new
technological breakthroughs and the orderly development of
the medium? Or did it represent a pernicious monopoly which
would stunt the industry by denying freedom of the air to
Herbert Hoover, interview, New York World, March
16, 1924, editorial section, 1. While the World*
s
interviewer received no byline, the wording of the question
indicates it may well have been Walter Lippmann who had
become the World's editorial page editor in 1923. The
question certainly echoes a major theme in Lippmann 's
writings during the period.
Hoover, American Individualiew , 46-7.
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those not admitted to the corporate alliance? All agreed
radio must be operated in the public interest, but how was
that interest to be defined? The question had been framed,
but the answer was unclear.
As the nation debated how best to regulate the new
medium, radio broadcasters themselves constructed its
content. They groped their way toward a successful formula,
drawing on pre-existing media for models. Yet they soon
discovered that model ing-by -analogy had its limits. Visual
images which worked on stage and film to reinforce the
spoken word were, of course, impossible to duplicate on the
air. On the other hand, radio enjoyed advantages of sound
which neither print nor film could enjoy. Most importantly,
the medium's immediacy, its ability to communicate to a
vast audience an event as it happened, was new and
completely different. Broadcasters had to learn how to
transcend the limits and take advantage of the unique
virtues of their new medium.
The content of the earliest radio broadcasts was not
the result of any master plan. Programming was determined
largely by trial and error and frequently dictated by
expediency. Broadcasters soon discovered how difficult it
was to fill hour after hour of air time with fresh
material. Many early radio stations operated for only a few
hours a day, and the main prerequisite for going on the air
was often the willingness to perform on demand.
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While programming evolved over the years, the goal of
broadcasters, then and now, remained the same: They sought
to attract an audience. At first, for the experimenters,
simply reaching anyone at all to prove that it could be
done was sufficient reason to take to the air. Soon,
however, broadcasters set their sights on different goals.
As broadcasters realized how much it cost to operate radio
stations, they came to understand that audiences once
assembled could be exploited.
Radio's product is its audience. Broadcasters speak of
selling time, but what they are actually selling is access
to the audience which they have attracted. If private
enterprises were expected to operate radio stations,
private sources of funding would have to be developed.
Advertising became the industry's lifeblood but remained a
sensitive topic throughout the 1920s. Hoover told the first
radio conference "it is inconceivable that we should allow
so great a possibility for service to be drowned in
advertising chatter. "^^ Direct advertising — unabashed
sales pitches for consumer products and services — arrived
gradually and always amid considerable hue and cry.
Indirect advertising — promotion, publicity, good will
aimed at moving goods more discreetly — was there from the
beginning
,
51 Hoover, Memoirs , 14 0.
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RCA and its allies operated their stations to promote
the new industry. The costs could be written off as
promotional and advertising expenses. As broadcast
schedules expanded and costs rose, however, station
operators began casting about for new revenue. Here, an
analogy with established media offered a solution.
Telephone and telegraph companies had long charged others
for the use of their systems. Why not extend the practice
to radio? AT&T inaugurated "toll broadcasting" in 1922,
selling fifteen minutes of air time on WEIAF, its New York
station, to a real estate developer who extolled the
virtues of life in bucolic Queens. Gradually, other
advertisers followed suit
. Advertising agencies purchased
blocks of time and created programs that both reflected
their clients' chosen images and attracted audiences.
Agencies and trade journals realized radio was a powerful
medium for communication, capable of bringing personal
messages into every consumer' s home but constantly warned
clients that the medium had to be carefully used. Vulgar
programming and intrusive hucksterism could offend
listeners and discourage sales.
Advertising might be vulgar, but what was the
alternative? "The largest unsolved question in this entire
problem," Hoover said in 1924, "is the problem of
remuneration for broadcasting stations."
52 Roland Marchand, Advertieing the An^erican Dream
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 89-94.
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The man who evolves a practical and fair way of
compensating them will have cracked the hardest
nut in the bowl. The British Government meets
this by licensing receiving instruments, and
imposing a tax out of which broadcasting stations
are remunerated. We cannot do that. It would make
the Government responsible for the programs,
which would lead to an impossible situation'.
Despite the presence on the air of numerous stations
licensed to government agencies, usually state land grant
colleges, government broadcasting was widely seen as
inimical to "freedom of the air." With government funding
equated with government control, advertising gradually came
to be seen as a necessary evil. The debate concerned what
form radio advertising would take and what regulatory role
if any the government would play. As media critic Gilbert
Seldes explained, "the plat itudinists and the propagandists
may make the air unclean; they are, however, the price
which has to be paid for freedom of the air. "^"^
As broadcasters experimented with programming in the
192 0s, they found that among the things their new medium
did exceedingly well was deliver the news. The immediacy of
radio and the timeliness of news seemed a perfect fit. And
as broadcasters sought to create popular programming, news
was an area they sought to exploit. As they tried to define
their new medium, they also tried to define news and figure
out how to bring news to the people without offending
government regulators who controlled access to the ether.
53 Hoover, World interview, 1.
54 Gilbert Seldes, "Listening In," The New Republic,
March 23, 1927, 140-41.
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Defining radio news is a more complex task than might
be assumed. Historian David Paul Nord suggested news is
"the reporting of current public occurrences." While the
definition remained constant, he cautioned, "the meaning of
each of the key terms — occurrence, public, current, and
reporting- — is contingent on the social contexts of the
time and place. "^^ gy including both "reporting" and
"occurrences" in his definition, Nord reminds us that when
we discuss the news, we are discussing both events
themselves and the sharing of information about events.
Radio broadcasters from the beginning shared information
about public occurrences with their listeners. The medium,
however, did more than that. For the first time, thanks to
radio, the audience could share in the event itself as it
occured. For our purposes, a broad definition of news
borrowed from communications historian Mitchell Stephens is
perhaps the most useful: "new information about a subject
of some public interest that is shared with some portion of
the publ ic .
"
55 David Paul Nord, "Teleology and News: The Religious
Roots of American Journalism, 1630-1730," Journal of
American History 77 (June 1990), 7. Emphasis in the
original . Nord argued that modern day news reports often
echo colonial era sermons and pamphlets reflecting the
predictable teleological patterns of God's revealed plan.
Both, he suggested, include news of horrors and disasters
which fit archetypal patterns. Today, however, in a
pluralistic society lacking a shared world view, "no one
knows what the stories mean."
56 Mitchell Stephens, A History of News: From the Drum
to the Satellite (New York: Penguin, 1988, 1989), 9.
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Technology, commercial imperativec and explicit and
implicit policiec of both the inductry and the government
all helped chape radio newc, ac did the cultural and cocial
milieuG from which the firet broadcacterc emerged. Many
came to the new medium from newcpaperc and arrived with the
print medium's profeccional baggage in hand. Otherc came
from public relatione or the performing arte or simply
walked in off the street and developed their journalistic
techniques and standards as they went along. They all found
themselves in the business of transmitting information to
the public and they could accomplish that in different
ways. A practical definition of radio news gradually
emerged.
One method was familiar, rooted in the origins of
speech. An event could be observed and later described to
the audience. Newspapers had been doing this for
generations, because it aped the way all individuals
communicate with one another. Or, and this was the unique
virtue of radio, the event could be transmitted directly to
the audience as it happened, without obvious mediation.
Each method was intended to transmit news, information of
interest to the publ ic
.
Early broadcasters soon began including news
headlines, weather reports, commodity market prices and
baseball scores in their programs. The first scheduled
newscasts — scripted summaries of the day's events —
probably were heard over WWJ in Detroit, the station that
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began as 8MK, but the practice spread quickly across the
country. 57 gy 1922, KYW, the Westinghouse station in
Chicago, was airing frequent newscasts. In January, the
station began broadcasting news summaries from the offices
of Hearst's Chicago Eveningr American. By the end of the
year, KYW launched its ambitious "World Crier" round-the-
clock coverage. Station staffers wrote and announced news
bulletins on the hour and half -hour, twenty- four hours a
day, based on material provided by the Chicago Evening-
Standard. 58 Listeners soon discovered they did not have to
wait for the local newspaper to be delivered to learn the
latest news.
While newscasts created interest, live broadcasts of
events as they happened created a sensation. Using
telephone lines to link microphones in the field to their
transmitters, radio stations brought all kinds of
information to their listeners. KDKA broadcast a service
from the Calvary Episcopal Church in Pittsburgh on January
2, 1921 in what is generally believed to be the first
remote broadcast. Two Westinghouse engineers, wearing
surplices to avoid attention, set up their equipment and
57 Irving E. Fang, Those Radio Commentatore ! (Ames,
Iowa: Iowa State University Press, 1977), 5.
58 Joseph E. Baudino, "The Story of KYW, " speech to
Delaware Valley Chapter of the Broadcast Pioneers,
Whitemarsh, Pennsylvania, September, 24, 1975, KTW station
folder, Broadcast Pioneers Library, Washington, DC. KYW is
one of the most traveled of all broadcast call signs, first
assigned to Chicago and then Philadelphia before being
transferred to Cleveland and finally back to Philadelphia.
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relayed the services back to the studio. The rector noted
that one engineer was Jewish and the other Roman Catholic,
a symbol, he said, of "the real universality of radio
religion, "^^
In April, KDKA broadcast a prize fight and, later that
summer, a Pittsburgh Pirates baseball game from Forbes
Field. ^0 Warren Harding's speech dedicating a Baltimore
monument to Francis Scott Key was broadcast in 1922,
Woodrow Wilson made his final appeal for the League of
Nations by radio on Armistice Day eve, 1923. Three months
later, Wilson's funeral was carried on stations in
Washington, New York and Providence. ATkT had discovered
that its network of telephone 1 ines could transmit a
program to radio stat ions in several cities
,
allowing
scattered listeners to be united into an audience far
larger than any single station could command.
Broadcasters also invited speakers into their studios.
The medium opened its microphones to the folksy and the
erudite, the amusing and the inspirational, speakers who
KDKA, It Started Hear, 12.
^0 charnley. News by Radio, 5. Broadcasts of sporting
events, especially the World Series and Jack Dempsey's
heavyweight title fights, were seen as means to induce men
to purchase radios and were heavily promoted. The same
pattern would be followed during the television boom
following the Second World War. See Benjamin Rader, In Its
Own Image: How Television has Transformed Sports (New York:
Free Press, 1984)
.
^1 Edward Bliss, Jr., Now The News: The Story of
Broadcast Journalism (New York: Columbia University Press,
1991) , 17
,
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could fill the ether with practical advice or learned
explanation. Listeners sweeping the airwaves came across
pastors and politicos, professors and polemicists in
profusion. Often, to the delight of both the speakers and
the broadcasters, they stopped to listen. These studio
speeches, which broadcasters simply called talks, covered
every conceivable topic and have too often been ignored
when we look back at broadcast news. They were, however, a
radio staple and a leading source of information.
The public took to news broadcasts of all sorts in
astounding numbers and with astounding speed. The
technology of radio, however, blurred the distinction among
different types of information programming . While
information in a newspaper or magazine clearly passed
through many hands before reaching its audience, radio gave
the public the illusion of direct communication with
reality. A newspaper, historian William Stott noted, offers
a "report of experience, not the experience. Radio provides
experience .... Direct
,
on-the-spot coverage, impossible in a
newspaper, is in a sense perpetual on radio. "^^ No longer
did the public have to wait to read all about it. A
newspaper could offer its readers a digest of an event only
after it had been filtered through the cumbersome machinery
of print. With radio, people could actually listen to the
6- William Stott, Documentary Experience and ThirtieG
America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973, 1986),
82,
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event as it happened and interpret every nuance, every
inflection for themselves.
Furthermore, the role of the announcer was far
different than that of the v/riter. The printed word -
cool, logical, linear - provided distance. The voice of
the announcer - human, emotional, seemingly spontaneous
even when carefully rehearsed - served as a direct link
between the audience and the event. Hearing an event
described was different than reading about it. When an
announcer described an event that was occurring before his
eyes, the listener's experience was immediate, intimate and
real
.
Heywood Broun, one of the most influential newspaper
columnists of the 1920s, described what it was like to
listen to the World Series on the radio:
[Announcer Graham] McNamee individualized and
particularized every emot ion . He made me feel the
temperature and the tension. The wind hit him and
deflected off to me . . . .No mere ticker report
could be in any way comparable, because McNamee
allowed you to follow the ball on the wing. The
instant it left the pitcher's hand, the radio
audience knew it was speeding on its way. The
sound of the bat against the ball, the cry of the
crowd, the swift dash after the fly — all that
came to consciousness
.
Heywood Broun, forward to You*re On the Air by
Graham McNamee with Robert Gordon Anderson (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1926), vi . Prior to radio. Western Union
provided pitch-by-pitch coverage by telegraph ticker, and
sports fans gathered in public places to follow the games.
See Eight Men Out (1988), John Sayles, dir., for an
especially evocative portrayal.
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Tne announcer was more than a reporter, more than an
observer. He became the listener's surrogate, a direct link
to the event, indeed an inseparable part of the event
itself. Listener and announcer conspired to create a shared
version of reality.
Radio, Marshall McLuhan suggested, extends our senses
over vast distances, "contracts the world to village size,
and creates insatiable village tastes for gossip, rumor,
and personal malice. "^^ Yet it could also become, as
President Hoover among many others hoped, "a new means of
widespread communication of intelligence that has the most
profound importance from the point of view of public
education and public welfare. These two opinions are not
necessarily contradictory. Radio allowed its audience to
hear the words of pres idents , descr ipt ions of boxing
matches and discussions of cooking, child-rearing and new
technologies . Each disparate broadcast provided new
information. Through their radios, listeners learned of and
shared a new and wider world.
Thanks in large part to the efforts of the radio
conferences and hard-pressed Commerce Department staffers,
a degree of order survived in broadcasting despite the
tumult. Still, the airwaves grew increasingly cluttered
^4 Marshall McLuhan, Understanding Media: The
Exteneions of Man (New York: McGraw-Hall, 1964, 1965), 305.
Hoover, Memoirs , 14 0
.
Hoover, the Commerce Department, broadcasters and
the radio conferences did undertake significant reforms
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and, for listeners, finding a clear signal often required a
great deal of patience and some technical expertise. As
sociologists Robert and Helen Lynd discovered when they
assessed the impact of the new medium on Muncie, Indiana in
1924, "far from being simply one more means of passive
enjoyment, the radio has given rise to much ingenious
manipulative activity. "^7 The radio boom, many observers
believed, heralded a popular awakening of interest in
science and engineering among the youth of America. "Tuning
in on a distant station," suggested one commentator in
defense of the hobby, "is a good deal like hunting for an
unknown scientific fact." Youngsters who devoted hours to
solving the problems of radio would find they had developed
"exactly the mental habits most in demand in the larger
field of general research."^® Listeners dubbed "DXers" or
"distance hounds" fiddled with their receivers in hopes of
between 1922 and 192 5 including periodic shifting and
prior it iz ing of usable frequencies within the broadcast
band, establ ishing geographic and frequency spacing among
exist ing stat ions and set t ing power 1 imi tat ions . Technology
also helped keep the situation somewhat under control.
Improved transmitters kept stations closer to their
assigned frequencies and power while superhetrodyne tubed
receivers, far more discriminating than previously common
crystal sets, enabled listeners to better sort out
competing signals
.
^'^ Robert S. Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd, Middletown:
A Study in American Culture (New York: Harcourt, Brace and
World, 1929, 1956) , 269.
^8 Dr. Willis R. Whitney, quoted in "Radio a Training-
School for Science," Literary Digest , March 15, 1924, 22.
Douglas discusses the "populist technology" of early radio
at length in Inventing American Broadcasting, 187-215.
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pulling in signals carrying information and entertainment
from across the country. The radio audience was not
passive. Listeners were active participants in the new
medium.
The 1912 law remained, however, "a weak rudder" that
continued to function only because of nearly universal
consent to Hoover's administration. During the conference
years, several attempts were made to amend or replace the
law to strengthen government regulation. As Hoover noted,
these reforms were doomed by "the very success of the
voluntary system we had created. Members of Congressional
committees kept saying, 'It is working well, so why
bother? '"^^ There was a time bomb hidden in the lav/,
however, and it dealt with the licensing power of the
Secretary of Commerce.
While the law required every wireless operator to
obtain a license, it was unclear whether the Secretary of
Commerce could use his discretion in awarding permits or
whether any applicant who met the rudimentary standards of
the law, written before the broadcast era began, had to be
issued a license. If it was, as Hoover said, a "primary
public interest to say who is to do the broadcasting, under
what circumstances, and with what type of material," a
measure of discretion was mandatory. Hoover, however,
doubted he had the authority under the law to deny any
Hoover, Memoirs, 142
.
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legitimate application. Republican Representative Wallace
H. White, Jr. of Maine, a delegate to the first radio
conference, agreed and in 1923 filed legislation that would
bring the law up to date and make it clear "that it is not
mandatory on the Secretary to issue a license, but is in
his discretion to issue licenses only when the public
service will be benefited thereby. ""^^
One month after the first hearings were held on
White's bill, the courts moved to limit Hoover's authority.
The case involved a New York company which sent point-to-
point messages for commercial customers . Because the
messages caused interference with several New York area
broadcasters, Hoover denied a new license. The company
sued, and the federal Court of Appeals ordered Hoover to
issue the renewal. Congress, the court ruled after
reviewing the legislative history of radio regulation,
" intended fully to regulate the business of radio
telegraphy, without leaving it to the discretion of an
executive." Some level of interference is inevitable on the
airwaves, the court noted, "hence the [1912] act undertakes
to prescribe regulations by which interference may be
minimized rather than prevented." Therefore, interference
alone was not sufficient grounds for disapproval. Hoover,
the court said, must issue a license. "The only
discretionary act is in selecting a wave length. which, in
70 House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,
HR 119 6 4 hearings , 20
.
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his judgment, will result in the least possible
interference, ""^i
Those involved with the new industry understood the
implications of the Intercity decision but despaired of an
immediate solution. "Since the last Conference I feel more
strongly than ever that legislation is needed," White wrote
to an AT&T executive in 1924, "and yet I suspect there is
less demand for it than heretofore."
There seems to be a general willingness on the
part of all interests to let things ride as they
are. It is my view that this state of mind comes
from the unusual confidence which all those
interested in the Radio industry have in Hoover.
I cannot think of anyone else who could exert
such an influence over the situation as he does.
When a change comes to the Secretaryship I look
for much less harmony in Radio ranks, and I would
not be surprised to see an awful mess follow. "^^
If faith in Hoover was one reason for a lack of
congressional action, the difficulty of drafting an
acceptable bill was also daunt ing . Complex technical
questions had to be answered, and most members had little
expert ise in the new medium . Senator Burton K. Wheeler of
Montana recalled an exchange after one hearing with
president Merlin Aylesworth of the National Broadcasting
Company
:
After he got through... he followed me out and
wanted to know what I thought of his testimony.
And I said I didn't know [if] he was telling the
Hoover v. Intercity Radio, 286 F. (1923), 1003 at
1007 .
72 White to Eugene S. Wilson, October 30, 1924, box
42 , White Papers
.
76
truth or not telling the truth because I didn't
understand enough about radio and neither did
anybody else on that commi t tee
For the time being, it seemed, the beet and safest action
was inaction. Meanwhile, the industry and its influence
continued to grow.
The election year 1924, many observers proclaimed,
would, thanks to radio, mark a new era in politics. The
Nation predicted that
every important speech will go out on the air to
hundreds of thousands, sometimes to millions, who
would never dream of packing themselves into
tight stuffy halls to hear the candidates .... More
effective than pamphlets, mass meetings, or
street orations will be these speeches to the
great home audiences receiving through the single
sense of hearing. It is something new in
politics, something totally, amazingly new.
Radio, Owen D. Young asserted, represented "a great hope
for democracy. ""^^ The people could participate fully in the
process. "The most reactionary newspaper," Senator Robert
La Follette of Wisconsin predicted, "will fear to twist
facts which thousands of its readers receive directly by
radio . " "^^
Burton K. Wheeler, interviewed by Ed Craney,
September 30, 1964, oral history file, Broadcast Pioneers
Library, Washington, DC, n. p
.
74 "Politics By Radio," The Nation, January 2, 1924,
5 .
75 Quoted in Eunice Fuller Barnard, "Radio Politics,"
The New Republic, March 19, 1924, 91.
76 Quoted in J.H. Morecroft, "The March of Radio,"
Padio Broadcast, October 1924, 476.
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Both AT^T and RCA announced they hoped to accemble
networks of ctationc to cover the party conventionG, the
campaign and the inauguration. If cuch radio coverage wac
totally new to politicians and the public, it was equally
new to the broadcacterc
.
The election year would test both
radio's technical limits and the talents of broadcasters.
Both major parties agreed to allow radio to broadcast
their nominating conventions, dipping into their campaign
funds to underwrite the cost. The Republicans' three -day
Cleveland coronation of Calvin Coolidge passed without
incident in June, causing only modest public response.
After hearing the Republicans on the radio, the Democrats
agreed to pay ten thousand dollars for access to ATkT'o
chain of stat ions . "Many shrewd observers bel ieve , " H . V.
Kal tenborn noted two years later, "that campaign funds were
never spent to worse purpose. ""^"^ Shattered by the Ku Klux
Klan and League of Nations issues
,
hamstrung by the unit
and two- thirds vot ing rules which kept front - runners Al f red
E. Smith and William Gibbs McAdoo from the nomination, the
Democrats wrestled through seventeen days and 103 ballots
in a classic political brawl before settling their
nomination on John W. Davis.
Graham McNamee, whose World Series broadcasts so
impressed Heywood Broun, was the lead announcer for WEAF
and AT5cT's network of stations, the largest yet assembled,
77 H.V. Kaltenborn, "On The Air," Century Magazine,
October 192 6 , 6 74 - 5
.
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reaching as far west as Kansas City.^e Major J. Andrew
White announced for a smaller chain of RCA stations
clustered in the Northeast. Neither broadcaster knew what
he was getting into. As McNamee later wrote, "there were no
precedents or rules to guide us. . .all we really knew was
that people met and somehow got together on a candidate . ""^^
In Cleveland, the Republican convention had gone according
to script. The broadcasters had merely introduced the
scheduled speakers, let the band play a rousing medley and
gone home. The New York convention promised to be more
raucous and less predictable. At the outset, neither chain
committed itsel f to complete gavel - to -gavel coverage
,
promising only " full or partial reports " of the proceedings
but cautioning that regular programming was "subject to
cancel 1 at ion or postponement in favor of convention
The number of stations which actually broadcast
WEIAF ' s coverage remains unclear. Contemporary press reports
based on information provided by AT&T first indicated
eighteen stations — WEAF and seventeen affiliates —
planned to air the convention, but subsequent press
references mention twenty -one or twenty- three af f il iates
linked by either telephone lines or over-the-air pick-ups,
rebroadcasting another station's signal. Given the unclear
regulatory climate of 1924, it seems likely that some
smaller stations pirated portions of the broadcast making a
final count impossible. McNamee wrote that twenty- seven
stations carried at least some of the coverage. McNamee,
You're on the Air, 79.
79 McNamee, You ^re on the Air, 70-1.
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reports. "80 Both the radio stations and their announcers
would learn as they went.
The men on the air could have looked to newspaper
reporters for guidance, but they knew because their medium
was different, their job was different, too. McNamee
especially saw himself as an announcer rather than a
journalist, an important distinction. An announcer's
skills, he believed, included a good voice, organizational
skills and, perhaps most importantly, what he called "the
ability to harmonize, synchronize, and be on time."^! The
announcer served as the listener's gracious host,
identifying new voices, explaining what was going on,
making the listener comfortable while all the time keeping
the broadcast on schedule. His job was not to analyze,
criticize or distract in any way from the featured
attraction
.
McNamee understood the virtues of preparation and much
preferred to work from a script or detailed notes. He spent
what time he could before the convention touring the Garden
®^ "Hour by Hour in the Air Today, " New York World,
June 28, 1924, 27. The same disclaimer appeared in each
day's radio program log throughout the convention.
81 McNamee, You're on the Air, GO. McNamee was a
concert singer before joining WEIAF. When he visited the
station's studios one day, his warm baritone voice and
pleasant manner impressed the management, and he was
offered a job, McNamee always claimed he was simply curious
to see what a radio station looked like and had no
intention of asking for work. For an appreciation of
McNamee '6 style and versatility, see Red Barber, The
Broadcasters (New York: Dial, 1970), 19-53.
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with a publicist employed by the arena's operator,
legendary boxing promoter Tex Rickard, and a stenographer
in tow. McNamee was not in search of the latest delegate
tally or details of platform debates which, he feared, were
"of little interest to anyone not a politician." Instead,
he was collecting anecdotes about the building's past —
"filler-in stuff," McNamee called it - to use during "dead
spots in the program." When a speaker arrived at the
podium, McNamee would be silent. The convention itself,
after all, was the real attraction. McNamee ' s preferences
and the party's interests coincided on this point. A party
publicist screened the announcer's notes before he went on
the air, warning, "Remember, young man, I want to see every
word you send out," a reminder that radio was being allowed
to broadcast at the party's sufferance and for the party's
good. ^2
Given the ongoing debate over control of the airwaves
in the 192 0s, broadcasters had good reason to be careful
not to offend the powers that be. The party leaders at the
New York convention could when they returned to Washington
change the way radio licenses were awarded and radio
stations operated, perhaps jeopardizing the very future of
the industry. Accordingly, the broadcasters often proved
eager to muzzle themselves and accepted explicit or
92 McNamee, You're on the Air, 79-81.
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implicit restrictions on coverage that newspapers rejected
out of hand.
When WEAF and the AT&T stations broadcast an address
to Congress by President Coolidge in December, 1923, for
example, McNamee went to Washington to announce the event.
Radio had never broadcast a presidential address to
Congress, and McNamee had no specific instructions, other
than to introduce the president and cue the studio in New
York when the event was over.
As the speech progressed, McNamee began taking notes
on the backs of envelopes. "I had begun just for the fun of
the thing," he later wrote, but since some listeners no
doubt had tuned in after the speech began, "it would not be
a bad idea, I thought, to recapitulate it for them." When
Coolidge finished, McNamee announced that the president had
just concluded an address to a joint session of Congress
and read his hastily-composed summary.
Afterwards, McNamee was quite pleased with himself. As
he read newspaper accounts of the speech, he noted that the
passages he had highlighted in his summary were the same
points the reporters had mentioned in their stories. Mail
from listeners was positive as well. Management back at the
station, however, did not view McNamee ' s initiative as
favorably.
It was decided not to repeat the practice on
other such occasions. While this time it had been
done without offense, it is obvious that there
could be complications, should the broadcaster be
indiscreet or too partial in his summarizing, and
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stress certain points too much while ignoring
others
.
®^
The anecdote is early evidence of cautious,
deferential attitudes within the industry and raises
intriguing questions. Who, for example, might take offense
at an announcer's summary that was too partial? By all
indications, the audience had approved of the innovation.
What complications might develop? As McNamee broadcast from
the Capitol, White's radio legislation was before Congress,
its final shape still unclear. Of more immediate concern,
Federal Trade Commission investigators were probing the
radio industry and, a month later, would issue their
monopoly complaint against the patent allies. ATScT had
ample motive to be wary of "complications."
Convention fever spread slowly at first. To publicize
both its broadcasts and the medium itself, WEAF erected
loudspeakers outside New York's City Hall to bring the
proceedings to passers-by. The experiment, a newspaper
reporter decided early in the event, was "a flat failure."
Those who paused were "bored to death by the voices which
came over the radio." One women listened for a time and
dismissed the entire affair, saying it was "just like alot
of men - to spend the whole day talking. "^"^ As the
convention went on, however, public interest soared.
®^ McNamee, You're on the Air, 68-9.
84 "City Hall Park Thinks Convention All Talk," New
York World, June 29, 1924, 8. See also photographs of the
scene in the World, June 28, 1924, 1; June 29, 1924, 3S;
July 3, 1924, 5.
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Before it was over, the broadcast had become a rousing
success. AT&T estimated an audience of up to twenty million
listeners had tuned in for at least part of the
proceedings, and New York City police said they noticed a
marked slackening in midtown traffic when the convention
was on the air. Senator Thomas Walsh of Montana, the
convention's chairman, became an audience favorite.
Governor Jim Brandon's drawling declaration at the start of
each roll call — "Alabama casts twenty- four votes for
Oscar W. Underwood!" — turned into a comic catch phrase.
Even the clerk who called the roll of the states became a
minor celebrity. The Cleveland Plain Dealer published a
photograph of party functionary P.J. Halligan to satisfy
its curious readers
.
One newspaper proclaimed the convention had stimulated
"more interest. . .than has been evoked by any other event
since Marconi first made the ether run errands for
mankind . " ®^ In Boston, where radio loudspeakers were
erected outside a downtown newspaper office, large crowds
gathered to hear "the voice of democracy." Listeners
spilled off the sidewalk and into the street, the men's
summertime skimmers turning Tremont Street into "a garden
®5 "You've Heard Him Over Radio. He Calls Democratic
Vote Roll," photograph, Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 4,
1924, 2.
"Sleepy Millions Alert for Break and Last Ballot,"
New York World, July 6, 1924, 6M.
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of straw hats. "87 A New York newspaperman vacationing in
Maine thought he had at last escaped the convention until
"from a large horn protruding from a store window as I
passed came a terrifying sound. 'Twenty-four votes for Un-
der-wo-o-o-od' it said. "88
The brightest star to emerge from the broadcasts was
McNamee. Hour after hour, day after day, he was the
listener's companion and guide. Throughout the convention,
he avoided political comments and leavened the broadcasts
with the background material he had so carefully gathered,
not always to the best effect. He opened one broadcast with
what a Boston critic summarized as "a dreary historical
sketch, in which he described New York as it was during the
last national convention held there back in eighteen- fifty
something . " 8^ When he did offer observat ions on the
proceedings, careful listeners noted, he limited himself to
personal asides and attempts at humor based on the length
of the affair. "McNamee made his usual prediction prior to
the opening of the evening session, " a reviewer noted as
the convention reached its midpoint, "Mac is an optimistic
bird. He hopes and believes every session will be the
87 "Convention News on Herald Radio, " Boston Herald,
July 2, 1924, 24; "Convention Doings Still Draw Crowds,"
Boston Herald, July 4, 1924, 14.
88 Oliver H.P. Garrett, "Perspective," New York World,
July 12, 1924, 9.
89 Charles Burton, "Review of Last Night's Radio,"
Boston Herald, July 2, 1924, 24.
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last. "90 The next day, he opened his broadcast with a joke,
announcing, "This is the Democratic national convention.
We've decided to leave out that other word (nominating) for
the present and let nature take its course. "^i
Inevitably, a few unplanned or embarrassing utterances
slipped into the ether and proved memorable. "The profane
and exasperated asides of party managers" which reached the
still -sensitive ears of the folks back home created "the
sensation of the moment in the radio world. "^2 when
convention clerk Halligan misstated a delegation's vote
total, listeners could hear partisans on the floor
clamoring for a correction. "It was little things like
that, " the New York Timee suggested, "and not the larger
happenings, that gave the listener-in the feeling of actual
presence at the convention. "^3
The people listened, not with patriotic fervor but
with a certain morbid fascination. Captivated by the
broadcasts, they were, witnesses tell us, appalled by the
event itself. A Boston newspaper opined on the Fourth of
July, "There is something fascinating about this
90 Charles Burton, ""Review of Last Night's Radio,"
Boston Herald, July 4, 1924, 14.
91 Quoted in "Listening In at the Globe," Boston
Evening Globe, July 5, 1924.
92 "Electioneering on the Air," The New Republic,
September 3, 1924, 8.
93
"As Present Though Miles Away," editorial. New York
Times, July 2, 1924, 18.
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convention. If g like a dud firecracker. There's no fun in
it, but it might go off. "94 to newspaper columnict Franklin
P. Adamc, the broadcast c were a welcome corrective. The
press corps had in past years, he wrote, been able to
filter out much of political "bunk" before it reached the
public and render both the rhetoric and those responsible
for it acceptable. Now, thanks to radio, the electorate "is
learning that the bunk is fundamental
. And wonder of
wonders, it is learning to cast an off eye at the political
prophets of the daily papers and say, 'Is THAT so!'"^^
If the convention demystified the politicians, the
announcers, most agreed, were not to blame. The broadcasts,
by allowing the " 1 isteners - in the actual feeling of
presence at the convention, " had simply exposed the truth.
"Radio, " a popular radio magazine proclaimed, "demonstrated
its ability to spread information as no other medium
possibly could." McNamee was commended for his "tact, keen
observation, and a charm of manner;" White, for "his
careful observation and extraordinarily fine descriptive
powers. "9^ Some listeners insisted, however, they could
detect spoken and unspoken biases over the air. One critic
reported that "White, than whom there is no smoother talker
9^ Boston Herald, July 4, 1924, 14.
95 F.P.A. [Franklin P. Adams], "The Conning Tower,"
New York World, July 10, 1924, 13.
96 J.H. Morecroft, "The March of Radio," Radio
Broadcaet, September 1924, 399.
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in the radio world, gives evidence that he is disgusted
with the convention" as the roll calls droned on while
McNamee "strives to keep up a cheerful tone. "97 Another
suggested McNamee had been told to pull his punches because
"he was reporting for stations and listeners of conflicting
political opinions from Atlanta to Kansas City, St. Louis,
Chicago and Canada. "^^
McNamee never claimed to be an analytical journalist,
and he had been warned by both his employers and party
officials not to give offense. Despite his best intentions,
however, the intimate relationship between the listener and
the announcer created a special bond which undermined his
attempts to remain a neutral observer. McNamee would later
marvel at "the extent to which radio has become a part of
the life and habits of our people." When he traveled the
country, McNamee said listeners would regularly approach
him as if he were an old friend "merely because I am part
of that machine. "95 Because the announcer was their friend,
listeners naturally empathized with him. They put
themselves in his place and mingled their emotions, biases
and predispositions with his.
97 "McNamee and White Convention Heroes, " (Boston)
Sunday Herald, July 6, 1924, 8.
98 "Walsh, White, and McNamee are Heroes of
Convention," New York World, July 13, 1924, 9E.
99 Graham McNamee, "Behind the Mike," American
Magazine, April 1928, 26.
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The earliest broadcasters often noted the intensely
personal bond between speaker and auditor. Kaltenborn
recalled that while readers often commented on points
raised in his newspaper editorials, when he spoke on the
radio, "at first, it was only the fact that they heard you
that listeners reported.
"
What you said was relatively unimportant. The
phrase, "Your voice came into my living room as
clear as a bell," occurred in hundreds of
letters. That was the miracle, the marvel; that
you could actually be heard. It was only later
that listeners began to comment on what I said,
and not on the fact that they heard what I
said.
By 1924, the personal bond between announcer and listener
continued, but the audience was also becoming increasingly
aware of what it heard on the radio. For the broadcasters,
this was a decidedly mixed blessing. The medium was being
forced to take responsibility for its content.
While McNamee described himself as an announcer,
Kaltenborn proudly claimed the mantle as radio's first news
analyst and saw himself as a trailblazer for commentators
who would follow. "I was the first person to interpret the
news on the air," he boasted. "No one else had tried
it. "101 while McNamee took it in stride when he was warned
not to give offense, Kaltenborn, a self-conscious and self-
100 H.V. Kaltenborn, "Reminiscences," 1950, 62, in the
Radio Pioneers project of the Oral History Collection of
Columbia University, hereafter Kaltenborn, COHC. Emphasis
in original
.
101 Kaltenborn, COHC, 66.
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confident advocate of vigorous free speech throughout his
long career, called such suggestions censorship.
Kaltenborn was never presented with a specific list of
topics or opinions which were considered out of bounds, but
he understood station management was listening to what he
said. This was especially true at WEAF. "I was later told,
that in case I got off the beam and said anything too
utterly outrageous," he recalled, "they were prepared to
cut me off and bring in the piano player. "^^2
Kaltenborn believed broadcasters served an important
public role in a democracy. He brought his newspaper
training with him to the new medium and maintained that
radio was simply a new vehicle for an old, activist
message
:
I always believed that the press had a very high
mission in our Republic, both to inform public
opinion, to reflect public opinion, and to create
publ ic opinion . All three functions are essent ial
if the press is to perform its duty. In the same
way, I felt that radio should inform, reflect,
and create public opinion.
This was an optimistic, progressive view that the press, to
paraphrase Justice Brandeis, could cleanse society with
sunshine. This activist view, what the muckraking
journalists at the turn of the century called "the
literature of exposure," was to Kaltenborn and others the
Kaltenborn, "The Early Days of Radio," 67;
Kaltenborn, COHC, 63, 113-4. Kaltenborn stated his fee was
$100 per talk.
103 Kaltenborn, COHC, 115. Emphasis in the original.
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reason a free press existed. "There is only one way to get
a democracy on its feet," newspaper publisher Joseph
Pulitzer had said, "and that is by keeping the public
informed." Democracy could cure itself of any ill, he
insisted, if the people had the facts. "Get these things
out in the open, describe them, attack them, ridicule them
in the press," Pulitzer insisted, "and sooner or later
public opinion will sweep them away. "lo^ Radio, Kaltenborn
and others believed, should follow the same path.
The leaders of the industry were not so certain.
Crusades could anger listeners, advertisers and,
importantly, federal regulators. While Kaltenborn was never
dragged away from the microphone in mid broadcast, his
commentaries, delivered during airtime purchased by his
newspaper, were moved from station to station because
nervous broadcasters, he said, "were unwilling to have me
provoke and antagonize sections of the audience . "^o^
Station managers were particularly sensitive to
provocations which antagonized those in power.
On one occasion. Secretary of State Charles Evans
Hughes angrily called the president of AT&T to demand that
Quoted in Alleyne Ireland, Joseph Pulitzer:
ReminiBcencee of a Secretary (New York: Mitchell Kennerly,
1914) , 115
.
David G. Clark, "H.V. Kaltenborn and his
Sponsors," Journal of Broadcasting 12 (Fall 1968), 319;
Kaltenborn, COHC, 114. Kaltenborn did not leave the
Brooklyn Eagle and become a full-time radio commentator
until 1930.
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Kaltenborn be silenced. Hughes had been entertaining guests
at his Washington home when he turned on the radio just in
time to hear Kaltenborn attack the administration's policy
toward the Soviet Union. The broadcast, Hughes argued, was
both an embarrassment and an invasion of privacy.
Kaltenborn' s broadcasts were relayed to a Washington
station by AT&T telephone lines, and Hughes insisted that
the telephone system should not be used to air public
criticism of cabinet of f icers
. The secretary's threat,
while never translated into direct government action,
indicates both a willingness to brandish federal power as a
threat and how an individual listener could take a radio
broadcast as a personal affront.
Kaltenborn was certain that fear of federal
intervention was the reason that many radio broadcasters
were hesitant to take part in debates over public issues.
The medium, he wrote, "has been extremely timid about
permitting the broadcasting of anything that contravenes
the established order," because the party in power
"controlled wave-lengths, licenses, and time -allotments
"
the broadcasters required in order to address the public.
"Radio," he concluded, "is making people think in unison."
It is doing more than any other agency to develop
the lock-step in public opinion. As radio is now
controlled, it objects to that which provokes and
106 David Holbrook Culbert, News For Everyman: Radio
and Foreign Affairs in Thirties America (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood, 1976) , 70.
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stimulates independent thinking as "too
controversial
.
"i^"^
Radio had promised to increase public participation and
usher in a new age of democracy. The New Republic observed
in 1927, but "none of these expectations has been
fulfilled.
. .
,
[Radio's] timidity is apparently growing worse
as the audiences get larger.
Broadcasters learned that informational programming
could both attract audiences and bolster the medium's image
of public service, but they remained wary of the
controversy which might be spawned by full-throated
expressions of opinion or controversial analysis. When RCA
announced with great fanfare in 1926 the creation of the
NBC network "to provide the best program available for
broadcasting in the United States, " the company's statement
promised programs "comprehensive and free from
discrimination. " The network did not include the word
"news" in its announcement of proposed programming, but
pledged to insure "that every event of national importance
may be broadcast widely throughout the United States." By
concentrating on special events and talks, the network
hoped to avoid the problem of opinion,
Kaltenborn, "On The Air," 673, 675-6.
108 "Can Radio Be Rescued?" The New Republic, October
26, 1927, 251.
109 "Announcing the National Broadcasting Company,
Inc.," display advertisement in the New York Times,
September 14, 1926, 27.
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Meanwhile, the regulatory climate remained unsettled,
and in 1926, an Illinois court threatened to unleash a
whirlwind. Zenith Radio Corporation had applied for a
license to operate a broadcasting station in suburban
Chicago. When the Commerce Department granted approval for
just two hours of broadcast time each week on a shared
frequency. Zenith ignored the limitations. The government
sought an injunction to force the station into compliance
or off the air.
After hearing arguments, the US District Court in
Chicago agreed that Zenith had violated its license but
then stated that the government had overstepped its bounds
by setting such restrictions in the first place. Building
on the J/3terci ty decision, the court reasoned Congress had
failed to establish any "test or standard ... by which the
discretion of the Secretary is to be controlled." Congress,
the court ruled, had set out limited specific guidelines
within the law regarding the assignment of wave lengths and
operating hours and "has withheld from [the Secretary of
Commerce] the power to prescribe additional regulations."
Although the nature of radio had changed radically since
1912, the court ruled it was not the role of the secretary
to set new regulations without explicit Congressional
authorization. "The theory of our institutions of
government," the court concluded, "does not mean to leave
94
room for the play and action of purely personal and
arbitrary power,
The Zenith decision was upheld by an opinion from the
Justice Department. Responding to Hoover's request to bring
the case to the Supreme Court, the Justice Department
predicted further appeals would prove futile and concluded
the government had "no general authority under the [1912]
Act to assign wave lengths to broadcasting stations." The
only solution was "new legislation, carefully adapted to
meet the needs of both the present and the future. "in With
the government's "ether cops" disarmed, broadcasters began
to shift frequencies and extend hours and power in hopes of
gaining a competitive edge or finding an interference - free
place in the spectrum. The cooperative consensus was
collapsing, and both listeners and broadcasters across the
country demanded action.
11° United States v. Zenith Radio Corporation, 12 F.
2nd Series (1926), 614 at 618.
111 35 Ops. Att'y Gen. 126 (1926) in Frank J. Kahn,
ed. , Document B of American Broadcasting (New York:
Appleton-Century-Crof ts, 1973), 31-32.
112 It quickly became clear that if Congress did not
act to restore order to the air, the courts would.
Historian Louise Benjamin cites another 1926 case stemming
from the crowded airwaves of Chicago, The Tribune Company
V. Oak Leaves Broadcasting et al . , in which the Illinois
state courts held that the Tribune's radio station held de
facto property rights to its frequency, a "priority of
time", because it had been on the air since 1924. See
Louise M. Benjamin, "The Precedent that Almost Was: A 1926
Court Effort to Regulate Radio, " Journalism Quarterly 67
(Autumn 1990), 578-85.
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Several radio bills were soon filed as Congress moved
to restore order. White believed Congress should simply
ratify the system of broadcasting which had evolved under
Hoover. The new law, he insisted, should "regulate Radio
communication and prevent interference. It should not make
new law! "113 Others took a more expansive view. The new
medium, they feared, had fallen under the control of a
handful of powerful corporations. The democratic promise of
radio was in jeopardy.
The debate which led to passage of the Radio Act of
1927 echoed themes which had been stated and restated since
1920. Both advocates of limited legislation and those who
championed sweeping reform appealed to what one scholar has
called "a libertarian mythology" which relied on the
vocabulary of democracy. Free speech, free enterprise and
equal access to the air were universally praised while
censorship and public or private monopoly control of the
ether was condemned . Hoover himself had set the tone
during the national radio conferences by embracing public
ownership and government regulation of the ether while
condemning monopoly and restrictions on free speech. Radio
would fulfill its promise, he said, if "the time-honored
principles of common justice" were observed by both the
Side-by-side copy of Dill and White bills, S. 1754
and HR 5589, with typewritten and handwritten comments, box
61, White Papers. Emphasis in the original.
114 Willard D. Rowland, Jr., The Politice of TV
Violence (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1983), 22.
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industry and the state, "The broad and basic duty of the
Government," he explained, "is to keep the ether free and
open to everybody.
The broadcasters quickly echoed Hoover's words and
embraced the ideology of freedom. "Public interest," RCA's
David Sarnoff flatly declared, "should be the sole test of
admission to this illimitable forum. "^^^ As regulators,
broadcasters and their critics pledged their devotion to
these fundamental goals, democratic rhetoric became useless
as a means of debating actual policy. Civil libertarian
Morris Ernst feared corporate domination of broadcasting
was already restricting free speech. He doubted, however,
the new legislation would produce a better system.
"Everyone," he sourly noted during the debate over the
Radio Act, "is announcing that the radio is a public
utility and should be operated for the public benef it . "^^"^
Congress discussed a variety of solutions including
government broadcasting and mandating common carrier status
for broadcasters, but the debate focused on the question of
monopoly. "I want to see radio conserved for the benefit
Hoover, World interview, 1.
David Sarnoff, "Freedom of the Air: Uncensored and
Uncontrolled," The Nation, July 23, 1924, 90.
117 Morris L. Ernst, "Who Shall Control the Air?" The
Nation, April 21, 1926, 443.
118 See Hugh Carter Donahue, The Battle To Control
Broadcast News: Who Owns the First Amendment? (Cambridge:
MIT Press, 1989), 1-18.
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of the people generally," Senator William Borah of Idaho
proclaimed, "and not permitted to come under the control o]
monopoly." A pillar ot Weatern progreooi vi am for a
generation, Borah had warily watched ao control ol i ho new
medium concentrated in New York board roomo . Economic
concentration would, he feared, lead inevitably to
reotrictiono on free opeech. He called for an independent
radio commiooion with explicit antimonopoly powero
comparable to thooe oi the Federal Trade Comitii oo ion
. Only
Dtrict government regulation, he oaid, could inouie Iteedom
of the air.^^^
The concern over monopoly wao in large part a freedom
of opeech iooue. Thooe whooe viewo did not dovetail with
what KLaltenborn called "the eotabliohed order" had already
tound that they could be denied a chance to opeak . Senator
Wheeler recalled that during a diopute over electric power
regulat ion in Montana , a o tat ion owned by the power company
broadcact the utility' o viewo and refuoed to give the other
oide a chance to opeak. Wheeler aloo remembered hio firot
Senate campaign in 192 2 when one radio o tat ion "let the
Republicano have time but... they wouldn't even cell me
time. "^2*^ Norman Thomac, the leader of the Socialiot Party,
wao denied the opportunity to deliver a radio addreoo on
Donald G. Godfrey and Val E. Limburg, "The Rogue
Elephant of Radio Legiolation: Senator William E. Borah,"
Journaliam Quarterly 67 (Spring 1990), 215-6.
120 wheeler, Craney interview, n.p.
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"freedom of the air" on a New York City station because the
station manager relied on leased telephone lines for remote
broadcasts and he feared retaliation from AT^T. "We thought
•Freedom of the Air' was a harmless topic; but Mr, Thomas's
speech was too radical," explained the station's spokesman,
"He wanted to slam hell out of WEAF, and we've got to
depend on WEIAF. "^^i
The Radio Act which eventually emerged from the
process reflected the libertarian mythology. The ether
would remain a public trust, and a new Federal Radio
Commiss ion would issue radio 1 icenses "as publ ic
convenience, interest, or necessity requires." The law
barred the FRC from establishing any regulations "which
shall interfere with the rights of free speech by means of
radio communication" while at the same time explicitly
banning "any obscene , indecent , or profane language . " The
law specified that " if any 1 icensee shall permit any person
who is a legally qualified candidate for any public office
to use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal
opportunities to all other such candidates." The
legislation, in other words, had something for everyone,
including strong antimonopoly language and, because White
and other Republicans remained convinced that licensing
authority should remain with the Secretary of Commerce, a
121 "Thomas Barred Again From Radio, " New York World,
May 17, 1926, 4. As the headline indicates, this was not
the first time Thomas had been excluded from the people's
air
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provision for the FRC to revert to advisory status when
Congress decided order had been restored to the ether. 122
It was the public interest clause, however, which
would become, in Senator Clarence Dill's phrase, the Magna
Carta of the law. Dill, a progressive Washington Democrat,
was the author of the Senate's version of the legislation.
As they worked out the final wording of the bill, Dill
recalled that he and White agreed that radio must continue
to be developed for the good of the entire nation. "I don't
know whether he or I said one day what's the use of fussing
about this," Dill remembered, "We're talking about the
public, let's say the public and we put in public
interest . "^23 phrase, borrowed from public utilities
law, was redolent of "the time -honored principles of common
justice" which Hoover said should form the basis of
government regulation and equally as vague.
The ambiguities of the Radio Act soon became evident.
The FRC ' s first order of business was to undo the damage of
the Zenith ruling and restore order to the broadcast band.
Commissioner Henry A. Bellows discussed the task facing the
new commission in a Washington speech. ^^4 broadcasting
122 See United States Statutes (HR 9971, The Radio Act
of 1927, February 23, 1927), vol. 44, pt . 2, chap. 169,
1162-74
.
123 clarence C. Dill, interview with Donald G. Godfrey
and William Chamberlin, March 7, 1975, Broadcast Pioneers
Library, Washington, DC.
124 Federal Radio Commission, Annual Report
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1927), 6-7.
100
station is in many ways akin to a newspaper," he explained,
but "there is no arbitrary limit to the number of
newspapers which may be published." Radio stations,
however, were limited by technology and the limit "has not
only been reached, it has been far overpassed." The result?
"The demand from every section of the country is to cut
down the number of broadcasting stations in the interests
of the listening public," The FRC, Bellows admitted, "can
not find suitable frequencies ... even for all the stations
already built and in operation," let alone new stations to
serve the rest of the country.
The only way to reduce interference was to eliminate
some radio stations and reduce the power and operating
hours of others. The FRC ' s only guideline in determining
which stations to keep and which to change was the public
interest standard. "It is a rather appalling
responsibility, " Bellows confessed, because "it means that
the [FRC] must say to this person, * You may broadcast,' and
to that person, 'You may not broadcast; there is no room
for you . '
"
The commissioners had not sought this power. Bellows
said, "it is the thing which Congress has told us we must
do, and it is the thing which the people of America rightly
demand shall be done." Given the "infinite" variety of
radio programs, how was the commission to judge which
stations should be allowed to broadcast? "How shall we
measure the conflicting claims of grand opera and religious
101
services, of market reports and direct advertising, of jazz
orchestras and lectures on the disease of hogs?"
While the law reqxiired that the FRC make the
decisions, Bellows said it was up to the public to let its
will be known. "The future of radio broadcasting," he said,
"is in your hands."
It is for you to say whether this potent agency
shall be used rightly or wrongly. It is for you
to say whether it shall degenerate into a mere
plaything or develop into one of the greatest
forces in the molding of our entire civilization.
It is for you to establish close relations with
the broadcasters who serve your communities and
to show them that it is to their advantage to use
their stations for the highest type of public
service
,
The commissioners, Bellows concluded, "can do only what you
tell us you want done."
As broadcasting ended its first decade, the radio
industry continued its phenomenal growth. If the
marketplace was a valid judge, broadcasters were clearly
serving the public interest. More than a third of all
American households owned a radio by 1929, and the medium
was becoming an ever more important source of information
and entertainment. Radio had become a bully national pulpit
for those who could gain access to the air. Thanks to the
development of radio networks, all Americans could now
share events and experiences. When Hoover was inaugurated
as president in March of 1929, an estimated sixty million
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Americans listened in, the largest radio audience up to
that time. 12
5
Still, many wondered if the medium had betrayed its
promise. The First World War and its aftermath, "the perils
of prosperity" described by historian William Leuchtenburg,
shaped a nation twisted by "the painful transition from
nineteenth-century to modern America. "^26 when President
Harding called for "normalcy, " his plaint resonated because
many Americans shared his concern that the world was
becoming a terribly different place. The war, growing
urbanization, the legacy of decades of immigration,
technological innovations that reshaped home and workplace,
the increasing power of national corporations which seemed
to threaten cherished individual and regional values all
excited and confused Americans of the 192 0s. As historian
Warren Susman noted, "an exceptional and ever-growing
number of Americans came to believe in a series of changes
in the structure of their world, natural, technological,
social, personal, and moral." ^27 Many felt, as the Lynds
discovered when they questioned the people of Muncie,
Indiana, that they had "one foot on the relatively solid
125 Bliss, Now The NewG, 24.
12 6 William E. Leuchtenburg, The Perils of Prosperity:
1914-1932 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1958),
273 .
127 Warren I. Susman, Culture Ae History: The
Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth Century
(New York: Pantheon, 1973, 1984), 106.
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ground of established institutional habits and the other
fast to an escalator erratically moving in several
directions at a bewildering variety of speeds. "^28
Radio was part of the problem and part of the solution
as well. By bringing the nation together, radio spread
democracy and demagoguery, clarification and confusion,
consumerism and compassion. The medium helped bring the
contradictions of modernity to America. The reformist
passion of the progressive era had cooled, but a lingering
distrust of monopoly remained alive. Hoover hoped
cooperation could smooth the rough edges of capitalism, but
as historian John Hicks noted, and the debate over radio
regulation affirmed, many Amex*icans bel ieved, if
cooperation failed, "a principal duty of government was to
regulate and restrain business in the interest of the
people as a whole . "i-^
Broadcasters and advertisers sought to provide popular
programming which would attract broad audiences while al so
attempting to offer "the highest type of public service."
Inevitably, their decisions sometimes triggered protests
from those who felt broadcasters were abusing the public
trust. The FRC wrestled with the public interest standard
128 Lynd and Lynd, Middletown, 498. See "Prelude: May,
1919," chapter 1, 1-12 in Allen, Only Yeeterday for a deft
summary of how from the perspective of 1931 "the
circumstances of American life have been transformed" since
the end of the war.
129 John D. Hicks, Republican Ascendancy: 1921-1933
(New York: Harper k Row, 1960), 66.
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and maintained "the interest of the broadcast listener is
of superior importance to that of the broadcaster" but
could not or would not tell broadcasters what kind of
programming served the public interest, To dictate
programming would be censorship, the FRC said, and that was
forbidden by both the law and American tradition. While
regulators proved reluctant to upset the increasingly
popular status quo, the threat of disruptive government
action remained, ready to be used.
Broadcasters supported government intervention to
limit and regularize competition. But they feared
government control of content v/hich could force them to
relinquish control over valuable air time or jeopardize
their licenses. Accordingly, to preserve their right to use
the public airwaves, they fervently embraced the language
of the public interest and freedom of the air, the
libertarian mythology that appealed to popular
sensibilities
.
As the 1920s turned into the 1930s, increasingly
sophisticated listeners facing an increasingly complex and
confusing world sought and expected a different kind of
news from the radio. It would no longer be enough to simply
broadcast an event or a summary of headlines. Radio would
be expected by its audience to add perspective, background
and analysis to the swelling tide of information.
130 FRC, Report (1928), 167-8.
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"What the radio needs today above all else is
editors," suggested The New Republic in 1930. Radio
broadcasters should no longer think of themselves as
McNamee had as announcers. They should develop their
reportorial powers of observation, interpretation and
skepticism, "the attitude of j ournal ists . "i^i This idea
would win favor with both audiences and working
broadcasters themselves during the 1930s. The men and women
on the air would continue to experiment with their new
medium and would continue to surprise themselves and their
audiences as they discovered the power of radio. Because
these experiments attracted audiences, they also appealed
to the station and network operators. This new kind of
broadcast news, however, also injected partisan controversy
into radio. While that attracted listeners, it also
attracted the attention of government regulators who held
the power to control the public airwaves and, accordingly,
the right of the radio industry to profit from that
resource
.
For the leaders of the radio industry, the former was
much to be desired, the latter was not. They would try
their best to have it both ways by demonstrating that they
sought to serve the public interest.
131 Mrphe Radio and the Press," The New Republic, May
7, 1930, 314
.
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CHAPTER II
"A STRONGER AND STRONGER TOOL OF DEMOCRACY "1
David Sarnoff 's dream of radio as a household utility
was fulfilled in the 193 0s. The miraculous new medium of
the 192 0s became in the next decade an accepted and
increasingly important part of American life. More than
half the nation's homes had radios by 1930; more than two-
thirds — twenty- six million — by 1935. As Americans
debated the nation's involvement in the Second World War in
1941, radio reached into fifty million households, 82.6
percent of the nation's homes. In the Northeast, the upper
Midwest and along the Pacific Coast, radio penetration
exceeded ninety percent .
^
Radio in the 193 0s truly became a mass medium,
bringing entertainment and information to the nation. As
the industry grew, the question of who would pay did not
prove to be, as Herbert Hoover had predicted in 1924, "the
hardest nut in the bowl."^ Advertisers would foot the bill,
^ William S. Paley, CBS annual report to stockholders
broadcast over the CBS network, April 5, 1938, reprinted as
"Minimum Interference Asked by Paley, " Broadcasting, April
15, 1938, 15.
2 Federal Communications Commission, An Economic Study
of Standard Broadcasting, mimeographed report issued
October 31, 1947, 103. "Standard broadcasting" refers to AM
radio as opposed to FM radio and television.
3 Herbert Hoover, interview. New York World, March 16,
1924, editorial section, 1.
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and they eagerly purchased more and more air time. In 1928,
radio had captured one percent of the nation's total
advertising budget with estimated gross billings of $14.1
million. The medium's share climbed steadily over the next
decade: four percent in 193 0, ten percent in 1934, twenty-
one percent in 1940 on gross billings of $208 million.
Radio's ascent was matched by a proportional and steady
decline in newspaper advertising. Newspapers still
controlled the lion's share of advertising — $629 million
in 1940 — but that was $218 million less than in 1929. As
a percentage of gross advertising billing, the nation's
newspapers, which had received eighty- one percent of all
revenue in 1928, took just sixty- two percent in 1940.
^
Broadcasters aci'oss the country did not share equally
in the medium's growth. The most powerful stations, which
could assemble the largest and most desirable audiences,
were the most prosperous. Smaller stations struggled to
make ends meet. "Probably two thirds of the existing radio
^ FCC, An Economic Study of Standard Broadcasting , 98,
100. QrosE newspaper advertising billings did not regain
1929 's level until 1946. According to Commerce Department
and advertising industry figures cited in the FCC study,
both the nation's disposable personal income and
advertising expenditures bottomed out in 1933 and did not
regain 1929 's level until 1941. Media advertising accounted
for slightly more than half of the nation's total
promotional, marketing and advertising expenditures
throughout the 193 0s. Magazine publishers' advertising
share remained relatively constant throughout the period,
drifting from eighteen percent in 1928 to a low of fifteen
percent in 1933, 1934 and 1935 before rebounding to
seventeen percent in 194 0. The growth of radio advertising,
therefore, came almost entirely at the expense of the
newspaper industry.
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stations," Senator Clarence Dill stated in 1934, "are not
able to do more than pay for their own maintenance now. "5
The grinding democracy of the marketplace made the strong
stronger. It cost money to provide listeners with top shelf
talent. The most popular programs attracted the largest
audiences which, in turn, attracted advertisers who could
pay for still more expensive programming.
This dynamic of commerce led to the most remarkable
aspect of radio in the 193 06: the spectacular development
of the national radio networks. The first ad hoc chains had
been forged in the early 192 0s to broadcast special events
of national interest such as the World Series and political
party conventions. The National Broadcasting Company's Red
and Blue chains, the Columbia Broadcasting System and the
Mutual Broadcasting System came to dominate the air waves
in the prime listening hours by providing stations across
the country with live programming over networks of leased
te 1 ephone 1 ine s .
^
^ Congress, Senate, Senator Clarence C. Dill of
Washington during debate on the Wagner -Hatfield Amendment
to the Communications Act, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess.,
CongreBBional Record (May 15, 1934), vol. 78, pt . 8, 8830.
^ The time differences across the country presented an
obvious problem here. A program broadcast at eight o'clock
in the East would air live on the West Coast at four in the
afternoon, significantly reducing its possible audience.
The networks responded to the problem by offering repeat
performances of popular programs for the West Coast and
also created regional mini -networks which fed programming
to the western half of the country exclusively.
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While technology made the radio chains possible, the
imperatives of commercial broadcasting made their creation
mandatory. Advertisers sought to reach beyond the range of
even the most powerful and popular single station to
attract a national audience."^ While the benefits of
national networks to advertisers were obvious, broadcasters
argued that listeners were the ultimate beneficiaries. Our
system of privately-operated, commercially- supported radio,
they said, provided the best programming in the world. Most
Americans seemed to agree and listened in growing numbers
to Jack Benny, Edgar Bergen and Charlie McCarthy, Bing
Crosby, Toscanini ' s NBC Symphony, the World Series, events
only the networks could afford to bring to every corner of
the country because , as Sarnof f himself stated, "radio
proved itself an important medium in the highly compet it ive
field of advertising. "®
"7 See Susan Renee Smulyan, " 'And Now a Word from our
Sponsors. . . ' : Commercialization of American Broadcast
Radio, 1920-1934" (Ph.D. diss. , Yale University, 1985)
.
Standard practice called for the chains and their
affiliates to share advertising revenues from sponsored
network programming. The chains also produced "sustaining"
programs which were not sponsored. NBC charged affiliates a
fee for sustainers while Columbia made them available at no
charge in exchange for an option insuring the network
access to a portion of the local station's air time,
® David Sarnof f, testimony in Official Report of
Proceedings Before the Federal Comniuni cations CommiGeion at
Washington, D.C. in the matter of ComndsBion Order No.
37, Investigation of Chain or Network Broadcasting,
Monopoly in the Broadcasting Industry and Related Mat ters
,
docket no. 5060, vol. 1 (November 14, 1938), 33, in box
1400, Record Group 173, National Archives National Records
Center, Suitland, Maryland; hereafter "FCC docket no.
5 060 . "
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Free radio, free enterprise and free choice, the
industry argument went, had proven superior in every way to
government control. In Europe, state monopolies controlled
broadcasting, producing a product that was dull, elitist
and potentially "the most effective agency ever devised for
the enslavement of the mass mentality of a nation.
Critics carped that the growing influence of the networks
was limiting program choices and overwhelming radio with
advertising chatter. Was this, they asked, truly in the
public interest? Sarnoff argued that it was. American radio
had proven profoundly democratic. "The richest man," he
said, "cannot buy for himself what the poorest man gets
free by radio. "^^
The rhetoric of broadcasters remained remarkably
consistent through the years. Radio was a resource of
unlimited potential that could be best developed for the
benefit of the people by dynamic free enterprise. American
broadcasting was popular and profitable, yes, but it was
also committed to serving the public interest. When NBC was
created in 1926, the network promised it would "be an
instrument of great public service" and "provide the best
program available for broadcasting in the United States."
Management decisions would "reflect enlightened public
9 William Hard, "Should the U.S. Adopt the British
System of Radio Control? Arguments Opposing," Cong[ressional
Digest, August -September 19 33 , 217
.
10 Sarnoff, testimony in FCC docket no. 5060, 33.
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opinion" and be overseen by a prestigious Advisory Council
of distinguished private citizens which would insure
quality, fairness and good taste. A dozen years later,
Sarnoff reaffirmed the pledge. "In every consideration of
radio broadcasting," he said, "the 'public interest' we are
pledged to serve is that of the entire nation, "i-
Radio, driven by revenue derived from its stewardship
of the public air waves, never tired of counting the ways
it served the public interest. One was news and public
affairs programming. By educating the public on issues of
importance, broadcasting could become, in the words of
Columbia's president William S. Paley, "a stronger and
stronger tool of democracy . "^^ The networks and stations
across the country broadcast news summaries to supplement
their established schedules of talks and expanded live
^1 "Announcing the National Broadcasting Company,
Inc.," display advertisement, New York Times, September 14,
1926, 27; LOuise M. Benjamin, "Birth of A Network's
'Conscience:' The NBC Advisory Council, 1927," JournaliBn)
Quarterly 66 (Autumn 1989), 587-590. The Council's
distinguished seventeen original members formed a
prototypical "blue ribbon" commission carefully selected to
represent and impress the public. They included 1924
Democrat ic pres ident ial nominee John W . Davis , president
s
William Green of the American Federation of Labor and Mary
Sherman of the General Federation of Women's Clubs and not
one but two former secretaries of state: Elihu Root and
Charles Evans Hughes. Benjamin accurately points out that
the Council served as an excellent public relations shield
for NBC, adding a high gloss to the project while
deflecting possible charges of censorship and monopoly
which might have threatened the network.
12 Sarnoff, testimony in FCC docket no. 5060, 34, 40.
1^ Quoted in "Minimum Interference Asked by Paley,
"
Broadcasting, April 15, 1938, 15
.
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broadcasts of an ever wider range of special events.
Popular entertainment programming was clearly the bulwark
of commercial broadcasting, attracting the largest
audiences and providing the industry's revenue base, but
broadcast historian Erik Barnouw overstated the case when
he suggested that "with rare except ions ... there was a
blackout on current problems" on radio until the late
193 0s. 14 In fact, hardly a day passed without a variety of
news programs on the air. To be sure, in 193 0, when Amos
'n' Andy and Rudy Valee ruled the ether, listeners during
the first week of October, for example, had only one
regularly scheduled nightly network news program to tune to
— Lowell Thomas's fifteen- minute talks on WJZ and NBC's
Blue Network — but that was hardly the only listening
option for those who preferred information to
entertainment . 1^ Broadcasters devoted a remarkable amount
of air time to talks and special events and saw
informational programming — news — as a significant factor
in the growing appeal of radio.
Erik Barnouw, A Hietory of Broadcasting in the
United States, vol. 2, The Golden Web (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), 17.
15 Program listings for both New York stations and
major stations across the country for the coming week in
"Radio Programs Scheduled for Broadcast This Week," JVeiv
York Times, October 5, 1930, sec. 10, 9. Metropolitan
newspapers of the day routinely published schedules for
out-of-town broadcasters and, as the Second World War
approached, international short wave signals, testimony to
the appeal of long-distance listening.
16 Some historians appear too reliant on Harrison B.
Summers, ed. , A Thirty-Year History of Progranw Carried on
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Columbia, with New York's WABC its flagship station,
aired the most ambitious schedule of informational
programming in October, 1930.1'^ H.V. Kaltenborn discussed
current events Monday night at seven and was followed by
Alexander Woolcott's "Town Crier" program which featured
news of the lively arts. On Thursday at eight, Frederick
William Wile assessed "The Political Situation in
Washington Tonight" while "Kaltenborn Edits the News" aired
at 8:30. Other information programs during the week
included a talk by journalist Heywood Broun, the latest
Broadway gossip from Daily Mirror columnist Walter Winchell
and several important special events, including a speech by
President Hoover and live coverage of the World Series
between the Cardinals and the Athletics.
WEAF and NBC Red carried only a single program of news
analysis , Will iam Hard * s "Back of the News " Wednesday at
7:45, but aired the World Series^ several special events
National Radio Networks in the United States 1926-1956
(Columbus: Ohio State University, 1958; repr
.
, New York:
Arno, 1971) , an exhaustive and extremely useful compilation
of network program schedules, sponsors and ratings.
Summers' classification system segregates evening and
daytime programming and lists informational programs under
several different headings. More importantly, because it
limits its scope to regularly scheduled programs, it
ignores the many hours of one- time-only special events and
talks which formed a vital segment of radio's public
affairs effort
.
17 The Columbia Broadcasting System usually referred
to itself as "Columbia" throughout the 1930s. The familiar
"CBS" acronym begins to appear as an alternate designation
in 1932-33 but did not become the people's or the network's
choice until quite late in the decade.
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and talks including speeches by Hoover and retired General
John J. Pershing to the American Legion's national
convention in Boston and talks by Speaker of the House
Nicholas Longworth and New York Congressman Samuel
Dickstein. NBC Blue also carried the speeches by Hoover and
Pershing as well as the World Series. 18
The chains' commitment to information broadcasting
accelerated in 1931 and 1932. Advances in shortwave
technology made broadcasts from Europe practical, and the
networks eagerly displayed radio's ability to bring the
world home. In the first week of February, 1932, listeners
heard Pope Pius XI in Vatican City celebrate the tenth
anniversary of his coronation and the eminent physicist Sir
Oliver Lodge in London discuss the impact of science on
civilization. Both Hard on NBC Red and Wile on CBS
broadcast their evening commentaries from League of Nations
While professional teams and major colleges began
cutting deals with broadcasters in the 19206, exclusive
network broadcasts of major sporting events were the
exception not the rule until the late 1930s and the policy
of selling broadcast rights to the highest bidder did not
become universal until the 194 0s. CBS news executive Paul
White later ascribed the expensive trend to competitiveness
and greed by all involved — "I write as a penitent. . . .1
was one of the worst offenders" — and regretted that he
"helped to do radio a great disservice ... .A small immediate
gain brought about a wholesale loss." Paul W. White, News
on the Air (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1947), 300-1. In
1930, CBS demonstrated its competitiveness by beginning its
game coverage at two o'clock, fifteen minutes before NBC
went on the air, to get an edge on the larger chain. What
White would have thought of today's billion dollar sports
television rights fees can only be surmised.
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headquarters in Geneva that week, and Wile interviewed
France's minister of war.
From this side of the ocean, Kaltenborn offered
analysis Tuesday and Thursday evening on CBS while John B.
Kennedy talked about current events Friday night on NBC
Blue. Both NBC and CBS offered daily coverage of the winter
Olympics from Lake Placid and an array of talks and
speeches on current events by public figures including
President Hoover, New York State Appeals Court Judge
Benjamin Cardozo and Senators Robert F. Wagner and Arthur
Clapper
.
By 1933, in addition to the variety of special events
and talks listeners had come to expect, NBC offered two
regularly scheduled news programs each weekday. In addition
to Thomas's nightly Blue broadcast, Washington
correspondent Anne Scribner Hard, William Hard's wife,
discussed current events each morning at 9:15 on the Red
chain. William Hard's "Back of the News" aired Tuesday
evening on the Red network while Kennedy was heard on
Thursday. Columbia presented news commentary by Boake
Carter each evening at 7:45. Kaltenborn spoke Tuesday and
Thursday while Edwin C. Hill presented stories "On the
Human Side of the News" Monday through Wednesday evenings
15 "Radio Programs Scheduled for Broadcast This Week,"
New York Tiwee, February 7, 1932, sec. 8, 15.
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and hosted "The Inside Story," a news dramatization
program, on Friday. 20
CBS typically devoted more time to informational
programming than NBC. Paley saw news as a way to establish
an identity and audience for his second-place chain, and
network press releases in 1931 were emblazoned with the
slogan "Columbia — The News Network. "^i Broadcasters
understood that listeners wanted information, and they
sought to meet the demand by providing news programming in
a variety of formats.
20 "Radio Programs Scheduled for Broadcast This Week,"
New York Tiwee, February 5, 19 33, sec. 9, 11. This genre,
most famously represented by "March of Time" which debuted
in 1931, would remain a fixture on network and local radio
for years. Some news dramatizations relied on actors to
impersonate figures in the news while others, such as
Columbia's "We The People, " "Report to the Nation" and
"Dateline" series, frequently brought the actual
participants in an event before the microphone to retell
their stories with the assistance of appropriate sound
effects and musical augmentation. Although critics
frequently called the programs sensational or maudlin, the
chains approached their preparation earnestly. CBS policy
directed script writers to use a participant's exact words
if they could be determined and allowed fictional dialogue
only if it was in character and could be supported by
evidence. Rehearsals for one episode of "March of Time"
were suspended while researchers determined the proper key
for the tolling of London's Big Ben. See White, News on the
Air, 249-98; Edward Bliss, Jr., Now the News: The Story of
Broadcast Journalism (New York: Columbia University Press,
1991), 66-8. White provides several complete scripts of
radio news dramatizations including a two-part "Dateline"
from November, 1943 in which CBS correspondent Eric
Sevareid helped re-enact his trek to safety out of the
jungles of Burma. Bliss says Big Ben sounds in low E.
21 Sally Bedell Smith, In All His Glory: The Life of
William S. Paley (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 159-
66 .
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As the 193 0s began, professional journalists such as
Kaltenborn, Wile and Hard, no longer mere announcers, began
to report the news on the radio. Nearly all of the
commentators, as they came to be called, came to
broadcasting with extensive newspaper or magazine
backgrounds. They combined their training and experience
with the technology of the new medium to create a different
kind of journalism. The broadcasts included summaries of
the day's events, but the commentators attracted listeners
because of their personalities, insights and opinions.
Radio had proven it could bring events into the home, but
these programs did more than that. They served as a gloss
to the events and opinions which listeners heard over the
air and helped make sense of the increasingly confusing
world. 22
The radio commentators soon began to attract both
loyal listeners and the attention of advertisers. As the
prosperity of the New Era collapsed into depression, the
nation seemed caught between conflicting eras and
contradictory ways of life. "A vague fear" spread among
Americans, suggested historian Warren Susman, "an ongoing
sense that things were not quite right, in the natural
order, in the moral order, in the technological order, and
22 Robert R. Smith, "The Origins of Radio Network News
Commentary," Journal of Broadcasting 3 (Spring 1965), 117.
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most especially in the relationships among them. "23 such
times, listeners looked to those who could make sense of
the confusion and help them decide what was right, what was
wrong, what to do. They welcomed the commentators'
opinions, accepting as valid a veteran Washington
correspondent's observation that "conjecture and
speculation have a value if they come from a good man in a
ringside seat. "24
By 1934, about a third of all network programming was
paid for and produced by advertising agencies which sought
to provide both large audiences and appropriate backgrounds
for their clients' messages. ^5 unsponsored broadcasts did
not directly provide revenue, but sustaining programs, as
they were called, fulfilled an important role in radio.
They al lowed broadcasters to counter charges of excessive
commercialism while experimenting with new talent and
program forms and demonstrating their mandated concern with
the public interest. At the same time, the best sustaining
programs boosted the overall image and audience of the
chain or station which ultimately translated to larger
audiences and more revenue from sponsored programs.
23 Warren I, Susman, Culture As History: The
Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth Century
(New York: Pantheon, 1984), 192.
24 Raymond Clapper quoted in Frank Luther Mott,
American Journalism, revised edition (New York: Macmillan,
1950) , 692 .
2 5 Barnouw, The Golden Web, 16-7.
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Just as the Brooklyn Eaofle believed in the 192 06 that
it gained prestige and circulation from Kaltenborn's radio
talks on current events, information programming proved the
perfect environment for some advertisers. Local stations
across the country made newscasts a standard part of their
broadcast days and often found advertisers ready to buy.
KMPC in Los Angeles aired three fifteen-minute news
summaries each day. KFAB in Lincoln, Nebraska hired the
city editor of the local newspaper to direct a twice
-a-day
"radio newspaper." WEEI in Boston offered fifteen-minute
"news despatches" as well as a locally-produced commentary
program. KHJ in Los Angeles, WHKC in Columbus, Ohio and
stations owned and operated by newspapers such as the St.
Louis Post -Dispatch , Kansas City Star and Detroit Free
Press were also among the early providers of news
broadcasts
.
The first network sponsor to use a nightly newscast to
promote itself was the Literary Digest. Largely a summary
of newspaper and magazine items gathered from across the
country, the Digest in 1929 saw radio news as a fine
vehicle for reaching its target audience. As its radio
voice, the Digest chose Floyd Gibbons, a famous and
26 See the published radio logs in many larger daily
newspapers. The WEEI and KHJ schedules are from the New
York Times, October 7, 192 8, sec. 10, 21-2. See also
Mitchell Charnley, News By Radio (New York: Macmillan,
1948), 1-15; Bliss, Now the News, 45-8; "What Broadcasting
Does for a Newspaper," Radio Broadcast, February 1924, 344-
6.
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flamboyant foreign correspondent in the beet Richard
Harding Davie ctyle.
Gibbons had literally wandered into radio earlier that
year. While researching a short story, he visited NBC to
see how the medium worked and quickly discovered the magic
of the microphone . 27 Gibbons had covered the First World
War for the Chicago Tribune, surviving a U-boat attack in
the Atlantic and losing an eye at Belleau Wood. Sporting a
white eye patch, he delivered the news at a breakneck pace
with a highly personal bent. A colleague observed that
while Gibbons might "at times overdress the naked truth in
dramatic embroideries [and] make his own role in the cosmic
pageant the principal one, his winged words are never
altogether unreliable.
Audiences tuned in and the Digest circulation
cl imbed while Gibbons held forth, but the magaz ine dropped
him in the fall of 1930. Dozens of candidates were
auditioned before the Digest settled on Lowell Thomas, a
Bliss, Now The News, 27.
28 Percy Hammond of the New York Herald Tribune quoted
in Literary Digest , October 15, 1932, 21.
29 Lowell Thomas, Good Evening, Everybody (New York:
Avon, 1976), 290-2. Gibbons, Thomas wrote in his
autobiography, was sacked because his hard-drinking
lifestyle personally offended the teetotalling chief
executive of the Digest's parent company. The final straw
was the arrival of Gibbons and his party on his boss's Long
Island door step late one night in search of a drink.
Still, the Digest tolerated him for a year because he
attracted an audience and his program produced results.
Gibbons and Thomas enjoyed a plum time slot immediately
before "Amos 'n' Andy" went on the air.
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globetrotting journalist, author and popular lecturer.
Although they were not quite sure how to define it, both
broadcasters and advertisers understood that personality
was critical to success in the medium. Graham McNamee of
WEAF devoted a chapter of his 1926 autobiography to letters
he had received from his listeners. "The intensity of
feeling on the part of the radio fans," he marveled, was
"astonishing." The audience thought of the announcers as
intimate friends.
This kind of power delighted advertisers and radio
station owners but left many others uneasy. Social
scientists, presented with a new field to analyze, soon
added their academic imprimatur to the phenomenon. A
pioneer in the field, Hadley Cantril, suggested "the
immediacy and reality of the radio voice" had a profound
impact on the listener. "If the voice sounds friendly and
informal, he feels almost as if he were receiving a
neighborly visit," Cantril wrote, "Rarely is he indifferent
to the radio voice." Cantril concluded that radio had a
"tenacious grip... on the mental life of men" Listening to a
familiar, persuasive radio voice, he wrote, "we respond to
it, and even obey its commands. "^^
30 Graham McNamee with Robert Gordon Anderson, You're
on the Air (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1926), 172-89,
quotation at 174.
31 Hadley Cantril and Gordon W. Allport, The
PBychology of Radio (New York: Harper & Brothers, 193 5;
repr., Salem, New Hampshire : Ayer, 1986), 3, 9, 18, 259-60.
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The political implications were obvious. In 1928, the
two major parties poured an estimated $2 million into radio
time. The Democratic National Committee spent $650,000 to
promote the Smith-Robinson ticket and afterwards said it
received in response to radio appeals a quarter-million
letters, ten-thousand telegrams and $600,000 in cash
contributions
.
As the power of radio became more evident and the
political climate grew increasingly contentious during the
1930s, stations and, especially, the chains would become
the targets of a growing number of freedom of speech
disputes. Reliant on six-month licenses granted by the
federal government , the increasingly profitable industry
began to sense political perils around every corner. Still,
broadcasters ultimately sought to please their listeners
and listeners wanted to hear voices which had something to
say. Such voices were truly pearls of great price which
could command both profit and prestige.
Thomas, who would be a familiar radio voice for more
than forty years, took full advantage of the medium's
intimacy by sharing with his listeners stories about his
adventures but studiously avoiding partisanship and
controversy. His cardinal rule, he wrote, was "not to
confuse opinions with hard news or be drawn into taking
=^2 David G, Clark, "Radio in Presidential Campaigns:
The Early Years (1924-1932)," Journal of Broadcasting 6
(Summer 1962) , 233
.
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sides. "33 General Smedley Butler, a Marine hero of the
first war, visited Thomas early in his career to caution
"you have the ear of America as no one has had it before.
Why, with a few words, or even an inflection of your voice,
you might start a revolution. "34 Thomas believed
broadcasters should use their power to judiciously indicate
where America was, not to lead the nation toward a
particular course
.
Gibbons was far less circumspect. Fully confident that
his perception of events was the revealed truth, he did not
hesitate to air his opinions. Reviewing the ratings and
reading their mail, broadcasters knew personal opinion was
popular, but it was also, they believed, potentially
dangerous. After the Digest pulled the plug on his daily
program, he continued to broadcast for NBC until his death
in 1939
,
reflecting the network ' s judgment that Gibbons
appealed to audiences. Politically, however, he could be a
loose cannon. In the fall of 1932, Gibbons broadcast from
the American Legion convention and his comments on the rout
of the Bonus Army in Washington caused a commotion in New
York. John Royal, NBC's head of programming, fired a
warning telegram off to Gibbons after the broadcast, the
trade journal Variety reported, then "did another burnup"
when Gibbons criticized Attorney General Mitchell's speech
33 Thomas, Oood Evening, Everybody, 3 01
34 Thomas, Good Evening, Everybody, 2 96
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to the Legion. "The network felt," Variety reported,
" [Gibbons] put it in an embarrassing spot with the
Washington administration. "^5
As radio news sought to define itself, it was pushed
in a new direction. After years of cordial support, and
often outright boosterism, for the new medium, the
newspaper industry sought to bring radio to heel.^^ Jealous
of radio's growth as an advertising medium, its impact on
circulation and its increasing role as a provider of
information, the publishers launched what came to be known
as the Press -Radio War. Intending to crush their rival, the
newspapers instead accelerated the development of radio as
an independent force
.
Radio ' s spectacular coverage of two stories in 1932
forced the publishers' hand. In March, the infant son of
Charles Lindbergh was kidnapped from the family home in New
Jersey. Both NBC and CBS filled the air with bulletins
chronicling the fate of the child Lowell Thomas called "the
world's most famous baby. "^"^ That fall, the election
campaign dominated the air. Candidates spent an estimated
"Inside Stuff — Radio," Variety, September 20,
1932, 49.
For an analysis of how newspapers promoted the new
medium and helped shape "the social construction of radio,"
see Susan J. Douglas, Invent incf American Broadcasting- 1899-
1922 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
Note also detailed and generally friendly coverage of the
1924 convention broadcasts Gupra.
Bliss, Now the News, 31-4.
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$5 million for radio time - the largest share of the
Roosevelt campaign budget was set aside for buying access
to the airwaves - and the chains brought up-to-the-minute
election night returns to the nation.
The machinations leading up to election night became a
farce which revealed the newspaper industry's confusion
when it came to dealing with its rival. CBS had intended to
purchase returns compiled by United Press. Shortly before
the election, UP executives backed out of the deal claiming
their newspaper clients were opposed to the idea.
Meanwhile, the Associated Press, unaware that its rival had
broken its agreement, decided it did not want to give up
such a rich opportunity for radio publicity and offered its
service to both CBS and NBC. UP, now fearing it would lose
prestige if only AP returns were broadcast, quickly
reconnected its teletype at CBS and installed one at NBC.
On election night
,
representatives of the third maj or wire
service. International News Service, arrived at the
networks' studios to install teletypes, asking only an on-
the-air credit in return. As a result, radio brought nev/s
of Roosevelt's election to the public hours before the
first extras hit the streets.
^® Clark, "Radio in Presidential Campaigns," 236-7.
^9 White, News on the Air, 34-6.
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Radio, a press critic of the time wrote, "was the hare
that broke the tortoise's heart. "40 it did not whet the
public appetite for information, the publishers believed,
it took the edge off the news and thus reduced circulation.
Radio's advantage of immediacy, the publishers knew, was
beyond their ability to counteract unless they could change
the rules of the game. As Roy Howard of the Scripps
-Howard
newspaper chain put it, "If news is to be given out before
I can deliver it,... I'm interested in protecting my
rights . "^i
The leaders of the broadcasting industry hoped to
avoid a confrontation, but as NBC president Merlin H.
Aylesworth admitted, many publishers became convinced as
the depression deepened that radio was "a serious and
dangerous competitor for advertising and circulation
patronage . "42 the spring of 1933, a coalition of
publishers led by Roy Howard moved against radio on two
fronts. The AP cut off all news reports to the networks and
restricted service to individual stations. UP and INS,
bowing to pressure from newspaper subscribers, followed
suit, and by late spring the flow of news copy to
broadcasters dried up. At the same time, the American
40 Isabelle Keating, "Pirates of the Air," Harper's
Monthly Magazine, September 1934, 463.
41 Quoted in "Publishers: Would Curb Radio in News
Field," NewB-Week, May 6, 1933, 26.
42 Quoted in Giraud Chester, "The Press -Radio War:
1933-1935," Public Opinion Quarterly 13 (Summer 1949), 254.
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Newspaper Publisher c AGGociation convention adopted a
resolution calling on memberG to publiGh program Gcheduleo
and press releases only as paid advertising . ^3
It was altogether appropriate that the 1932 election
had helped bring the conflict between newspapers and
broadcasterG to a head. Although Herbert Hoover shaped
radio regulation more decisively than any other chief
executive, Franklin D. Roosevelt was in the public's mind
the radio president. His administration spanned network
radio's golden age, and he was an acknowledged master of
the medium. With most of the nation's newspaper publishers
aligned against him, radio, a biographer noted, became
Roosevelt's "one great line of communication to the
people.'"*^ His radio talks, meticulously scripted but
del ivered with studied informal ity , made mill ions feel that
he was not only their president but their friend, a caring,
concerned ally who, as one New Dealer put it, knew and
understood " their little town and mill, their little 1 ives
and problems . '"^^
By the time he reached the White House, Roosevelt was
a proven veteran at the microphone. His "happy warrior"
4^ Chester, "The Press-Radio War," 254-57/ White, NewB
on the Air, 30-42
.
44 James MacGregor Burns, Rooeevelt : The Lion and the
Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956) , 455.
45 Federal Emergency Relief Administration field
investigator Martha Gellhorn quoted in Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Rooeevelt : The Coming of the
New Deal (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1959), 572.
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cpeech nominating Alfred E. Smith had been a highlight of
the 1924 Democratic convention broadcast. The galleriec at
Madicon Square Garden, McNamee recalled, "Dnapped wide
open" as Roooevelt concluded, drowning hie final centencec
with a roar. 46 when he nominated Smith for a oecond time at
the 1928 HouGton convention, Roocevelt delivered an
entirely different cpeech, directed not go much to the
convention delegatec ac to the radio audience at home. It
wac an unprecedented kind of political oratory, the New
York Timea obcerved, "limpid and unaffected.
. .without a
Gingle trace of fuctian, " free of the bombact that had
alwayc marked effective ctump cpeaking . ^"^ Roocevelt knew
the new medium required new ckillc.
Ac governor of New York, Roocevelt broadcact in 1929
hie f irct f ireGide chatc . Directed primarily at upctate
reader c of hoct ile Republ ican newcpaperc , Roocevel t ac cured
broadcacterc the talkc would be nonpartican diccuccionc of
state isGuec. Not curpr isingly , the chatc were interpreted
by his opponents ac attacks and helped propel him to a
lands 1 ide re-election in 193 0."^®
By 1933, Roosevelt was a radio professional, more
adept than many who made their living on the air. Recalling
the first presidential fireside chat, Robert Trout,
4^ McNamee, You * re on the Air, 82.
Burns, The Lion and the Fox, 99.
48 Burns, The Lion and the Fox, 118-9
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Columbia's announcer at the White House that night, said
"we weren't used to performers like that, especially not a
performer who also happened to be President of the United
States . "49
The President was not the only Roosevelt on the air.
Eleanor Roosevelt became one of the best known radio
personalities of the decade. In 1935, she was paid $72,000
— which she turned over to the American Friends Service
Committee — by a shoe company for a series of broadcast
talks. ^0 Elliott Roosevelt, the president's second son, ran
a chain of Texas radio stations and broadcast commentaries
aired nationally on the Mutual network. He would become a
prominent and contentious figure within the industry by the
end of the decade, often editorializing against his
father ' s pol icies
.
Despite the publ ishers ' best efforts , radio news did
not go away. Popular with listeners and advertisers,
newscasts were cheap and easy for broadcasters to produce.
Most stations had never hired reporters or subscribed to a
wire service. Instead, they followed a simple formula: "Get
Quoted in Bliss, Now the News, 52.
50 Joseph P. Lash, Eleanor and Franklin (New York:
W.W. Norton, 1971) , 418-9.
51 "Regarding Code Compliance," NAB [National
Association of Broadcasters] Reports 7 (October 20, 1939),
3779; Ted Morgan, FDR: A Biography (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1985), 460-1. Harold Ickes, after listening to
one of his anti-third term editorials, confided in his
diary, "Elliott Roosevelt is being insufferable again."
Quoted in Morgan, FDR, 46 0.
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a raconteur with a good voice, a lively imagination, and a
copy of the afternoon paper, and there was your program. "^2
With the publishers on the rampage, radio stations could no
longer take the customary shortcuts, but rather than
abandon news, broadcasters took up the publishers'
challenge
.
Columbia, with General Mills agreeing to pay the bill
in exchange for exclusive sponsorship, set up its own news
service with correspondents in every major city.^^ At NBC,
Thomas and his two-man staff worked the phones. Thomas
quickly found that police chiefs and mayors around the
country, "flattered to have attracted the attention of a
New York radio station, would provide us with fresh and
exclusive material right up to air time.''^"^
When the information embargo failed, the publishers
invoked the publicity blackout. As the Columbia News
Service grew, newspapers dropped program logs of the
chain's affiliates because, as the Washington Star
declared, the network had become "a direct competitor to
our paper" in the news field. To make matters worse, many
papers continued to publish listings of Columbia's rivals,
^2 isabelle Keating, "Radio Invades Journalism," The
Nation, June 12, 1935, 677.
53 White, News on the Air, 38-9.
5^ Thomas, Good Evening, Everybody, 298.
55 Quoted in "Radio News: Columbia News Service Has
Troubled Start," News-Week, October 7, 1933, 27.
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placing the network's stations at a major competitive
disadvantage. Columbia, the self
-proclaimed news network,
trembled. NBC, fearing the newspapers would soon attack its
stations, grew fearful. By the end of 1933, broadcasters
sued for peace.
Representatives of the publishers, wire services,
networks and the National Association of Broadcasters,
representing station owners across the country, gathered at
New York's Hotel Biltmore to negotiate an armistice which
from radio's perspective more closely resembled a
surrender. The pact called for the networks to suspend all
news gathering operations. In exchange, a new wire service,
the Press-Radio Bureau, would be established to provide the
chains and interested stations each day with two five-
minute news summaries based on AP reports. The first could
be broadcast no earlier than 9:30 in the morning; the
second, no earlier than nine at night. Except for
developments of "transcendent importance" which would be
"written and broadcast in such a manner to stimulate public
interest in the reading of newspapers," the summaries would
contain only items already available in print. Neither
summary could be sponsored. As a final insult, the
broadcasters agreed to pay all costs associated with
preparing and distributing the summaries.
5^ Chester, "The Press-Radio War," 256-7.
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The publishers' spokesman claimed "the public interest
will be served by making available to any radio station in
the United States for broadcasting purposes brief daily
reports of authentic news, "57 agreed with him. The
settlement was widely seen for what it was, a surrender by
the chains which dominated the new medium to the barons of
the old with neither side worrying very much about the
public interest. The publishers, claimed The New Republic,
sought "to establish a dictatorship of the blue pencil over
the microphone [by] attempting to bottle the news and
administer it in five-minute doses only twice a day."^® CBS
news director Paul White later wrote the agreement brought
peace, but "the loser was the public. "^^ Columbia's Paley
was, News-Week noted, "the man who made most concessions,"
trading competition for the "tacit understanding that
newspapers were to adopt a more liberal policy on radio
publ icity .
"
In Washington, the settlement caught the attention of
radio's regulators. Senator Clarence Dill called the
Biltmore Agreement "suppression" of the news. If the
E.H. Harris, "Note to editors," January 31, 1934,
reprinted in 73rd Cong., 2nd sess., CongreBsional Record
(February 19, 1934), vol. 78, pt . 3, 2726-7.
58 c.W. Whittemore, "Radio's Fight for News," The New
Republic, February 6, 193 5, 3 54.
5^ White, NewB on the Air, 42.
"Radio News: Broadcasters and Newspapers Make
Peace," News -Week, December 23, 1933, 18.
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restrictionG were not eaced, he predicted, "there will be a
radio newc cervice ectabliched in the country that will
give the newc collection agenciec a good deal more trouble
than they have ever had up to this time from radio
broadcactG." Americanc, Dill caid, "expect the radio
GtationG to give them information. "^^
The publicherc, by and large, were determined to ride
out cuch criticiGm becauce they did not believe radio could
gather newc. Dill'c prediction of "a radio newc cervice"
wac derided by the newcpaper trade journal Editor and
Publicher ac "a monumental bluff." BroadcaGterG coon proved
the doubters wrong. The Bocton-baced Yankee Network
provided daily newGcactc to eight Gtations around New
England. The chain' g editor-in-chief caid the Yankee
Network newc cervice — "exactly ac outl ined by Senator
Dill" — had become in lecc than a year "a recognized
nececcity, with a proven following many timec lar-ger than
that of any othex' radio program. "^-^ The Don Lee ctationc in
California launched a cimilar Wect Coact newc chain^ and
many independent ctationG including WOR in New York and WLS
in Chicago jumped heartily into the newG buGinecG. A new
wire cervice , Trancradio Precc , wae organized to cerve the
^1 Senator Clarence C. Dill, "Radiobroadcact ing of
Newc," 73rd Cong., 2nd cecG., Congressional Record
(February 19, 1934), vol. 78, pt . 3, 2726.
^2 Leland Bickford, News While It Is News (Bocton:
G. C. Manthorne, 1935) , 64 -6
.
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independents and within a year was sending up to fifty-
thousand words of copy a day to its clients,
Launched by the newspaper industry to protect its
vested interests, the Press-Radio War ended with a scramble
for economic gain. In 1934, at a meeting of the executive
committee of the Press-Radio Bureau, United Press president
Hugh Baillie referred to Transradio and the regional radio
news chains as "outlaws" and insisted they "should be
squashed at the outset." His sentiments were ringingly
endorsed by his counterpart at International News
Service. Less than a year later, both UP and INS,
acknowledging the valuable radio market and seeing a chance
to steal a march on the venerable AP, announced they would
begin servicing broadcasters. The AP held out but finally
established its own radio service as the Second World War
approached.
Resistance to the pact, negotiated by the national
networks, was led by individual stations or small groups
seeking to continue popular programming. With an early wink
Bliss, Now the News, 43-4. Transradio 's finest
moment — and the Press -Radio Bureau's worst — came on
February 13, 1935 when Press-Radio prematurely flashed that
Bruno Richard Hauptmann had been convicted of kidnapping
the Lindbergh baby but had escaped the death penalty.
Transradio got the story right, and Press-Radio issued an
awkward correction ten minutes later. See Bliss, Now the
News, 35 or, for an especially gloating account, Bickford,
News While It Is News, 105-8.
^4 Quoted in Chester, The Press -Radio War, 259.
^5 Bliss, Now the News, 44.
135
and nod from the influential Dill, they reckoned they could
proceed without regulatory peril, a guess confirmed when
their licenses were routinely renewed. The network stations
soon followed suit. WEAF and WJZ, the NBC flagship
stations, offered six news summaries a day by early 1936.
Mutual '6 WOR aired five while Columbia's WABC broadcast
two. In addition, each carried its network's nightly news
and information programming.^^
Broadcasting emerged from the Press-Radio War with its
reputation as an information medium enhanced. The industry,
however, still had to contend with the implications of
federal regulation. With Hoover, broadcasting's champion,
defeated, the industry watched with trepidation as the New
Deal took shape. Roosevelt, however, was slow to turn his
attention to broadcasting. The consensus of the 192 0s which
allowed broadcasters to occupy the ether under the
supervision of sympathetic federal regulation survived the
election of 1932. Critics fretted over monopoly control of
radio, but the American system of broadcasting still seemed
the best course for the medium . The crises of the time
,
many broadcast to the nation by radio, dominated the
political agenda. In the maelstrom of Roosevelt's first
term, radio simply did not command a high priority.
One issue which might have forced the New Deal to act
was laid to rest in the final days of the Hoover
6^ "Radio Programs Scheduled for Broadcast This Week,"
New York Times, February 2, 1936, sec. 9, 13.
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adminiGtration. The Federal Trade CommiGsion monopoly probe
of the radio patent allies had resulted in a Justice
Department antitrust suit in 1930, A dauntingly prolix
dispute pitting the federal government against several of
the nation's largest corporations, the suit was settled out
of court less than three weeks after the 1932 election. The
consent decree created an independent Radio Corporation of
America, no longer a subsidiary of General Electric and
West inghouse
,
and solved the most pressing radio "problem"
which might have confronted the new president . During the
first summer of the Roosevelt administration, the National
Recovery Administration did belatedly authorize a code for
the broadcasting business. The code, drafted with the help
of the National Association of Broadcasters, mandated
minimum wages, but radio stations, which neither
manufactured a tangible product nor sold their services to
the general publ ic , were far from center stage as the
administrat ion struggled to reverse the nat ion ' s economic
collapse . ^®
The one major piece of broadcast law enacted by
Congress during the first term, the Communications Act of
^'^ Kenneth Bilby, The General: David Sarnoff and the
Rise of the Cowwuni cations Industry (New York: Harper &
Row, 1986), 111-38. As Bilby notes, Sarnoff was already
focused on the development of television by the start of
the New Deal and saw radio profits as the means of
financing the new medium. This made NBC especially
sensitive to any threat to commercial broadcasting as it
existed.
6® Barnouw, The Golden Web, 31.
1934, became the new controlling document of American
broadcaGting.^9 At the time, however, it wac concidered a
minor piece of the New Deal ' c legiclative quilt, a largely
adminictrative reform. The Radio Act of 1927 had concerned
itself solely with wirelecB communications. Telephone and
telegraph regulation remained the province of the
Interstate Commerce Commission and the Poet Office
Department with the Department of State exercising a
measure of control over international service . As part of a
broader reform movement, Roosevelt moved to bring all
electronic communications under a single regulatory agency.
In the fall of 1933, the president directed Secretary of
Commerce Daniel C. Roper to set up an interagency study
group to ratify the concept and, in February of 19 34,
Roosevelt asked Congress to create a new Federal
Communications Commission . One day after the president '
s
message was sent to the Hill, bills to do just that were
introduced in the Senate by Dill and in the House by
Democrat Sam Rayburn of Texas. Both had participated in the
work of Roper's panel and endorsed its limited goals.
Neither sought to disturb the existing structure of radio
regulation.
69 See especially Robert W. McChesney, "Franklin
Roosevelt, His Administration, and the Communications Act
of 1934," Awerioan Journalieni 5 (1988), 204-29; Philip T.
Rosen, The Modern Stentore: Radio Broadcaeters and the
Federal Government , 1920 -193 4 , (Westport , Connecticut
:
Greenwood, 198 0) , 161-79
.
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The Radio Act had institutionalized the conceptc of
public ownerchip and private uce of the ether and
establiGhed the public interect standard as the measure for
deciding who would be allowed to broadcast. Congress,
however, had left important issues unresolved. The law
condemned monopoly and censorship and promised equal access
but left it to the Federal Radio Commission to work out the
prickliest details. Most significantly, it was up to the
FRC to determine just what Congress meant by "the public
interest, convenience and necessity." Through it all,
legislators kept a constant vigil over the Commission's
budget
,
personnel and decisions
.
While sniping at regulatory agencies is not unusual,
the FRC ' s troubles stand out . A 19 32 Brookings Institution
report concluded "probably no quasi - j udic ial body was ever
subject to so much congressional pressure as the Federal
Radio Commiss ion . " "^o The FRC was created to restore order
in broadcasting in the wake of the Zenith decision. To
accompl ish that goal , the commiss ioners were forced to
determine which radio stations were truly serving the
public interest. Understandably reluctant to tamper with
popular stations able to generate thousands of letters to
members of Congress , the commissioners most often targeted
smaller operations. Stations which failed to attract mass
70 Laurence F. Schmeckebier , The Federal Radio
CommiBGion: Its History, Activities and Organization
(Washington: Brookings Institution, 1932) , 54-5.
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audiences were seen as electronic clutter, obstacles to
clear reception of popular programming. Dozens of
broadcasters representing educational institutions,
religious groups and non-profit agencies became, as the FRC
phrased it, "martyrs to the cause of better radio, "'^i This
was not what many advocates of freedom of the air had had
in mind, but Wallace White, the House sponsor of the Radio
Act, had foreseen just such a result. The public interest
standard, he had assured a colleague, would in practice
benefit popular stations. Common sense, he suggested,
indicated that allowing marginal stations to clutter the
air "would tend to a confusion and chaos manifestly against
public interest and convenience "^^
The conflation of private profit and public interest,
so often espoused in the 1920s, had in the 1930s lost much
of its appeal. WLWL, a New York City station operated by
the Paulist Fathers, saw its air time and power
authorization reduced by a series of FRC decisions favoring
popular stations. Father John Harney, the order's superior,
told a Senate committee it was clear the "liking of the
commission was commercial — ' oh, yes ; income , income . We
will do everything we can for you. Religion, education —
Federal Radio Commission, Second Annual Report of
the Federal Radio CommisBion (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1928), 73.
72 White to Rep. Allen T. Treadway, November 22, 1926,
box 51, Wallace H. White, Jr. Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
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well, there ic a difficulty there. '""^^ Harney and other
opponentc of radio-ac
-ucual hoped the new Communicat ionc
Act would addrecD their concernc
. Shortly before the
interagency panel iccued itc report, Roper acked Roocevelt
to appoint a new committee to ctudy broadcasting. Radio,
Roper wi-ote, had received "inadequate attention" and
warranted "cpecial cone iderat ion . " The president was at
first supportive, but Dill and Rayburn convinced him that a
new study would become a showcase for critics of commercial
broadcasting and make it impossible for any administrative
reform to clear Congress that year. Denied a forum for*
expressing their views, the critics took their campaign to
the floor of the Senate.
Their vehicle was the Wagner -Hat f ie Id amendment
setting aside a quarter of all radio frequencies for
schools, colleges, churches and other non-profit "human
wel fare " agenc ies . Sponsored by Democrat Robert Wagner of
New York and Republican Henry Hatfield of West Virginia,
the plan attracted support from those concerned with the
dominat ion of the medium by commerc ial broadcasters and,
especially, the increasingly powerful chains . The idea that
a portion of the broadcast band should be set aside for
non-profit broadcasters was not new. Dill had included
Testimony in Congress , Senate , Committee on
Interstate Commerce, A Bill to Provide for Regulation of
Interstate and Foreign Communications by Wire or Radio,
hearings on S. 2910, 73rd Cong., 2nd sess . (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1934), 190.
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Gimilar language in his version of the Radio Act, but it
was deleted in conference at White 'g insictence. White, who
had been elected to the Senate in 1930, recalled that the
set-aside issue was "one of the most difficult problems we
had to deal with." He had included language in a
preliminary version of the House bill directing the
Commerce Department to "establish priorities as to the
character of service, but even that was so controversial
that it was eliminated from the final draft." Rather than
risk "interminable discussion here in the legislative body"
which could have killed needed reform, White explained, he
passed the buck to the regulators "to make the best
distribution they could" under the public interest
standard
.
"^^ Broadcasters
,
fearing a frontal assault on the
American system of radio, rallied opposition. The reforms,
they argued, were unworkable
,
dangerously impract ical and
would in the long run prove both costly and destructive
.
Deftly mobilizing allies and placating foes, the
industry demonstrated considerable political skill. The
networks' capitulation to the publishers neutralized one
potential source of anti -broadcast ing agitation. If the
broadcasters had taken a stronger stand at the Biltmore,
the publishers and their formidable Washington lobbyists
would likely have taken a much more adversarial role during
74 Hearings on S. 2910, March 10, 1934, 190- 1.
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the debate. 75 With critics in the press mollified,
broadcasters and their allies argued against change by
emphasizing perils lurking within the amendment.
To opponents of radio commercialism. Dill pointed out
that the Wagner-Hatf ield plan would allow the proposed non-
profit stations to support themselves by selling
advertising time. Clearly, he argued, that would mean more
commercials on the air."^^ To advocates of process and
stability, former Federal Radio Commissioner Henry Bellows,
a Harvard classmate of President Roosevelt's hired by
Columbia in 1933 to manage its Washington station and help
handle government relations, recalled the president's
modest goal of "transferring the present authority for the
control of communications" to a new commission. To make a
major change in the regulatory landscape, to overthrow
seven years of experience. Bellows said, would "tell the
new commission that broadcasting must remain unstable,
hazardous, unable to look ahead with any assurance or
conf idence . " "^"^ For those concerned with censorship and
William Paley, Ab It Happened: A Memoir (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday, 1979), 118-29. Paley in his
autobiography defended his actions during the Press -Radio
War and cited fear of newspaper lobbying during the debate
on radio regulation as one motive for his agreement to the
settlement. The Biltmore negotiations commenced ten weeks
before Roosevelt called for a new Communications Act but
after the Roper committee convened, additional evidence
that the panel's conclusion that new legislation was needed
was preordained,
76 Barnouw, The Golden Web, 22-8,
77 Hearings on S. 2910, March 10, 1934, 170, 180.
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monopoly, Dill pointed out that the legislation
incorporated the same accurances which had been part of the
1927 law. Finally, as a sop to educational broadcasters who
had been silenced by the FRC
'
b tilt toward commercial
broadcasters, Dill offered an amendment directing the FCC
to conduct an investigation and hold a public conference on
radio education within a year."^®
All of this was enough to convince Congress to act
cautiously. The growing influence of radio as an
informational medium and the popularity of programs
produced by the national chains had given radio a solid
base of support among the nation ' s 1 isteners . The concerns
of educat ional broadcasters had been duly addressed, if not
actually answered
. In addit ion, opponents of the exist ing
system failed to mount a united front for change . Some
educators and church leaders had struck al 1 iances with
commerc ial broadcasters which al lowed them access to the
air without the expense of operating their own stations.
Intramural disputes over which labor union, which farm
cooperative might receive an educational station weakened
the coalition behind Wagner-Hatf ield
.
78 Rosen, The Modern Stentors, 177-8.
79 See S.E. Frost, Jr. Education Own Stations
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1937; reprint, New
York: Arno, 1971); James A. Brown, "Struggle Against
Commercialism: The 1934 'Harney Lobby' for Nonprofit
Frequency Allocation," Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic
Media 33 (Summer 1989), 273-91.
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Most importantly, there was no vivid public outcry for
reform as there had been prior to enactment of the 1927
law. The FRC had many faults, but it had succeeded in
regularizing the radio dial. Listeners were not faced with
the infuriating interference and constantly shifting
frequencies which had in 1926 threatened to turn the ether
into a Babel. The broadcasters' appeal for continuity and
caution seemed the safest choice. Rather than risk
potentially disruptive change, legislators opted to stay
the course. Most accepted Dill's view that "private
initiative, private capital, and, most of all, American
business methods of popularizing and developing radio, have
placed radio in this country far ahead of that in any other
country in the world. Convinced it had done enough, the
Senate defeated the Wagner-Hatf ield amendment, 42-23. Less
than a week later, a version of Dill's bill including the
major provisions of the Radio Act passed both houses and
was signed by the president on June 19, 19 34.
The transition from the old FRC to the new FCC was
seamless. Broadcasters were reassured when two allies from
the FRC, chairman Eugene Sykes and Thad Brown, were
appointed to the new agency. Radio's triumph was not,
however, total. As Erik Barnouw observed, "in winning their
victory, networks and stations had made promises that were
80 clarence C. Dill in Martin Codel, ed. , Padio and
Its Future (New York: Harper and Brothers, 193 0) , reprinted
as "Guarding the Ether — The American Way, " Congreeeional
Digeet
,
August -September 1933, 196.
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hoctagec."8i The moot important wac their renewed pledge of
allegiance to the bargain of public Dervice in exchange fox
acceoD to the air. By again acknowledging that baoic
premice, the radio induotry gave itc critico acceoc to a
weapon of great weight: the regulatory power of the otate.
Some Dcholarc, blecced with the percpective of time,
have Duggeoted the regulatory debate effectively ended in
1934. To Philip Rocen, the Communicat ionc Act reaffirmed
"the legal and regulatory foundationo of the American
cyctem initially implemented by Herbert Hoover and the
Republican adminictrat ionc during the 192 Oc. "Q- By
licencing individual stationc rather than the powerful
chainc, the FCC, Barnouw wi^ote, caw every day "evidence of
the irrelevance of itc work."®^ Robert McChecney cuggeoted
the Roooevelt adminictrat ion "wao willing to cacrifice the
lact and only opportunity the publ ic would have to debate
the meritc of itc broadcaoting cervice" for fear of
offending broadcacterc . Sucan Douglac argued that both
the 1927 and 1934 lawc endorced a conctruct favoring
corporate control of "both broadcacting technology and
acceco to the opectrum" which had been created during the
®i Barnouw, The Oolden Web, 27.
®2 Rocen, The Modern Stentorc, 182.
®^ Barnouw, The Oolden Web, 34.
64 McChecney, "Franklin Roocevelt, Hie Adminictrat ion
and the Communicat ionc Act of 1934," 229.
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first two decades of the century. 85 while such arguments
are far more apt than earlier analyses which saw the 1927
and 1934 laws as clear victories for the public interest,
broadcasters in the 193 0s were not nearly so confident that
their vision of American broadcasting had once and for all
prevailed.
Roosevelt's election had eliminated from the
regulatory structure one of the best friends the American
system of broadcasting had ever known. Hoover's views on
radio were writ large, the product of his years as
Secretary of Commerce and in the White House. He was an
opponent of government monopoly, an advocate of cooperative
self -regulation and a generally supportive critic of
commercial radio. The status quo was in large part Hoover's
creation. Given what New Dealer Raymond Moley later called
"Roosevelt's lack of firm convictions" on economic matters
and his willingness to try several different plans,
sometimes in unison, the radio industry had good reason to
be concerned . ^"^
As Assistant Secretary of the Navy during the Wilson
administration, Roosevelt had been a supporting player in
the creation of RCA. More ominously, he had also backed
85 Douglas, Inventing AniericAn Broadcasting, 322.
86 See for example Sydney W. Head, Broadcasting in
America (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956), a standard
college broadcasting text now in its seventh edition.
87 Raymond Moley, The First New Deal (New York:
Harcourt, Brace & World, 1966), 228.
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plans to maintain the government's wireless monopoly.
Roosevelt's wartime chief, Secretary of the Navy Josephus
Daniels, had been the most outspoken advocate of a
government radio monopoly and had taken part in the initial
1919 meeting which resulted in the formation of RCA as an
American-owned wireless company. Roosevelt himself had
participated in subsequent negot iat ions . ®8 In 1929, Daniels
wrote Roosevelt asking for his former aide's recollections.
Roosevelt responded with a letter summarizing his meetings
with GE's Owen Young and added, "I was in hearty accord
with the proposal for permanent government control until
such time as it was clearly impossible to get it from
Congress. While Roosevelt was in part simply reaffirming
his loyalty to Daniels, Roosevelt's participation in the
navy's bid to control radio was personally recalled by
several NBC execut ives
.
Describing the "conflicting policies and gyrations" of
the New Deal, historian Ellis Hawley noted the Roosevelt
administration "began with government sponsorship of
cartels and business planning; it ended with the antitrust
®Q E. Daniel Cronon, ed. , The Cabinet Diaries of
tJosephuG Daniels 1913-1921 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska
Press, 1963), 416. In light of the future debate over the
radio trust, it may be noted that Daniels, in his diary
entry for May 23, 1919, said the meeting between navy and
General Electric officials in New York was "about their
organizing a wireless company — a monopoly in patents,"
®^ Carrol Kilpatrick, ed. , Roosevelt and Daniels
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1952),
100-3 .
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campaign and the attack on rigid prices; and along the way,
it engaged in minor excursions into socialism, public
utility regulation, and the establishment of 'government
yardsticks. ' "90 There were, in other words, enough
potential dangers within the broad outlines of the New Deal
to horrify the radio industry. After benefiting from
Hoover's benign associat ionist policies, what lay in store
with a president who pledged in his inaugural address that
"we must act, and act quickly" to right the economic boat?
What dangerous changes could radio anticipate from what
Roosevelt's biographer Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. called "a
government determined to sfovern, " determined to prove to
the people of the nation that the federal government could
make a difference in the ir 1 ives?^^
Broadcasters delightedly discovered Roosevelt appeared
content to let the radio industry cont inue about its
business largely as before. Criticism of specific radio
programs and industry practices continued to be heard but
rarely from the White House . The most vocal and potentially
dangerous critics, it seemed, were in Congress. Old line
populists and progressives such as Burton Wheeler who
distrusted most things corporate and hard-shell Republicans
such as Hamilton Fish who berated broadcasters for failing
90 Ellis Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of
Monopoly (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1966, 1969) , 15.
^1 Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal , 1, 22.
Emphasis in the original.
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to recognize the evils of the New Deal regularly sniped at
the medium. Within the FCC itself, commissioner George
Henry Payne soon proved a constant irritant. A Bull Moose
Republican reformer from New York City, Payne was a
frequent critic of shoddy programs and excessive
advertising who hectored his fellow commissioners on the
need for a vigilant FCC.^^ Broadcasting should elevate and
enlighten society, but because it was dominated by selfish
commercial interests, Payne argued in one speech, it
instead posed "a fundamental danger" to democracy. "The
people, through their Government," Payne cautioned, must
continue to "exercise. . .their sovereignty" over the
ether
.
When Roosevelt named Democratic New York Congressman
Anning Prall to replace Judge Sykes as FCC chairman, the
industry worried the appointment signaled an important
Payne took great pride in his progressive
antecedents . During his conf irmat ion hearings in 1935
,
Wheeler
,
vigilant against the encroachments of Wal 1 Street
,
queried, "You were appointed as a Republican, were you?"
"As a Progressive Republican," Payne corrected him.
Unsure that such a breed existed in such close
proximity to the House of Morgan, Wheeler inquired, "Well,
what is the distinction in New York?"
"I would say solitude," Payne replied.
Senator Robert Wagner, the liberal New York Democrat,
quickly interrupted to vouch for Payne's bona fides.
Congress, Senate, Interstate Commerce Committee,
Confirmation of Members of the Federal Communications
Commission, 74th Cong., 1st sess., January 25, 1935, 119.
George Henry Payne, "Safeguarding the Public
Interest in Radio," speech delivered at Cornell University,
August 21, 1935, reprinted in 74th Cong., 1st sess.,
Congressional Record (August 22, 1935), vol. 79, pt . 13,
14123
•
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policy change. Scion of the Dutch colonial family which had
settled Staten Island in the 1670s, Prall had no radio
experience, but his background indicated he might lend a
sympathetic ear to critics such as Payne since he had
served as president of the New York City Board of Education
before being elected to Congress in 1923.^4 Rumors flew
that the administration was ready to launch its long-feared
assault on the broadcasters. Variety reported that
"Congressional enemies of chain broadcasters and critics of
Government policies" were pushing the White House to oust
both Sykes and Thad Brown from the FCC because their
'
"presence ... seriously damages hopes of a new deal in radio
regulation. "^^
While the industry worried, Prall maintained his
agenda was limited — "I wouldn't say we're going to do
anything especially sensational, " he assured the industry
upon taking office — and while his regime represented no
real change in course, events in 1935 demonstrated both how
the FCC worked and how sensitive broadcasters were to the
threat of government intervention. The FCC held under law
the power to revoke any broadcaster's license, it was
reluctant to invoke that draconian solution. For the vast
94 "Anning S. Prall, 66, Head of FCC, Dead," New York
Times, July 24, 1937, 15. Prall did not assume his place on
the Commission until March, 1935, because members of
Congress are forbidden by law from accepting appointments
to executive agencies created by a Congress in which they
served.
95 "Ganging Up on Commish, " Variety, May 1, 1935, 25.
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majority of stations, the renewal process involved no more
than filling out a few forms and waiting for the new
license to arrive in the mail.^e The FCC's weapon of choice
in defending the public interest was publicity, in the rare
instances when a public scolding proved ineffective, the
commission reserved the right to designate a license for
hearing. That, broadcasters knew, would mean more negative
publicity - possibly enough to frighten away skittish
advertisers — and mounting legal expenses which could
threaten the financial stability of the two-thirds of all
stations which were already only marginally profitable.
This one -two punch came to be known as "the raised eyebrow"
technique . ^"^
In a talk broadcast on NBC Red, Prall promised to
"maintain a general surveillance over radio stations" and
reminded his listeners that the FCC could deny new licenses
to stations which ignored the public interest. "Radio
people," he cautioned, "would do well to eliminate programs
that arouse the imaginations of children to the point where
they cannot eat or sleep." Programs "that can be compared
to the dime novels of the 'Dead-eye Dick' or 'Boy Smuggler'
In its first three years, the FCC denied only eight
renewal applications, and two applicants failed to contest
their hearings, effectively surrendering their licenses
without a fight. Maurice M. Jansky, "An Analysis of the
Standard of Public Interest, Convenience and Necessity as
Defined by the Federal Communications Commission, " The
George Washincfton Law Review 6 (November 1937), 24.
Barnouw, The Golden Web, 28-36.
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variety" would not, he said, be tolerated. He also noted
the public's revulsion with explicit advertisements for
patent medicines and personal care products. ^8
Prall failed to single out any specific children's
program. Nor did he identify specific products when he
criticized advertisers for discussing inappropriate
subjects on the air. He did not have to. By raising the
issues, he opened the door, and opponents of business-as-
usual on the air quickly entered. A hastily organized
letter-writing campaign, a public statement from an
impressively- titled interest group or a pointed inquiry
from a member of congress was usually enough to elicit a
response from the FCC. Broadcasters who refused to adjust
sufficiently by dropping the most controversial programs or
advertisements and continued to inspire public protests
risked being summoned for hearings. This was Prall 's vision
of how the marketplace should work. The interaction of the
broadcasters and the public would best produce positive
change
.
The broadcasters ' response to Prall ' s scolding is
instructive. The chairman's talk coincided with rumors of
an FCC shake-up, but the radio industry was also watching
two other potentially dangerous problems in Washington,
First, the FCC's conference on education and radio, part of
the Communications Act compromise of the previous year, was
98 "FCC: Chairman Prall Gives Radio Broadcasters a
Radio Spanking," Newe-Week, April 6, 1935, 34.
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scheduled for the following month. Second, and more
importantly, Congrees was debating a comprehensive reform
of federal food and drug regulations which would if passed
impact important broadcast advertisers.
Talk of updating the legislation which created the
Food and Drug Administration in 1906 had first surfaced in
the spring of 1933. The driving force behind the proposed
changes was Rexford Tugwell, by title the Assistant
Secretary of Agriculture but by inclination a freelance
brains truster eager to bring rationalization, reform and
centralized planning to government. The bill, if approved,
would require significant changes in the patent medicine
and cosmetics industry, and the industry and its allies in
the advertising agencies and the media mounted the
barricades to stop it.^^
When Prall assumed his chairmanship, food and drug
reform was again making its way through Congress. The
patent medicine industry had managed to derail the
legislation during the previous session, but it had been a
difficult fight. The idea of pure food and drugs was hard
to oppose, especially when Tugwell and his allies bolstered
their argument with demonstrations of corrosive and
poisonous preparations which the FDA was unable to regulate
under the existing law. In the spring of 1935, the industry
and its advertising agencies summoned top radio executives
99 Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal , 354 -61.
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to a meeting at the New York headquarters of Bristol-Myers,
one of the largest patent medicine advertisers. The goal
was to bring radio into line against the bill. William
Paley of CBS and several high-ranking NBC officials were
sympathetic but declined to take an active role in
opposition. The broadcasters believed there was no
percentage, Variety subsequently reported, in confronting
the Roosevelt administration on an issue with "strong
common support. "lOO
Radio executives understood the value of favorable
publicity. After Prall criticized pharmaceutical
advertising, an NBC executive promptly proclaimed "radio is
hardly a suitable medium to advertise remedies for bodily
ills" and promised the network would take action to
eliminate the abuses. NBC's announcement was quickly
trumped by CBS which revealed with great fanfare a new
network policy to limit advertising excesses and clean up
children's programming as well. Columbia pledged to refuse
advertisements which were offensive in content or which
featured sleazy, fast -talking announcers. The chain's
eight -point agenda for better children's programs was also
aimed to please. Among other things, CBS promised an end to
100 H ij^^e You With Us?' Drug Boys Ask Broadcasters at
Lunch; Polite Silence is Answer," Variety, April 24, 1935,
35 .
101 NBC sales promotion manager E.P.H. James quoted in
"Chairman Prall Gives Radio Broadcasters a Radio Spanking,
"
34 .
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chowG Which might " arouse harmful nervouc react ionc in the
child,
"
exactly the kind of "blood and thunder" dramac
Prall had criticized.
Columbia's policy statement was greeted with near
universal praise. Prall, lowering his raised eyebrow,
called it "an example of wise leadership." Owen Young saw
it as proof that the system worked. "This step, more than
anything that has recently been done," said the father of
RCA, "justifies, I think, our American system of
broadcasting control." Several leading independent stations
quickly embraced the CBS position. 103 ^he New York Timec
added its editorial endorsement describing Columbia's
statement as "a policy demanding courage and vision which
we are happy to acclaim. "^^^ One of the few negative
responses came from NBC, whose publicists grumbled that the
older network had had a similar policy in place for more
than a year but had chosen not to discuss it outside the
industry
.
The broadcasters' deft response to Prall 's criticism
reflected the industry's political acumen. The networks saw
no benefit in adopting an anti-reform posture. Instead,
102 "Radio Ads Curbed by Columbia Chain, " New York
TimeB, May 14, 1935, 10.
103 "Air Reform Praised by U.S. Radio Head," New York
Times, May 16, 1935, 5.
104 Editorial, New York Timee, May 16, 1935, 22.
105 "NBC Slant on CBS Policy," Variety, May 22, 1935,
37 .
156
they worked behind the scenes with less confrontational
elements of the advertising and pharmaceutical industries
to water down provisions which could hobble radio
advertising. When a significantly weakened food and drug
bill finally passed in 1938, broadcasters enjoyed the
benefits of being perceived as leaders in the reform
movement and the income from more deftly edited and less
obtrusive patent medicine ads.io^ Similarly, broadcasters
continued to air adventure programs for children but fine
tuned the scripts and sound effects to silence their most
vocal critics while keeping the stories spicy enough to
appeal to their young listeners.
As Columbia announced its new programming policies in
May of 1935, educational broadcasters and their allies were
gathering in Washington for their promised FCC forum.
Commercial broadcasters were hoping to derail any talk of
frequency set -asides by pledging full cooperation with the
non-profits. The coincidence in timing between the CBS
announcement and the radio educators' meeting was not
missed by the New York Times which reported that "the
timeliness of the campaign to clean up the air was linked
in radio circles yesterday with the public hearing of non-
profit stations that the Federal Communications Commission
Schlesinger, The Coming of the New Deal , 358-9.
Watered-down regulations giving the Federal Trade
Commission rather than the FDA some authority over patent
medicine advertising and labeling were approved as part of
the Wheeler-Lea Act of 1938.
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will open in Washington today. "107 ^he FCC hoped the forum
would "eliminate controversy and misunderstanding between
groups of educators and between the industry and educators"
while actively promoting "actual cooperative arrangements"
for more educational and uplifting programming. It would be
a far more efficient use of both the non-profits' resources
and the public's radio spectrum, the commissioners said, to
use existing broadcast facilities rather than construct new
stations
.
The industry agreed that cooperation was the path of
least resistance. The alternative was likely some variant
of the Wagner-Hatf ield amendment to reserve a portion of
the broadcast spectrum for non-profit stations. To
commercial broadcasters, of course, this was unacceptable,
and it had little appeal to the regulators. Even if such a
controversial measure should succeed in Congress, the
thought of having to choose which commercial broadcasters
would be thrown off the air and which non-profit groups
would be chosen to take over their frequencies was more
than the FCC could bear with an election just a year away.
Commercial broadcasters. Variety noted as the forum began,
107 MCT_ij^i3 on Radio Ads Pleases Stations, " New York
Times, May 15, 1935, 24.
108 Federal Communications Commission, Third Annual
Report of the Federal Communi cations CommiBsion for the
Fiscal Year Ended June 30, 193 7 (Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1937), 45-50; Hugh Carter Donahue, The
Battle to Control Broadcast News: Who Owns the First
Amendment? (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 19-31.
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knowing they would have the upper hand in any cooperative
projects becauee they controlled the facilities, "generally
are leaping aboard the CommiDh bandwagon, figuring that a
little co-operation now may head off more dractic
government action in the future. "109
The broadcasting industry was learning that self-
regulation was the secret to avoiding government
regulation. It was a gradual process. When the issue at
hand was medical quackery or programs which terrified
children, practices which were either illegal on their face
or unlikely to inspire outpourings of public support, the
system worked, but such clear-cut situations, one critic
observed, formed only a small part of the debate over the
proper role of radio. "As to what the Commission would do
with programs of doubtful public policy," he cautioned,
"there can be only conj ec ture .
"
This was the dilemma which confx'onted both radio and
its regulators. By soliciting and reacting to public
protests while at the same time adopting a cautious
approach to regulation, the FCC had raised expectations for
change while ratifying the status quo. In a series of test
cases dating back to the birth of the old Radio Commission,
both the commissions and the federal courts had held that
109 "Air-Pedagogs Rally May 15 Looks Big," Variety,
May 8, 193 5, 51.
110 Jansky, "An Analysis of the Standard of Public
Interest, " 40
.
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regulators must of necessity "consider the character and
the quality of the service" when determining whether or not
to grant a license in the public interest, when a station
was applying for a renewal, past performance would be "an
important consideration. "in Although Section 326 of the
Communications Act explicitly denied the FCC censorship
powers, the commission's duty to examine programming during
licensing proceedings gave the regulators what many
broadcasters believed was a potentially devastating power.
To make matters worse for the industry, the commission's
history demonstrated that the panel launched inquiries into
programming when complaints were received from the public,
and the volume of complaints , not their substance , was
often the decisive factor in deciding which licenses to
designate for hearings
.
m Associate Justice Charles H. Robb, United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, KFKB
Broadcasti ncf Abboci at ion, Inc. v. Federa 1 Radio CommisBion,
47 F. 2d 670-2 (DC Cir. 1931), quotation at 672.
Jansky, "An Analysis of the Standard of Public
Interest," 38-9. Section 326 of the Communications Act of
1934, Public Law 73-416, states:
Nothing in this Act shall be understood or
construed to give the Commiss ion the power of
censorship over the radio communications or
signals transmitted by any radio station, and no
regulation or condition shall be promulgated or
fixed by the Commission which shall interfere
with the right of free speech by means of radio
communication. No person within the jurisdiction
of the United States shall utter any obscene,
indecent, or profane language by means of radio
communication.
The obvious contradiction between the first sentence and
the second, while in keeping with established legal
precedents, would in practice trigger its share of
controversies over the years
.
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The failings of the regulatory tradition in place
since the early 1920s were exposed in the 1930g as
political discourse grew increasingly contentious. News-
hungry listeners demanded information and radio gave it to
them by broadcasting talks and special events and offering
newscasts and commentaries, but by serving as a vehicle for
debate, radio inevitably became a participant. The
broadcasters' most basic programming decisions — who would
speak about what and at what time, who would be allowed to
buy time and for how much — became themselves topics of
intense publ ic controversy.
Gradually, the industry developed formal policies to
regularize programming decisions . These pol icies evolved
both from the body of precedent which had developed over
the previous decade and from the rhetorical and
philosophical frameworks which had defined the debate over
control of radio. Industry leaders earnestly hoped
responsible self -regulation would forestall new assaults on
the American system of broadcasting. They warily tried to
frame policies which would be seen as neither censorship
nor an effort to monopolize the air waves on behalf of
privileged interests
.
When CBS announced its proposals for children's
programming reform, Paley underscored the industry's
conflicting tasks of insuring free expression and at the
same time exercising responsible stewardship of the
public's air waves. "We have no thought of setting
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ourselves up as arbiters of what is proper for children to
hear," he said, "but we have an editorial responsibility to
the community, in the interpretation of public wish and
sentiment, which cannot be waived. "^^^ Broadcasters
constantly sought the golden mean, a balance between
freedom and control. Try as it might to blunt charges of
censorship, the industry's own defensive practices left it
vulnerable to new attacks,
CBS, during the programming debates over educational
radio in 1935, reaffirmed what network officials said had
always been the chain's policy. Network time would not be
sold for the spread of propaganda, only for the sale of
goods and services. Columbia explained it would continue to
broadcast discussions of controversial public issues but
only on sustaining programs produced to insure fairness and
balance. As models, the network pointed to its own
"American School of the Air, " which included current events
segments, and NBC's public affairs forums, "America's Tov/n
Meeting" and "The University of Chicago Round Table. "^^^
Only one exception was allowed. During political campaigns,
candidates would be allowed to buy air time. The theory,
Paley later explained, "was that broadcasters not
government regulators should exercise editorial judgment
Quoted in "Radio Ads Curbed by Columbia Chain,"
10 .
114 Paley, As It Happened, 116; Summers, A Thirty Year
History of Programs Carried on National Radio Networks in
the United States 1926-1956, 54.
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and take editorial responsibility for what went out over
the networks. "^^^
The Columbia policy and similar standards adopted by
the other chains and the National Association of
Broadcasters in part reflected the need shared by any
maturing industry to regularize its practices. For most
businesses, however, internal production codes were of
relatively little interest to consumers. Radio, balancing
the often conflicting interests of its advertisers,
listeners and regulators, was under closer scrutiny. This
was especially true when broadcasters made decisions on
those staples of information programming, talks and special
events. Whenever one event was covered while another was
not, when some guests were invited to appear on radio round
tables and others were not , broadcasters risked attack
.
The Ford Motor Company's Sunday evening concert series
offered an example of how a seemingly routine programming
decision could lead to controversy. In 1934, the car maker
purchased an hour on Columbia each Sunday night to showcase
the Detroit Symphony. During the orchestra's intermission,
rather than espousing the virtues of Ford automobiles,
company spokesman William Cameron, the ex-editor of Henry
Ford's radically right wing and often anti-Semitic Dearborn
Independent, discussed current events "to assist, if
Paley, As It Happened, 116-7.
possible, those who desire to make up their minds.
Invariably, he assaulted invasive government in general and
the New Deal in particular. Ford's refusal to subscribe to
the National Recovery Administration code for auto makers
was, he argued, a crusade for freedom, a struggle against
"autocratic authority. "H^ ^^3^ the Supreme Court struck
down the NRA, he proclaimed that "every attempt to
subjugate our citizens as vassals of the state has
failed, "^s
Stung by criticism that the Ford program was corporate
propaganda, the network struggled mightily to show that it
neither exercised censorship nor allowed their microphones
to be used irresponsibly. "We are careful whom we invite to
broadcast, and once invited we would not expect to censor,"
said NBC program director John Royal, "We do not expect men
and women in public life to say anything we would be
ashamed of."^^ Cameron's talks were controversial, but he
116 Thomas S. Green, Jr., "Mr. Cameron and the Ford
Hour," Public Opinion Quarterly 3 (October 1939), 670.
Barnouw, The Golden Web, 34; Green, "Mr. Cameron
and the Ford Hour," 6 75.
118 "Ford Sunday Evening Hour," CBS, June 23, 1935,
quoted in Bliss, Now the Newe , 64. While the Ford program
was the most notorious example of corporate propaganda, it
was not unique. Fred G. Clark's "Voice of the Crusader" on
Columbia and later Mutual also provided a staunchly pro-
business viewpoint financed by an alliance of manufacturers
and advertising agencies. See Barnouw, The Golden Web, 14-
5
.
119 Quoted in "Censors: Aclu Declares Radio Gags
Speakers With Red Tape," Newe-Week, September 14, 1935, 25.
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reprecented Ford, a pillar of American inductry and a
valued advertiser. Advocatec of ideac out of the mainotream
of public opinion who represented organizations unlikely to
purchase significant amounts of air time often found the
studio closed to them.
Radio's index of proscribed topics shifted over time.
As Kaltenborn had discovered while broadcasting on WEAF,
there was no actual list of subjects beyond the pale.
Broadcasters exercised editorial judgment, critics felt, by
wh im
.
In 19 3 3, criticism of the i ncom i ng Rooseve 1
1
administration was apparently discouraged if not banned
outright. The American Civil Liberties Union charged that
Columbia's Henry Bellows "frankly stated that no broadcast
would be permitted over CBS which was in any way critical
of any policy of the Administration." NBC had the same
policy, the ACLU charged, telling the Massachusetts
American Legion to make sure its radio speakers did not
"disturb public confidence in the President . "^^*-"^ The
embargo on cx^iticism of the New Deal had clearly been
relaxed for paying customers by the fall of 1934 — after
the Communications Act had been signed — when Cameron went
on the air, but other restrictions continued and even
astute students of radio found it difficult to determine
what was allowed and what was not. "The would-be speaker
120 "Censors: Aclu Declares Radio Gags Speakers With
Red Tape," 25. The report outlined one hundred instances of
"private radio censox^ship. "
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must run the gauntlet of a regular army of amateur Catos,"
reported a 1936 ACLU study, resulting in a "rather
catholic" list of banned subjects and speakers ranging from
radicals to Republ icans . 121 topic which was perfectly
acceptable to one station might be forbidden by another.
Even at the same station, a program welcomed one month
might be too hot to handle the next.
Partisan politics were a particularly treacherous mine
field for radio broadcasters, and the networks' evolving
policies were severely tested in the first month of 1936.
President Roosevelt, in an unprecedented move, announced he
would deliver his State of the Union message to Congress at
night. Radio had routinely broadcast the annual message
since 1923 when McNamee experimented with his on- the -air
summary during the Cool idge administration. Previously,
however, it had always been delivered at midday. By
speaking at nine o'clock on a Friday night, Roosevelt knew
he would command the largest audience such an address had
ever enj oyed.
The White House, of course, claimed the president's
speech would be nonpartisan and therefore nonpol it ical
.
When the chains announced they would as usual carry the
address, Republican National Committee chairman Henry P.
Fletcher, claiming Roosevelt planned to use the speech to
121 "Radio Censorship Charged In Survey," New York
Times, December 20, 1936, 10. The ACLU reported "seventy
'authenticated' instances of censorship by radio stations
since 193 0 . "
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launch his reelection campaign, demanded air time to
respond. 122 while Fletcher's position was predictable,
debate over Roosevelt's strategy and the chains'
cooperation spread beyond partisan boundaries. Columnist
Walter Lippmann shared Fletcher's concern that Roosevelt's
speech required some kind of a response "for never before
has radio been used in America with such calculated purpose
to establish any one man's domination of public
opinion. "123 ^BC seemed to agree. The network dispatched a
telegram inviting the Republicans to speak, citing NBC's
"established policy... of making its facilities available to
responsible speakers for discussion of both sides of public
questions affecting the national welfare. "124
Revealing the lack of consensus within the industry,
Columbia disagreed. Paley wired Fletcher that Roosevelt
would be speaking as president carrying out the duties of
his office, not as a candidate for reelection. Therefore,
Columbia would not offer free time. Neither would the
network allow the Republicans to purchase time to respond
because it was CBS policy not to sell political time prior
to the national conventions. In an exchange of telegrams
122 Turner Catledge, "Roosevelt Speech Politics, Says
Q.O.P.; Radio Reply Asked," New York Times, January 2,
1936, 1.
123 Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow, " Boston
Globe, January 4, 1936, 12.
124 Quoted in "NBC Allows Reply to Roosevelt Talk,"
New York Times, January 3, 1936, 3.
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and letters later reprinted in pamphlet form by CBS,
Fletcher and Paley sparred over the issue. Fletcher,
appealing to the public's interest in balanced debate,
charged censorship. Paley insisted that broadcasters must
be allowed to exercise editorial judgment and promised to
allow the Republicans fair access to the network during the
campaign. 12
5
Roosevelt's speech was only one point of dispute
between the radio industry and the Republicans. Less than
two weeks after the president's message, the Republicans
approached the networks with a request to buy time for a
series of "political skits" dramatizing the issues of the
day. This time, both CBS and NBC refused to sell the party
air time, citing network policies against dramatization of
political issues. Given the popularity of "March of Time"
and similar fact -based programs, the explanation rang
false. "The two great broadcasting companies are attempting
to prevent the Republican party the freedom of the air," a
party official proclaimed, "They have abandoned their
function as servants of the people, surrendered their
independence and joined the 'dictators of the New
Deal. '"126 The Republicans turned to WGN, owned by the
125 Summarized in Alistair Cooke, "US Radio Fights
Political Control," World Film News, July 1936, 28-9,
reprinted in Daniel J. Leab, "Document: US Radio Fights
Political Control: 1936," HiBtorical Journal of Film, Radio
and Television 9 (1989), 189-96.
126 Harrison E. Spangler, western division director of
the Republican National Committee, quoted in "Radio Chains
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ant i -New Deal Chicacfo Tribune, which smugly agreed to air
the series as a contribution to free public debate. 127
In October, the Republicans purchased time on CBS for
a talk by Senator Arthur Vandenberg . 12 8 A veteran behind
the microphone blessed with what one leading columnist
described as "a radio voice that requires all listeners to
sit well back from their receivers," Vandenberg on this
occasion had more than the usual pre-election talk in
mind. 129 He arrived at Columbia's studio with a recording
of a Roosevelt speech and a script portraying a "debate"
with the pire s ident
.
CBS st8.ffeirs at first irefused. to all ow
Vandenberg on the air, then relented only to cut the
program off in midstream. When the Republicans, who had
after all paid for the air time, demanded that the program
be rescheduled and broadcast in its entirety, Columbia
refused, citing both its stand against dramatizations and a
rule against airing recorded material which stemmed from an
on-going dispute between the radio industry and the
musicians ' union.
Bar Republican Skit But Party Gets Chicago Outlet," New
York Times, January 14, 19 36, 1.
127 "Radio Chains Bar Republican Skit," 1,
128 Barnouw, The Golden Web, 52.
Arthur Krock, "In Washington," New York Times,
January 3 , 1936 , 18
.
Smith, In All His Glory, 162. Columbia was
particularly adamant in its refusal to air transcriptions.
The network radio system was based on simultaneous
transmission of live programming to stations across the
country. Paley feared that recordings would allow
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Paley's biographer charges that Columbia's actions
throughout the election year, while they "stopped short of
blatant partisanship," reflected the network's strong bias
toward Roosevelt . i^i It would be more accurate to portray
the industry's behavior as additional evidence of radio's
deference toward its regulators regardless of party.
Roosevelt's acknowledged radio expertise had led the
Republicans to search for a successful means of countering
the president's advantage. As the Republicans and their
supporters in the advertising community devised strategies,
both CBS and NBC made and revised policy on the fly. Paley
and NBC's new president Lenox Lohr explained their
decisions in the familiar rhetoric of public interest and
fairness
.
In a letter rejecting the Republican's "political
skit" proposal, Paley argued that dramatizations might
cause voters to decide among candidates on emotional rather
than intellectual grounds. The election, he suggested,
might be decided by which side employed the better
dramatists. Lohr repeated that same theme. NBC desired to
bring listeners "the various sides of political
issues ... fairly and adequately," he wrote. The network
sought "to reflect the thought of the religious, political,
social and cultural life of our country" by presenting
individual stations such flexibility in programming that
the network system itself would be jeopardized.
131 Smith, In All Hie Glory, 162
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"responsible spokesmen on the public questions" of the day.
"To accept such dramatic programs as you have offered,"
Lohr concluded, "would place the discussion of vital
political and national issues on the basis of dramatic
license, rather than upon a basis of responsibly stated
fact or opinion. "^^^
The radio industry, despite its inbred conservatism,
has often shown an odd tenacity. Broadcasters seek to
please their constituents: listeners, advertisers and
regulators. They are averse to straying from courses which
have proven successful. Originality is most often met with
scorn. At times, however, a new concept manages to enter
the medium and be universally embraced. Remote broadcasts
in the 1920s were one such example. In the 1930s, overseas
pickups were another . Broadcasts from far away, the farther
the better , once perfected, became memorable radio moments
.
A few, the "woman I love" abdication speech of Edward VIII
for one, were truly historic. Others, the sound of an
English nightingale trilling in the Surrey woods which CBS
declared a major step forward in Anglo-American relations,
simply displayed the virtuosity of the medium. The
development of radio commentary was such an innovation.
Lohr to Fletcher, January 8, 1936, published in
"Party Head Reveals Ban," New York Times, January 14, 1936,
17 .
David Holbrook Culbert, News For Everyman: Radio
and Foreign Affairs in Thirties America (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood, 1976) , 15.
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Outspoken discussion of controversial issues would seem to
have little appeal to broadcasters who believed that
controversy would by definition alienate or anger at least
a portion of its public. Yet controversy excited and
attracted audiences.
Network news in the mid- 1930s increasingly came to be
identified with the commentators. The chains had seen this
trend in 1934, because they argued for and won one
important concession in the Biltmore Agreement. Sponsored
broadcasts by commentators could continue on the air as
long as they were devoted to "a generalization and
background of general news situations" rather than "a
recital of spot news."!^^ It was a fine difference at best
— hoW; exactly, could you discuss the "background" of an
event without revealing what event you were talking about?
— which proved impossible to interpret. Columbia's White
dismissed the distinction as a "specious idea" and wondered
why the newspapers had gone along with it. "Maybe
publishers and press association executives, who might have
objected," he reflected, "just liked to listen to those
'commentators. ' "1^5
Like the newspaper columnists from whose ranks most
emerged, the commentators were identified as responsible
Harris, "Note to editors," 2727.
White, NewB on the Air, 43.
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journalictG with cpecial expert ice . 1=^^ They cought to
explain the newc
,
a cervice in increacing demand during the
1930G. Ac Stanley Walker, the ecteemed city editor of the
New York Herald Tribune, Guggected, the perconal, intimate
medium of radio ceemed ecpecially suited to cerve the
publ ic
ac a forum for comment and analyciG — a roctrum
from which the Walter Lippmannc of the ether may
ceek to explain to the befuddled citizenry juct
what everything ic about. Since the depreccion,
thic yearning of the public for an explanation of
what iG happening — if there ic an explanation —
has resulted in Gcorec of prophetc who are only
too glad, for a modect fee, to leap to the
microphone and do their level beet to clarify
matters . ^'^^
Commentatorc who Gought more than "a modect fee" needed a
sponsor. That implied the ability to attract an audience.
As one analyst of radio news noted, "this places him more
in the position of a performer than a clarifier, and may
dictate irrespons ibility in the treatment of certain
events . "1^8 '
The nat ion ' s most opinionated, most diccusced and
perhaps most popular radio commentator in the mid-1930s was
Boake Carter. Born in Baku, Azerbaijan, the son of a
British oil man who doubled ac His Majesty's consular
Smith, "The Origins of Radio Network News
Commentary, " 114-5.
1^"^ Stanley Walker, City Editor (New York: Blue
Ribbon, 1934) , 243
.
Sherman H. Dryer, Radio In Wartime (New York:
Greenberg, 1942) , 157.
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agent. Carter was a $50-a-week rewrite man for the
Philadelphia Daily News when he broke into radio in 1930.
His first broadcast assignment was a rugby game because, so
the story goes, no one else understood the rules, and the
station manager thought his British accent would add a
certain tone of authenticity
.
Carter described himself as "a nightly radio
editorialist on the news of each day's events" with "no axe
to grind... no political adherences — Democratic,
Republican, Labor, Socialist, Communist, or what have you
— no economic crucifix to bear, whether of big business,
little business
,
planned economy, or laissez
- faire
pol icies
.
"1^^ In practice, he v/ac an isolationist, a foe of
organized labor, the military establishment, the New Deal
and virtually everything the Roosevelt administration
supported.
Carter elbowed his way into the national spotlight in
1932 with his broadcasts following the Lindbergh
kidnapping . The owner of his Philadelphia station, who was
both Carter's personal manager and William Paley's brother-
in-law, refused to allow CBS use of the station's mobile
broadcasting unit unless Carter was allowed to take part in
the coverage. He salted his reports on the investigation
A.J. Liebling, "Boake Carter," Scribner 's
Magazine
,
August, 1938 , 8
.
140 Boake Carter, ''Johnny Q. Public'' Speaks! (New
York: Dodge, 1936) , ix, xi
.
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with tirades against the supposed corruption and links with
organized crime of the governor of New Jersey. The programs
brought Carter national attention as well as a libel suit
which was settled with a subsequent on-air apology. I4i
Neither caused Carter to trim his sails. "A news
commentator like myself," he told his audience in 1936,
"should be free to comment editorially on the day's news,
free to express my opinions, in adherence to the best poker
language, 'Calling them as I see them, letting the chips
fall where they may and playing no favorites .' "1^2
Carter's program at its peak reached a weekly audience
estimated at five to ten million. Radio Digest^ g annual
poll named him the most popular commentator of 1938.143 His
audience, researchers discovered, was fiercely supportive,
considered his broadcasts accurate and reliable, said he
helped them determine which current events were significant
and which were not, and generally agreed with his opinions
on the news . i^'* While Carter's audience included all social
strata, his program was especially popular with upper-
Liebling, "Boake Carter," 10; Bliss, Now the News,
33 .
142 Boake Carter, "Broadcasting and the American
Public," broadcast on the CBS network, February 15, 1936,
reprinted in 74th Cong., 2nd sess., CongresGional Record
(February 20, 1936), vol. 80, pt . 3, 2454.
143 Liebling, "Boake Carter," 8-10; Culbert, News for
Everyman
,
4 7.
144 Hadley Cantril, "The Role of the Radio
Commentator, " Public Opinion Quarterly 3 (October 1939)
,
654-62
.
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income lietenerc moct decired by adverticerc. A ctudy of
upper
-income familiec in the Bocton area revealed that
Carter wac their radio favorite, ranking well ahead of such
network iconc ac Major Bowec and Rudy Vallee.145
During the Little Steel strike of 1937, Carter locked
hornG with John L. Lewie and the Congrecc of Industrial
Organizations
.
Carter stridently attacked the CIO which
responded with picket lines outside Carter's studio and a
boycott of Philco products. Philco sales slumped, as did
the economy generally, and the radio manufacturer allowed
its contract with Carter to lapse. General Foods stepped
in, and Carter continued to broadcast on Columbia.
Targeting a broader spectrum of consumers less likely to be
influenced by a union boycott. General Foods was eager to
pay for access to Carter's audience. Certainly Carter's new
boss. General Foods chairman Colby M. Chester, president of
the National Association of Manufacturers and an American
Liberty League activist, had no philosophical problem with
the commentator's opposition to trade unionism and the New
Deal . 146
Columbia, assured of revenue from a national sponsor,
kept Carter on the air. The commentator was a lightning rod
145 "Listening Habits and Purchasing of Wealthy
Analyzed," Broadcacting
,
January 1, 1937, 34. "Wealthy" was
defined in the Boston University study as an annual family
income of $10,000. CBS later distributed the results to
advertisers in a booklet titled The Very Rich.
14 6 Culbert, Newc for Everyman, 47-8.
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for controversy, but, as one historian observed, Carter was
"a sinner, but a profitably sponsored sinner. "147 q^q ^lad
room for him in the congregation until August of 1938 when
his nightly broadcasts were abruptly canceled.
Carter's sudden downfall was widely discussed within
the industry and had several causes. As his leading
chronicler, historian David Holbrook Culbert, has noted
Carter's unyielding isolationism slipped farther and
farther away from both governmental policy and the
mainstream of public opinion. Still, he maintained his
popularity with listeners until he left CBS. Carter was
"forced off the air for his isolationist views," Culbert
concluded, only after the Roosevelt administration launched
a concerted attack on the commentator, his sponsor and, by
extension, the network. I'^s
Carter was clearly the target of administration
harassment. Scattered documentary evidence reveals a
campaign against General Foods, CBS and Carter himself
coordinated by the White House press secretary Stephen
Early. He was investigated by the Department of State and
the Immigration and Naturalization Service, both of which
found his citizenship papers in order. The American
ambassador to Moscow, Joseph E. Davies, played a key role.
147 Joseph E. Persico, Edward R . Murrow: An American
Original (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), 128.
148 Culbert, News for Everyman, 34-59, quotation at
58 .
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His wife, the former Marjorie Merriwether Poet, was the
major stockholder in General Foods . 149 when Carter signed
his sponsorship contract with General Foods, Round Table
magazine reported the Davies connection with the firm and
added, "it is understood Mr. Davies may 'speak to' Mr.
Carter, and it remains to be seen whether the tone of his
comments will change or not."i50 once Carter was off the
air, Variety, skeptically noting that "the official reason"
was because General Foods could not obtain a suitable
network time slot, suggested the commentator's battle with
organized labor did him in. Carter, Variety reported, would
keep busy with a coast-to-coast lecture tour during which
he would discuss "Free Speech in the News," a topic the
show business trade journal said which was "particularly
applicable. "isi
1"*^ See Culbert, News for Everyman
,
47-53, and David
Culbert, "US Censorship of Radio News in the 1930s: the
case of Boake Carter, " Hi etorical Journal of Film, Radio
and Television 2 (1982), 173-6.
150
"vjarp and Woof of American Policy," Round Table 38
(1937-8), 297-304, reprinted in 76th Cong., 3rd sess.,
CongrreBBional Record (August 22, 1940), vol. 86, pt . 10,
10733
.
151 "Boake Carter Will Air 'Free Speech' on Lecture
Tour," Variety, September 21, 1938, 27. Carter claimed
Roosevelt administration insiders such as "Early, Tommy
Corcoran, Harold L. Ickes, Harry L. Hopkins and that group"
had forced him off the air and the network would continue
to deny air time to critics of Roosevelt "until the
Administration lets up." "Censorship Seen By Boake Carter,"
Broadcasting, January 1, 1939, 18. The radically
isolationist Committee for the Defense of American
Constitutional Rights seemed unsure who exactly was to
blame, issuing a press release charging Carter had been
denied "the right of free speech. . -by a small coterie of
un-American-minded propagandists." "Dies Charges Networks
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Ultimately, the reason for Carter's disappearance from
Columbia's nightly schedule is unimportant. What is both
important and abundantly clear is that Boake Carter was
seen by his colleagues in radio as a victim of government
persecution. As Culbert has noted, "industry insiders all
knew that Carter had been forced off the air for being so
vituperative. whether this knowledge was based on an
accurate interpretation of events is of little consequence.
The result was the same.
Two years after Carter left CBS, Quincy Howe noted
that the national networks "have accepted Roosevelt's
foreign policy" and identified Carter as the last "strong
dissenter" who had "spoken regularly on a national
network . " While ignoring the details of the case , Howe
continued, "Only if Carter comes back, stays back, and hits
back can the New Deal deny that it has deliberately
squelched one of its most ef fect ive critics on the air .
"
Howe at the time was a member of the still small fraternity
are Influenced Refuted as Congressman Gets Hookup,
"
Broadcastinof, December 15, 1938, 15. Journalist Stanley
High, a frequent critic of what he perceived as radio
censorship, speculated in the Saturday Evening Post that
Carter was silenced by a Roosevelt administration campaign
aimed at both General Foods and Columbia and added "there
can be scarcely any doubt that all the parties concerned,
except Mr. Carter, were glad to see him go." Stanley High,
"Not-So-Free Air," Saturday Evening Poet, February 11,
1938, 77.
Culbert, "US Censorship of Radio News," 174.
Quincy Howe, The News and How To Understand It
(New York: Simon Sc Schuster, 1940; repr., Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood, 1968) , 187.
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of broadcast journal istc, a commentator on New York's WQXR
who would soon join the CBS staff. He echoed the
conventional wisdom within the broadcasting business that
the administration could and would use its powers to bring
radio to heel.
Throughout the 1930s, then, the broadcasting industry
had taken upon itself the role of defender of freedom of
the air. To serve the public interest, broadcasters would
provide news and public affairs programs. To avoid stricter
government regulations, they would make time available to
those wishing to discuss topics of public concern. Time
would be sold for partisan purposes during campaigns — an
increasingly profitable business for the broadcasters —
but not at other times . Execut ing that relatively
straightforward policy proved much more difficult than the
industry might have 1 iked, but broadcasters consistently
argued that they, not the government , could best do the
job. Not all critics agreed^ including a growing number of
influential members of Congress who would continue to prod
the administration to take a much more active role in
defending freedom of the air.
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CHAPTER III
"THE ANNOUNCER HAS BECOME A GREAT DRA14ATIC SYMBOL"!
Since the beginning, radio had been in the information
business. The medium changed the way Americans learned of
the events that shaped their lives. Listeners were there
when Clarence Darrow confronted William Jennings Bryan at
the Scopes trial, when Jack Dempsey stood over Gene Tunney
as the "long count" tolled, when President Roosevelt told
them they only thing they had to fear was fear itself. Shop
clerks and school children heard the great debates of the
day played out in their living rooms. By the beginning of
the Roosevelt administration, radio was both a source of
information and a forum for debate on public affairs. Yet
in years to come, many in the industry would look back at
the 1920s and early 1930s as a time when radio largely
ignored the news.
In the second half of the 1930s, the industry's own
definition of broadcast news changed and narrowed.
Broadcasts of events as they occurred and talks by public
figures became, in retrospect, something less than real
news. Increasingly, broadcast news came to mean programs
prepared by station or network employees who reported and
then summarized the latest current events in a factual
1 Archibald MacLeish quoted in Orrin E. Dunlap, Jr.,
"Exploring in Drama," New York Times, October 30, 1938,
sec. 9, 12,
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manner. Prior to the Press-Radio War, a CBS executive
recalled, the network had no news department.
It was almost all "special events" — speeches,
dedications, parades. We did only snippets of'
news, which came in on the old-fashioned tickers
that gave you the stock market quotations. The
news was on this paper ribbon, the kind used in
ticker tape parades, and you'd paste it up on a
sheet of paper for the announcer to read.^
Such broadcasts hardly qualified as news, he seemed to say.
Not until broadcasters began to produce and control the
content of informational programming themselves could radio
claim to be a medium for journalism.
By equating news programming with the conscious
exercise of editorial control
, broadcasters were
acknowledging that as stewards of the public ' s air they
were responsible for the content of informational
programming . As the decade went on, the broadcasting
industry with the national networks in the vanguard would
defend itself against attacks on its stewardship by
claiming that this kind of news was truly a better way to
serve the public interest.
The industry's embrace of this new definition of
broadcast journalism was a gradual one. True to the terms
of the Biltmore agreement, the national networks suspended
their independent news gathering efforts, leaving daily
spot news reporting to the wire services and local
2 John G. "Jap" Gude quoted in Edward Bliss, Jr., Now
the News: The Story of Broadcast Journalism (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1991), 27.
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Gtations. The networkc added the occacional ctudio newccact
but concentrated on providing commentary, talkc and live
coverage of special eventc from acroes the country and,
increasingly, from around the world.
It was with an eye toward expanded special events
coverage from overseas, not daily coverage of breaking
news, that the networks in the 193 06 began to assemble
their first foreign bureaus. The first of the network
representatives, and Columbia's lone full-time employee in
Europe until the summer of 1937, was Cesar Saerchinger. A
freelance journal ist who special ized in news of the
cultural scene, Saerchinger had lived in Europe for more
than a decade and was working for the Philadelphia Public
Ledger' B London bureau when CBS hired him in 193 0. NBC,
larger and more prosperous but more cautious, followed
Columbia ' s lead two years later, stat ioning Fred Bate in
London in 19 32 and later adding a second full-timer in
Berlin, Max Jordan, and part-timers in Geneva, Paris and
Shanghai. Bate had lived in Europe since 1912, while Jordan
had been born in Italy, had emigrated to the United States
and had become a naturalized citizen before returning the
Europe as a newspaper correspondent in 1910 . ^ Their primary
task was to serve as producers, promoters and all-purpose
trouble-shooters protecting their employers' interests
abroad. They were paid not to report the news but to
^ Mitchell Charnley, News By Radio (New York:
Macmillan, 1948), 26-7; Bliss, Now the News, 70-3.
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arrange talks and performances by politicians, authors,
musicians, eminent and exotic personalities who would catch
the ears of listeners back home .
4
At the network headquarters in New York, the years
between the end of the Press
-Radio War in 1934 and the
European crises of 1938 marked what Paul White, Columbia's
news director during those years, would recall as "a
peculiar period in news broadcast ing ." ^ with the wire
services and local stations handling the day-to-day news
beat, the chains concentrated on living up to NBC's 1926
pledge "that every event of national importance may be
broadcast widely throughout the United States. Network
microphones were present at virtually every occasion of
note, and White and his counterpart at NBC, Abe Schecter,
sought a competitive edge by devising and promoting ever
4 William Paley, Ab It Happened: A Memoir (Garden
City, New York: Doubleday, 1979) 121; Bliss, Now the News,
73 .
^ Paul W. White, News on the Air (New York: Harcourt,
Brace
, 1947) , 44 .
^ Display advertisement, "Announcing the National
Broadcasting Company, Inc.," New York Times, September 14,
1926, 27.
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more exotic "nemos" - remote broadcasts - from locations
across the country and throughout Europe .
^
In journalistic terms. White and Schecter saw
themselves during these years as editors concerned with the
overall content of their product. Not yet certain what
radio news should sound like, they looked to the print
medium for models. "We try to function very much like a
newspaper or magazine would, " Schecter explained, "You
can't interest all the people in pol it ics . . . so we try to do
various things that will attract attention. " The networks
continued to broadcast conventions and political speeches
but worked just as hard to scoop the opposition on more
ethereal events: sporting spectacles, talks by celebrities,
public ceremonies and screwball features such as a trilling
English lark or a chorus of singing mice. This was radio's
enduring advantage over the printed page, the medium's
unique strength. The broadcasters' purposes were to bring
the audience "a lot of news to which people want to listen"
but also, as Schecter frankly admitted, "to pep up
listeners to the station and the network and... to create
publicity and promotion for the company."®
7 Phillips Carlin, who joined WEAF as a staff
announcer in 1923 and later became a senior NBC executive,
explained in a 1939 speech that a "nemo" was "anything
outside of the studio. That is just a word somebody cooked
up. . .and it stuck and has come down in the industry ever
since." "The Sustaining Program Division," typescript of a
talk given to an NBC employees' discussion group, October
25, 1939, Broadcast Pioneers Library, Washington, DC, 16.
8 A. A. Schecter, "The News and Special Events
Division," typescript of a talk given to an NBC employees'
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During these years prior to the Second World War, the
broadcasters learned valuable skills. Schecter, White and
the network representatives overseas made contacts and
mastered techniques which would prove vital as the European
situation deteriorated. The networks learned how to
transmit voices by transoceanic short-wave relays, portable
transmitters and telephone lines to their affiliates across
the country. Saerchinger, Bate and Jordan dealt regularly
with government broadcasters who controlled the radio
studios and powerful short-wave stations of Europe and the
state telephone monopoly officials whose cooperation was
needed to link Windsor Castle, the Reichstag and dozens of
other locations to the transmitters. At home, network
executives , announcers and technical personnel gradually
worked out techniques, procedures and standards for
broadcasting breaking news and special events. They learned
when to interrupt scheduled programming for live coverage,
how to move smoothly from entertainment to news and back
again without confusing the audience, how to deal with
sponsors and advertising agencies whose commercial
discussion group, November 8, 1939, Broadcast Pioneers
Library, Washington, DC, 4. Regarding the singing mice,
Schecter said, "Now that sounds very silly, and it really
is very silly. On the other hand, I remember picking up one
midwestern newspaper — it was a Sunday radio section — and
it had an eight column streamer across the radio page
saying — ''Singing- Mice on Air Today. " And then a little
two column head with, "Lilly Pons Makes Debut'' - so you
see who ' s more important .
"
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broadcaBts might be disrupted. The payoff would come in
1938 .
Radio's coverage of Germany's annexation of Austria in
March and the Munich crisis in September raised broadcast
news to a new level. The medium's critical advantages of
immediacy and intimacy allowed broadcasters and their
listeners to keep constant track of shifting events.
Through their radios, Americans could hear the news as it
happened and, thanks to the voices on the scene, they felt
they were participants in events. As Europe stumbled into
war, broadcasters, building on nearly two decades of
practical experience, brought the crisis home to a nation
divided over the threat of a coming war.
Historian David Culbert has argued that radio played
an important, perhaps decisive, role in building a domestic
consensus on foreign policy prior to 1941, "first, by
making foreign policy of concern to a majority of
Americans; second, by urging a consensus as to what sort of
foreign policy this country should have."^ By bringing the
European crisis home, by making the outbreak of war
intimately real to millions of Americans, radio clearly
fulfilled Culbert 's first assertion. An examination of the
broadcasts of the time gives considerable support to the
second. This question, however, remains: Why did radio's
9 David Holbrook Culbert, News for Everyman: Radio and
Foreign Affairs in Thirties America (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood, 1976), 3-11, quotation at 11.
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coverage take the form it did? Did broadcasters
intentionally hew to the internationalist, interventionist
line? If so, what was their motivation? Throughout the late
193 06, broadcasters argued repeatedly that they sought only
to serve the public interest by presenting accurate,
unbiased information. The networks, especially Columbia,
were vocal on this point, but as commentator Quincy Howe
suggested after the war, "the public record tells a
different story. "1°
As the Second World War approached in Europe and Asia,
the war for control of the people's airwaves continued at
home. While the nation was listening to events unfold
overseas, broadcasters feared an increasingly truculent
Roosevelt administration, a newly activist Federal
Communications Commission and important critics in Congress
threatened to upset the American system of broadcasting.
Events in Washington shaped what Americans heard on their
radios as the broadcasting industry sought to defend itself
against its own enemies.
While broadcasters continued to experiment with their
medium, the regulators of the ether attempted to keep pace
with the rapidly growing industry. Broadcasters, aware that
the law gave their federal regulators 1 if e -and-death power,
repeatedly reacted to the implicit threat of federal
intervention, even though the FCC rarely moved beyond the
Quincy Howe, "The Rise and Fall of the Radio
Commentator," The Saturday Review, October 26, 1957, 38.
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raised eyebrow. Chairman Anning Prall's comment that he
planned no sensational changes in the regulatory climate
had proven entirely too true for many critics who yearned
for a more activist FCC to counterbalance what they saw as
the immense power of the corporations. Increasingly, as the
power of radio seemed to grow unchecked, broadcasting's
regulators were called to account for failing to bring the
industry to heel
.
An odd alliance of New Deal critics gradually turned
against the FCC. Conservative Republicans such as Hamilton
Fish formed one flank of the attack. They saw the heavy
hand of government regulation suppressing both free
enterprise and the expression of opinion not consistent
with administration policies. On the other were
anticorporate and increasingly ant i -New Deal Westerners
such as Burton Wheeler who saw big government and major
corporations arrayed against local autonomy. Additional
snipers were recruited from the ranks of the administration
itself, advocates of activist government hoping to prod the
New Deal into more direct intervention in radio. The most
vocal and, from the broadcasters ' point of view, most
threatening attacks came from Congress. Lawmakers hoped to
use threats of investigations and new regulatory
legislation to bring the industry into line.
Wheeler became the most outspoken congressional critic
of the broadcasting establishment. Born in Hudson,
Massachusetts and educated at the University of Michigan,
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Wheeler had settled in the rough - and - tuird^le mining country
of Montana before the Firot World War. Elected to the
Senate in 1922, he had run for vice precident on La
Follette'c 1924 Progreccive elate and never loot hio
ambition for higher office. When the Seventy- Fourth
Congreco convened in 1935, Wheeler oucceeded Clarence Dill,
who had retired to return to hie law practice, ac chair of
the Senate's Interstate Commerce Committee, the committee
in charge of radio legiclat ion . ^ From that perch, he would
crucade against what he understood to be an increasingly
monopolistic, centralized radio industry beholden to
corporate interests that was being given a free pass by
reluctant regulators who were in the pocket of the
bx'oadcasters
.
In January, 1935, when President Roosevelt's nominees
to the new FCC appeared before Wheeler's committee, the new
chairman announced "everybody who knows anything about
radio appreciates that there has grown up in the United
States a practical monopoly with reference to radio
broadcasting in this country. "^^ To Wheeler, the growth of
Congress , Senate
,
Biographical Directory of the
Uhi ted Stateo CongrecD 1 774 -19 89 (Washington : Government
Printing Office, 1989), 2033.
^-^ Congress , Senate , Committee on Interstate Commerce
,
Confirmat i on of Memberd of the Federal Communi cati one
Conwiiooion , 74th Cong., 1st sess., January 23, 1935, 40.
The hearings wex"e dominated by Mississippi ' s newly - elected
Senator Theodore Bilbo who attempted to derail Eugene O.
Sykes' nomination on grounds that Sykes, a former Bilbo
ally turned New Dealer, and two FRC staffers from
Mississippi had conspired with Roosevelt to defeat him the
previous fall. "In the loom of Mississippi politics," Bilbo
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the broadcasting chains represented centralization and
standardization of both entertainment and public affairs.
The networks, headquartered in New York, influential in
Washington, bankrolled by the nation's leading industries,
were enemies to those who like Wheeler had for decades
defended local autonomy and individualism from the
corrupting power of "the interests." when Congress in 1928
approved an amendment to the Radio Act requiring the
equitable geographic distribution of broadcast licenses,
southerners and westerners including Wheeler had led the
fight, fearing the FRC if left to its own devices would
award prime frequencies to big city applicants. As General
Electric, Westinghouse and the other radio allies continued
to secure powerful stations across the country, they blamed
this on regulators beholden to the industry.
The industry and its regulators were in fact closely
linked. President Hoover, in keeping with his
associationist ideals, had argued that the best candidates
for the Federal Radio Commission would be found within the
ranks of the industry itself. They, he said, would be the
most knowledgeable on both the latest developments within
radio and the problems facing the industry. The FRC had
proven itself a faithful ally of commercial broadcasters
proclaimed in magnificent metaphor, "they plied like a
shuttle back and forth between Washington and Mississippi
bearing messages from the Capitol City to the unsuspecting
and confiding voters, that authorities who occupied the
exalted places in Washington did not want Theodore G. Bilbo
to be elected United States Senator." Hearings, 4.
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and membership was a useful addition to the resume of
career-minded broadcast executives. Columbia was especially
hospitable to former commissioners, hiring Sam Pickard as
vice president for station relations in 1929 and Henry
Bellows as Washington manager in 1933. Fortune
congratulated CBS president William Paley for these hirings
and credited Paley' s political acumen as a major reason for
network's rapid rise.i^ Former and current FRC staffers
were often reunited at commission hearings. Wheeler
reminded former FRC chairman Eugene Sykes during hearings
on his nomination to the FCC. "Now, it does seem to me that
it is extremely bad practice, to say the least," Wheeler
scolded, "for a man to step out of the Federal Radio
Commission and then go up there before it and appear for
private clients." Sykes, who himself would join a prominent
broadcast law firm upon leaving the commission, was forced
to agree.
Despite his belief that a radio monopoly existed.
Wheeler was reluctant to replace a private monopoly with
what he feared would become a monopoly of the air
controlled by the New Deal. "I have never favored
Government ownership of the broadcasting in this country,
"
he confessed, but he added a warning to the industry. If
^3 "And All Because They're Smart," Fortune, June
1935, 80.
Confirmation of Members of the Federal
Commun i cations Commi eeion, 3 9.
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broadcasters failed to clean their own house, he cautioned,
"they are going to find a demand for Government ownership."
And the FCC, he said, would have to begin looking seriously
at the growing influence of the chains if it wanted to
prove it was a serious regulatory agency. is
The attacks on radio took several forms, but pointed
questions about freedom of speech and equal access to the
air were usually part of the inquiry. Wheeler's House
colleague from Montana, Democrat Joseph P. Monaghan,
introduced legislation in 1935 to limit commercial
broadcasting, establish not-for-profit stations and end
trafficking in broadcast licenses. Why, he argued, should
private businesses profit from the purchase and sale of
permits to use the people's air? The FCC ' s complicity in
the current system was responsible, he claimed, for a
growing threat to democracy. As the radio trust tightened
its control of the air, it stifled free debate. "Big
business seeks to control and mold public opinion,"
Monaghan said in a populist outburst, "in order that they
may add to the millions they now possess and that the cost
of government may be imposed upon the little fellow rather
than upon those who are well able to pay. "^^
IS Confirmation of Members of the Federal
Communi cations Commission, 49-50.
1^ Congress, House, Representative Joseph P. Monaghan
discussing H.R. 8475, 74th Cong., 1st sess.. Congressional
Record (August 23, 1935), vol. 79, pt . 13, 14311.
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Democrat Byron N. Scott of California called for
legislation requiring every station "to give over desirable
periods on a regular basis and without revenue to
unrestricted discussion of public issues" as a condition of
its license. Radio stations, in return, would be shielded
from any liability for slander. Scott's proposal echoed
progressive calls that radio broadcasting should be a
regulated common carrier which were heard prior to adoption
of the 1927 Radio Act. Acknowledging that broadcasters
labored under "a very real danger" that they would be held
responsible for "defamatory or improper remarks," Scott
argued that "censorship has flourished under fear of these
dangers" and the free exchange of information basic to the
functioning of a democracy was the victim.
Such attacks from junior members of Congress
demonstrated an awareness that radio's growing influence ac
a news and information medium and its perceived
vulnerability to corporate control were of increasing
concern to the public. That no single bid to reform the
medium gathered sufficient support for passage reflected
the lack of agreement on how to create a better system.
Both the White House and a majority in Congress seemed to
agree that the newly reconstituted FCC should be given an
Congress, House, Representative Byron N. Scott,
"Proposed Amendments to the Communications Act of 1934.
Resolution for the Establishment of a Broadcasting Research
Commission," 74th Cong., 1st sess., Concfreeeional Record
(August 23, 1935), vol. 79, pt . 13, 14400.
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opportunity to function. Following the election year
battleG over accecs to the air in 1936, however, there were
renewed calls for sweeping structural change. While several
resolutions calling for investigations into broadcasting
remained stalled in the House and Wheeler threatened to
launch a similar probe in the Senate, it was the entrance
of a leading Republican into the debate which finally
forced the Roosevelt administration to act to head off a
Congressional attack
.
On Saint Patrick's Day, 1937, Senator Wallace H,
White, Jr. of Maine, the co-author of the 1927 Radio Act,
rose on the Senate floor to join those calling for a
thorough investigation of both the broadcasting industry
and the FCC. White had been easily re-elected in 1936 as
Maine voters ignored the Roosevelt landslide. Respected on
both sides of the aisle as a meticulous legislative
craftsman and behind-the-scenes negotiator, he was by
common consent the Senate's expert on communications
questions . ^®
In a lengthy, tightly-reasoned speech. White recounted
the legislative history of radio regulation which he had
18 "Ex-Senator White of Maine, Was 74," New York
Tiniee, April 1, 1952, 29; Biog^raphical Directory of the
Uni ted States Cong'resG , 204 1 . White was Republ ican to the
bone . He first came to Washington in 1899 as the secretary
for his grandfather , Senator Wil 1 iam Pierce Frye , who had
been appointed in 1881 to take the seat of James G. Blaine,
the legendary Plumed Knight. White would become Senate
minority leader in 1944 and majority leader in 1947. When
he declined to seek re-election in 1948, he was succeeded
by another Republican icon, Margaret Chase Smith.
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played such an important role in writing. One by one, he
covered the critical issues: public ownership of the ether,
monopoly, trafficking in licenses, freedom of the air, the
problems of regulation. Ultimately, White stated, the
thrust of the law was clear. It was up to Congress "to make
certain that the public interest ... is not subordinated to
private advantage," and circumstances now demanded that
Congress act to reassert its authority. 20
The FCC, White said, had lost the confidence of the
public. Its decisions were seen as tainted by political
influence and economic power. "There is a greater volume
and persistence of criticism of this Commission than of any
other bureau or commission of the Government," he said, "Is
there warrant for this?... Only a searching inquiry will
give the answer to these quest ions . "2i Echoing the
progressive doctrine of exposure. White said, "I know of no
more certain means of reestablishing the Commission in
public respect than to turn on the light of publicity and
thereby stop these attempts to improperly influence a
quasi -judicial and regulatory body of the Government ." 22
White stopped short of endorsing any one of the several
1^ Congress, Senate, Senator Wallace H. White,
"Regulation of Radio Communication," 75th Cong., 1st sess.,
Congrreesional Record (March 17, 1937), vol. 81, pt . 2,
2332
-7
.
20 White, "Regulation of Radio Communication," 2332.
21 White, "Regulation of Radio Communication," 2337.
22 white, "Regulation of Radio Communication," 2336-7.
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resolutions before Congress, promising to outline his own
proposal later in the session.
When the Senate reconvened after the Fourth of July
recess, white introduced a detailed resolution directing
the Interstate Commerce Committee to investigate
broadcasting. He proposed an sweeping agenda of thirty
items covering all aspects of the radio business, including
monopoly and censorship, the use of stations by political
candidates and "the development and present facts
concerning broadcasting networks or chains, including the
effects of chain association upon the licensee's control
over his station. "23 white's resolution was referred to
Wheeler's Interstate Commerce Committee for hearings during
the fall session.
There was good reason for the leadership to delay
acting on White's challenge. The spring and summer of 1937
had seen one of the most remarkable political turnarounds
in American history. While White was drafting his proposed
resolution for a radio investigation, two issues arose to
weaken Roosevelt's control of events. In April, he proposed
the "court packing" judicial reform plan and was rebuffed.
Secondly, the economy took a turn for the worse in the late
summer, triggering a recession which threatened to wipe out
the gradual economic gains of the first term. The
23 Congress, Senate, Investigation of Radio
Broadcast incf, 75th Cong., 1st sess., S. Res. 149,
Congreeeional Record (July 6, 1937), vol. 81, pt . 6, 6786-
7
.
197
president's opponents celebrated. Less than a year after
his overwhelming re-election victory, Roosevelt seemed
vulnerable . 24
Given that political background, the idea of a full-
fledged congressional investigation of the broadcasting
industry promised to become an unwelcome partisan side
show. The FCC to be sure had few defenders on either side
of the aisle. As Raymond Moley would recall, "everyone"
knew the commission was bogged down in industry politics
and had "made pretty much of a mess of things. "25 prall
appeared unable to right the ship and, to make matters
worse, was in declining health. In the summer of 1937, the
chairman retreated to his summer home in Maine to
convalesce. On July 23, he died of a heart attack. 26
Perhaps, administration officials believed, a stronger
chairman could solve the problem. As his successor,
Roosevelt appointed Federal Power Commission chairman Frank
R. McNinch.
McNinch had been the Democratic mayor of Charlotte,
North Carolina and had attracted some national notice in
1918 by deputizing and arming private citizens to keep the
peace during a streetcar strike. He deserted the party in
24 See for example James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt:
The Lion and the Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 19 56)
,
291-336
.
25 Raymond Moley, "Perspective," Newsweek, February 6,
1939, 48.
26 "Anning S. Prall, 66, Head of FCC, Dead," 15.
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1928 to endorse Hoover and was rewarded with an appointment
to the Federal Power Commission where, much to the
administration's surprise, he revealed an appetite for
populist trust busting. McNinch proved himself a strong
Roosevelt ally during the battle leading to passage of the
Public Utility Holding Company Act in 1935. Roosevelt's
appointment of a man Time colorfully described as the
president's "acute and large-eared little trouble shooter"
to head the FCC sent clear signals both to broadcasters and
their critics in Congress. 27
McNinch 's antimonopoly reputation was clearly meant to
soothe those on the hill who feared the domination of
broadcasting by corporate America. Wheeler had co- sponsored
the public utility legislation and knew McNinch as an ally
on that issue. For those primarily concerned that political
influence distorted the commission's decisions, McNinch
took quick action to reorganize the FCC. He abolished the
critics' favorite target, the Examining Division, which
screened all station applications and sent most on to the
full Commission for routine approval. In the future, the
chairman decreed, "each hearing is to be conducted by the
Commission, by a commissioner, or by one or more suitably
qualified employees, chiefly lawyers," and referred to the
full Commission for further hearing if necessary. The
reform, McNinch said, "provides for 'fair play' by
27 "QRX, " Time, May 16, 1938, 25. "QRX" is a standard
Morse code signal meaning "stand by for more."
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apprising the parties of the proposed decisions before they
are made final." The result, he continued, would mean
"first, greater efficiency, and second, the utmost
protection attainable against possible improper influence
by those having business with the Commission. "28 McNinch's
words seemed to be carefully chosen to mollify White, whose
proposed Senate investigation would attempt among other
things to determine "whether the acts and decisions of the
Commission in broadcasting cases have been influenced by
matters not apparent in the public records. "2S The Maine
Republican must also have noticed that among the political
appointees who were purged in the reorganization were
relatives of Democratic stalwarts Sam Rayburn of Texas and
Hugo Black of Alabama.
McNinch's appointment was clearly designed to buy the
administration time. With a vigorous new chairman on board,
a Congressional investigation of the industry could be
opposed on grounds that the FCC should be given a chance to
put its own house in order. Despite McNinch's reputation as
a foe of the trusts and his initial administrative reforms,
critics on the hill remained restive. When Commissioner
Irvin Stewart's term on the FCC expired in July, Roosevelt
28 Federal Communications Commission, Fourth Annual
Report, Federal Communications Commieeion, Fiscal Year
Ended June 30, 1938 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1939), vi-vii.
29 S. Res. 149, 6786.
^0 "QRX, " 25
.
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nominated the Commission's chief engineer, retired naval
officer T.A.M. Craven, to take his place. An Annapolis
graduate who had headed the Navy's transoceanic radio
operations during the First World War, Craven was an
acknowledged expert on the science of radio. His
appointment, it was hoped, would comfort those critics who
believed that the commissioners lacked the technical
expertise needed to properly regulate the medium.
The FCC's enemies saw the appointment another way. Not
only was Craven part of the naval establishment that had
worked closely with GE, Westinghouse and ultimately the new
RCA when the military controlled all broadcasting during
the war, after retiring from the service in 1930, he had
spent five years as a consulting engineer to the industry.
That he had moved so smoothly from the public to the
private sector and now stood ready become one of the
industry's regulators seemed another example of the
revolving door policy that had plagued broadcast regulation
for so long.
During floor debate on Craven's nomination, FCC
critics seized the opportunity to voice their concerns over
the radio situation. Wheeler reminded his colleagues that
the Commission "has been used as a political football" and
"political influence," not the public interest, had too
often dictated decisions. Massachusetts Democrat Daniel
31 Congress, Senate, Burton K. Wheeler debating the
nomination of T.A.M. Craven to the FCC, 75th Cong., 1st
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I. Walsh agreed and warned, "I can conceive of nothing more
harmful and injurious to the public interest than to have
the communications Commission politically controlled by any
sinister influences, or by any group except those activated
by the highest motives of serving the whole public. "32 The
Senate leadership had the votes to approve the nomination,
but Wheeler's warning left both Craven and the
administration duly chastened.
The attacks on radio and its regulators were by 1937
sounding familiar. The same concerns over monopoly,
commercialism, corporate control of the air and the
medium's failure to live up to expectations that it would
be a democratizing force which had dominated debate in the
192 0s persisted. The times, however, had changed. The
networks had matured and prospered, changing radio into an
important part of most Americans daily lives. The political
climate at home was far more contentious than it had been a
decade before. The social uncertainty triggered by the
depression had been augmented by growing concern over
worldwide unrest and instability emanating from Asia and
especially from Europe where the dogs of war were baying
again.
sess., ConcfreBBional Record (August 21, 1937), vol. 81, pt
8, 9604.
32 Congress, Senate, Daniel I. Walsh debating the
nomination of T.A.M. Craven to the FCC, 75th Cong., 1st
sess., CongrsBBional Record (August 21, 1937), vol. 81, pt
8, 9604.
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Radio's informational programming brought the event g
home and amplified the debate over their impact on the
nation. Columbia, the self
-proclaimed news network, would
establish itself in 1938 as the leading source of war news
from Europe. The network's story is representative both of
the evolution of broadcast news and of the grittier
political issues facing the industry. Columbia, the network
personified by Edward R. Murrow, became the standard bearer
for broadcast j ournal ism. ^3 while Murrow himself eventually
attained god-like status in television and radio newsrooms
around the world, the environment in which he worked in the
1930s was largely shaped by two network executives. These
two men, CBS vice-president Edward Klauber and news and
public affairs director Paul White, played perhaps the most
critical roles in the development of both the network's and
the industry's concept of broadcast journalism in the
critical years before the Second World War.
Klauber was forty- three when he joined CBS in 19 3 0 as
an assistant to twenty-nine year old network president
William Paley. A native of Louisville, Kentucky, Klauber
had briefly studied medicine but soon turned to newspaper
work, first at the New York World, then at the New York
Times where his uncle had once been a theater critic. At
33 Y'or an example of the abiding power of the CBS News
tradition within the broadcasting industry, see for example
Gary Paul Gates, Air Time: The Inside Story of CBS News
(New York: Harper, 1978) and more recently Ken Auletta,
Three Blind Mice: How the TV Networks Lost Their Way (New
York: Random House, 1991)
.
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the TinwB, he rose from reporter to night city editor
during the tenure of managing editor Carr Van Anda and
brought the Times tradition of news-as-fact with him to the
network. A short, heavy- set man described by Paley as
"taciturn" and by subordinates as autocratic, tyrannical
and cruel, Klauber was morbidly shy and certainly demanding
and terse. He brought with him a reputation as a can-do
administrator who demanded results. 34 He also appreciated
that the new medium, generally held in disdain as a mere
vehicle for entertainment and advertising by serious print
journalists, could become a valuable - if different -
source of information for the public. As David Halberstam,
a Pulitzer Prize
-winning Timee correspondent in the 196 0s,
observed, "Klauber transferred his own knowledge of
journalism, learned at an elite newspaper with an elite
audience, to a new medium with a mass audience. "35
Columbia's public affairs programming was only one of
Klauber 's many domains. His first responsibility was to
impose order and discipline within the rapidly growing
network organization and upon the mercurial Paley
34 Joseph E. Persico, Edward R. Murrow: An American
Original (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1988), 98-9/ Robert Metz,
CBS: Reflections in a Bloodshot Eye (Chicago: Playboy,
19 75), 39-4 8; Paley, As It Happened, 6 3-4.
35 David Halberstam, The Powers That Be (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 34-5.
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himself. 36 To run the network's fledgling news and public
affairs department, he hired White away from the United
Press. A consummate newspaperman known in the trade for
going to any length to beat the competition. White
cultivated a gruff, street-smart image that belied both his
Kansas roots and his graduate degree in journalism from
Columbia University. "Paul came from the school of
journalism where you worm your way into the house of the
bereaved widow and while you're there, you steal a picture
of the deceased for the paper," a CBS veteran remembered.
Another colleague perceptively suggested White carefully
cultivated his chosen newsroom persona, saying "he had seen
The Front Page too many times. "^7
Like Klauber, White understood both radio's potential
as a news medium and how the medium's new technologies
would change journalism. "Paul was, I think, the first real
managing editor the business ever had, " CBS newsman Eric
Sevareid recalled,
He loved the thing, you know — the switching
around the world. That was his news, what he
called "the fine careless rapture" of the
business. . . .But he was concerned with substance.
Oh yes, Paul was all wrapped up in techniques,
and who had a beautiful voice and all that; he
was a real newsman. And so was Klauber. ^8
36 Sally Bedell Smith, In All Hie Glory: The Life of
William S. Paley (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 118
9 .
"^"^ John Daley and Helen Sioussat quoted in Persico,
Edward R. Marrow, 106.
38 Eric Sevareid interviewed in "CBS: The First 6 0
Years," Broadcaeting
,
September 14, 1987, 86. Sevareid
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Together, Klauber and White would create network radio's
dominant news organization, while both came to radio from
the newspaper industry and were committed to the factual
paradigm, their past was liberating rather than limiting.
Each saw radio as a different medium which could borrow
certain techniques and ethics from print but which would
ultimately be judged by different standards. Both Klauber
and especially White, as Sevareid pointed out, understood
that the dynamics of broadcasting would make for a new and
different kind of journalism.
In 1935, Klauber hired Murrow as the chain's director
of talks. Murrow at the time was the assistant director of
the Institute of International Education and part of his
job involved negotiating radio appearances for scholars
from around the world as part of the "actual cooperative
arrangements between educators and broadcasters" endorsed
by the FCC. The CBS job, Klauber frankly told him, was
purely administrative. Murrow would use his contacts to
arrange the chain's talks schedule. He would not speak on
the air himself. That restriction had in fact allowed
Murrow to get the job. Klauber 's first choice, newspaperman
expressed a similar opinion in a letter to the author,
August 22, 1991. White's often-cited comment on the
"rapture" of the medium is from Robert Browning's Home-
ThoughtB, from the Sea which establishes an interesting
metaphor: "That's the wise thrush: he sings each song twice
over, / Lest you should think he never could recapture /
The first fine careless rapture!" White understood that the
transparent magical moments of broadcasting were the result
of careful preparation, not improvisation.
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Raymond Gram Swing, had already gotten a taste of life
behind the microphone as an occasional commentator on
foreign affairs during Columbia's "American School of the
Air" broadcasts and did not want to sacrifice what he hoped
was a budding radio career. 39 Two years after joining the
network, Murrow was sent to London to succeed Saerchinger
as Columbia's European director.
Murrow was not a trained journalist nor was he
expected to be one by his superiors in New York. His job,
like Saerchinger 's, was to schedule talks by European
statesmen and celebrities as well as concerts, sporting
events and local celebrations which would make interesting
programs for the listeners back home. When a newsworthy
event occurred in Europe, Murrow' s job was to line up
official spokesmen or distinguished journalists to discuss
what was happening. He was not to report the events
39 Alexander Kendrick, Prime Time, The Life of Edward
i?. Murrow (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969), 130-1. Murrow, a
college debater at Washington State University, had
previously spoken on the radio on behalf of the HE and
earlier as an officer of the National Student Federation.
Murrow' 6 on- the -air debut as a CBS employee occurred on
Christmas Eve, 1936 when, after a company party, he
snatched the script for a late-night news summary away from
Robert Trout, marched into the studio and read it himself,
claiming Trout was in no shape to face the microphone.
Kendrick, a long-time CBS correspondent himself, notes that
Murrow, not the temperate Trout, was the one who had
overindulged and wrote, "Murrow never faltered. He marched
through the news clearly and precisely, as if it had been
made for him, and he for it. This was exactly the case."
The anecdote, repeated by all Murrow biographers, reveals
Murrow' 6 natural talent on the air but, more importantly,
the haphazard nature of network news at the time. Kendrick,
Prime Time, 13 7.
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himself. That was the job of the news staff back in the
States where wire service dispatches were turned into news
Bummaries and where Boake Carter, H.V. Kaltenborn and the
other commentators would add their analysis. From time to
time, if events warranted, commentators such as William
Hard or Frederick William Wile or special events announcers
such as Robert Trout would travel to Europe but such
decisions seemed to be made more for their potential
publicity value than on the grounds of news judgment, when,
for example, George IV was crowned in 1937, Trout arrived
in London to describe the pageantry and introduce British
notables who added their insights. Murrow's voice was never
heard. Instead, like any other tourist, he watched the
festivities from the reviewing stands at Hyde Park.^o
This was Columbia's established practice prior to the
war. The chain wanted the prestige of bringing events from
Europe to its listeners but also sought to maintain a
certain protective distance from the content of its
programs. It was embarrassing when a guest of the network
referred to listeners in America as "you dear old boobs" as
George Bernard Shaw had done in 1935. A similar statement
by a network representative might trigger such a howl of
protest the FCC would be moved to act. When Murrow was
allowed to hire an assistant — doubling the network's
Kendrick, Prime Time, 14 3-4
Kendrick, Prime Time, 144.
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European staff - in August, 1937, he chose William L.
Shirer, an experienced newspaperman and foreign
correspondent. New York wanted to hear what Shirer sounded
like on the radio because he would be called upon to voice
introductions from time to time, but as Shirer noted in his
diary, "Murrow and I are not supposed to do any talking on
the radio ourselves. New York wants us to hire newspaper
correspondents for that. We just arrange broadcasts . "42
This policy was satisfactory while radio devoted itself to
coverage of scheduled events and timeless features. As
Europe approached war and newsworthy events erupted across
the continent without advance notice, the chains would of
necessity require their own men and women to assume more of
the reporter ial burden. Murrow - intelligent, aware and
ambitious — seemed to foresee the future. He wanted
trained reporters on board when the time came.
The time came in March, 1938 as Hitler moved into
Austria. Neither Murrow nor Shirer was in Vienna as the
AnchluBB approached. In keeping with their primary duties,
Murrow was in Warsaw and Shirer was in Yugoslavia. Both
were making arrangements for an upcoming "American School
of the Air" broadcast which would feature musical youth
^^ William L. Shirer, Berlin Dairy (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1943), 64-7, 70. The network disliked Shirer's
soft and rather high-pitched voice. The fact that White did
not block Shirer's hiring perhaps indicates that in
addition to appreciating his skills as a journalist, he did
not expect Shirer to become a regular on- the -air
personality.
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groups at home and abroad. 43 shirer wac the firct to reach
Vienna, arriving in the city March ll as an Austrian puppet
government was taking power and German troops were marching
on the capital. He got word to Murrow in Warsaw and, as the
only American radio representative on the scene, tried to
get through to New York via short-wave from Ravag, the
Austrian state radio system, only to be shown the door by
armed Nazi guards. Shirer caught the first available plane
to London, hoping to get on the air there as Murrow headed
for Vienna. Shirer reached London late that night and
broadcast an eyewitness account . 44 when Murrow reached
Vienna, he also found Ravag
• s studio door closed to him.
NBC's Jordan, on the other hand, was allowed to broadcast
heavily censored reports thanks to a pre-existing agreement
between NBC and the Austrian radio system. Enraged by his
competitor's advantage, Paley telephoned the manager of
Ravag, a personal friend, only to be told by the sobbing
executive that "I am no longer in charge here." Desperate
now, Paley then called NBC president Lenox Lohr who agreed
— for one week only — to waive his network's exclusive
contract and allow Columbia to use the Vienna studio. The
call for help to Lohr must have been especially galling to
Paley, Ab It Happened, 131.
44 Shirer, Berlin Diary, 77-83.
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the competitive Paley.^s cbs needed to come up with some
way of getting even.
Columbia's answer was an international multiple pickup
news broadcast that would air live reports on the crisis
from five European capitals, New York and Washington. The
plan while not unprecedented had been tried only rarely in
the past, Shirer recalled, "and it took us months of
fussing before technical arrangements could be completed.
And then, in the end, they usually broke down. "46 ^his
time, to close the competitive gap, there would be only a
few hours to prepare for the broadcast. And, to make
matters worse, it was a Sunday.
Somehow, all the details came together in time. By
calling in numerous favors and taking advantage of years of
accumulated experience, CBS was ready to go on the air at
eight o'clock in the evening. New York time, March 13,
1938. The broadcast was, in historian Donald Godfrey's
phrase, "more than just another report from Europe. It was
a precedent - sett ing radio program. "^7
45 Paley, Ab It Happened, 13 0-3; Robert Landry,
"Edward R. Murrow, " Scribner'e, December 1938, 11. Landry,
the radio editor of Variety, recounted the call to Lohr
.
Paley explained Columbia's sudden acquisition of studio
privileges in Vienna by writing that Murrow "persuaded
German authorities to open a line for him."
46 William L. Shirer, "Berlin Speaking," Jitlantic
Monthly, September 194 0, 310.
47 Donald G. Godfrey, "CBS World News Roundup: Setting
the Stage for the Next Half Century, " American Journalieiv 7
(Summer 1990), 171.
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In form, the roundup was indeed a model for the future
of broadcast journalism. The structure of the program,
reports from correspondents around the world introduced by
a single announcer at network headquarters and distributed
to affiliates across the country, became the now-familiar
model for subsequent radio and television network
newscasts. In content, however, the roundup was very much
in the accepted pattern of the times, while Columbia's
Trout anchored the broadcast in New York, newspaper and
wire service reporters and government officials rather than
network employees supplied most of the informat ion . 48
Pierre Huss of the International News Service read a
cautious, censored report from Berlin. From Paris, Edgar
Ansel Mowrer of the Chicago Daily News, recently expelled
from Berlin, spoke of Germany's use of "brutal, naked
force." Ellen Wilkinson, a Labor Member of Parliament,
spoke from London while Senator Lewis Schwel lenbach of
Washington state offered an American perspective from
Washington. Shirer spoke briefly to introduce Wilkinson and
Trout's skills as an extemporaneous broadcaster are
legendary within the industry and no doubt explain why he
was chosen to announce what figured to be an important but
extremely dicey program. "He belonged, " Paley noted, "to
that small group who could talk in front of a microphone
without notes for twenty, thirty, sixty minutes, two hours,
without stopping." Paley, Ab It Happened, 133. Three
decades later, news executives at a leading New York radio
station would invoke Trout's reputation to caution new
staffers on the perils of ad-libbing. "Over the years, we
have had many reporters who insisted they could ad-lib like
Bob Trout. Most have ad-libbed their way right out of
work." Jerry Graham and Jack Pluntze, WNEW Style Book (New
York: Metromedia, [1968]), 13.
212
later in the program read a diopatch wi-itteii by Frank
Gervaoi, the ins correcpondent in Rome becauee Italian
otate radio could not arrange a broadcact circuit on ouch
ohort not ice. 49
Murrow wac the only CBS ctaffer to play a major role
in the broadcaot. Speaking from the Ravag ctudioc in
Vienna, Murrow informed hie liotenerc that "Herr Hitler hac
not yet arrived but moot people expect him comet ime
after 10:00 o'clock tomorrow morning." He then offered a
deocription of the Auctrian capital, demonc trat ing the eye
for telling detail which would mark hie later broadcaotc.
"They lift the right arm a little higher here than in
Berlin," he caid of the Auctrian Nazic and told of "young
Gtorm trooperc" cruioing the ctreeto in military vehiclec
"Dinging and toccing orangec out to the crowd." It wac well
after two o'clock in the morning when Murrow went on the
air. He counded tired ac he read hie ccript, paucing
occaoionally to collect himcelf or fit hie wordc to the
predetermined time allotted for hie report. In contract to
what would become hie later practice, he identified himcelf
on the air ac "Edward Murrow" with no middle initial. It
was Murrow' D first real newo broadcaot, and he did not
oound out of place among the profeccional journal io to and
Shirer, "Berlin Speaking," 310-1; Paley, It
Happened, 133; Godfrey, "CBS World Newo Roundup," 169-70.
Edward R. Mtirrow, "CBS European Roundup," CBS
network, March 13, 1938. A portion of the text ic reprinted
in Paley, Aa It Happened, 133-4.
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politicians. Shirer noted in his diary, "Edgar and Ed were
especially good.... New York said.
.. it was a success. "5i it
was such a success that Columbia repeated the feat with
varying personnel each of the next two nights. 52
The broadcast and its aftermath also reflected how
Columbia used its news coverage as a promotional tool.
While the CBS roundup was a remarkable technical
accomplishment, NBC had, thanks to Max Jordan and the
network's exclusive contract with Ravag, scooped its
competition on the Nazi takeover. Not only had Jordan been
first on the air from Vienna, he had scored a major beat on
Saturday, the day before the Columbia roundup, when he
intercepted Hitler's motorcade at Linz and managed to
transmit a portion of Hitler's speech to the townspeople
back to New York. In all, NBC, also largely relying on the
contributions of newspaper correspondents, aired nine
separate broadcasts from Europe over the weekend compared
to a dozen for CBS . ^3
NBC's success did not stop CBS from claiming victory.
Just as the network had scored a public relations coup
three years earlier with its programming reform plans,
Columbia understood its performance during the Anchluee
51 Shirer, Berlin Diary, 107.
52 Shirer, "Berlin Speaking," 311.
53 "Quick Conquest of Austria By Hitler Given
Extensive Coverage by Networks, " Broadcast incf
,
April 1,
1938, 71.
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offered an opportunity to demonstrate how the chain served
the public interest. Columbia's publicity chief Paul Kesten
and his crack promotion staff quickly compiled, printed and
distributed to opinion makers throughout government and the
trade
- at a reported cost of $7,000 - a handsome brochure
memorializing the network's coverage of the annexation of
Austria. The publication, Variety's radio editor noted,
told "a fascinating story which, incidental to its
fascination, conveyed the impression without saying so that
Columbia had been omnipresent and omnipotent throughout."
Soon thereafter, the Headliners Club of Atlantic City
announced it would present a medal to Murrow for his work,
an honor CBS made sure was widely heralded. NBC publicists
were aghast, pointing out that White was a board member of
the Headliners Club and scoffing that the award marked the
first time a reporter had been honored for not getting the
story. CBS, with a final twist of the knife, countered by
explaining that White had actually nominated Jordan for the
medal, but the club had refused to go along because of
Jordan's rumored pro-Nazi sympathies
.
For Murrow and Shirer, the triumphs of March augured a
minor but nonetheless significant change in network policy.
Their primary duties remained the same, but New York now
wanted them to make a few talks on the European situation
Landry, "Edward R. Murrow," 11.
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themselves. 55 Columbia and the other networks would still
rely on distinguished foreigners and American print
correspondents to provide the bulk of their overseas
broadcasts, but from now on the chain's own representatives
would also be heard on the air. Edward Bliss, for many
years a CBS producer and news writer, suggested the
decision was largely motivated by practical concerns.
Events were moving so quickly, it was no longer always
possible to make advance arrangements for outside speakers
and still meet radio's deadlines. 56 As Murrow, Jordan and
the others more frequently reported the news themselves,
they evolved in their own minds as well as the minds of
network executives and listeners into credible journalists
whose observations and descriptions were worthy of respect.
As the situation in Austria stabilized, and the
public's hunger for the latest European news diminished,
Columbia suspended its nightly roundups from abroad. As one
CBS news editor recalled years later, everyone in the
network hierarchy saw the costly and technically demanding
roundups as a temporary response to a competitive
emergency; everyone, that is, except Paul White. "Paul had
tasted blood," the editor remembered. 57 to White, dedicated
to both the wire service tradition of getting the news
55 A.M. Sperber, Murrow: Hie Life and Times (New York
Freundlich, 1986), 122.
56 Bliss, Now the News, 86.
57 William J. Dunn quoted in Bliss, Now the News, 87.
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first and to maximizing the innate advantages of radio, the
experimental roundups of March represented the future of
the medium.
When Germany turned its attention toward
Czechoslovakia in the fall of 1938, radio seized the story.
Columbia, NBC and understaffed Mutual canceled their
regular schedules to fill the air with the latest from
Europe. For three weeks in September, as the great powers
of Europe debated the fate of the Czechs, radio, Variety
proclaimed, "stepped in with consummate skill and utmost
efficiency and proficiency to bring to America up-to-the-
minute dispatches from Prague, Berlin, London and Paris
with intermittent stops at other key cities in Europe. "^8
By broadcasting virtually every major public speech as it
happened and marshaling their own representatives as well
as scores of American newspaper journalists to add color
and analysis, "the networks," Time reported, "did a bang-up
job of bringing the throbbing reality of it to
listeners. "59 Columbia logged 471 news broadcasts during
the crisis, nearly forty-eight hours worth of air time
valued at then-current network rates at $300,000. NBC's
coverage was even more exhaustive: nearly fifty-nine hours
including 117 live pickups from Europe. Once again, Jordan
scooped the opposition, using his diplomatic contacts to
58 "War and the Show Biz," Variety, September 21,
1938, 1.
59 "Crisis Credit," Time, October 3, 1938, 32.
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obtain the full text of the Munich agreement seventeen
minutes before it was officially released to the press and
broadcasting its contents to the nation forty-six minutes
before Columbia. NBC refunded $26,000 to advertisers whose
scheduled broadcasts were pre-empted, discovering to the
sales department's surprise "that the majority of sponsors
welcomed the practice as it kept listeners tuned to their
programs without fearing that they would miss the latest
news of the crisis. "^o
Radio had provided more than simply news, Columbia
trumpeted in a full -page advertisement in the radio trade
journal Broadcast ingr. The network had allowed its listeners
to hear "the very Sound of History." Once again, Columbia
declared, broadcasters had proven themselves worthy
stewards "alert... to that side of public interest which is
served by knowing the truth." The chain's broadcasts
provided "the best possible demonstration of its own
awareness to the power of the truth and its own ingenuity
in obtaining it."^i
^° "Vast Sums Spent for Nets' Coverage of Events in
European War Threat," Broadcast ingr, October 15, 1938, 15.
CBS, display advertisement, Broadcasting , November
1, 1938, 8. As it had earlier in the year, Paul Kesten and
Columbia's ever-alert public relations department rushed
another souvenir book into print to capitalize on its
efforts, a 175 -page "permanent record of what radio is
doing today to keep a democratic people accurately and
fully informed on matters of vital concern to them. " "CBS
Publishes Report on European Programs," Broadcasting,
December 15, 1938, 28.
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Audience surveys and a blizzard of congratulatory
telegrams, letters and telephone calls demonstrated the
public's approval. Even the White House cooperated in
validating radio's authority and influence by releasing a
photograph of President Roosevelt, Secretary of State
Cordell Hull and six other cabinet officers gathered around
a radio to keep abreast of the latest events. 62 Both the
industry and the nation learned, Shirer would later write,
"men three thousand miles away on the scene of action could
penetrate into American homes and relate, simply and
sincerely, the first -hand story of Europe plunging
inexorably towards war."^^
While Columbia congratulated itself on its "sensitive
alertness to news values and sources ... and keen exercise of
impartiality and temperateness, " the public, it seemed,
expected more than the facts from radio.
-phe story
broadcasters told was far from simple. For most Americans,
it was almost impossible to comprehend what was going on.
Events tumbled out of the radio too quickly to be fully
understood, Orrin Dunlop, the perceptive radio editor of
the New York TimeB, wrote that summer and left the nation
"perplexed and puzzled.
"
"The New Diplomacy, " photograph. Broadcast inar,
October 15, 1938, 15.
Shirer, "Berlin Speaking," 311.
6^ CBS, display advertisement, Broadcaeting , November
1, 1938, 8.
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Throughout the months the "ether" has been
saturated with discussions on wages and hourscrop control budgets, Federal regulations of themarkets, the RFC and its loans to business,
railway aid, the TVA, the SEC, social secuktyhome building, the small business man, tax law
relief, public works, flood control, naval
expansion, labor relations, ant i
- lynchingphosphates and un-American activities Woids
words, words, as Hamlet would say, have been'
electrified by the mute "mike" which passes theproduct of the tongue into the emptiness of spacein hopes that somewhere somebody will belistening
.
At Columbia, Klauber and White understood that the audience
needed context if they were to put the welter of facts in
order. During the Munich crisis. White wrote, the majority
of Americans, "long apathetic to events abroad, finally
became aware that Germany alone of the big powers was
playing for keeps," and the man most responsible for
shaping that opinion was "the redoubtable Kaltenborn. "^6
After more than a decade as a radio commentator, H.V.
Kaltenborn emerged from the Munich crisis as a nationally-
known personality. In 102 separate broadcasts over nearly
three weeks, he anchored Columbia's coverage, analyzing the
implications of the correspondents' reports and translating
speeches as they were shortwaved across the ocean. ^"^ "He
offered better comment on the crisis than any one else,
"
Time enthused, "His comments throughout were calm, hopeful,
Orrin E. Dunlop Jr., "6 Months' Roundup," New York
Times, July 3, 19 38, sec. 9, 10.
White, NewB on the Air, 46.
^"^ David G. Clark, "H.V. Kaltenborn and his Sponsors:
Controversial Broadcasting and the Sponsor's Role," Journal
of BroadcaGtinof 12 (Fall 1968), 310.
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accurate. "68 Lietenere responded to hie broadcasts as they
would to especially perceptive comments by a friend, with
dozens of telephone calls each time he left the studio.
"Most of them were friendly, congratulating me for
fairness," Kaltenborn recalled, "Some of them were angry,
telling me, always in equal number, that I leaned to this
or the other side of the question. "^9
Kaltenborn analyzed the crisis to a fare - thee
-well
,
interviewing correspondents abroad and experts at home as
well as offering comment on the latest communiques from
foreign capitals. One afternoon, after a Columbia pickup of
a church service in England, he dissected a prayer by the
Archbishop of Canterbury in search of possible policy
implications
.
"7° His always extemporaneous comments while
representing admirable erudition and endurance were
frequently rambling and sometimes contradictory. On
September 17, for example, he stated that the Roosevelt
administration was "sympathetic with the efforts of Britain
and France to restrain Herr Hitler" and hoped "to use our
influence on the side of peace" but was "apprehensive lest
any incautious word or action should so arouse isolationist
sentiment" that a "benevolent neutrality to the French and
68 "Combination for Comment," Time, October 10, 1938,
42-3
.
69 H.V. Kaltenborn, I Broadcast the CrieiG (New York:
Random House, 1938), 9-10.
White, Newc on the Air, 46.
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British would be jeopardized." The next day, Kaltenborn
chided the administration for its "discreet attitude" and
reminded his listeners that "the question of peace and war
concerns not only Europe but the United States and all the
world." Just twenty-four hours later, he veered toward a
more isolationist position and said "the United States must
stand aloof from a continent that for the moment is devoted
to the glorification of force. "7i
As the telephone calls Kaltenborn received indicated
and telegrams and letters confirmed, Columbia's listeners
embraced Kaltenborn' s efforts to explain the crisis. They
might, as Kaltenborn observed, want to argue with his
conclusions, but they wanted to hear them. Amid confusion,
they wanted someone to set unruly facts in order. Perhaps,
as Tiwe concluded, "in times of stress, listeners prefer
conclusions and even bias to straight factual report ing ." 72
Certainly, listeners across the country, struggling to make
sense of what was happening across the ocean, came to
appreciate Kaltenborn' s clipped, fast-paced delivery and
admitted him, like Shakespeare's Chorus, to this history to
add narrative structure to threatening, uncertain reality.
White later recounted an anecdote about a Rhode Island
family fleeing the destruction of the 1938 New England
hurricane which struck at the height of the Munich crisis.
Kaltenborn, J Broadcast the Crieie, 49, 73, 8 8
"Combination for Comment," 43.
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When they reached safety and found their hosts listening to
a radio report of destruction caused by the storm, the
refugees suggested, "Let's dial around and find out what
Kaltenborn has to say about Europe. "73 guch was the power
of the medium that when the voices asked, "let us, ciphers
to this great account, on your imaginary forces work," the
radio audience eagerly agreed. ^4
By 1938, both broadcasters and their critics
understood the ability of the medium to shape public
opinion. For years, Kaltenborn had insisted broadcasters
must use their authority to direct public opinion. The
networks, however, were wary that if they used their power
they would be accused of misusing it. At Columbia, this
concern was played out in a series of backstage disputes
between the chain's executives and news personnel. Boake
Carter, the network's first star commentator, had been
dismissed by CBS in August, the month before the Sudeten
crisis, because, it was widely believed, his opinions had
antagonized the Roosevelt administration. In the aftermath
of the crisis, Kaltenborn became involved in a protracted
debate over network policy which would lead to his
departure in 194 0.
Kaltenborn' s position on a broadcaster's right, indeed
a broadcaster's responsibility, to express opinions was
73 white, NewB on the Air, 47.
74 Henry the Fifth, act 1, scene 1, lines 17-8
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well known. He had long called on "radio to tread more
freely and firmly on the battlefields of modern thought" by
encouraging a vigorous exchange of views on controversial
public affairs. 75 His career had been marked with periodic
controversies over his outspoken views, and he had paid a
professional price for his stand. Yet soon after Munich, in
the book published to capitalize on his notoriety, he wrote
that the radio commentator's job was "not so much to
express what he thinks as to try to help other reasonable
people to keep the facts straight in their o%vn minds. "76 m
subscribing to that modest goal, Kaltenborn was reluctantly
conforming to Columbia's newly proclaimed network policy of
militant nonpart isanship
.
In the spring of 1938, as Congressional attacks on
chain broadcasters and the FCC escalated, William Paley,
because "nearly everyone in America is interested in
broadcasting," went on the air to deliver his "annual
report as president of the Columbia Broadcasting System to
the listening public as well as to our stockholders . "77
Paley 's remarks - carried on 114 CBS affiliates across the
country — combined a ringing defense of "our American
75 H.V. Kaltenborn, "On the Air," Century Macfazine,
October 1926, 676.
76 Kaltenborn, I Broadcast the Crieie, 255.
77 William S. Paley, CBS network, April 5, 1938. The
complete text of his talk was reprinted as "Minimum
Interference Asked by Paley," Broadcast ing, April 15, 1938,
15, 62-3.
224
Gystem of broadcasting" with a warning that government
regulation beyond "the bare necessities" could "cripple our
operations in one way and another."
Recalling that radio regulation "arose out of a single
physical fact," that there was not room on the spectrum for
all who wanted to broadcast to be clearly heard, Paley
urged the FCC to restrict itself to monitoring technical
matters. Of course, he admitted, broadcasters should be
subject to general legislation "against indecency,
fraudulent advertising and the like," but federal
regulation "should never go beyond that." Two factors would
insure broadcasting's continued development. The first was
self
-regulation. Broadcasters themselves, Paley said,
"should unite on a definite program of service, of progress
and of protection" through their trade association, the
National Association of Broadcasters. The second and
ultimately "the most swift and potent means of regulating
broadcasting" was the will of the listening public. "So
long as each individual listener has strength enough to
snap a switch or twist a dial," Paley proclaimed,
competitive, privately-owned, advertiser-financed radio
stations would continue to respond to the public will.
Paley 's defense of the broadcasting industry deftly
recapitulated the same arguments which had prevailed for
the past fifteen years. He also defended network
broadcasting as "the miracle of radio, " capable of bringing
the entire nation together for "the best entertainment, the
moGt authoritative discourse and discussion, the swiftest
first-hand participation in the drama of the world." Paley
dismissed charges of monopoly, "i can assure you I can
imagine no more intense competitive spirit than that which
today drives the three sets of owners and management groups
who operate the four existing nationwide networks." Any new
federal regulations which threatened the viability of the
networks, he implied, threatened the framework of American
radio
.
In one area of broadcasting, however, Paley called for
new federal regulation: "public information and
discussion." Recognizing broadcasting's impact on public
opinion, Paley announced that "the Columbia Network has
pledged itself not only to freedom of the air but to
nonpartisanship and fairness of the air."
By freedom of the air we mean the right of
any speaker to express his views, subject only to
general laws and the laws of libel and slander,
the rule that he may not provoke racial or
religious hatred and the ordinary limitations of
good taste and the decorum appropriate to the
home s of the na t ion
.
By nonpartisanship we mean that broadcasting
as an instrument of American democracy must
forever be wholly, honestly and militantly
nonpar t isan . This is true not only in pol it ics
,
but in the whole realm of arguable social ideas.
To put it another way, we must never have an
editorial page, we must never seek to maintain
views of our own, on any public question except
broadcasting itself
Paley had expressed a similar position in much the same
words during a December, 1937 talk on the CBS network.
Then, however, he framed his proposal as the outline of a
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radio code of ethics to be voluntarily adopted by the
industry. 78 Now, he added a new wrinkle. If broadcasters
failed to voluntarily endorse these standards, Paley said,
"I do not believe it would be amiss" for Congress and the
FCC "to make adherence to these principles a prerequisite
of having and holding a broadcast license."
Paley 's statement won widespread approval. The
Waehingfton Post, reflecting a consensus of press comments,
said broadcasters had demonstrated their eagerness to avoid
bias in the past and self
-regulation remained the best
solution. 73 Broadcaetincr called it "direct and forthright"
and commended it "to Congress, the FCC and the host of
crusaders and fault-finders who constantly belabor
radio. "80 While his appeal for limited federal regulation,
defense of the network system and call for extending
licensing periods for stations all restated the industry's
corporate line which had largely been in place since the
1920s, Paley' s call for absolute non-partisanship in public
affairs as a requirement for holding a license was
something new. Broadcasters in the past had advocated
balance and fairness in theory as the best way to serve the
78 William S. Paley, "Radio Ethics," CBS network,
[December 1937]
,
reprinted in "Reading Around the World,
"
Literary Digest
,
January 1, 1938, 23-4.
73 "Paley '6 Speech on Federal Regulation Draws
Favorable Comment from Press, " Broadcasting, April 15,
1938, 63.
80 Editorial, "The Paley Report: Radio's Own
Statesmanship," Broadcasting, April 15, 1938, 14.
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public interest and in practice as the best defense against
Congressional intervention. The industry had always gone to
great lengths to dissuade its regulators from taking any
role in dictating "freedom of the air." why was he now
seeming to invite regulation?
One reason was what Paley and many others in the
broadcasting industry perceived a serious assault on the
radio networks from Congress, the Roosevelt administration
and the FCC. "During the eight months of the last
Congress," Broadcast ingr editorialized in November, 1937,
"there was more oratory on the subject of radio than in any
past Congress. The loudest note was for an investigation of
all things radio." Despite the industry's many triumphs,
the editorial noted, "There was not a single speech in its
defense . ®^
The industry had so far been successful in heading off
congressional calls for investigations into network radio
but now with Senator White joining those in favor of a
thorough look inside the industry, some form of probe
seemed likely. As Congress became more restive, the
administration also became more assertive. McNinch's
appointment and his initial restructuring of the agency
were seen as signals that the regulatory climate was
shifting. Action by the FCC seemed the only way to block a
Broadcasting , November 15, 19 37, quoted in Bryan
Putney, "Regulation of Radio Broadcasting," Editorial
Research Report, February 19, 1938, 106.
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congressional probe which could easily veer out of control.
Senate Audit Committee chairman James Byrnes of South
Carolina, a Roosevelt ally, pledged to "resist any effort
to take up the White resolution" for a radio investigation
"until Chairman McNinch has had time to reorganize the
Commission and put in the reforms the President has
requested. "82 Broadcasters justifiably feared their
industry was under attack and sought a way to defend their
institutions
.
Of the major complaints heard against the networks,
charges of bias in public affairs programs were the least
threatening to the basic structure of the system. To the
listening public, radio was the programs that filled the
air each day. If the industry's critics confined their fire
to the content of programming and ignored the corporate
structure of commercial broadcasting, the industry would
gladly make that trade.
When the National Association of Broadcasters gathered
in Washington in February, 1938, Senator Burton Wheeler
delivered a strong warning to the industry that he smelled
monopoly in the air and Congress was preparing to take an
active role in regulating radio. 83 wheeler reminded the
82 Quoted in Putney, "Regulation of Radio
Broadcasting," 109.
83 Sen. Burton K. Wheeler, address to the National
Association of Broadcasters, Washington, D.C., February 14,
1938, reprinted in 75th Cong., 3rd sess., CongreBsional
Record (February 14, 1938), appendix, vol. 83, pt . 9, 580-
1
.
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broadcasters that they were merely "temporary" users of
public property which "has been and should forever be
inalienably reserved to the people." Broadcasters, he said,
were "trustees" of the ether, and "to overlook or disregard
this trust relationship is a breach that calls for a
forfeit of your franchise." He reassured the broadcasters
that he had no interest in government ownership, saying any
form of state ownership smacked of dictatorship. But,
Wheeler cautioned, government ownership was not the only
form of centralized control which threatened democracy.
Should "entities in the industry" become too powerful, they
could destroy the American system of radio.
"There are several species of monopoly that might get
a stranglehold on radio, " Wheeler mused, then recited the
litany of ant i -network charges current among critics:
centralized ownership, trafficking in licenses, national
programs which eroded local standards, high-power and
clear -channel broadcasting which threatened to overwhelm
small stations, excess advertising, tasteless programming
and especially the overwhelming impact of the national
networks. Where, Wheeler asked, was the FCC while these
trends were developing? Too often, the regulators seemed to
be in the chain broadcasters' pockets. "It seems to me that
if regulation of radio has lagged in any particular, " he
said, "it has been in relation to those national entities."
Wheeler made a special point of raising the specter of
corporate control of public opinion. "We have developed a
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technique through radio," he said, "that ic at once a
unifying force and an instrument of power so tremendous
that its ultimate significance cannot yet be appraised."
The potentialities of the improper utilization ofradio are so fraught with such peril as to
require the elected representatives of the peopleto guard zealously against the possibilities ofsuch abuse. This raises the question of monopoly
and also the problem of the relation of
regulatory power of government and the use of
radio for political and commercial purposes.
"We of Congress and you of radio - both dedicated to the
public service - have," Wheeler concluded, "a definite
mutuality of interest."
The next day, chairman McNinch spoke to the
broadcasters and also sounded a warning against the
temptations of monopoly. 84 Recalling his tenure at the
Federal Power Commission, McNinch advised the radio
industry that both recent events and American tradition
spelled out the fate of illegal combinations and asked,
"Why follow the tragic path that others have trod to their
downfall and ruin when all we need to do is look about and
read the handwriting on the wall, which is that America is
monopoly conscious, that America hates autocratic power,
that America will not tolerate the dominance of greed over
public utilities that touch either the economic necessities
or the social requirements of its people."
FCC chairman Frank R. McNinch, address to the
National Association of Broadcasters, Washington, D.C.,
February 15, 1938, reprinted in 75th Cong., 3rd sess.,
Congreesional Record (May 10, 1938), appendix, vol. 83, pt
.
10, 1904-7.
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"Do not deceive yourselves, gentlemen," warned
McNinch, the radio industry could easily fall prey to an
"unwieldy concentration of control" similar to the recently
toppled power trust. Congress and the FCC would remain on
guard as the people's representatives. "The American public
tumbled the pyramids of Insull and devastated the financial
empire he built," he warned, "and you may be sure that it
will not tolerate an Insull in this industry, which touches
so intimately the homes and our social life at so many
angles." Wheeler was right, he told the broadcasters, when
he warned you of the dangers of monopoly, "it is the duty
of the Communications Commission," McNinch concluded, "to
prevent the development of a monopoly or to set about to
destroy it if one exists." He would, he pledged, eliminate
monopoly root and branch should a monopoly exist, certain
that "in so doing... I am serving the best interests of the
industry as well as of the public."
The chairman then tipped his hand, confirming a rumor
that had been circulating in trade circles for some time.
"I have in mind suggesting to the Commission that it
proceed soon to investigate whether a monopoly exists,
"
McNinch said, "This should include an investigation of the
chain broadcasting systems and of the chain contracts with
affiliates, of the management contracts and of the actual
practices of the chains in dealing with affiliated
stations." The Communications Act, he reminded the
broadcasters, allowed the FCC to regulate the networks "and
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I believe it ought to do this promptly if it has the
necesGary information upon which to base regulations."
The industry B leaders were stunned and clearly on the
defensive as they left Washington. Wheeler and McNinch,
Broadcasting editorialized as the NAB convention adjourned,
"were extreme in their views; perhaps their talks presage a
new era, tighter regulation of radio." What especially
annoyed the industry was the tone of the speeches. "The
broadcasting industry does not want to see continued the
one-way practice of harassing it at every turn, threatening
it with dire things, and calling it every conceivable
name." Radio, Broadcast incf 3iX<3ned, deserved respect. "For
every monopoly and blatant ad charge, broadcasting can
point to a dozen humanitarian achievements in time of flood
and storm and stress .... but we didn't notice them in the
headlines." It had been a difficult meeting for the
chastened leaders of the radio industry, its trade journal
and cheerleader admitted, and "the broadcasting
industry ... wholly cognizant of its shortcomings ... is ready
and willing to cooperate with the national authorities."®^
One month later, as McNinch had predicted, the FCC
announced it would launch "an immediate investigation to
determine what special regulations applicable to radio
stations engaged in chain or other broadcasting are
8^ Editorial. "The New NAB: Facing a New Era of
Regulation," Broadcasting, February 15, 1938, 12. The
magazine also reprinted the texts of Wheeler's and
McNinch 's speeches.
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required in the public interest, convenience, or
necessity." The investigation, the Commission's order
explained, would cover every aspect of network operations:
concentration of ownership, station operations, affiliation
contracts and programming policies "particularly insofar as
the same tends toward or results in restraint of trade or
monopoly. "86 Hearings, the FCC staff announced, would begin
in July. While the order took no notice of White's pending
legislation, it listed the most important elements of the
senator's bill of particulars.
While the FCC ' s announcement did not cause outright
panic in the corridors of Columbia and NBC, it did send
detectable tremors throughout the industry. Third-place
Mutual and a few regional networks and independent stations
welcomed the pending investigation on the grounds that any
threat to the oligarchy of NBC Red, NBC Blue and Columbia
could only benefit them. The NAB, representing stations
large and small, affiliated and independent, which had
voted to reorganize and professionalize at its February
convention, seized the opportunity to hire its first full-
time executive director and launch a public relations
campaign aimed at "spreading good will and minimizing
dangers of attacks on radio. "8"^ Broadcasters had
85 Federal Communications Commission, Order no. 37,
March 18, 1938.
^"^ Bob Landry, "N.A.B.'s Future Charted," Variety,
November 16, 1938, 25.
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euccessfully protected their interests in the past and
hoped they could do so again.
McNinch, despite his trust
-bust ing rhetoric, had
continued to rely on the raised eyebrow technique when
radio strayed from the straight
-and-narrow. Historian Erik
Barnouw later dismissed McNinch as "an elderly gentlemen
who, over-reacting to complaints proj ected an image of
the FCC as a watch
-and- ward society. "88 Certainly, several
of McNinch 's crusades for wholesome radio reflected his
Bible -belt background. Perhaps the most notorious involved
a December, 1937 appearance by Mae West on NBC's highly-
rated "Chase & Sanborn Hour." Portraying Eve opposite
Charlie McCarthy's Adam in a Garden of Eden sketch, West
attempted to lure Charlie, Edgar Bergen's sophisticated
wooden dummy, out of the garden by promising "I'll let you
play in my woodpile." Although the network's censors tried
to explain that the line had not seemed that suggestive
when they reviewed the script. West's provocative delivery
turned the broadcast into a scandal . As the complaints
poured in, McNinch called the program "profane, obscene,
indecent, vulgar, sexy, dirty, and insulting to the
American public," and, until sponsors, writers, actors and
station executives promised never to do anything like that
88 Erik Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting in the
United States, vol. 2, The Golden Web (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), 169.
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again, threatened to designate scores of stations' renewal
applications for hearings. 89
While McNinch can be dismissed as a prude, the
broadcasting industry's reaction indicated radio's fear of
federal intervention. The networks could, and often did,
muzzle entertainers whose material was deemed too racy for
conservative listeners who might complain to Congress or
the FCC. Columbia's rush to eliminate objectionable
children's programs and offensive patent medicine
advertisements in response to Anning Prall's complaints was
but one example. Humorist Fred Allen joked that even his
personal letters were subject to careful review, protesting
that "all of the buts were stricken from the missives since
the word 'but' has a derriere connotation throughout the
south. The broadcasters were equally cautious when it
came to news and public affairs programs. Advocates of
views considered too controversial or likely to trigger
complaints were sometimes denied the opportunity to speak.
Faced with any threat to their franchise, broadcasters
opted for caution and embraced self -censorship as an
85 McClellan Patten, "Radio Gets the Jitters,"
American Magazine , March 1939, 42. The fact that a program
featuring a ventriloquist's dummy was one of decade's
biggest hits testifies to the public's willingness to
suspend disbelief when listening to the radio.
5° Allen to Don Quinn, April 12, 1940, in Joe
McCarthy, ed. , Fred Allen's Letters (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, 1965; New York: Pocket Books, 1966), 211. Quinn
was the creator of the popular radio serial "Fibber Magee
and Molly.
"
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alternative to government intervention, in 1938, as
McNinch, Wheeler and other critics raised the flag of
trust-busting and the regulatory climate in Washington
warmed to a new round of antimonopoly activity, the
networks hoped self
-regulation would again be enough to
protect the American system of broadcasting.
With the economy again in recession, ant imonopol ists
within the Roosevelt administration argued it was their
turn to attempt to right the economy. Cooperation and
centralized planning had failed, they reasoned. The best
hope for recovery now was to crack the cartels which
distorted the market and artificially maintained inflated
prices. By April, the president had been persuaded to go
along, and he called for a new antitrust initiative to be
headed by a Temporary National Economic Committee. While
the TNEC proposal worked its way through Congress, Thurman
Arnold was placed in charge of the Antitrust Division at
the Department of Justice. Business groups saw Arnold's
appointment as another signal that the administration was
veering toward trust -bust ing . Arnold, author of two
influential books on the folkways of government, was
convinced the market worked and equally convinced that
illegal combinations were preventing it from functioning
properly. 51 The market, he told a banking group, was like a
51 Ellis W. Hawley, The New Deal and the Problem of
Monopoly (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University
Press, 1966, 1969), 404-38; Alan Brinkley, "The
Antimonopoly Ideal and the Liberal State: The Case of
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boxing ring, but
-the referee has been absent in most
sections of American industry
.... m such a contest, the man
who puts on brass knuckles will win. "92 Arnold promised he
would turn economic competition into a fair fight.
In the months following the FCC
• s announcement of its
monopoly hearing, congressional criticism of the
commission's slow pace escalated. The first hearings,
scheduled originally for July, would, the FCC announced, be
pushed back to the fall. In June, plans for an independent
congressional inquiry into monopoly in radio reached the
floor of the House only to be defeated 236-100.93 The
resolution was brought up just hours before the House was
scheduled to debate Roosevelt's TNEC proposal, which
mandated a general inquiry into monopolies, and
administration allies led by New York Democrat Emmanuel
Celler insisted that the TNEC and FCC should be allowed to
conduct their investigations first. "I see no present need
for passage of this resolution," Celler argued, "If we pass
it, we will have three radio investigations going on at the
same time."^^ Another Democrat, Lindsay C. Warren of North
Thurman Arnold, " Journal of American Hietory 8 0 (September
1993) , 557-79
.
92 "Arnold Likens 'Trust Buster' to the Referee," New
York Herald Tribune, September 4, 1938, 2.
93 Congress, House, debate on H.R. 92, 75th Cong., 3rd
Bess., Congreseional Record (June 14, 1938), vol. 83, pt
.
8, 9313-25.
94 Congress, House, Rep. Emmanuel Celler, debate on
H.R. 92, 9318.
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Carolina, while reminding the House that he had not
entirely forgiven McNinch for bolting the party to support
Hoover in 1928, charged the resolution's supporters were
simply seeking to create another forum for attacks on the
Roosevelt administration and were carrying water for
maverick FCC commissioner George Henry Payne, who Warren
dismissed as "a disgruntled Republican smart aleck. "95
The network broadcasters clearly viewed the potential
House monopoly investigation as a serious threat and
mounted a major lobbying campaign to block the resolution.
Congressman Lawrence J. Connery, the ant i -New Deal
Massachusetts Democrat who sponsored the resolution,
protested that Congress had to act because any FCC
investigation of radio "will only result in whitewash. "^^
Republican Richard B. Wigglesworth of Massachusetts said it
was up to Congress to break up the radio trust, "a monopoly
which may fairly be said to have been created and fostered
by the Federal Government itself . "^7 xhe interests were the
enemy, Connery charged, adding that the radio industry's
public relations "gang is at work; the bunch is down here
from New York going right to town." NBC, he warned, had
Congress, House, Rep. Lindsay C. Warren, debate on
H.R. 92, 9316.
9^ Congress, House, Rep. L.J. Connery, debate on H.R.
92, 9316. The resolution was actually introduced by
Connery '6 brother. Rep. William Connery, who had died
earlier in the year.
Congress, House, Rep. Richard B. Wigglesworth,
debate on H.R. 92, 9314.
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gone BO far as to retain Edward Bernays, the nation's
leading image
-maker, to twist lawmakers' arms. 98
congressman John J. O'Connor of New York, the chairman of
the House Rules Committee and an implacable Roosevelt
opponent, agreed, "i have never in my life seen such
lobbying against a resolution, " he exclaimed, "You can walk
out in that lobby tonight and you will find difficulty in
getting through the lobby because of the crowd of radio
lobbyists from New York and all over the country, and from
every department of the Government . "^^
Despite the administration's apparent support for the
FCC'B monopoly probe, the decision to back McNinch was
dictated more by a lack of any acceptable alternative.
Roosevelt's patience with the commission was wearing thin.
Government regulation of broadcasting was becoming a
needless irritant, an easy target for administration
critics. Committee hearings on the Connery resolution had
turned into an ant i -New Deal circus. Commissioner Payne was
becoming increasingly vocal in his criticism of both the
industry and the commission's own procedures. Testifying
before O'Connor's Rules Committee, Payne had scoffed at the
idea of an FCC investigation of broadcasting, charging that
98 Congress, House, Rep. L.J. Connery, debate on H.R.
92, 9316.
99 Congress, House, Rep. John J. O'Connor, debate on
H.R. 92, 9314. O'Connor would become a victim of
Roosevelt's 1938 purge of party conservatives, losing
narrowly in the September primary to pro-New Deal candidate
James H. Fay. Burns, Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox, 364.
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the FCC was under the thumb of industry lawyers and
lobbyists. In one case, he said, a lav/yer "actually
doctored the records of the Commission in a case in which
he was interested" and received only "a soft reprimand. "lOO
By early fall, as the Munich crisis reached its climax, the
word was passed from the White House to McNinch to clean
house and get the situation under control.
On Columbus Day, the chairman abruptly fired chief
legal counsel Hampson Gary, a courtly Texan and former FRC
commissioner who was once an aide to President Wilson, and
replaced him with William Dempsey, a thirty-two year old
protege of New Dealer Thomas G. Corcoran. Three other
veteran staffers, all career civil servants, were also
banished. Rather than solve the problems at the FCC,
McNinch 's preemptory strike made things even worse. The
seven-member commission was now "split... to the bottom,"
the New York Herald Tribune reported, with Payne and T.A.M.
Craven solidly opposed to McNinch. Citing an unidentified
source — almost certainly the prototypical silk-stocking
New York Republican and Herald Tribune reader Payne —
inside the FCC, the paper's Albert Warner, who within a
Commissioner George Henry Payne, statement to the
House Rules Committee on H.R. 92, 75th Cong., 3rd sess.,
June 2, 1938, CongreBBional Record (June 3, 1938),
appendix, vol. 83, pt . 11, 2 3 57.
James D. Secrest, "Causes of Friction in the
Communications Commission, " CongreBsional Digest 17
(December 1938), 289. The article originally appeared in
the Washington Poet, November 20, 1938.
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year would join Columbia as a broadcast commentator, wrote
that McNinch was plotting to turn the commission into a
political arm of the Roosevelt administration. The
chairman, Warner's source charged, was "looking to
commission control of speakers on radio station programs."
McNinch' B main targets would be "Boake Carter, often an
ant i
-Administration commentator, and William J. Cameron, of
the Ford Company. "I02
Syndicated Washington columnist Ray Tucker also saw
the political hand of the White House behind the
machinations. The purge, he wrote, exposed "the
administration's growing resentment against the Texas
dynasty on Capital Hill whose anti-New Deal spirit has
frequently pained the White House." Gary, Tucker noted, was
a well-known "friend of Texas politicos," and those in the
know saw his dismissal as more evidence of the widening
divide between Roosevelt and conservative southerners such
as Vice President John Nance Garner and Mississippi Senator
Pat Harrison. "What most people miss — though regular
Democrats don't - is that Mr. Gary was fired by a North
Carolina Hoovercrat — Mr. McNinch — and two Republicans,
Messrs. Case and Brown," Tucker wrote. "They and an anti-
Albert L. Warner, "McNinch Move to Oust Counsel
Stirs FCC Row," New York Herald Tribune, October 13, 1938,
2 .
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Harrison Democrat - Eugene Sykes - provided the majority
for the massacre . "103
In the increasingly partisan atmosphere of late 1938,
with critical congressional elections approaching and
Europe in crisis, any public action could be seen as
"politically inspired." Broadcasters feared their editorial
decisions, their news and special events programming
policies which had attracted such criticism during the
presidential election two years before, would be monitored
even more carefully by both parties.
Paley's declaration of absolute impartiality on the
air must be placed against this background. Its rhetoric
was in the tradition of the broadcasting industry's past
pledges to serve the public interest, but the policy in
practice proved difficult to define and enforce. Kaltenborn
recalled that by the end of 1938, a few months after Carter
was dismissed, he too was being pressed to limit his
opinions despite his success on the air during the Munich
crisis when he "had shown the value of extemporized
editorial that was completely free and untrammeled. "1°^ The
network "had been closing in on my editorial freedom, " he
said in an interview a dozen years later, "for the
Ray Tucker, "Capital 'Mutiny' Concerns F.D.R.'s
Nicknaming Pals," Springfield (Massachusetts) Daily-
Republican, October 21, 1938, 26.
H.V. Kaltenborn, "Reminiscences," 1950, 206, in
the Radio Pioneers project of the Oral History Collection
of Columbia University, hereafter Kaltenborn, COHC.
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preceding two or three years," apparently since about the
time of the network's 1936 troubles with the Republicans
over Roosevelt's use of the air.i05
It was Klauber, Kaltenborn said, "who developed and
explained the policy to the people who were working for the
news department" and who offered Kaltenborn some practical
advice
.
Klauber.
. .would say, "Now you can do the
same thing without seeming to editorialize. Allyou've got to do is say, 'a prominent authority
declared,' or 'it is said in informed circles,'
or 'there is good reason to believe that.'" He
said, "You can always use a qualifying phrase.
Why do you have to say 'I think' and 'I
bel ieve? '
"
"Well," I replied, "Don't you think it is
more honest in dealing with the radio audience
for me to say that this is my opinion instead of
attributing it to some anonymous official?"
He countered, "You know it doesn't set very
well to have a representative of the Columbia
Broadcasting System intruding his own opinion on
the radio audience."
"But," I told him, "the radio audience has
shown that it likes it and wants it. Even if it
doesn't agree with me it is perfectly willing to
listen to me. After all, there are some other
commentators who have other opinions. Why
shouldn't there be an editorial opinion voiced
from a radio station just as there is such an
opinion in a newspaper in signed columns on the
editorial page."
"Well," he said, "we don't believe in that
and our policy is against it."i°^
Kaltenborn, recalling the conversation more than a
decade after the fact, likely enhanced his role as an
advocate of free speech. Still, the dialogue rings true,
Kaltenborn, COHC, 206.
Kaltenborn, COHC, 2 06-7
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and, despite his protestations, Kaltenborn seems to have
taken Klauber's advice to heart.
In 1940, Kaltenborn- s nightly program moved from CBS
to NBC when Pure Oil signed him to what his biographer
called "the most favorable contract any radio man had ever
received. "107 while both the sponsor and the network had
agreed, Kaltenborn said, to a contract insuring "complete
freedom of opinion," the commentator's style changed and
reflected Klauber's dicta speech communications scholar
Giraud Chester who compiled a detailed analysis of the
commentator's broadcasts noted that in the 194 0s, rather
than voice "straightforward personal opinions" as he had in
the 1930s, Kaltenborn increasingly adopted "techniques
which enable him to editorialize without seeming to."
Chester demonstrated how one 194 0 Kaltenborn broadcast
commenting on a speech by Wendell Willkie evolved through
three successive drafts:
(1) "I listened to Wendell Willkie 's speech
last night. It was wholly admirable."
(2) "I hope you listened to Wendell
Willkie '6 speech last night. It was wholly
admirable .
"
(3) "Millions of Americans of both parties
listened to Wendell Willkie 's speech last night.
Most of them agreed that it was a wholly
admirable speech. "109
1°"^ Giraud Chester, "Kaltenborn Edits the News,"
American Mercury, October 194 7, 39 3.
108 Kaltenborn, COHC, 208.
109 Quoted in Chester, "Kaltenborn Edits the News,"
400. For a thorough analysis of Kaltenborn' s techniques,
see Giraud Chester, "The Radio Commentaries of H.V.
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The message remained intact. Only the source was changed.
Klauber would have been pleased. Kaltenborn had clearly not
Gaid that he was impressed by Willkie's speech. That would
have been personal opinion. Instead, the commentator cited
as his source "millions of Americans." How could he be
expected to disagree with the voice of the people? Whether
or not Kaltenborn had actually spoken to any of those
millions was a question left unasked. The form the
statement took was much more important than the validity of
the assertion.
Such verbal gymnastics were not unusual as
journalists, radio executives and their critics debated the
proper role of broadcasting as an information source in the
late 193 0s. There was little new about the debate, of
course. Reporters and editors had always discussed how best
to communicate information to the public. As the definition
of news evolved over time, so too did the conventional
wisdom of how best to reach those elusive goals of
conveying "facts" and "the truth." What was new, however,
was the nature of radio itself. The medium created a new
kind of reality. That much was clear.
Toward the end of Columbia's coverage of the Munich
crisis, Murrow, broadcasting from London, ruminated on what
he believed he and his radio colleagues were trying to do:
Kaltenborn: A Case Study in Persuasion" (Ph.D. diss.,
University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1947)
.
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I would like to cay juct one final word thatbroadcacting by virtue of itc cpeed and intimacyIB playing a tremendous role in the formation ofpublic opinion over here. If you could hear acwe do m London, nation hurling invective at
nation through the air, you would understand what
I mean^ l just want to tell you that those of ushere who talk to you from over here are fully
conscious of our responsibility and propose togive you an undistorted picture of the historybeing made in Europe during these long days and
nights. We are trying to find you material on
which your opinion can be based. We aren't tryingto tell you what that opinion should be . no
It was, Variety noted, a "statement which made a marked
impression on the trade, "in Murrow was in essence
acknowledging the unique power of radio and at the same
time restating the gist of Paley's policy of fairness. As a
declaration of journalistic intent, it echoed the New York
Timec tradition of objective, factual reporting which
Klauber had brought with him to CBS.
The truth of Murrow' s observation that radio played "a
tremendous role" in shaping public opinion during a time of
crisis was demonstrated anew at home later that fall. On
Halloween Eve, Orson Welles' "Mercury Theatre of the Air"
aired a dramatization of H.G. Wells' The War of the Worldo.
The broadcast, as Time reported the following week, "caused
no Edward R. Murrow, CBS network, September 25, 1938,
quoted in "Fast and Vivid War Service Given Nation by
Broadcasts," Broadcasting, October 1, 1938, 63.
ni
"Overseas Radio Slants," Variety, September 28,
1938, 26.
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something pretty close to national hysteria. "II2 The
reworking of the 1898 science fiction classic transposed
the setting from turn-of
- the
-century England to southern
New Jersey in 1939. The day after the broadcast, at a press
conference arranged by Columbia officials panicked not by
the broadcast but by the reaction to it, Welles claimed he
was "bewildered by the misunderstanding" caused by the
broadcast. "At the very outset of the broadcast and twice
during its enactment listeners were told that this was a
play," he patiently explained, "Furthermore, at the
conclusion a detailed statement to this effect was made."
How, he innocently asked, could he have been expected to
know that such an obvious "fantasy... a familiarly accepted
fairy-tale," would cause such a stir?ii3 Welles of
course knew, what led thousands of Americans to take the
broadcast seriously was its use of the same techniques so
recently and grippingly demonstrated by the network's news
broadcasters during the Munich crisis.
The program had gone on the air at eight o'clock as it
had for the previous seventeen weeks. Welles welcomed the
audience and then described the evening's broadcast as a
play set one year in the future, "in the thirty-ninth year
112 "'Boo!'," Time, November 7, 1938, 40. See also
Hadley Cantril with Hazel Gaudet and Herta Herzog, The
InvaBion from Mare: A Study in the Psychology of Panic
(Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1940).
Quoted in "FCC to Scan Script of 'War' Broadcast,"
New York TimeB, November 1, 1938, 26.
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of the twentieth century, near the end of October. "114
Unfortunately, many listeners were tuned to Edgar Bergen
and Charlie McCarthy on NBC Red while Welles spoke. Those
who had tuned to Columbia when a guest vocalist on NBC
began singing or who had not been paying attention then
heard what seemed to be a routine remote broadcast of an
orchestra playing dance music. Abruptly, an announcer's
voice broke into the music: "Ladies and gentlemen, we
interrupt our program of dance music to bring you a special
bulletin from the Intercontinental Radio News
. .
.
"
There was no such press agency. CBS officials had
ordered Welles, producer John Houseman and writer Howard
Koch to make thirty-eight specific changes in their
original script in order to make the broadcast more clearly
fictional. Most listeners failed to notice. While the words
were unfamiliar, the sound clearly mimicked the crisis
broadcasts which had held the nation transfixed the month
before
.
Welles was not alone in realizing the dramatic impact
of the conventions of radio news. In an interview published
the morning of the Welles broadcast, poet and playwright
Archibald MacLeish discussed how his radio dramas had been
114 "Mercury Theatre of the Air, " CBS network, October
30, 1938. The FCC the day after the broadcast ordered CBS
to submit transcripts and recordings of the program for
examination and the network released transcripts of the
program to the press. See "Excerpts From the 'War'
Broadcast," New York Times, November 1, 1938, 26.
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overtaken by events, us One of his verse dramas, "The Air
Raid," had been broadcast by Columbia earlier in June and
in September, the New York Tiniee^ Orrin Dunlap wrote,
MacLeish "had the novel experience of hearing parts of it
enacted in real life, almost as he envisaged it."
He tuned in on the September broadcasts from
Czechoslovakia in which announcers described theblack-out, the fear of bombers and the
preparations for the air attack. He heard London
commentators describing feverish activity indigging bomb-proof shelters, the piling up of
sandbags, planes loaded with tons of death and oflong-nozzled anti-aircraft guns pointed skywardfrom their turntables.
In both "The Air Raid" and his ant i
-Fascist parable "The
Fall of the City," also broadcast on Columbia, MacLeish had
used the techniques of radio news to bring his story to
life. As a dramatist, he had immediately recognized the
power of the distant voice.
"For the radio play," MacLeish explained, "the
announcer has become a great dramatic symbol .... a dramatic
device far beyond expectations as revealed by the European
crisis, and chiefly by those announcers who went on the air
at Prague." For the dramatist, MacLeish said, "the
announcer as a narrator becomes a most colorful and useful
tool." As "The War of the Worlds" made clear, as events in
the real world became as dramatic as any fictional
creation, many listeners were finding it difficult to
separate the stories they heard on their radios.
115 Orrin E. Dunlap, Jr., "Exploring in Drama," New
York Timee, October 30, 1938, sec. 9, 12.
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The remarkably similar public reaction to the Munich
crisis and Orson Welles' invasion from Mars provided more
evidence of the power broadcasters held and, to many
critics, the dangers which would flow from control of the
air by their opponents. "The widespread public reaction to
this broadcast," observed McNinch the day after "The War of
the Worlds" aired, "is another demonstration of the power
and force of radio and points out again the serious public
responsibility of those who are licensed to operate
stations. "116 Fascists, communists, corporate monopolists,
New Dealers, any group which took control of the
microphone, it seemed, could convince the public that it
was to be trusted and its enemies were to be resisted.
Welles and his Mercury players, columnist Dorothy
Thompson wrote, "have proved how easy it is to start a mass
delusion." Perhaps recalling Murrow's description of
"nation hurling invective at nation through the air,"
Thompson continued:
The greatest organizers of mass hysteria and mass
delusions today are states using the radio to
excite terrors, incite hatreds, inflame masses,
win mass support for policies, create idolatries,
cibolish reason and maintain themselves in power.
The immediate moral is apparent if the whole
incident is viewed in reason; no political body
must ever, under any circumstances, obtain a
monopoly of radio, n"^
116 Quoted in "FCC is Perplexed on Steps to Take, " New-
York Times, November 1, 193 8, 26.
11"^ Dorothy Thompson, "On the Record: Mr. Welles and
Mass Delusion," St. Louis Post -Dispatch , November 3, 1938,
3C.
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Ad 1938 ended, radio wac at once eotabliched ac a
vital and profitable communicat iono industry and a
potentially dangerouc monopoly. Broadcaotxng wao, depending
on one'c perouacion, a baction of democracy or a oource of
dangerouc demagoguery. Radio 'o coverage of the newc from
Europe had raiced the inductry'o prestige and made radio a
principal cource of newc for millionc of Americano
. Yet
with the FCC invectigating chain broadcacting and
Congreccional criticc prepared to join in if they cenced a
whitewach, the financial underpinnings of commercial radio
were under attack. Ac the wider world tilted toward war,
American broadcactero were concerned that their own,
cmaller univerce wac every bit ac unctable.
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CHAPTER IV
"PROBLEMS WERE COMING IN ON ALL WAVE LENGTHS"!
By the late fall of 1938, the broadcasting industry's
euphoria over its triumphal coverage of the Munich crisis
had faded. For the first time since the enactment of the
Communications Act four years before, critics of network
radio hoped and the industry feared the regulators were
poised to take a probing look at the way the industry
worked. Ongoing arguments over censorship, access to the
airwaves, children's programming, advertising abuses and
the like had been subsumed by a broader debate: Were the
networks, the engines of the medium's greatest
accomplishments and mounting profitability, in fact nothing
more than monopolies which concentrated control of the
people's airwaves in the hands of a favored few? This
became the question of the day, and broadcasters feared
powerful legislators such as Senators Burton Wheeler and
Wallace White and a majority on the Federal Communications
Commission had already decided on the answer. Network
executives, by now quite familiar with the folkways of
Washington, understood how the political game was played.
When the FCC announced an "inquiry" into monopolistic chain
! Edward M. Kirby, former National Association of
Broadcasters publicist, to Frank Pellegrin, November 18,
1958, in Kirby biography file, Broadcast Pioneers Library,
Washington, DC, [5]
.
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practiceB, the CommisBion clearly had an answer already in
mind. The only mystery was whether the regulators would
Bimply raise their eyebrows or this time initiate real
changes in the way radio worked.
While the machinations of government agencies occupied
industry insiders, Americans listening to the radio had
other concerns. The question of whether or not there would
be a new European war would soon be supplanted by the
harsher query of when the conflict would begin. In the
spring of 1939, America listened as Adolf Hitler promised
ethnic Germans in western Poland that they too would soon
become citizens of a greater Reich. As the debate over
military preparedness gripped Washington, the networks
readied themselves for the coming conflict. In June, CBS
news director Paul White went to London to meet with
Columbia's two experienced European representatives, Edward
R. Murrow and William L. Shirer, and the network's newly
hired man in Paris, Thomas Grandin, and "the four of us
plotted how we'd cover the war when it came."^
At home, Americans were divided over what role the
United States should play in the coming conflict. The First
World War had clearly failed to end all wars. Did we have
to repeat our mistakes? Was the coming conflict simply
2 Paul W. White, NewB On The Air (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 1947), 48. White recalled that he produced a
detailed memorandum on war coverage following the meeting,
but he admitted he had no idea if the network could
actually execute its plan.
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another dispute among European powere which was of no real
concern to us? Or was fascism, especially Hitler's National
Socialism, a threat to democracy everywhere which the
United States would have to oppose?
Politically, the New Deal had stalled as President
Roosevelt faced an increasingly recalcitrant Congress. The
president's failed attempt to purge his party of
conservatives in the 1938 elections proved that the New
Deal was not in fact the invincible juggernaut it had
appeared to be just two years before. 194 0 promised to be a
fascinating year. Following Washington's precedent,
presidents had always stepped aside after two terms and
Roosevelt, while keeping his own counsel, gave every
indication he would honor the tradition, dropping hints
that he yearned to retire to his gentleman's farm at Hyde
Park. Network commentators, sniffing the shifting political
wind, told their listeners that Harry Hopkins, Herbert
Lehman, Henry Wallace, Paul McNutt or Alben Barkley would
secure the president's blessing as his successor. Others
now outside the New Deal's charmed circle — John Nance
Garner, James Farley, Cordell Hull and Burton Wheelei: among
them — positioned themselves to make their own runs for
the nomination when, if, the president announced he would
step down. The Republicans, buoyed by their belief that the
tide of public opinion was running against the New Deal and
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RooBevelt's tilt toward internationalism, were eager to
take their chances against any of them.^
Both these debates were played out in large part on
the radio, white House hopefuls sought to sound
presidential as they addressed the issues of the day during
radio talks. Advocates of preparedness and isolation traded
opinions in broadcast speeches and roundtable discussions
and whispered in the ears of sympathetic commentators in
hopes their views and political dreams would be blessed by
the analysts. The events of 1938 proved decisively that the
medium had taken its place as a potent, credible shaper of
public opinion. A Roper poll showed that while Americans
Btill relied on their newspapers for most of their daily
news, if the radio and the newspaper offered conflicting
versions of the same story, many more would believe what
they heard on the radio. ^ A medium which had long boasted
that its great virtue was "its capacity for providing the
listener an opportunity to extend his environment easily
and inexpensively, and to participate with a feeling of
personal involvement in the events of the outside world, "
^ James MacGregor Burns, Roosevelt : The Lion and the
Fox{New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), 408-15.
^ "The Press and the People — A Survey, " Fortune,
August 1939, 64-5, 70.
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radio in general and the networks in particular were more
powerful and profitable than ever before.
5
The Federal Communications Commission finally opened
its long-anticipated chain broadcasting inquiry in
November, 1938. Network executives, fearing the worst,
carefully examined their programming for broadcasts which
might weaken their political position. Controversy and
criticism were to be avoided at all costs. The growing
corps of news executives and broadcasters was aware of
their employers' concerns, but they also continued to
wrestle with their own professional imperatives. How could
they as journalists best tell their stories? How could they
use radio to enlighten the public?
The concerns of the board rooms and the news
departments may have been driven by differing motives, but
at this point in their histories, both sides were
particularly sensitive to criticism. The emerging cadre of
broadcast journalists was creating a new profession on the
fly and was frankly unsure how radio could be best used to
inform the public. As journalists, they understood that
their function was to advance democratic debate by
providing accurate information. As broadcasters, they
wanted to take advantage of the immediacy and intimacy of
radio. The medium's demonstrated emotional hold over its
^ Hadley Cantril and Gordon W. Allport, The Peychology
of Radio (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1935; reprint,
Salem, New Hampshire: Ayer, 1986), 260.
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listeners both exhilarated and frightened them. Radio's
potential to enlighten, they believed, was matched by its
ability to manipulate and misguide.
As war approached, CBS commentator Elmer Davis
remembered, an "hysterical fear of
-propaganda'" was in the
air. 6 Broadcasters and their critics had heard the power of
radio. They understood that Roosevelt had used the medium
to win the confidence of the people, and they had seen how
a radio fantasy by Orson Welles could create panic. They
knew that in Europe Hitler had used a state broadcasting
monopoly to consolidate his power. But Davis' comment,
however accurate, revealed only a partial truth. If
societies could be manipulated for ill, did it not follow
that they could be manipulated for noble ends as well?
Edward Bernays, the nation's leading public relations
counsel, equated "freedom of propaganda" with "the other
great civil liberties — freedom of speech, religion,
press, assembly and petition." Propaganda, which he defined
as "an attempt to modify people's ideas or behavior without
coercion," was merely "a ready tool" which "can be made the
voice of the people in the democracy of today. "^
^ Elmer Davis to Edward R. Murrow, June 29, 1947,
Edward R. Murrow Papers 1927-1965 (Sanford, North Carolina:
Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982), folder 169,
frame 0301.
Edward L. Bernays, "Does Propaganda Menace
Democracy? Melting Pot of Ideas," Forum, June 1938, 341-2.
The eminent political scientist Harold Lasswell defined
propaganda "as the use of symbols to influence
controversial attitudes" and argued that propaganda was not
necessarily a pejorative. The nation, he said, owed its
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By the late 1930s, such positive descriptions of
propaganda became increasingly rare. Murrow, speaking in
1938, had told his listeners how international broadcasting
was being used as a weapon of war and how he wished "you
could hear, as we do in London, nation hurling invective at
nation through the air. "8 in reality, many of his listeners
could hear. American intervention had proved decisive in
the first war, and the European powers sought to influence
public opinion across the ocean. Powerful short-wave
transmitters were targeted at the United States from
London, Berlin, Paris and Rome and short-wave receivers
were common. Many major metropolitan newspapers recognized
their readers' interest in overseas broadcasts by routinely
publishing schedules and frequencies for overseas
transmissions along with program logs for local stations.^
Either by monitoring these broadcasts directly or by
listening to retransmissions on the domestic networks,
very existence to skilled propagandists who convinced
colonists "to move themselves and to risk their capital in
America. This, perhaps, is America's greatest debt to
propaganda." Harold D. Lasswell, "The Propagandist Bids for
Power," Anierican Scholar 8 (Summer 1939), 353, 350.
S Edward R. Murrow, CBS network, September 25, 1938,
reprinted in "Fast and Vivid War Service Given Nation by
Broadcasts," Broadcaeting, October 1, 1938, 63.
5 Radios may be manufactured to receive signals of
varying frequencies. "Shortwave" broadcasting refers to
radio waves generated at between 2,000 and 3 0,000 cycles or
"Hertz" per second. The standard broadcast band in the
United States, often referred to in Europe as "medium
wave", includes waves generated at between 53 0 and 1,700
cycles per second. Both short and medium wave broadcasts
rely on amplitude modulation transmission.
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millions of Americans heard the representatives of the
European powers argue their positions. Time dubbed the
escalating radio propaganda wars "the Fourth Front" and
reminded its readers of Berlin radio's "Hitler- inspired
rule: 'Make it simple, tell them often, make it burn. ' "lo
The manipulation of public opinion through the use of
propaganda, many thoughtful Americans feared, was not
limited to questions of war and peace. The domestic
dissension of the 193 0s and the growing influence of the
mass media, especially radio, had combined, they believed,
to devalue rational public discourse and threaten the
foundation of liberal democracy. Commercial broadcasters
felt particularly vulnerable to this criticism because they
relied on a form of propaganda - product advertising - for
their very survival. The industry boasted that radio could
create consumer demand and convince listeners that
purchasing a particular product would make them more
successful, more popular, more content. Broadcasters talked
as always about freedom of the air, but freedom to speak on
the radio, critics charged, was hardly free "because it
costs money, which, usually, is in the hands of antisocial
groups dedicated to narrow self-interest rather than to the
common weal."^^ Well-heeled corporations had the cash to
10 "Fourth Front," ri;77e, October 9, 1939, 64-5.
H Ferdinand Lundberg, "Does Propaganda Menace
Democracy? Freedom to Distort the Truth," Forum, June 1938,
343 .
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promote their economic and philooophical agendas through
adverticing. Only a few ant icommercial holdoutc by the late
1930S begrudged Ford the right to sell its automobiles on
the air, but William Cameron's reactionary Sunday evening
talks were quite another matter. Polemicists such as
Cameron who paid for their microphones enjoyed all the
freedom money could buy, but were such programs truly in
the public interest which broadcasters were pledged to
uphold?
The industry wrestled with the dilemma throughout the
decade. Radio was not a common carrier like the telephone
system. Licensees were held legally accountable for the
content of broadcasts heard over their stations, even when
the air time was purchased and the program prepared by an
independent agency. The networks and individual stations
believed themselves in constant jeopardy: If they allowed
unpopular voices to purchase air time to spread their
words, they were accused of betraying the public interest
for financial gain. If they refused to sell time, they were
liable to be accused of censorship and restricting freedom
of the air.
The industry's dilemma can be seen in its response to
Father Charles E. Coughlin. A Canadian-born Roman Catholic
priest, Coughlin exploited the anger and fear of 193 0s
America to become, thanks to radio, one of the decade's
most powerful political voices. He was, a biographer
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observed, a magnetic personality who like Roosevelt, Hitler
and Mussolini fit both his times and his chosen medium.
All were strong figures. They seemed to know theanswers to the ills of their societies. They
acted with decisiveness - they acted as if they
really knew the answers. Father Coughlin actedthis way too. His crisp voice with its shrill
r's his vibrant personality and his message were
wonderfully suited to the time in which he lived
and to the new medium which was sweeping the
country. 12
Coughlin's message, contemporary observers agreed, could
not be separated from his medium. Commentator Raymond Gram
Swing compared the priest, not with Roosevelt or Mussolini,
but with another Detroit celebrity, Henry Ford. Swing
observed that Ford did not invent the gasoline engine and
Coughlin did not invent radio. However, just as Ford
exploited another's invention, Coughlin "developed the
possibilities of radio as a source of power.... If not an
inventor, he was a discoverer . "^^
Coughlin was first heard on the air in Detroit in the
192 06, broadcasting services for shut-ins and Sunday
afternoon lessons for children. As prosperity collapsed
into depression, he discussed how economic stress was
tearing apart the social fabric of families in his parish
and discovered that his talks were attracting larger and
12 Sheldon Marcus, Father Coucfhlin : The Tumultuous
Life of the Priest of the Little Flower (Boston: Little,
Brown, 1973 ) , 37 .
1^ Raymond Gram Swing, Forerunners of American Fascism
(New York: Julian Messner, 1935), 34.
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increasingly supportive audiences. 14 At first an avid
Roosevelt booster, Coughlin evolved into a virulent anti-
New Dealer.
In 193 0, Coughlin's weekly broadcasts were heard
nationwide during purchased time on the Coluinbia network.
As he attacked banks, financiers and government policies
which he said had allowed them to strangle the economy, CBS
reacted. This was not the kind of benign religious
programming the network had had in mind. The radio priest
was far too controversial for the chain. In 1931, Columbia
demanded that Coughlin tone down his social criticism and
submit his scripts in advance for clearance. Coughlin
protested on the air, and his listeners responded with over
a million angry letters to the network. When Coughlin's
contract expired later in the year, Columbia refused to
sell him time for his program.
The network replaced Coughlin's broadcasts with a
weekly non-denominational "Church of the Air" which
provided free time to representatives of every faith.
Columbia president William Paley disingenuously claimed
that Coughlin was not being silenced by CBS. The network,
he said, was simply trying to better serve the public
14 See Alan Brinkley, Voicee of Protest: Huey Long,
Father Coughlin, and the Great Depreeeion (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1982), 82-106.
15 Erik Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting in the
United States, vol. 2, The Golden Web (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), 44-51; Swing, Forerunners of
Ameri can Fascism, 34-61.
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interect by aoouring "the radio audience the balanced
religious broadcacting it is entitled to."i« Coughl in wao
not off the air for long. He created the Radio League of
the Little Flower and aeoeitibled a network of otationo
acroDD the country to cpread hie gocpel
.
How could broadcacterc claim the air wac truly free if
a peroonality with Coughlin'o popularity and following were
cilenced? The induotry, and ecpecially the networks, nought
to defend itc claim that radio wac a medium for free cpeech
by offering air time to thoce they concidered recponcible
reprecentativec of diveroe groupc . To avoid charges that
they were pandering to extremictc, however, the chains
increasingly limited their working definition of
responsibility. Columbia barred Coughl in from the air but
welcomed speakers from established religious groups who
promised to deliver less inflammatory talks.
Publicity campaigns mounted by government agencies
also caused trouble for the industry because they were
frequently attacked as partisan propaganda. Foes of the
Roosevelt administration charged that the New Deal was
brandishing the threat of its regulatory power to command
unprecedented access to the air. The networks sought to
prove their impartiality by producing program logs showing
that both New Dealers and their political opponents were
Quoted in Sally Bedell Smith, In All Hie Glory: The
Life of William S. Paley (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1990) , 160
.
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frequent radio speakers, but critics such as Virginia
senator Harry Flood Byrd remained unconvinced. Byrd charged
that the industry's eagerness to cooperate with the
government's burgeoning public relations operations
distorted the debate. To Byrd, who launched an
investigation into the subject, and others, the machinery
of the state was being perverted into a perpetual campaign
organization dedicated to praising intrusive,
redistributive government programs. "It is clear that the
country is literally being drenched with administration
propaganda,
"
wrote veteran Washington correspondent and
columnist Frank Kent in 1937, "the cost of which is charged
to the taxpayers." Programs prepared by the Office of
Education, the Department of Agriculture, the Federal
Housing Commission and other government agencies, critics
charged, did more than dispense helpful, non-partisan
advice. They served as soap boxes for the social engineers
of the Roosevelt administration. Radio, Kent charged, had
become "one of the greatest of the publicity instruments
used by the administration. "^"^
The fear of propaganda was not limited to ant i -New
Dealers. It cut across the political spectrum. Progressive
department store magnate Edward A. Filene, fearing the
nation was being victimized by propaganda from the right,
Frank R. Kent, "Washington's Ballyhoo Brigade,
American Magazine, September 1937, 66. See also Stanley
High, "You Can't Beat the Government," Saturday Evening
Post, November 2 0, 1937, 66.
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assembled a distinguished group of educators, psychologists
and public opinion experts for meetings in Boston and New
York. Each had suggestions, but none had a solution to the
growing influence of propaganda. Finally, one participant
recalled, Filene turned to Columbia University Teachers
College professor and journalist Clyde R. Miller and said,
"You there - here is ten thousand dollars for the first
year. I don't care how you spend the money. I suggest you
and two others appoint a committee. The American nation
must be taught to think. "^^
Miller used Filene 's bequest to establish the
Institute for Propaganda Analysis "for scientific research
in methods used by propagandists in influencing public
opinion. He enlisted an impressive roster of experts to
help in the crusade. The Institute's president was
Princeton psychology professor Hadley Cantril, the pioneer
researcher on radio and its impact on the audience. The
advisory board boasted such prominent progressive academics
as historians Charles A. Beard and James T. Shotwell,
sociologist Robert S. Lynd and economist Paul Douglas,
later a Democratic senator from Illinois. 2°
1^ Edward L. Bernays, Biography of an Idea: Memoirc of
a Public Relations Counsel (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1965), 443-4. Filene died prior to the Institute's launch.
15 "Analysis of Propaganda: Institute Teaches How to
Bare Influences on Public Opinion," Newsweek, April 3,
1939, 32.
20 "Announcement," Propaganda Analysis: A Monthly
Letter to Help the Intelligent Citizen Detect and Analyze
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Miller set the Institute's agenda in its founding
statement
:
There ie today especial need for propagandaanalyeiB. America is beset by a confusion of
conflicting propagandas, a Babel of voices
warnings, charges, counter-charges, assertions
and contradictions assailing us continuallythrough press, radio, and newsreel
. These
propagandas are disseminated by political
parties, labor unions, business organizationsfarm organizations, patriotic societies,
churches, schools, and other agencies; klso by
word of mouth by millions of individuals . 21
In words foreshadowing Murrow's widely praised broadcast
from London, the Institute pledged it would be "fair,
scientific, objective," but admitted it "lays no claim to
infallibility. We don't propose to tell our subscribers
what to think; we aim to help them and to help ourselves
learn how to think. "^2
Political and philosophical divisions within the
organization itself and in society at large would soon
prove how difficult it was to conduct rational discourse in
the late 193 0s. Discussing propaganda in his ground-
breaking 1935 study, The Peychology of Radio, Cantril
coolly stated that the public could resist those who sought
to twist opinion with logic. "Rational thought," he wrote,
"is the propagandist's most deadly enemy."
Propaganda 1 (October 1937), 1. Emphasis in the original;
"Analysis of Propaganda," 32.
21 "Announcement," Propaganda Analysis, 1. Emphasis in
the original
.
22 "Announcement," Propaganda Analysis, 4. Emphasis in
the original.
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[The propagandict] followG the advice of EdmundBurke and putG hie truct not in the riqht
argument but in the right word. The mental
mechanicm upon which the propagandict reliec icnot reacon but Guggection, which bringc about theacceptance of a propocition for belief or actionwithout the normal intervention of criticaljudgment . ^3
Radio'G cuccecG wac, of cource, teGtimony to the medium's
power of Guggection. By bringing fleeting Goundc and
lingering emotionG to itG lictenerc, radio had proven
itGelf a powerful inctrument of propaganda. In a decade
many caw aG irrational, the medium Geemed to add to the
uncertainty which gripped Gociety.24 seeking an explanation
for the reaction to the "War of the Worldc" broadcact, one
pGychologict GuggeGted radio 'g coverage of the decade
'
g
crieec, "together with the general strain of theGe yearG of
economic strecc and feeling of incecurity, created juct the
Gtate of mind for such a panic. It couldn't have happened
in 1928 . "-5
Ag war approached in Europe, the idea that any
participant in public debate could remain "fair.
23 Cantril and Allport, The Peychology of Radio, 62.
2^ For an insightful overview of the period, see
Warren I. Susman, "The Culture of the Thirtiec" and
"Culture and Commitment," chape, in Culture Ag History: The
Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth Century
(New York: Pantheon, 1984), 150-210. For a discuGGion of
the quect for a unifying national tradition between the
wars, see Michael Kammen, Mystic Chords of Memory: The
Transformation of Tradition in American Culture (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), 297-527.
2^ Wayland Vaughn of Boston University quoted in
"Radio Panic Showc Public Jittery, Prof. Vaughn Sayc,"
Boston Globe, November 1, 1938, 5.
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scientific, objective" and above the fray seemed either
disingenuous or naive. In the fall of 1938, the Institute
for Propaganda Analysis provided materials for a nationwide
series of discussion groups on propaganda promoted by the
non- interventionist National Committee on the Cause and
cure of war. "While the term
-propaganda' is used without
qualification," the New York Times blandly noted, "it is
generally understood that it is the agencies economically
interested in promoting war which are to be under
scrutiny. "26 The IPA's distinguished board shattered over
the issue of military preparedness. Douglas, Cantril and
Shotwell determined that more than propaganda analysis was
needed to counteract the spread of fascism. Beard remained
resolutely isolationist, fearing Roosevelt would use a new
war in Europe to distract the nation from its domestic
troubles and limit democracy and dissent. Increasingly, he
found himself uncomfortably allied with reactionary
organizations sympathetic with fascist goals. "I wanted to
speak out for peace, " Beard ruefully told author Matthew
Josephson, "But I found that the wrong kind of people were
in that camp, while those I like all seem to be on the
other side . "^^
26 Elizabeth LaHines, "Peace Group Maps Propaganda
Study," New York Times, October 10, 1938, sec. 2, 5.
2"^ Quoted in Matthew Josephson, Infidel in the Temple
A Memoir of the Nineteen -Thirties (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1967) , 413-4
.
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Among those Beard and other non- intervent ionis ts found
"on the other side" of the issue were most of the familiar
voices of broadcast news. Murrow, Shirer, Davis,
Kaltenborn, Swing, virtually every prominent radio
broadcaster of the day saw Hitler's regime as a palpable
threat to democracy in Europe and at home. Despite their
corporate and individual proclamations of impartiality,
each of these broadcasters was philosophically and
personally committed to democratic internationalism. As
their fellow commentator Quincy Howe observed, "all of them
knew Europe as well as the United States" and believed the
interests of the democracies on either side of the Atlantic
were inseparable . 28 When Germany invaded Poland in 1939 and
especially after the fall of France in the spring of 1940,
they used their broadcasts and their medium to advocate
greater American aid to the allies and, as historian David
Culbert has persuasively argued, helped create a climate of
opinion in favor of preparedness and, ultimately,
intervention. ^9
The broadcasters, long aware of their ability to shape
the public's perception of events, had since the 192 0s been
28 Quincy Howe, "The Rise and Fall of the Radio
Commentator," The Saturday Review, October 26, 1957, 14.
29 David Holbrook Culbert, News For Everyman: Radio
and Foreign Affaire in Thirties America (Westport,
Connecticut: Greenwood, 1976). As examples of the minority
isolationist view, Culbert proposed the rapidly fading
Boake Carter and Fulton Lewis, Jr. Both broadcast over
Mutual, the least influential of the four networks, in the
critical years between 1939 and 1941.
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concerned about how they should deal with this disquieting
power. The debate within the industry intensified as war
approached in Europe and became increasingly heated in the
two years between the start of the war and America's entry.
Yet throughout the immediate pre-war years, the leaders of
the broadcasting industry continued to pretend they were
playing no part in the debate and to proclaim their
militant nonpartisanship on all controversial issues at
home and abroad. Columbia's Paley, who in 1938 demanded
that radio "as an instrument of American democracy must
forever be wholly, honestly and militantly
nonpartisan.
... in the whole realm of arguable social
ideas," continued to be one of the industry's leading
spokesman. 30 As late as the spring of 1941, he renewed his
pledge that Columbia would continue its "consistent and
determined effort to present the essence of the news, both
national and international, in a strictly factual and
objective way, devoid of bias."^! Radio broadcasters, he
insisted, could best contribute to the commonweal and serve
the public interest by serving as moderators rather than
participants in a democratic debate.
2° William S. Paley, annual report of CBS, CBS
network, April 5, 1938 reprinted as "Minimum Interference
Asked by Paley," Broadcasting
,
April 15, 1938, 15.
3^ William S. Paley, Annual Report of the Columbia
Broadcast inof System, Inc. For the Fiscal Year Ended
December 29, 1940 (New York: Columbia Broadcasting System,
1941), [5].
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The reality of war and the spectacle of fascism on the
march played an important role in shaping both newsroom
practices and network policies just as they shaped all
aspects of public discourse. The industry's statements were
also shaped by more parochial concerns. Radio executives
viewed both interventionists and isolationists as potential
enemies and feared that many others with long-standing
criticisms of the industry in general and the networks in
particular were poised to strike. Whether the issues were
neutrality or the New Deal, excessive commercialism or too
little culture, many broadcasters observed a restive FCC
and a truculent Congress and believed, as one industry
insider later put it, that "problems ... were coming in on
all wave lengths. "^2
What the industry feared more than anything else, of
course, was new government regulation which might
jeopardize radio's profits. To protect their interests,
broadcasting's leaders wrapped themselves in the now
familiar rhetoric of the Radio and Communications Acts. The
newly elected president of the National Association of
Broadcasters, former Louisville, Kentucky mayor Neville
Miller, in his first public address called on radio's
listeners to join with broadcasters in resisting any
governmental assault on "freedom of the air. Speaking
^2 Kirby to Pellegrin, November 18, 1958, [5].
"Public With Broadcasters in Fight for Freedom,"
NAB [National Association of Broadcasters] Reports 6
272
over a nationwide NBC Blue hook-up from Nashville, Miller
embraced the cooperative ethos that had thrived since the
days of Herbert Hoover and compared those in favor of a
more activist role for the FCC with the Nazis.
Broadcasters, he said, wanted and needed governmental
regulation to prevent "utter confusion on the air" and
insure that every station operated "in the public interest,
convenience and necessity.
"
"Should any station, large or small, fail to so
operate," he said, "it deserves to lose the privilege to
operate." The suddenly confrontational FCC, however, was
going too far and threatening "to dictate what shall and
what shall not be broadcast." The Commission, Miller
warned, "is abandoning the democratic pattern and is
assuming the technique of the totalitarian state which
determines what the people shall hear; what they shall say;
what they shall read and think." There was. Miller said, a
"basic relation of radio to our democracy, " and the
industry intended to work hard "to improve radio's
contribution to American life." The answer, he implied, lay
in an alliance between privately operated radio stations
and a supportive government. Miller's peroration implicitly
made a fine distinction. "Advocates of both sides" would be
welcomed to the microphone to take part in balanced debate.
Radio as an institution did not embrace any particular view
(August 19, 1938), 2909. Miller's address was broadcast
over NBC Blue, August 19, 1938.
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and repeatedly proved it by allowing contrary voices to
speak out. Should the government control radio programming,
he seemed to say, the public would lose that forum for
debate and informed democracy would suffer. Like Paley,
Miller portrayed radio as an unbiased conduit, a common
carrier of sorts, for the opinions of others rather than as
an institutional shaper of opinion itself. As the start of
the FCC chain broadcasting inquiry neared, the leaders of
the broadcasting industry were fast distancing themselves
from the idea that they or their employees were attempting
to direct public opinion.
The FCC's monopoly inquiry, broadcasters knew, would
be a lengthy one and would proceed on two tracks. While the
commission held public hearings to take testimony, staff
members assembled financial and legal information which
would form the bulk of the final report. The FCC, with
ant imonopol ists in Congress watching over its shoulder,
promised to cast a wide net and the result, many
broadcasters feared, would be as Variety predicted "a
cellar- to-attic scrubbing as preliminary for tightening of
the Communications Act and promulgation of sterner
regulatory principles . "^^
When the FCC's formal proceedings began in November of
1938, dozens of broadcast executives representing more than
a score of national networks, regional chains and
34 "Cellar-To-Attic Scrubbing Forecast as FCC's
Industry Probe Widens," Variety, September 28, 1938, 42.
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individual stations were called to testify before a four-
member FCC subcommittee presided over by chairman Frank
McNinch.3S AS is the case in all such events, the hearings
were carefully choreographed. NBC's David Sarnoff, a
living monument to the spectacular growth of the medium,
was the first witness. As chief executive of RCA, he was
the most powerful figure in the industry, and his
corporation, the leading manufacturer of radio equipment
and the operator of two national chains, had long been the
principal target of ant imonopol ists . In his prepared
statement, he offered an Olympian defense of the status
quo. "In this time of world crisis," Sarnoff intoned, "it
is of vital importance that every American citizen should
recognize, in the freedom of our American system of
3^ In addition to McNinch, commissioners Thad Brown,
Eugene Sykes and Paul Walker conducted the initial round' of
hearings with the assistance of FCC staffers. The
transcript of the hearings. Official Report of Proceedings
Before the Federal Communications Commission at Washington,
B.C. in the matter of Commission ' s Order No. 37,
Investigation of Chain or Network Broadcasting, Monopoly in
the Broadcasting Industry and Related Matters, docket no.
5060, is in boxes 1400-1425, Record Group 173, National
Archives Record Center, Suitland, Maryland; hereafter, "FCC
docket no. 5060."
3^ From time to time, the choreography became
painfully evident. NBC vice-president George Engles,
becoming hopelessly entangled in details while under
questioning by the Commission staff, admitted he had not
actually written the testimony he had just presented but
cheerily added, "I read it, sir, three times." Engles,
testimony, FCC docket no. 5060, vol. 1 (November 14, 1938),
96. Such comments, no doubt, helped inspire the tradition
of "NBC vice-president" jokes which has helped sustain
network comedians from Fred Allen to David Letterman.
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broadcasting, one of the eRPif=.nt- ; ai ^-f w3, wiic ^j. Liie sse ci B of his own personal
freedom. "^^
What problems existed in the industry, Sarnoff
insisted, must be solved by the industry itself. Reflecting
an emerging consensus within the top echelons of the
industry, his solution was the same as Columbia's Paley had
proposed the year before. "My recommendation is that the
experience of the different groups within the industry
should now be combined and correlated, " Sarnoff proposed.
"An industry code should emerge that advances beyond all
previous standards. Such a code should be an act of
voluntary self
-regulation.
"
Trust the industry, Sarnoff continued, to solicit the
views of the public and negotiate with the government to
shape and publicize the code. Self
-regulation, he insisted,
was "the American answer to an American problem." The
success of self -regulation would be demonstrated in the
marketplace by America's radio listeners. "By their control
of the nation's radio dials they give approval or
disapproval to radio programs, and decide the ultimate fate
of the broadcaster, " Sarnoff said. "Legitimate censorship
by public opinion" would determine the public interest far
more efficiently than government intervention. Self-
regulation by an industry sensitive to the needs and
^"^ David Sarnoff, testimony, FCC docket no. 5060, vol.
1 (November 14, 1938), 36.
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desires of its audience, he concluded, was "the democratic
way in a democratic country. "38
Sarnoff 's carefully crafted testimony addressed the
concerns of radio's critics and offered a viable solution
which fit neatly into the existing regulatory structure.
Both the broadcasters and the commissioners implicitly and
often explicitly agreed to several vital assumptions which
had informed debates over radio regulation for nearly two
decades. The most important was the primacy of the
marketplace. Government must play an important regulatory
role in administering the people's airwaves, but private
broadcasters, not government, should be allowed to use the
ether for both the public good and their own profit. What
problems existed in the industry could best be cured by
reform rather than restructuring, solved by cordial
cooperation between broadcasters and the government, self-
regulation overseen by a nurturing state. The framework
constructed by Hoover survived intact.
As testimony droned on through the winter, several
important themes developed which revealed the strategies of
the major networks. While FCC staffers probed the financial
dealings of the chains in search of signs of monopoly, the
3S David Sarnoff, testimony, FCC docket no. 506 0, vol.
1 (November 14, 1938), 40-1. According to FCC statistics,
82 percent of the nation's 32.6 million families owned
radios at the start of 1938. In the Northeast and along the
Pacific coast, radio penetration was above 9 0 percent.
Federal Communications Commission, Statietics of the
Communications Industry in the United States (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1941), 245-7.
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networks hoped to keep their critics focused on
programming. While the major chains made common cause on
this issue, it must be remembered that the networks were
profoundly different corporations. CBS was an entertainment
business, surviving on revenue from its network
advertisers, profits from the stations it owned or leased
in leading markets around the nation and related ventures
such as its artist management and booking agencies, its
prosperity relied on the continuation of the commercial
broadcasting system. NBC was simply one part, albeit both
profitable and visible, of RCA, an increasingly diversified
electronics conglomerate. When Sarnoff described his
company, he invoked the image of "a tree with three
branches [and] a common trunk." The branches, he said,
represented "communications, manufacturing, and
broadcasting." The root, "the part of the tree that is
ordinarily unseen, the part that gives it life and growth,"
was research. -^^
While the corporation itself would survive if the
broadcasting branch was for some reason pruned off, the NBC
radio networks' profits helped pay for the research that
Sarnoff believed sustained RCA. According to documents
filed with the FCC, the NBC networks in 1937 generated a
David Sarnoff, testimony, FCC docket no. 506 0, vol
1 (November 14, 1938), 23.
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$3.7 million profit from revenues of $41.6 million. 40
Sarnoff
-B company needed that cash flow to prepare for the
future, and the future was television. With test broadcasts
underway since 1930 and scheduled service set to debut in
the summer of 1939, Sarnoff, always the visionary, foresaw
a new bonanza on the horizon.
As both an industry and as a cultural influence,
television would within a decade dwarf radio. While we
think of the medium as a phenomenon of the 1950s, practical
television technology was developed during the 1920s. ^2 By
40 "NBC Exhibit 191: National Broadcasting CompanyConsolidated Operating Budgets," FCC docket no. 5060 box
14 16 . '
41 The standard account of the development of
television technology is Albert Abramson, The HiBtory of
TeleviEion, 1880-1941 (Jefferson, North Carolina:
McFarland, 1987)
.
The best single volume chronicle of theindustry as a whole is Erik Barnouw, Tube of Plenty (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1975; 2d ed.
,
1990). The
first image telecast by RCA's engineers in 1930 was the
cartoon character Felix the Cat. The camera focused on a
foot-high statuette, selected because it was recognizable,
starkly black-and-white and immobile. The statuette is now
in the collection of the Smithsonian Institution's Museum
of American History.
42 As soon as radio hit its stride, broadcast pioneers
turned to television. Westinghouse engineer Vladimir
Zworykin was conducting television research in 1920.
Charles Francis Jenkins of RCA and English scientist John
L. Baird each publicly demonstrated television systems in
1925. AT&T produced an experimental telecast in 1927
featuring Commerce Secretary Hoover. General Electric '
s
Ernest Alexanderson began testing television in his
Schenectady laboratory in 1928. Philo Farnsworth, who had
designed a primitive electronic television system for a
high school science project in 1922, telecast images in
1927. In contrast to RCA's grinning cartoon cat, among
Farnsworth' 6 first images was a dollar sign. Barnouw, Tube
of Plenty, 25-96
.
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the end of the 1930s, television was very much on the minds
of both broadcasters and the public, and the dawn of the
television age was being widely heralded in the popular
press. In Great Britain, where the BBC had been offering
scheduled telecasts since mid-decade, television was by
early 1939, in the Timee of London's phrase, "an industry
in full bloom." Londoners were expected to purchase 40,000
sets by the end of the year. "At the average price of
$250," the New York Times breathlessly pointed out, "there
is more than $9,000,000 worth of sets in the London
district alone. "43 ^he potential for profit in the United
States, the industry believed, was virtually limitless, and
RCA mobilized its public relations operation to prepare
consumers
.
In a seven-page photographic essay on RCA's
experiments with the wondrous new medium, Life depicted a
dazzling future. The technology was evolving so quickly.
Life promised its readers, it was a "safe guess... that in
ten years... you will be able to enjoy most forms of public
entertainment in your home. By that time the television
industry will be one of the biggest and most powerful in
the land. ""^4 The only stumbling block standing between
television and the nation, the magazine suggested, was
financial
:
43 "New Industry Booms," New York Times, March 19,
1939, sec. 11, 12.
"Television," Life, February 29, 1939, 42.
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Estimates place the cost of a television
show at ten times that of a radio show or about$2,000 an hour, exclusive of talent cost. Because
advertisers will not get their money back until
they reach an audience of several hundred
thousand people, the telecasting companies are
going to have to make and pay for their own
programs for some time to come
.
RCA, because of the success of its radio networks, had the
money to pay for the programming which would motivate those
hundreds of thousands to buy television sets which, of
course, RCA would manufacture.
The networks were profit centers, but their high
public profile presented potentially troublesome public
relations problems which could jeopardize RCA's future. If,
in a fit of antimonopoly fervor, the FCC scuttled the radio
networks, profits RCA was counting on to subsidize the
fledgling television industry until it became a viable
advertising medium could be wiped out.
CBS, without a manufacturing arm to produce television
receivers, approached television more cautiously. Paley was
uncertain how to approach the new medium. He feared
television would prove far too expensive to turn an
immediate profit, but he also worried that Sarnoff and NBC
might steal the march on Columbia. The network briefly put
an experimental station on the air in 1931 but did not take
a leading role in developing the new technology. By 1937,
however, Paley was convinced that television was at hand
45 "Television, " 48
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and built a new and larger experimental station in New York
with studios at Grand Central Station and a transmitter
perched atop the nearby Chrysler building. 46 Columbia would
remain focused on radio until well after the Second World
War because of the network's tremendous profitability, in
1937, when NBC reported profits of $3.7 million, CBS earned
$4.2 million on revenues of just $28 million. 47
To protect the business of radio, the networks'
representatives clung tenaciously to the mantle of public
service. Radio, the argument went, was free to serve the
public interest because it responded to the demands of the
market, because it was not controlled by the government.
Profits realized in the market allowed radio to provide
programming in the public interest. Profits and public
service were bound together. "The American people have a
free radio,
" Sarnof f said, "because they have a
broadcasting industry that pays its own way. "48 Freedom of
the air, therefore, must be protected by preserving the
industry's ability to profit.
Repeatedly, to prove their commitment to" public
service, the broadcasters pointed to radio's functions as a
46 Smith, In All Hie Glory, 185-8. Smith notes that
Paley's choice of such highly visible locations for
Columbia's television facilities was another demonstration
of his public relations acumen.
47 Smith, In Jill Hie Glory, 144.
48 David Sarnof f, testimony, FCC docket no. 5060, vol.
1 (November 14, 1938), 33.
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news medium and a forum for democratic debate. NBC's news
and special events division, the network's vice-president
for programming told the FCC, had become "one of the most
important departments in radio," ready to bring events from
anywhere in the world to NBC's audience . 49 Explaining
Columbia's policies, Paley insisted that "it is a part of
the function of network broadcasting to provide a free and
open forum for the discussion of controversial issues, or
an issue that might be important to the American people. "^o
Witness after witness repeated the refrain: The medium
magically brought the events of the world into our homes
and allowed us to hear for ourselves the clash of opinions
in the marketplace of ideas.
Among the most forceful defenders of the networks'
policies was Edward R. Murrow. Home for a holiday round of
meetings, speeches and celebrations, Murrow was as the
result of his Vienna and Munich broadcasts already a
celebrity whom the network hierarchy was eager to promote
as a champion of radio journalism. Janet Murrow understood
her husband's symbolic role. Describing one network gala in
a letter to her family, she wryly noted that after "a few
John F. Royal, testimony, FCC docket no. 5060, vol.
4 (November 17, 1938), 448.
5° William S. Paley, testimony, FCC docket no. 5060,
vol. 28 (January 18, 1939), 3484.
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bigwigs have had their say, Ed is to perform and we're to
depart .
"
Despite his triumphs on the air, Murrow had not yet
reached the elevated status he would later achieve. He was
a celebrity, but he was still Columbia's all-purpose man on
the scene in Europe, called on to fill in however the
moment warranted. The network's presence on the continent
in 1938 was far too limited to allow for any divisions of
labor. After reporting Hitler's march into Austria in the
spring, for instance, Murrow was dispatched to Scotland to
cover the Walker Cup golf matches at St. Andrew's and then
to Wimbledon where he shared the microphone with tennis
champion Bill Tilden during Columbia's coverage of the
Wightman Cup competition. Later in the summer, when Howard
Hughes touched down near London during his round-the-world
flight, Murrow was at the air field to interview the
dashing celebrity airman for the listeners at home
.
keeping with the industry's traditions, each event was
considered part of radio's function as the people's
witness
.
5^ Quoted in A.M. Sperber, Murrow: Hie Life and Timee
(New York: Freundlich, 1986), 133.
52 "CBS Exhibit 241: Special International and Foreign
Broadcasts," FCC docket no. 5060, box 1417. Murrow's
broadcast partner at St. Andrew's was Henry Longhurst of
the London Evening Standard. Longhurst would go on to serve
as a golf commentator for CBS radio and television for the
next five decades.
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Shortly before returning to Europe in early 1939,
Murrow testified on network news practices before the FCC
inquiry. Murrow echoed both radio's fundamental role as a
witness to events and Paley's pledge of impartiality and
objectivity. "We are attempting to bring the listeners in
this country," he said, "information that is timely, that
is informative, that is as objective as we can make it,
information covering various fields of listener interest,
that is to say, cultural affairs, programs of entertainment
value, in addition to news broadcasts." Each of these
broadcasts was informative, but he acknowledged that the
network hoped to transmit more than information. "We are
trying," Murrow said, "to give people an opportunity to
hear the sort of thing they would hear if they were
actually with us in Prague, in Vienna, or in whatever point
the program may or iginate .
"
Pressed to elaborate on corporate policies on
objective reporting, Murrow cited his widely-praised
September broadcast from London at the peak of the Munich
crisis and said "I was given only one instruction" by his
superiors in New York.
We were to be guided by the same principles in
our European operations that apply here. In other
words, that we were to have no editorial
policies, and that under no circumstances was the
news to be selected or interpreted to accord with
Edward R. Murrow, testimony, FCC docket no. 5 060,
vol. 26 (January 13, 1939), 3251-2.
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the suggestions or directions of individuals
interested in promoting a given point of view,
and that, so far as humanly possible, in
reporting from Europe we were to avoid the
intrusion of personal opinion and not to make an
effort at evaluating happenings in terms of
personal approval or disapproval . ^4
Guided through his testimony by the questions of Columbia's
legal counsel John J. Burns, Murrow, on behalf of his
network, clearly wanted Columbia's objectivity policy
firmly on the record.
"What is the underlying basis for that approach on the
part of Columbia, as you understand it?" Burns asked.
"As I understand it," Murrow replied, "it is on the
assumption that the American public, if given the
opportunity to hear the facts and an opportunity to hear a
fair statement of opposing views with reference to these
facts, will form a public opinion in accordance with the
truth.
"
"Then it is true without qualification that in your
foreign broadcasts to this country you have attempted no
form of editorial policy?"
"That is true .
"
"Now, " Burns continued, "how does your staff or how do
you arrange to segregate the element of rumor and
speculation from the factual in your broadcasts to this
country?
"
Edward R. Murrow, testimony, FCC docket no. 5 060,
vol. 26 (January 13, 1939), 3252.
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"That is very difficult because so much news, so-
called news, in Europe today consists of rumor and
speculation,
" Murrow responded, "but when we broadcast
rumor we try to brand it as such. In other words, we try to
identify the source of the news, whether official or
otherwise .
"
Satisfied that they had proven the network's point.
Burns turned the questioning to a discussion of the
logistics of CBS coverage of the Munich crisis. A few
minutes later, however, he returned to the question of
editorializing on the air.
"Now, in reporting the events over the air, " Burns
asked, "did any of the Columbia broadcasters seek to state
by way of appraisal what their opinion was as to events?"
"We attempted to avoid that, " Murrow responded, "We
attempted to simply give the facts, to give the setting in
which the facts occurred, and on occasion comment
concerning opinion as to the significance of those
facts . "55
Murrow' B statements, carefully elicited by Columbia's
legal counsel, obviously demonstrate the network's favored
public image as a nonpartisan source of unbiased
information which would never seek to impose its own views
on the audience. The testimony also reflects Murrow'
s
steadfast belief in rationality and logic, as well as his
55 Edward R. Murrow, testimony, FCC docket no. 506 0,
vol. 26 (January 13, 1939), 3253-4, 3256-7.
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faith in the ability of both broadcasters and their
listeners to accurately discern "the facts." Yet even at
the start of 1939, more than a year before his evocative
broadcasts from London during the blitz, Murrow was aware
that radio journalism extended beyond the linear logic of
print into a more emotional, but no less valid, form of
communication. By insisting that the broadcaster's duty
included both reporting the facts as accurately as humanly
possible while at the same time allowing the listener to
share the experience of being present, Murrow acknowledged
that broadcast journalism operated on different and
sometimes contradictory planes.
The FCC completed taking testimony on chain
broadcasting in May of 1939. After 73 days of hearings
featuring 94 witnesses, the commission staff set to work.
The hearing panel had accumulated 8,713 pages of testimony
accompanied by 674 supporting exhibits. It would take the
commission until the summer of 1940 to complete its
preliminary report and order. ^6 Neither the industry nor
the FCC's many critics in Congress knew what to expect, but
neither group was optimistic. Broadcasters feared any
change would work against their interests. Congressional
critics observing the hearings were certain they detected
Federal Communications Commission, Report on Chain
Broadcasting- (Washington: Government Printing Office,
1941)
, 1; Federal Communications Commission, Fifth Annual
Report of the Federal Communi cations CommiBeion, Fiscal
Year ended June 30, 1939, (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1940) , 52
.
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those familiar undercurrents of stalemate and political
bickering which had foiled their previous attempts to bring
the networks to heel, when the FCC attempted in March of
1939 to identify certain practices which might be
considered "contrary to the public interest," the
Commission's deliberations led to an embarrassing public
squabble between McNinch and Commissioner T.A.M. Craven.
When McNinch suggested the government should mandate equal
treatment for all sides in controversial issues, Craven
asked if that meant a program condemning gambling or
prostitution would have to be answered by a "representative
of organized vice" qualified to offer the other side. The
FCC, he argued, could only respond after the fact to
"particular evils... of serious proportions" and must resist
"any attempt to force stations to broadcast programs which
the commission thinks best for the public." McNinch replied
by branding Craven an "alarmist" and calling his dissent a
"gratuitous.
. .flag-waving.
. .grandstand play. "^"^
"Morale of the Federal Communications Commission is
described by Washington observers as 'at a new low' and
work at a standstill," the New York Timee reported as the
chain broadcasting hearings wound down and the
commissioners bickered. Congress had given the FCC one last
chance to put both the industry and its own house in order.
Now, almost a year later, neither result seemed at hand.
^"^
"New Brawls in the FCC Bring Reports the President
May Step in Again," Newsweek, March 13, 1939, 40, 42.
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"Observers believe," the Tin.es continued, "that the only
solution to the dilemma is a thorough airing of the whole
FCC affair before a Congressional Committee."
Rumors that President Roosevelt will again take ahand in straightening out the muddle continue tocirculate around Washington, with Judge Eugene OSykes due to step down after twelve years service
next month, broadcasters are wondering if thatmay now be just the beginning of a general exodusfrom the commission. ^8
"While the FCC can keep offending broadcasters a-tremble,"
NewBweek added, "its own neck is be
- noosed. " The McNinch-
Craven spat "may add fuel to the legislative flame" and the
word was out "that the President himself might step in
again. "
The question of why the FCC was unable to "solve" the
problems of radio had many answers, the most basic being
the absence of any politically viable alternative to the
existing commercial broadcasting system. The rejection of
the Wagner -Hatfield amendment in 19 34 remained a powerful
object lesson. Beyond that, the commissioners, their staff
and the broadcasting industry they were charged with
regulating shared fundamental assumptions rooted in nearly
twenty years of cooperative management of the ether which
had been institutionalized by the national radio
conferences and reaffirmed by a growing body of precedents.
Frank McNinch had earned impressive trust -busting
^® "New Radio Legislation Forecast Indeed Bleak, " New-
York Times, March 19, 1939, sec. 11, 10.
55 "New Brawls in the FCC," 42.
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ewe
credentials during his service on the Federal Power
commission and had no ambitions for a comfortable future
within the industry he regulated, but in practice his vi
on the industry proved quite conventional. Private
ownership of radio stations had to be maintained . so
Moreover, McNinch insisted, any system of government
censorship would be "impracticable and definitely
objectionable.
.. .If any such measure should be brought
before Congress for consideration, conviction would impel
me to do battle against it. "61 Thus, McNinch, wryly
described by New Dealer- turned-columnist Raymond Moley as
"a wise and munificent shepherd" of the listening public,
seemed unable to do more than raise his eyebrow and
periodically express his outrage at some new transgression
by the radio broadcasters
.
While the FCC conducted its inquiry and commercial
broadcasting's opponents continued their criticism, the
broadcasting industry moved to defend itself. Recalling two
decades of success in dealing with threats from reformers
both inside and outside of government, the broadcasters
6° "Public Owns Air, McNinch Cautions," New York
Times, November 20, 1938, 12.
61 Quoted in "U.S. Radio Monopolistic? Sarnoff Starts
String of Denials as FCC Inquiry Opens, " Newsweek, November
28, 1938, 19. See also Frank R. McNinch, "Freedom of the
Air," speech delivered at Chapel Hill, North Carolina,
January 26, 1939, reprinted in NAB Reports 1 (February 3,
1939) , 3229-31.
62 Raymond Moley, "Perspective: Radio Dangers,"
Newsweek, November 14, 1938, 48.
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went to work to prove that the American system of
broadcasting was capable of regulating itself, while the
national chains and owners of stations large and small
across the country often argued among themselves, they were
in agreement on the need for sel f
-regulation
. In December
of 1938, eleven network, station and trade association
representatives met in New York under the banner of the
National Association of Broadcasters to organize the NAB
Committee on Program Standards. The committee set to work
drafting the kind of new industry code Sarnoff and Paley
hoped would provide an alternative to new government
regulations." NAB publicist Edward Kirby was appointed
committee secretary and assembled a draft from policy
statements by the networks, regional chains and individual
stations across the country. The document borrowed heavily
from Columbia's frequent public statements on programming
issues
.
The committee's draft of the new industry guidelines
was finalized at an NAB board meeting in New York in March
of 1939 and distributed to the membership for comment.^"*
^3 Under provisions of the National Industrial
Recovery Act, an industry-wide code of fair business
practices had been in force from 1933 until the NIRA was
struck down by the Supreme Court in 1935. Later that year,
the NAB issued a ten-point code of ethics short on
specifics and lacking any enforcement machinery. See
Christopher H. Sterling and John M. Kitross, Stay Tuned: A
ConciBe History of American Broadcasting , second ed.
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth, 1990), 192-3.
Neville Miller, interview by Donald H. Kirkley,
September 25, 1973, transcript, oral history collection.
Broadcast Pioneers Library, Washington, DC, 22. Miller
292
Kirby, meanwhile, went to work building public support for
the proposal. "Self
-regulation of the industry is the
keynote," reported the Ne^ York Tin.es, quoting Sarnoff that
the code "would produce the maximum of free speech and the
best kind of programs. "65 At the annual convention of the
National Council of Women in May, Kirby explained how the
industry would insure the "proper use of radio" by
mandating "factual reporting" and "logical exposition"
while banning "hidden propaganda . "^^ The following month,
at a meeting of the Advertising Federation of America in
New York, the portions of the draft devoted to ending
advertising abuses were presented "for discussion" to
agency representatives and radio sales managers. ^7
Subsequent events indicate copies of the proposed
guidelines were also distributed to important players in
Congress, the FCC and elsewhere in the Roosevelt
administration.
When the NAB gathered for its annual convention in
Atlantic City in the summer of 1939, the Committee on
recalled that the chains, already under fire as alleged
monopolies, were eager to endorse the code but fearful that
any enforcement mechanism would present new ant i- trust
problems
.
^5 Orrin E. Dunlap, Jr., "Rules for Radio," New York
Timee, May 28, 1939, sec. 10, 10.
66 "Radio Code Drawn to Prevent Abuses, " New York
Timee, May 25, 19 39, 27.
67 William J. Enright, "Puts Peace Action Up to 'Have'
Powers," New York Timee, June 21, 1939, 42.
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Program Standards presented the new code of ethics to the
full membership. Resolutely ignoring such financial issues
as monopoly ownership or network domination of their
affiliates, the Code formally presented to the NAB
membership in Atlantic City focused squarely on program
content and addressed the most frequent criticisms aimed at
broadcasters. Particular attention was paid to news and
special events broadcasts. While forcefully proclaiming
their dedication to free speech, broadcasters announced
they were ready to sacrifice certain rights in the name of
responsibility. The Code echoed many of the same phrases
industry leaders had in the earlier years of the decade
relied on to deflect attacks on the status quo.
News broadcasts, the Code directed, would be presented
"with fairness and accuracy" and "shall not be selected for
the purpose of furthering or hindering either side of any
controversial public issue." Editorializing was strictly
forbidden. The news should never "be colored by the
opinions or desires of the station or network management,
the editor or others engaged in its preparation or the
person actually delivering it over the air, or, in the case
of sponsored news broadcasts, the advertiser . "^^
While refraining from voicing their own opinions,
broadcasters reassured their critics that they would make
sure that radio remained an open public forum for all
68
..The Code," NAB Reports 7 (July 15, 1939), 3586-7.
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points of view. "As part of their public service," the
Code's section on "controversial public issues" began,
"networks and stations shall provide time for the
presentation of public questions including those of
controversial nature." Broadcasters, the Code promised,
would not sell time "for the presentation of controversial
issues" to make sure such "a powerful public forum" would
not be controlled by "those with a greater means to buy
it." Two exceptions were clearly noted: Political
candidates and parties would be allowed to buy time during
election campaigns "because at certain times the contending
parties want to use and are entitled to use more time than
broadcasters could possibly afford to give away," and the
stations and networks themselves would continue to offer
"fair-sided discussions of public issues" during radio
round tables and forums.
In its discussion of both news broadcasts and the
coverage of controversial issues, the NAB Code almost
exactly paralleled the policies proclaimed by CBS and
endorsed by NBC over the preceding several years . The
similarities to Paley's public position, first espoused in
the 1938 broadcast in which he proclaimed the industry
"must forever be wholly, honestly and militantly
nonpar t isan. ... in the whole realm of arguable social
ideas," are striking. The Code even endorsed Paley's
69 "The Code, " 3 58 6
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statement to the FCC chain broadcasting inquiry that too
much public debate would alienate listeners by asserting
that air time should be devoted to controversial issues
"with due regard to all the other elements of balanced
program schedules." The similarities extended to sections
of the code concerning advertising and broadcasts intended
for children as well. Recalling Columbia's successful
efforts to deflect criticism of serials for youngsters, the
Code dictated that such programs "should be based upon
sound social concepts" and "reflect respect for parents,
adult authority, law and order, clean living, high morals,
fair play and honorable behavior . ""^o
The Code, in both content and purpose, summarized an
industry consensus that had formed by 1939. From the
beginning, the radio industry and its governmental
regulators had worked together to bring stability and order
to the new medium. Whether the issue of the moment was
news, children's programming or patent medicine
advertising, under both Prall and McNinch, the FCC had
praised the industry when it put its own house in order. As
the end of the decade approached and the political climate
became more contentious, radio's handling of controversial
public issues moved to center stage. Both McNinch and
Senator Wheeler urged self-control on the industry while
reading the riot act to radio at the NAB ' s 1938 Washington
70 I. The Code, " 3 58 6 .
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convention. At the 1939 convention, presidential press
secretary Stephen T. Early delivered a similar speech,
praising radio while at the same time warning the industry
to keep its own house in order.
Early, once a Washington correspondent for the
Associated Press and the grandson of Confederate cavalryman
General Jubal Early, had known the President since 1913
when Early covered the Navy Department. Despite his
protests to the contrary, the broadcasters knew that
Early's words carried the authority of the White House. He
was, after all, the presence at the side of the President
during Roosevelt's Oval Office press conferences who would
from time to time prod the President to restate or reword
his answers to make sure they would be understood as
correct expressions of administration policy, "^i
"The big, bad government," Early continued, had no
desire to censor radio, nor did it desire to hamstring
broadcasters with "definite, detailed and rigid standards
of public service, implemented by specific rules and
prohibitions." Such regulations would be both unworkable
and unnecessary because "each of you broadcasters know
"'Steve' Early, Presidential Aide: Good-Will
Ambassador to the Press," United States News, December 6,
1940, 39. Early prefaced his remarks to the NAB by saying,
"None could presume to speak for the President of the
United States. . . .Any views which I express to you,
therefore, reflect solely my personal beliefs, based upon
experience as a newspaperman and upon observations made
during the past six years of official life." "Early's
Speech," NAB Reports 7 (July 15, 1939), 3590.
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whether your station is doing the right kind of job."
Still, it was part of broadcasters' "public duty to keep
their programs free from false news .... and definitely the
Government is watching and will continue to watch with
great interest" to make sure this duty is carried out. "72
The proposed NAB Code, Early concluded, was an example of
the kind of "enlightened policies" radio should follow. The
Code's directives for broadcasting news, controversial
issues and political discussions, Early said, reflected his
"old fashioned" belief that "a reporter should stick to the
facts with appropriate elucidation to make the news
understandable and let his reader or listener reach his own
conclusions." As long as radio hewed to such a course.
Early promised, "so long as radio serves democracy, it will
remain free."^^
Early's pointed comments on radio's patriotic duty to
avoid "false news" in a time of increasing world tension
fueled the industry's rush to self
-regulation. His remarks,
it seemed, offered a clear White House endorsement of the
industry's efforts to govern itself. The NAB convention,
despite a few holdouts who feared they were being stampeded
into "balloting on self -censorship, " voted "by an
overwhelming majority" of 148 to 24 to adopt the Code and
72 "Early's Speech," 3592.
73 "Early's Speech," 3592.
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directed the association's board to establish compliance
procedures in time for a special convention in September. ^4
Early's remarks fit neatly into the pattern that had
developed over the previous two decades and had been
further institutionalized during the FCC ' s first five
years. The NAB Code was an exercise in pre-emptive self-
censorship, but the industry in 1939 believed it had no
alternative. 75 Free speech absolutists who insisted radio
deserved the same First Amendment protections the press
enjoyed and a handful of station operators such as Elliot
Roosevelt who insisted on the right to editorialize
resisted the Code's restrictions, but the majority of the
industry was willing to forego the responsibility of
voicing opinion and the revenue generated by selling time
to Father Coughlin and other controversial speakers. "A
self-imposed censorship is no safer than any other kind,
under ordinary circumstances," the Richmond Tiniee
-Dispatch
editorialized, "but these are not commonplace times." The
leaders of the radio industry, the Times -Dispatch correctly
noted, "foresee that unless they can themselves regulate
their programs in the public interest, the Federal
"^"^
"Convention Takes Copyright, Code Action, " NAB
Reports 7 (July 15, 1939), 3585; "Broadcasters' New Code
Curbs Controversial Matter, Restrains Child Programs,
"
Newsweek, July 24, 1939, 27.
"^^ Neville Miller recalled that when confronted with a
possibly controversial program many station executives
"used the Code as an excuse when they didn't want to do
something." Miller, interview, 22-3.
299
communications Commiseion will make its own supervision of
broadcasting far more strict. ""^^
As the broadcasters returned home from Atlantic City
to await the final shape of their new industry code, they
still shared concerns over the future of their industry.
The FCC staff was toiling on the chain broadcasting report
and criticism of McNinch's tenure continued to boil. Before
the summer was over, McNinch would depart and a new
chairman, James Lawrence Fly, would take over with a
presidential mandate to bring order to the regulatory
chaos. In the fall, Germany would invade Poland, and war
would envelop Europe. These events would speed radio's rush
to self
-regulation and solidify the medium's leaders'
conviction that news broadcasts must be presented with
"fairness and accuracy" and "shall not be editorial." Such
a policy, most in the industry agreed, would both serve the
public interest and protect the profitable American system
of broadcasting from disruptive government regulation.
"^^ Editorial, Richmond [Virginia] Timee -Dispatch
,
October 6, 1939, reprinted in "Editorial Comment Concerning
the NAB Code, " supplement distributed with NAB Reports 7
(October 20, 1939) , 1
.
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CHAPTER V
"SELF-REGULATION... CONSISTENT WITH THE PUBLIC INTEREST"!
In July, 1939, three years before his term was due to
expire, Frank McNinch resigned as chairman of the Federal
Communications Commission. Sixty-six years old and
suffering from chronic colitis, McNinch, all agreed,
deserved a rest. 2 The North Carolinian had more than done
his duty for the administration at the Federal Power
Commission as well as the FCC, and President Roosevelt made
certain to acknowledge his loyalty, "it was stated on the
highest authority," the New York Tiniee reported, "that the
considerations of health alone had dictated the decision of
Mr. McNinch to retire from that field" and suggested the
chairman, once he recuperated, would be in line for new
duties .
^
Despite the pleasantries, McNinch 's tenure at the FCC
had been by nearly any measure a failure, and his departure
had been expected for several months. Six weeks earlier,
! James Lawrence Fly, "Some Comments on Current Radio
Problems," radio address, CBS Network, October 26, 1939.
Printed text in radio file, Raymond Clapper Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
2 HMcNinch Quits FCC," Newsweek, August 7, 1939, 39.
3 "McNinch Asks To Be Relieved of FCC Post; President
Indicates New Job Awaits Him," New York Tiniee, July 26,
1939, 1. Reporters attending Roosevelt's Oval Office
briefings were usually not permitted to quote the president
directly
.
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variety, citing rumors "said to be authoritative in well-
informed quarters," predicted McNinch would quit "just as
quickly as another post, one which will save his face, can
be discovered. Bad heal th . . . wil 1 be the excuse. "4 m his
formal letter of resignation, McNinch acknowledged what the
President and many critics in Congress had been saying: The
FCC and the law itself were not sufficient to govern the
radio industry, "it is not possible," McNinch wrote, "to
reach the maximum of efficiency in the public interest with
the present personnel and within the inadequate framework
of the Communications Act."^
After five years, the Communications Act in the
opinion of many had proven as weak a rudder for the
industry as the 1927 Radio Act and the administrative
procedures of Hoover's Commerce Department. Roosevelt
himself had admitted that the FCC was out of control when
in January he asked Senator Burton Wheeler of Montana,
chairman of the Committee on Interstate Commerce, to
consider drafting new communications legislation. Despite
repeated administrative attempts to revitalize the FCC
through new appointments and internal reorganization,
Roosevelt wrote, he was "thoroughly dissatisfied with the
present legal framework and administrative machinery" and
4 "New Rumor of McNinch Retirement Seems Supported;
Thompson Seen As Possible Successor in Chair, " Variety,
June 14, 1939, 32.
^ Quoted in "President Accepts M'Ninch Resignation,
"
New York TimeB, July 29, 1939, 2.
302
had "come to the conclusion that new legislation is
necessary." Roosevelt made no specific recommendations.
Indeed, he washed his hands of the problem, urging "clear
Congressional policies on the substantive side - so clear
that the new administrative body will have no difficulty in
interpreting or administering them. "«
The President's call for new legislation met with
quick and vocal support. Wheeler, whose committee had
jurisdiction over radio legislation, held meetings with
McNinch and Representative Clarence Lea, the chairman of
the House Committee on Foreign and Interstate Commerce, and
won a vital endorsement in principal from Senator Wallace
White, the Republican from Maine who had helped write both
the Radio and Communication Acts and was widely regarded on
both sides of the aisle as the Senate's leading expert on
the issue. White cautiously stated the FCC might be
restructured "with advantage."
The Roosevelt administration, the Wall Street Journal
gleefully predicted, was clearly ready to dismantle the
regulatory framework governing the communications industry
and let Congress try its hand at solving "what has long
been the New Deal's greatest administrative headache."
Within a year, the Journal predicted, a new radio law would
be enacted and a new commission appointed. The FCC, Wheeler
^ Roosevelt to Wheeler, January 23, 1939, in Samuel I
Rosenman, ed.
,
The Public Papers and Addreeeee of Franklin
D. Roosevelt, 1939 volume (London: Macmillan, 1941), 96.
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agreed, had proven a failure and Congress had to act to
restore the people's control of their air waves.
^
The problems within the FCC were confirmed by its
members' reactions to calls for new legislation. Rather
than fighting to protect their political turf, the
embattled regulators welcomed the idea that Congress and
the White House might save them from themselves. McNinch
said he was "wholly sympathetic" with the President's
request and noted that he had "recommended to the President
some time ago that the commission be reorganized."
Commissioner Norman S. Case, the former Republican governor
of Rhode Island, was relieved that Congress might step in.
"Now perhaps they can hold hearings," he told the New York
Times, "and get things straightened out."^
Seven months later, no hearings had been held, no new
law had been passed, McNinch had resigned and a solution to
the FCC tangle seemed no closer at hand. The momentum for
reform, so evident that winter, had melted away by
summertime, more evidence, the President's critics
believed, of the imminent demise of the New Deal.
"Undoubtedly, there will be some flashes in the pan and
perhaps a phony revival," veteran Washington columnist
Frank Kent wrote, "Nevertheless, most detached observers
Bernard Kilgore, "McNinch Says New Law, New
Personnel Required For Efficient Operation, " Wall Street
Journal, July 29, 1939, 1.
® "Roosevelt Seeks Laws Revising FCC, " New York Times,
January 25, 193 9, 12.
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are fairly well convinced that the hand is played out, the
game is over and the Roosevelt regime is on the way out. "3
certainly the New Deal, if not dead, had passed into a
new and more passive phase by the summer of 1939. Political
defeats at home and a looming crisis in Europe meant the
nation's role in the increasingly troubled world would now
take center stage. Roosevelt himself had said as much in
his State of the Union address in January, when he finally
turned to domestic affairs, he proposed a most modest
agenda. "We have now passed the period of internal conflict
in the launching of our program of social reform," the
President announced. The goal now was "to preserve our
reforms
.
"^^
The Communications Act of 19 34 was a product of the
heady first days of the New Deal. Facing an economic and
political crisis and armed with an overwhelming mandate for
change, Roosevelt and the Democratic Congress, the
president recalled, "had to forge new tools for a new role
of government operating in a democracy. " Inevitably, he
said, "some of these tools had to be roughly shaped and
still need some machining down." Now, it was up "to the
Congress to improve the new machinery which we have
permanently installed, provided that in the process the
5 Frank R. Kent, "The Great Game of Politics: The Game
is Over," Wall Street Journal, August 7, 1939, 4.
1° Roosevelt, address to Congress, January 4, 1939,
Public Papers and AddreeeeG, 1939, 7.
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social usefulness of the machinery is not destroyed or
impaired.
The Communications Act had proven more roughly shaped
than most. Designed to coordinate and rationalize federal
controls of all forms of interstate and international
electronic communications, the law was a pastiche of pre-
existing statutes and regulations. The sections concerning
broadcasting were largely taken from the Radio Act of 1927
which itself had its origins in the associat ionist
practices of the Hoover Commerce Department. By 1939, the
cacophony of competing stations which had forced Congress
to act a dozen years before had been replaced by the
orchestrated voices of the national chains sounding in
unison from radios across the nation. The machinery the
nation relied upon to regulate radio had been assembled
when the chains were in their infancy. Now, it was showing
its age.
Given the political climate of the time, a wholesale
rewriting of the Communications Act and its regulation of
telephone and telegraph service as well as radio and the
emerging television industry was probably impossible.
Conservatives in Congress were in no mood to create another
New Deal agency, nor was the unlikely coalition of crusty
populists, left-over progressives, classical conservatives
and liberal reformers which rallied to the banner of public
11 Roosevelt, address to Congress, January 4, 1939, 7.
306
interest ready to surrender control of the people's air to
private corporations. The consensus reached two decades
before held firm. The radio spectrum belonged to the
people, yes, but private businesses could profit from its
use as long as they pledged to serve the public interest.
No one could say with certainty how to solve the obvious
regulatory problems. Wheeler, as quick to attack the FCC as
any, was reluctant to force new legislation when no
consensus existed. The Commission had long been "a
political football," he said, but its problems were "no
fault of the law but rather one of personnel . "I2
"Sooner or later a new basic Federal radio law will
have to be written," Variety editorialized, but the trade
paper agreed with Wheeler that the problem was
fundamentally political. When that "now-unforeseen
legislation" was written. Variety hoped it would "lessen
the present overwhelming domination of political wire-
pulling as a prerequisite to getting on the air, staying on
the air, or improving the conditions of tenure."!^
While McNinch's resignation as FCC chair would not
take effect until the end of the summer, Roosevelt
nominated his successor within forty-eight hours, another
indication that McNinch's departure had been in the works
^2 Quoted in Kilgore, "McNinch Says New Law, New
Personnel Required, " 4
.
1^ "Self -Regulation is an Art," editorial. Variety,
July 26, 1939, 31.
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for some time. The President's choice was James Lawrence
Fly, the 41-year old general solicitor of the Tennessee
valley Authority. 14 The nomination appears to have caught
the industry's Washington watchers very much by surprise.
When variety handicapped the field in June as rumors of
McNinch'e departure grew louder, the well-connected trade
paper predicted that Frederick Thompson, named to the
Commission in April to succeed Eugene Sykes, would be
elevated to the chair. 15 Thompson, a newspaper publisher
who had questioned the wisdom of awarding additional
broadcast licenses to newspapers, seemed a logical choice
since the newspaper ownership question was soon to face the
Commission. T.A.M. Craven's standing with the White House
had collapsed because of his public disagreements with
McNinch, but the former FCC chief engineer, the panel's
acknowledged technical expert, enjoyed considerable support
in Congress. Another name making the rounds, Variety
reported, was that of eminent New Deal insider Thomas G.
Corcoran.
Fly, while he appeared to possess neither Thompson's
standing. Craven's technical expertise nor Corcoran'
s
political connections, was, the New York Times reported,
"rated one of the most accomplished of the Administration's
14 "Fly Named to FCC as M'Ninch Quits," New York
Times, July 28, 1939, 2/ "McNinch Quits FCC," 39.
15 "New Rumor of McNinch Retirement Seems Supported;
Thompson Seen As Possible Successor in Chair," 32.
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younger men. "i^ Born and raised in a small town near
Dallas, Fly had displayed signs of Texas populism si
joining the Justice Department's antitrust division in
1929.17 He helped successfully prosecute the Sugar
Institute for antitrust violations then jumped to the TVA
in 1934. The next year, when the Public Utilities Holding
Company Act was under attack from the power industry. Fly
was among a cadre of top lawyers from various government
agencies assembled by Corcoran and Benjamin V. Cohen to
defend the law in the courts. 18 in 1937, as the TVA's
counsel. Fly squared off in the US District Court in
Chattanooga against Wendell Willkie of the Commonwealth and
Southern Corporation in an epic legal battle over who would
control hydropower distribution in the Tennessee Valley, i^
"He is the most dangerous man in the United States - to
have on the other side," Willkie commented as the trial
ended with a TVA victory. 20 Fly's defense of the authority
16 M Fly Named to FCC as M'Ninch Quits," 2.
17 Henry F. Pringle, "The Controversial Mr. Fly,"
Saturday Evening- Poet, July 22, 1944, 9.
18 Joseph P. Lash, Dealers and Dreamers (New York:
Doubleday, 1988), 286-7. Lash notes that several of the
attorneys present, including future Supreme Court justice
Robert H. Jackson, later received major appointments and
suggests their work on the utility holding company affair
played an important role in advancing their careers.
15 Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The Age of Roosevelt
:
The Politics of Upheaval (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1960),
367-76
.
20 Pringle, "The Controversial Mr. Fly," 40.
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also impressed Senator George Norris, the progressive
Nebraska Republican and architect of the TVA, and Corcoran,
who had first encountered Fly when both were at Harvard Law
School .21
While he was not selected to chair the FCC, Corcoran
certainly played an important role in filling the vacancy.
A protege of Supreme Court Justice Felix Frankfurter,
Corcoran had arrived in Washington fresh from Harvard Law
in 1926 to clerk for Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes. While
Frankfurter remained at Harvard, Corcoran, who appreciated
more than most the value of the men and women who had their
hands on the levers of bureaucratic power, returned to
Washington after Roosevelt's victory and helped fill the
government with men and women who shared his vision of
activist government. Everyone in Washington knew "Tommy the
Cork" was a man who could get things done and who kept an
eye out for promising talent. "The spectacle of a good man
jobless or a good job manless drives him to a frenzy,"
observed the authors of a leading Washington column. 22
Larry Fly certainly qualified as promising talent and, by
1939 after five years with the TVA, he was looking to move
up the governmental ladder.
Fly brought an entirely new philosophy and style of
leadership to the FCC. Harry Plotkin, a long-time FCC legal
21 Pringle, "The Controversial Mr. Fly," 41.
22 Joseph Alsop and Robert Kintner quoted in
Schlesinger, The Politice of Upheaval, 221.
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counsel who began his tenure at the Commission during Flys
administration, argued that the history of the FCC as a
significant regulatory body begins with Fly:
The New Deal came to radio because of [him]
. The
whole concept of public responsibility of
broadcast licensees got a strong impetus from
Fly, and everything the Commission ultimately didin the area stems from the fact that he put his
shoulder behind the wheel. 23
Fly had "a deep sense of the public service," wrote Robert
Leigh, the director of the FCC ' s wartime Foreign Broadcast
Intelligence Service. "Even those who questioned his
objectives acknowledged his devotion to the public interest
as he conceived it. "24 under Fly, the public interest
standard, enshrined in broadcast law since 1927 and warmly
embraced by the broadcasting industry ever since, would
become more significant than ever before.
Fly would soon prove he had no patience for the
internal bickering that had hamstrung both the FCC and the
old Radio Commission which preceded it. Upon taking office,
he went out of his way to signal that a new era of
cooperation was about to begin. Fly acknowledged the
difficult tasks ahead but promised to consult with fellow
commissioners and the FCC staff before proposing any
23 Harry Plotkin, interview by Sally Fly McConnell,
n.d., 24, 26, in the James Lawrence Fly project in the Oral
History Collection of Columbia University, New York
24 Robert D. Leigh, "Politicians vs. Bureaucrats,"
Harper ' B Magazine
,
January 1945, 98.
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radical changes in the law or the Commission's internal
structure, "i didn't run for this job on a dogmatic
platform," Fly confessed at his first press conference,
"i
don't assume to know the answer to basic issues." He would
thoroughly study the issues, making sure he "heard both
sides, and there has been a complete exchange of views,"
before moving ahead. 25
The new chairman's apparent commitment to prudent
reform was greeted with a sigh of relief by the embattled
radio industry. Fly's promise to go slow echoed Anning
Prall's initial remarks and, X^ariety reported, was
"accepted as evidence that considerable time will pass
before the Commish takes up several outstanding matters
which have been on the hook for varying periods" including
the "most significant issue on the slate," the chain
monopoly inquiry.
The industry's dreams of a respite from federal
intervention were soon shattered. Fly was no Prall, content
to raise his eyebrow. Events would soon overtake any
leisurely transition and force both the new chairman and
the radio industry to launch a series of important
initiatives. Fly quickly began to exercise his power and
25 Quoted in "J.L. Fly, New FCC Topper, to Hold Up
Decisions on Major Disputes," Variety, September 13, 1939,
31.
26 "J.L. Fly, New FCC Topper, to Hold Up Decisions on
Major Disputes," 31.
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would soon become "a favorite industry bogeyman. "27 After
years of drift, a strong hand on the FCC rudder, long hoped
for in theory, turned out in practice to be something less
than the answer to the industry's prayers,
-since Mr. Fly's
accession to power last September," Colliers editorially
fumed in the spring of 1940, "the FCC has raised itself
from a mere monumental public nuisance to the status, in
our estimation, of Public Enemy No. l."28
Fly remained true in a fashion to his pledge to
solicit "a complete exchange of views." Those who
interpreted such words as an invitation to inaction,
however, were surprised to discover that Fly actually
intended to reach decisions and take action. His was an
incisive mind, Leigh wrote. "I watched him at weekly
meetings of the Commission, cutting through verbiage and
vagueness to the main point or unerringly putting the
single instance in its proper place in a general regulatory
framework. "29 other, less admiring, colleagues interpreted
Fly's demeanor differently. Fly has "a vivid personality
and a strong will," perpetual dissenter T.A.M. Craven
conceded, but "many things do occur that the other
commissioners know nothing about. Sometimes we are faced
27 Erik Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting- in the
United States, vol. 2, The Golden Web (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), 173.
28 "Who is Public Enemy No. 1?" Colliers
,
May 25,
1940, 78.
29 Leigh, "Politicians vs. Bureaucrats," 98
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with a fai, aaron:pU.~ Commissioner Ray Wakefield suggested
that even chairman's strongest supporters "will tell you
that at times Fly is a little impatient." Fly joked about
this himself, Wakefield said, comparing himself to the
frontier judge "who never liked to hear both sides of the
question because it confused him. "^o
While Fly had no established record regarding radio
issues, his connection with the Tennessee Valley Authority,
the most aggressive of the New Deal's social experiments,
gave many in the industry pause. He was a known opponent of
monopoly, and the fight against Commonwealth and Southern
over hydroelectric power distribution indicated he might
look favorably on direct competition between the public and
private sectors. Many in the industry remembered that
during the discussion over educational broadcasting
mandated by the Communications Act, the TVA's spokesman
called for the government to "own and operate a national
system of radio stations, giving full-time coverage over
the entire country." The government network would be
administered by a committee of representatives from
"nonprofit national educational and cultural
agencies .. .designated by the President." The government
stations would not replace existing commercial operations
but would share the broadcast band. However, by taking
space within the already crowded spectrum, commercial
30 Quoted in Pringle, "The Controversial Mr. Fly," 9
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broadcaeters quickly noted, the new stations would
effectively limit the development of new commercial
stations. 31 The TVA's plan for a state-run radio service
had never been implemented, of course, but five years in
such an environment hardly endorsed Fly to the wary
industry.
The perception that Fly was a member of Corcoran 's
bureaucratic legion also gave critics of the FCC pause.
Corcoran and his frequent collaborator Benjamin Cohen had
come to symbolize to critics of the New Deal the Roosevelt
administration's continuing attempts to centralize power in
Washington. As calls for FCC reorganization reached another
of their periodic crescendos in the spring of 1939,
Republican Congressman Richard Wigglesworth of
Massachusetts condemned proposed legislation to create a
smaller and more powerful FCC as a "Corcoran-Cohen" plan to
create "a dictator of radio and communications" who would
represent "a sinister threat to the country itself" and
endanger "freedom of religious beliefs, freedom of speech
and freedom of press. "^2
31 TVA director of personnel Floyd W. Reeves,
testimony before the FCC, October 19, 1934, quoted in
Education by J^adio 4 (October 25, 1934) , tearsheet in
Raymond Clapper Papers, box 112, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
32 Radio address. Mutual network, March 1, 1939,
quoted in "McNinch Calls Craven Report 'Stump Speech'," New
York Herald Tribune, March 2, 1939, 2.
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The political climate of 1939 reseirUDled that of the
years prior to enactment the Radio Act of 1927. while there
was substantial unease across the political spectrum with
the status of broadcasting regulation, no positive
consensus had yet emerged as to an alternative. The fear
among the rank-and-file on the Hill was that an ill-
considered reform package could prove worse than the
current state of affairs, somehow disrupt the established
pattern of network broadcasting and trigger outraged
protests not simply from the industry but from hundreds of
thousands of irate listeners denied their weekly visits
with Charlie McCarthy and Jack Benny. Accordingly, inaction
was judged both the wisest and least perilous political
course. In any case, until Senators Wheeler and White
reconciled their differences over how best to reshape the
Communications Act, there was little hope of new
legislation even being considered. The broadcasting
industry, it appeared, would be operating under the current
rules for some time to come and so had little choice but to
work with the new chairman.
With critics assembled on all sides, the radio
industry relied on self -regulation to keep governmental
action at arm's length. The broadcasters' ratification of a
voluntary code of regulation had temporarily frozen the
debate over freedom of the air. Some, notably supporters of
^2 "Sundry Bills Affecting Radio Die With Congress;
Dry Answered Gurney, " Variety, August 16, 1939, 30.
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Father Charles Coughlin, called the code censorship, but
they were in the minority. By reaffirming its vow of public
service and establishing standards addressing some of the
chronic complaints of their critics, broadcasters hoped
they could enjoy at least a brief respite from the sniping.
The NAB's code compliance committee spent the summer
polishing the details of the new code in preparation to its
formal ratification in late summer and implementation in
the fall.
The industry's hopes for a honeymoon were dispelled in
September when Germany invaded Poland. The networks, their
techniques honed by the crises of the previous year,
broadcast the news of impending war in dazzling detail to a
spellbound nation of listeners who had grown accustomed to
turning on the radio whenever a new crisis loomed. One
familiar voice was largely absent from the broadcasts as
war approached. H.V. Kaltenborn was in Europe, spending the
final weeks of peace assessing the mood of continental
capitals. To fill Kaltenborn' s role as Chorus, Columbia's
Edward Klauber and Paul White summoned the journalist,
essayist and occasional radio commentator Elmer Davis from
his summer house in Connecticut to analyze the torrent of
events as war drew near.
Davis went on the air for the first time as a Columbia
employee on August 23, eight days before Germany crossed
the border into Poland. He had like millions of Americans
listened at home the year before while Kaltenboi-n
explicated the Munich crisis. Now it would be up to hi. to
be, as he put it, "the radio news analyst, interpreter,
commentator (nobody is quite sure yet just what to call us)
who from time to time takes up the latest news, tries to
explain what is true, what is probable, and what is surely
false (and why)
; who ties it together, gives it a
background, and tries to tell the listener what it
means
.
"^"^
Broadcasting the news, Davis quickly discovered, "is
newspaper work immeasurably intensified.
... Radio can get
out its extras instantly whenever there is news big enough
to justify it. The techniques of broadcast journalism
were familiar in many ways, the former newspaperman
realized, but the medium was also something new and
different.
The rapid ascent of radio news was brought home to
Davis when he noticed the youth of his co-workers.
On the morning of September 1st I looked round
the Columbia news room remembering how I had
heard of the outbreak of another world war in the
New York Times city room on August 1, 1914; and
it struck me that of all the men in the room —
with the single exception of one of the top
3** Elmer Davis, "Broadcasting the Outbreak of War,"
Harpers Magazine, November 1939, 580-1. Davis had
substituted for Kaltenborn from time to time in the past.
Reading a scripted news commentary was one thing, he wrote,
but "to fill in for him in such a crisis as this was a
little like trying to play center-field in place of Joe di
Maggio [sic] . "
35 Davis, "Broadcasting the Outbreak of War," 582.
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executives of the system who had come down
because he was an old newspaperman and couldn'tkeep away from the excitement - i was the only
one who had worn long pants in 1914. Most of mypresent colleagues, then, had not even beenborn
.
The "top executive" who was unable to "keep away from the
excitement" was, of course, Klauber. White, who was running
the show, magically summoning voices out of the air from
Berlin, Paris, London, Rome and Washington by manipulating
the dials and switches of a control board known in the
studio as "Paul White's piano," had just turned twelve when
the First World War began.
With the first volleys of the new war, the on-going
debate over radio propaganda, government censorship and the
relationship between broadcasters and their regulators
resumed and quickly escalated. The government had
nationalized the nascent wireless industry during the First
World War and, broadcasters nervously remembered, had the
legal authority to do so again. The Communications Act
explicitly authorized the president to seize or shutdown
any or all radio stations in the case of "war or a threat
of war or a state of public peril or disaster or other
national emergency, or in order to preserve the neutrality
of the United States. "^"^
Davis, "Broadcasting the Outbreak of War," 582.
Communications Act of 1934, Public Law no. 416,
June 19, 1934, 73d Cong., title VI, sec. 606(c).
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Recalling what had happened three decades before,
broadcasters were prepared for quick government action.
Rumors flew that the government was preparing formal
wartime censorship policies. Fly addressed the reports with
carefully chosen words intended to both clarify and
instruct. Such talk, he insisted, was both "exaggerated and
premature....! haven't proposed any regulations, have no
particular rule in mind, nor am I sure we shall issue any. "
The chairman then proceeded to send several implicit but
obvious signals to the industry. The sources of all war
reports, he said, must be clearly identified, and, should
any regulations be drafted sometime in the future, Fly
promised they would preserve true freedom of radio by
curbing what he called misuse of the air.^^
Fly's comments, his first substantive public statement
as FCC chairman, revealed the new administrator's ability
to express policy while denying he was doing anything of
the sort. Fly also seemed to be following in the "raised
eyebrow" tradition of his predecessors, hoping that by
dropping weighty hints he could steer the industry in the
proper direction. Would that hoary technique be enough in
time of war?
Emotions were of course running high, and events were
tipping public opinion ever more strongly against the Nazis
if not in favor of direct military intervention. Tales of
38 "Propaganda Curb is Urged for Radio, " New York
Times, September 6, 1939, 14.
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German atrocities had helped swing public opinion behind
the British during the First World War. Given radio's
proven ability to directly engage its listeners with events
half a world away, similar stories of death and destruction
this time would likely have even greater and certainly more
immediate impact. Broadcasters anguished that the very
nature of their medium, the directness and immediacy with
which it conveyed emotionally-charged information, made
them subject to special criticism, citing public revulsion
over the sinking of the steamer Athena by a German
submarine September 3, network executives. Variety
reported, feared "whatever resolves their organizations may
have made to maintain neutrality in the talks of their
domestic commentators
... were seriously undermined."
As the networks see it, they have never been
faced with a more ticklish dilemma. With opinion
as it is in this country, the imposition of
strict neutrality over its facilities would not
only be going against the public grain, but
subject the networks to severe backfire, with the
word censorship proving but a mild term in the
opprobrium. The networks on the other hand feel
that it is their duty to stem the spread of mob
hatred and prevent being used to cement public
opinion toward America's entry into the European
conf 1 ict . ^5
The industry's uncertainty on how to cover the war was
already being reflected on the air. The day before the
Germans moved against Poland, NBC Blue's St. Louis
39 "Neutrality Impossible?" Variety, September 6,
1939, 24.
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affiliate cut network commentator Dorothy Thompson off in
mid-broadcast as she accused Hitler of ignoring the dangers
of a new world war. The station's manager denied he was in
any way censoring Thompson. The commentator, he explained,
"was expressing some personal opinions," and it "does not
seem, in view of the present tension in international
affairs, that anything but reporter ial matter would be in
the public interest" the station was licensed to serve. 40
The NAB Code approved by the broadcasters in the
summer of 1939 had demanded impartial objectivity from
licensees and those who spoke on the air. It was a
peacetime document aimed at answering a variety of
lingering complaints against the industry, with Europe
engulfed in war, news and public affairs broadcasting had
moved to the top of the agenda, and complaints about
children's programs and advertising policy took a distant
second place. Critics of broadcast propaganda raised their
voices, fearing that partisan words from foreign capitals
or domestic rabble-rousers such as the increasingly
inflammatory Father Coughlin would cloud the minds of the
anxious audience. Among the critics was Elliott Roosevelt,
the president's son who operated a chain of radio stations
in Texas. He called on NAB president Neville Miller to meet
40 Robert Convey of KWK, quoted in "Dorothy Thompson
Cut Off," Variety, September 6, 1939, 24.
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with Fly "to confer" about wartime propaganda which he said
was already proliferating on the air.^i
A more significant warning emerged from White House
press secretary Stephen Early. 42 He had downplayed
administration plans to more strictly regulate radio and
praised the broadcasters for "that sense of public
responsibility your codification efforts imply" when he
addressed the NAB convention in July. 43 Meeting with
reporters the Wednesday after the fighting began, Early
assured them that the government had counter-espionage and
ant i-propaganda plans in place and said he was certain the
President did not want to formally establish government
censorship of war news as long as the United States
remained a non-belligerent. Radio, however, presented a
unique problem, Early noted, because domestic transmitters
reached beyond our borders. Accordingly, all short-wave
stations, both commercial and amateur, must be especially
cautious and the government would monitor their broadcasts
closely
.
In regard to the domestic radio industry in general.
Early sent an obvious and chilling message to broadcasters.
41 M Propaganda Curb is Urged for Radio, " 14
42 "The War, " NAB [National Association of
Broadcasters] Reports 7 (September 8, 1939), 3699-3701
contains a detailed account of Early's remarks from the
industry's perspective.
43 "Early's Speech," NAB Reports 7 (July 15, 1939),
3590-2
.
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He reminded reporters that the Communications Act allowed
the government to commandeer transmitters in war time. He
hoped, however, that would not become necessary. Self-
censorship
,
he recalled, had proven sufficient during the
First World War when newspapers provided the news.
NAB Reports, the trade association's weekly newsletter
for station executives across the country, heard the White
House message loud and clear.
Then Mr. Early went on to say that there was
a general feeling throughout the government that
radio, because of its youth, was coming into a
period in history which is new to it.
He added that if radio proved itself to be a
"good child" and was well-mannered and showed
that it had been well reared, it would be left to
move along on its own. On the other hand, if
radio proved itself to be a "bad child, " the
disposition would be to teach it some manners -
to correct it so that it would behave itself, the
secretary explained
.
The imagery - and the warning - was clear. Radio must
control itself or risk punishment. The government, a stern
but concerned parent, would discipline the industry if it
failed to act its age.
As the broadcasting industry looked for direction,
Columbia, once again, took the lead. With its finely honed
mastery of corporate public relations, Columbia had
traditionally been the network to first respond to attacks
on the industry with skillfully publicized proclamations of
" The War , " 3 7 0 0.
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good intentions which would both reassure radio's critics
and forestall government intervention. ^5 On September 5,
CBS executive vice president Edward Klauber distributed a
memorandum "to formalize and amplify- the network's
policies on news coverage. 46 if, as Senator Clarence C.
Dill insisted, the "public interest" clause of the Radio
Act of 1927 was the Magna Carta of broadcast regulation,
Klauber 's memorandum would prove to be the founding
philosophical document of modern radio and television
journalism.
Columbia, the self
-proclaimed news network, had during
its dozen years of operation created a distinctive style.
William Paley, unable to compete for popular entertainers
with NBC's financial juggernaut, had allowed Klauber and
White to create a news and public affairs department which
had won the network critical praise and popular fame. Paley
himself had no journalistic experience and no knowledge of
how such an organization should be built. His abject
45 Merrill Denison, "Editorial Policies of
Broadcasting Companies, " Public Opinion Quarterly 1,
January 1937, 64-82.
46 [Edward Klauber], "CBS European War Coverage: A
Memorandum Governing General Operations for the Information
of the Organization," September 5, 1939. The complete text
of the memorandum is printed in Statement of Columbia
Broadcast ingr System, Inc., with respect to Chain
Broadcasting Regulations and the Petition of the Mutual
Broadcasting System, Inc., for Amendment Thereof, 77-83,
submitted to the FCC in 1941 in response to the
Commission's report on chain broadcasting. FCC docket no.
506 0, record group 173, box 1426, National Archives and
Records Administration, Suitland, Maryland.
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surrender to the newspaper interests at the Biltmore five
years before demonstrated his limited grasp of how news was
gathered. He was seeking prestige and profits for his
organization and simply saw radio news as a means to those
ends. Of course, neither Klauber nor White really knew what
made a radio news department either since nothing of the
sort had ever existed before. Radio through most of its
existence had been a witness to events, a forum for
opinions and an occasional headline service relying on the
reporting of others. Critical reporting, which required
constant editorial decisions on which facts and
observations to air and which to discard and which could
not be monitored by management, was something radio had not
emphasized and indeed had often discouraged. Naturally, as
they created a radio news organization, they drew upon the
models they knew best. Klauber of the New York Timee and
White of the United Press built on the foundation most
familiar to them: the factual style of objective reporting
which had emerged a half -century before in the wake of the
triumph of liberalism.
While Klauber and White's prejudices predisposed them
toward a certain journalistic style, Paley sought to expand
and protect the empire he had built over the past dozen
years by seeking accommodation with those who threatened
his network. Among the most potentially threatening were
the regulators who governed the air. By skillfully
cultivating political contacts and changing course to adapt
to the ebb and flow of public opinion, Paley sought to keep
Columbia squarely in the center of the mainstream of
opinion and safely away from any shoals which could
jeopardize his network. As long as Columbia prospered,
Paley had been quite willing to adjust network policies on
advertising, children's programs, the sale of time to
religious organizations and educational programming to fit
what he perceived to be the consensus view, in every case,
Columbia pledged its commitment to the public interest and
argued that industry self
-regulation, not rules imposed by
government, was the means toward that goal.
The Columbia memorandum on war coverage revealed both
Klauber and White's theories of journalism and Paley'
s
pattern of political accommodation. The network news
department's "plan of operation," Klauber wrote,
"represents no basic change in the policy the company has
maintained in the past."
This policy has been to deal, honestly,
accurately and fairly with news and with public
discussion. ... Columbia, as an organization, has
no editorial opinions about the war. Those,
therefore, who are its voice in presenting or
analyzing the news must not express their own
feel ings .
Columbia's news broadcasts, Klauber continued, must be
"fair and factual" in both content and tone. Announcers
"must refrain from microphone manner designed to cast
doubt, suspicion, sarcasm, ridicule or anything of that
47 II CBS European War Coverage, " 77
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sort... The rule, Klauber assarted, applied to news readers,
announcers introducing speakers and, significantly, news
analysts
.
What news analysts are entitled to do and
should do is to elucidate and illuminate the news
out of common knowledge or special knowledge
possessed by them or made available to them by
this organization through its news sources. They
should point out the facts on both sides, show
contradictions with the known record, and so on.
They should bear in mind that in a democracy it
is important that people not only should know but
should understand, and their function is to help
the listener to understand, to weigh and to
judge, but not to do the judging for him.^s
"It was," wrote veteran CBS newsman and historian of
broadcast journalism Edward Bliss a half-century later, "a
landmark statement.""*^
Klauber 's memorandum summarized the practices the
network and the industry had constructed over the past
several years. It explicitly recalled in both substance and
tone Murrow's 1938 broadcast from London as well as his
defense of Columbia's news policies before the FCC ' s chain
broadcasting inquiry. The memorandum also paraphrased
"CBS European War Coverage," 78.
Edward Bliss, Jr., Now the News: The Story of
Broadcast Journaliem (New York: Columbia University Press,
1991), 107. Fred Friendly, Murrow's producer and alter ego
throughout the 1950s and president of CBS News in 1965-6,
observed while recalling the memorandum "journalists have
always despaired of defining the difference between
reporting and interpretation too precisely, though Ed
Klauber came close." Fred W. Friendly, Due To CircuniBtancee
Beyond Our Control... (New York: Vintage, 1967, 1968), 200.
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Paley'B frequent protestations of impartiality as he
lobbied for industry self
-regulation. The Klauber
memorandum's main points would be incorporated in the NAB
Code and would become the industry's standard.
Additionally, it set the scene for the continuing quarrels
over where the line should be drawn between elucidation and
illumination based on special knowledge on the one hand and
personal opinion on the other.
On a more basic level, Klauber 's memorandum expressed
much more than Columbia's practices. It was a summary of
the philosophy of objective journalism that had been
steadily evolving for a hundred years. Influenced by Carr
Van Anda's rigorous demand for the facts while reporting
for the New York Times, it is not surprising that Klauber
brought that tradition with him to CBS. The policy also
grew naturally from William Paley's tendency to avoid
controversy by embracing the opinions of those who
controlled the levers of government regulation and by
extension the power to grant or deny broadcast licenses.
The objective style, relying on verifiable facts and
balanced statements from recognized authorities, privileged
those in power and marginalized oppositional voices.
On September 7, Klauber and representatives of NBC,
Mutual and the National Association of Broadcasters invited
Fly to New York to hear how the industry planned to cover
the European war. The following Monday, September 11, the
network representatives met with an FCC subcommittee
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composed of Chairman Fly and CommiBsioners Thad Brown and
T.A.M. Craven in Washington to receive the regulators'
blessing for what the broadcasters chose to call a
"voluntary arrangement" on war coverage, in describing the
session, all involved emphasized the voluntary nature of
the plan. Fly called the meeting "an exchange of ideas,"
while the broadcasters insisted they were only presenting
the arrangement to the FCC "as a matter of courtesy" and
were not seeking government approval. Klauber was on hand
to represent Columbia. He was joined by his counterpart at
NBC, executive vice president Niles Trammell. Speaking for
Mutual were chairman of the board Alfred J. McCosker and
William Dolph, the manager of Mutual
• s station in
Washington. NAB president Neville Miller was also present
and was chosen to announce the latest triumph of self-
regulat ion. ^°
The "Memorandum of European War Coverage" pledged the
radio industry to both impartiality and discretion,
Broadcasters, using the same analogy Early had invoked the
week before, proclaimed that radio had come of age and
could be counted upon to "make every effort to be
temperate, responsible, and mature" in broadcasting war
news. The networks promised to "try to distinguish between
5° "Network's Adopt Arrangement for War Broadcasts,"
NAB Reports 7 (September 15, 1939), 3717; "Radio Nets Agree
on War Coverage," New York Times, September 12, 1939, 1.
The complete text of the memorandum was published
in NAB Reports 1 (September 15, 1939), 3717-8.
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fact, official statement, news obtained from responsible
official or unofficial sources, rumor, and matter taken
from or contained in the foreign press or other
publications, so that, by reporting and identifying these
sources, we can help the radio audience as much as possible
to evaluate the news brought to it." Radio's primary duty
during this time of crisis, the memorandum continued, was
as always to serve the public interest, to insure "that the
American audience shall be as completely and fairly
informed as possible."
The war coverage compact also contained an explicit
admission that the American system of broadcasting itself
was under attack and acknowledged that radio had reached a
critical juncture.
Broadcasters recognize that, if they do not
handle the war with complete responsibility
toward the American people, and if they deviate
from these principles, they run the risk of
involving all other broadcasters in the
consequences of their acts. The operation of
these principles should include at all times a
strong responsibility toward the industry as a
whole
.
Radio, its leaders admitted, had no choice but to regulate
itself, and given the chance could devise policies which
would benefit both the industry and the public at large.
52 "Networks Adopt Arrangement for War Broadcasts,"
3717. Broadcasters, at the urging of the government's
wartime Office of Censorship, would adopt several voluntary
programming policies to address wartime security concerns.
Musical request and "man-on- the - street " interview programs
were discontinued for fear secret agents would use song
titles or seemingly random comments as coded messages.
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Fly isBued a Gtatement following the meeting saying
"the radio industry, taken by and large, had rendered an
important public service in broadcasting news and comment
on war conditions" and voiced confidence "that all parties
will continue to give consideration to the most effective
means of assuring that broadcast operation in this period
of stress will promote the public interest. "53 while Fly's
measured remarks could not be considered a blanket
endorsement of self
-regulation, Variety reported,
"conferees reported a general understanding that no
official interpretation of radio's obligation will be
attempted. The adoption of policies and practices will be
left to the discretion of 1 icensees . " ^4
Fly clearly sought to avoid having to impose formal
government censorship on radio, a move which would
obviously trigger a firestorm of criticism. Still, he was
not ready to offer broadcasters a totally free hand. As if
to make that point, the FCC the day of its meeting with the
industry leadership, fired a shot across the broadcasters'
bow by cracking down on a station which the Commission
charged had gone too far. Caught up in war coverage fever,
Weather forecasts were sharply curtailed, and sportscasters
were warned not mention that baseball games had been rained
out
.
Quoted in "Networks Adopt Arrangement for War
Broadcasts," 3 718.
5"^ "Self -Regulation on War," Variety, September 13,
1939, 21.
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aWMCA in New York, a feisty independent station not
affiliated with any of the major networks and bereft of
European staff of its own, tuned its short-wave receive
toward Europe and allegedly intercepted, decoded and
rebroadcast messages transmitted by the British and German
governments to overseas forces. As the industry
representatives gathered in Washington, the FCC announced
the station was in apparent violation of provisions of the
Communications Act banning unauthorized retransmission of
radio signals. "During the period of tense international
relations," the Commission stated, "the public, interest,
convenience and necessity required strict observance by
licensees of radiobroadcast stations in this country of all
provisions of international undertakings." WMCA, therefore,
was ordered to show cause why its license should not be
revoked. The message was received loud and clear by the
industry. The FCC ' s action, Variety noted, was the "first
instance of Federal stick waving at broadcasters as a
result of European war coverage. "^^
Two days after the meeting in Washington, the NAB ' s
board of directors gathered in Chicago to prepare for a
special convention of the trade organization September 15.
Federal Communications Commission, In re
Knickerbocker Broadcasting Company, Inc., September 12,
1939. Section 605 of the Communications Act forbids any
licensee intercepting and divulging the contents of a radio
message without authorization from the original sender.
56 "FCC Orders WMCA to Defend License; Hinges on
Decodings, " Variety, September 13, 1939, 21.
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The board heartily endorsed the network's arrangement. The
NAB rank-and-file did the same. The convention also passed
a resolution pledging the NAB membership's "full co-
operation, through self-regulation, to the support" of the
government's policy of "strict neutrality" regarding the
war in Europe . ^7 As the convention ended, the NAB board
announced that the self
-regulatory Code approved in
Atlantic City in July would officially take effect on
October 1.58
"The Code," Neville Miller proclaimed, "represents
almost a year's constant deliberation of every conceivable
problem affecting the operation of radio in both the social
and economic life of our nation." It also represented, the
NAB president frankly stated, proof that the American
system of broadcasting could combine public interest and
private profit:
Adherence to the Code means to the individual
radio station operator a better long-pull
investment and to the American home gives another
reason for inviting the NAB station as a
preferred guest in its living room. I am
convinced that in the Code we find an admixture
of the best interests of the radio industry and
the public interest of the American people. The
two are inseparable. This is the essence of self-
regulation as we know it in our American
"Convention September 15, " NAB Reports 7 (September
8, 1939), 3699/ "Neutrality," NAB Reports 7 (September 15,
1939) , 3729
.
^® Neville Miller, "The Code in Effect October 1 (A
Statement by Neville Miller)," NAB Reports 7 (September 29,
1939) , 3741.
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democracy. And this is the purpose of the NABCode
.
^5
The Code, Miller announced, would be interpreted and
administered by an eleven-member committee
"representative
of both the industry and of the country" to be chaired by
Peoria, Illinois station owner Edgar Bill, while Bill gave
the panel a reassuringly Midwestern image and also sent the
message to monopoly watchers that individual stations
across the country rather than the New York-based networks
held control of the air, the best known names on the panel
were those of the three network representative: Klauber of
CBS, Trammell of NBC and Theodore Streibert of Mutual.
Edward Kirby, the NAB ' s deft publicist, would serve as the
committee's secretary.
Taken as a whole, Columbia's statement of war coverage
policies, the networks' arrangement on war news and the
sections of the NAB Code covering news and controversial
public affairs represent a consensus on broadcast
journalism practices and the regulatory relationship
between broadcasters and the state which would remain
intact for forty years. By emphasizing freedom, fairness,
balance and the people's ability to make up their own minds
while attacking censorship, propaganda and the pernicious
influence of monopolists and grasping bureaucrats, the
broadcasters captured the moral high ground.
59 "The Code in Effect October 1," 3741-2.
60 "The Code in Effect October 1," 3741-2.
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Chairman Fly gave the Code a glowing review. "The
adoption of the Code and its self - imposition by the
broadcasters is," he said, "an example of democracy at
work." The radio industry which used the public's air, the
chairman said, must operate in the public interest and it
was ultimately the Commission's duty to make sure private
broadcasters lived up to their public duty. The system. Fly
said, had generally proven worthy because "in general the
best public service is the best business. To succeed the
listeners must be attracted and held. Thus, the private
benefit emerges from an effective public service." Although
the Commission must ultimately decide whether or not a
broadcaster operated in the public interest, convenience
and necessity, "there is no reason why self
-regulation may
not be in the public interest and may not to a certain
extent supplement the work of the Government
Fly's opinion was largely shared by newspaper
editorial writers across the country. By emphasizing both
its right to free speech and its responsibility to exercise
that right fairly, the radio industry was falling in line
with what was becoming a prevailing opinion shared by the
mainstream press. The NAB collected dozens of laudatory
^1 James Lawrence Fly, "Some Comments on Current Radio
Problems," radio address, CBS Network, October 26, 1939.
Printed text in radio file, Raymond Clapper Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
^2 The ultimate expression of that opinion was the
work of the Hutchins Commission, a blue ribbon panel headed
by University of Chicago president Robert Hutchins which
was created at the urging of Tinie'B Henry Luce in 1942 to
editorials from across the country and distributed texts to
member stations." Radio couid be responsible and fair and
the American people, given the facts, could distinguish
truth from propaganda.
That the people could logically determine the rational
truth became ironically an article of faith. Ignoring the
demonstrated power of political propaganda on the air.
President Roosevelt optimistically proclaimed that "radio
listeners have learned to discriminate over the air between
the honest advocate who relies on truth and logic and the
more dramatic speaker who is clever in appealing to the
passions and prejudices of his listeners."
Roosevelt's own use of radio undermined his words. The
fireside chats which helped reassure the nation in the
early years of the New Deal and build support for the
administration's reforms succeeded not just because they
were logical expositions of government policy initiatives.
Roosevelt, of course, understood this, but he chose now to
flatter those who were tuned in — the listeners he had so
address the role of the media in the postwar world. The
Commission concluded that "freedom of the press for the
coming period can only continue as an accountable freedom.
Its moral right will be conditioned on its acceptance of
this accountability. Its legal right will stand unaltered
as its moral duty is performed." For the panel's views, see
the Commission on Freedom of the Press, A Free and
Reeponeible Preee (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1947), quotation at 19.
"Editorial Comment Concerning the NAB Code" and
"Additional Editorial Comment Concerning the NAB Code,
"
supplements to NAB Reports 7, October 2 0 and November 3,
1939 .
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often intimately addressed over the air as "my friends" -
by complimenting their ability to discern the truth, "it is
a fact increasingly manifest," he said, "that presentation
of real news has sharpened the minds and the judgment of
men and women everywhere in these days of real public
discussion
- and we Americans begin to know the difference
between the truth on the one side and the falsehood on the
other, no matter how often the falsehood is iterated and
reiterated.
"
"Real news," Roosevelt explained, was "objective
reporting.
.. .an unbiased and factual chronicle of
developments. "64 The president's modern, limiting
definition of news ran counter to the established
traditions of radio journalism which had for so long
rejected reporting and its inherent need to exercise
editorial judgment in favor of live coverage of public
events, complete broadcasts of studio talks or analysis and
commentary which capitalized on the medium's ability to
build an emotional relationship between the broadcaster and
the audience. As the 1930s drew to a close, this tradition
would be set aside in favor of the factual, balanced style
of reporting which came to be identified as objectivity. In
the process, the inherent biases of reporting, interpreting
and editing the news would be, if not forgotten,
conveniently ignored.
Quoted in NAB Reports 7 (November 3, 1939), 3809
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A few critics continued to speak out against what they
interpreted as the broadcasters' willingness to surrender
their right to free speech. United States News editor David
Lawrence insisted during a CBS broadcast that station
owners had "surrendered their individual freedom" by
establishing the Code. The idea "that radio itself is
somehow affected with a 'public interest' like a public
utility" was, Lawrence warned, "a dangerous interpretation"
promoted by "various chairmen of the Federal Communications
Commission possibly because some day they wish to justify
the exercise of wider power." Self
-regulation, Lawrence
contended, was nothing more than the industry's
capitulation to government control of speech.
Most broadcast journalists endorsed their industry's
new commitment to what Roosevelt had so adeptly identified
as "real news." The Klauber memorandum proposed "a
thoroughly sound policy," Elmer Davis wrote that fall,
"from the point of view of the news analyst... as well as
from that of his employer. "^^ Davis, another veteran of the
New York Times, believed passionately that in a democracy
the people, given the facts, could be trusted to come to
the correct conclusion
.
^"^ Davis was also convinced that the
65 "Freedom fOX the Thought We Hate, " iradio add.i"ess,
CBS network, October 29, 1939, quoted in NAB ReportG 7
(November 3, 1939), 3810.
Davis, "Broadcasting the Outbreak of War," 588.
^"^ Davis was such a favorite at the Times, he was
chosen to write an authorized history of the newspaper . See
nature of the medium made shrill editorializing and
invective ultimately counter-productive, while newspapers
could survive and prosper should their readers flip past
the editorial page, a more disastrous fate, Davis believed,
awaited any broadcaster who followed such a course, "if i
denounce Hitler once I might do it so forcibly as to
impress some of my hearers," Davis explained, "but if i
denounce him again the next night, and every night
thereafter, the customers will say 'We have heard that
already and turn the dial to something else."^^
Davis' defense of fairness and objectivity betrays a
selective blindness to the implications of his words.
Davis' practical interpretation of Klauber's standards show
how objectivity had by the end of the 193 0s become a style,
a journalist's tool rather than a philosophy. The idea that
it was entirely fitting and proper for journalism to
achieve a political end - whether the immediate goal was
discrediting the New Deal or Adolph Hitler is immaterial -
went unchallenged. Objectivity, which had become in the
understanding of working journalists a word to describe a
logical argument constructed from observed facts and data
Elmer Davis, History of the New York Timee 1851-1921 (New
York: New York Times, 1921)
.
Davis, "Broadcasting the Outbreak of War," 588.
Davis often referred in print to his listeners as "the
customers," a construction reflecting both the down-to-
earth Hoosier sensibility he cultivated and the realities
of broadcasting.
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attributed to reputable sources, was simply a more
efficient method of persuasion than an appeal to emoti
Kaltenborn, devoted as always to parading hi
erudition and opinions, refused to refrain from openly
airing his views. Rather than a reporter, he saw himself as
one with the noble traditions of crusading editorialists
and stump- speaking advocates. Kaltenborn believed that he
had established himself as an authority whose opinions of
the latest developments were worthy contributions to the
public discourse. When he returned from Europe to reclaim
his commentator's seat from Davis, he filled the air with
the same "fervor of commentation" which marked his work
during the Munich crisis. The opinionated analysis which
won praise in 1938, however, was received differently in
1939. The objective reportorial style best and most
influent ially demonstrated by Edward R. Murrow would become
the standard for the future.
On September 1, listeners tuned to Columbia's war
coverage heard a transoceanic confrontation between the old
style and the new. As German troops pushed into Poland, the
English government appeared paralyzed by indecision. Would
the Chamberlain government go to the aid of the Poles? Or
would the world see a reprise of the Munich capitulation
that ceded Czechoslovakia to the Germans? Kaltenborn,
monitoring reports in New York, believed that England would
once again fail to act, and he cited as evidence a Murrow
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dispatch from London. Murrow, furious, responded on the air
during his next broadcast.
"I should like to recapitulate a few things said from
here on an earlier broadcast," Murrow began.
First, that the British ultimatum without a time
limit has been handed to von Ribbentrop [the
German foreign minister] Second, that Poland
has been hammered by the German military machine
for nearly twenty- four hours .... Third, it has
been expected in certain quarters that the Prime
Minister would speak to the nation by radio
tonight. He has not done so.
I also said that while delay yesterday and
the day before might have been advantageous to
the so-called peace front, delay today can hardly
be helpful to the Poles and was not calculated to
improve their morale.
Murrow s opening was in itself not unusual. As reports
from Europe chased one another through the air, it was
standard practice to preface a broadcast with a summary of
what had been reported previously. What Murrow said next,
however, was not standard practice. It was a direct slap at
Kaltenborn personally and openly opinionated radio
commentary in general
.
I reported those things. At the end of that
broadcast you were told that my remarks might
have created the impression that appeasement was
in the air. I have had my say concerning
appeasement
. I reported that I have seen no
evidence of it for some time. I have also given
you such facts as are available in London
tonight. I have an old-fashioned belief that
A.M. Sperber, Murrow: Hie Life and Times (New York
Freundlich, 1986), 138.
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Americans like to make up their own minds on thebasis of all available information. The
conclusions you draw are your own affair, i have
no desire to influence them and shall leave such
efforts to those who have more confidence in
their own judgment than I have in mind.^o
As Murrow spoke, Kaltenborn and Robert Trout listened in
Columbia's New York studio. Trout later remembered how he
watched Kaltenborn
-s face redden in anger,
Murrow, as usual, was reading from a prepared script.
His words were as always carefully chosen. ^2 He had not, he
told his listeners, relied on his own uncertain "judgment"
to convey to the audience what was happening in London.
Instead, he had "reported" the "facts" and "evidence" which
were "available in London tonight." It was not his job to
shape opinion. That was, as it should be, the American
audience's "own affair." Kaltenborn might be so sure of
himself that he could foresee the future, but Murrow would
be content to describe what was known to have happened. It
was not his role as a broadcaster to speculate or to take
sides. That, also, was the kind of broadcast journalism
that Columbia under Paley, Klauber and White favored and
7° CBS network, September 1, 1939, text in Edward R.
Murrow, This ie London, ed. Elmer Davis (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1941), 11.
Sperber, Murrow: Hie Life and Times , 141.
72 Murrow usually dictated his reports to a secretary,
then edited the transcript and read the resulting copy on
the air.
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which had been enshrined in the NAB Code and the network's
memorandum on European war coverage.
conveniently, the Murrow style also fit the definition
of "real news" posited by President Roosevelt and endorsed
by Fly. Murrow and his "boys," the CBS correspondents who
covered the Second World War, developed and shared a
distinctive style of broadcast journalism based on the
public record, the opinions of authoritative sources and
close personal observation that came to represent the new
generation of radio news. They exploited the immediacy and
intimacy of the medium, but they consciously avoided the
overt expressions of personal opinion which was the stock
in trade of an earlier generation of broadcast journalists
exemplified by Kaltenborn and Boake Carter. Murrow, of
course, set the pattern and remained the master of the
technique
.
Murrow' s words, spoken in a grave baritone filtered by
short-wave transmission, survive in both recordings and
print. "^^ His broadcasts from London during the blitz
described in one sense a momentous battle between historic
A two-record collection including many of Murrow'
s
most famous broadcasts, Edward R . Murrow: A Reporter
Remembers
, Volume One: The War Years and Volume Two: 1948-
1961, Columbia 02L 4 00, is unfortunately no longer in
print. For selections of Murrow' s scripts, see Murrow, This
IB London and Edward R. Murrow, In Search of Light, ed.
Edward Bliss, Jr. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967)
.
Murrow' s collected papers, Edward R. Murrow Papers 1927-
1962 (Sanford, NC: Microfilming Corporation of America,
1982), contain most of his post-war scripts but the texts
of only scattered wartime broadcasts.
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forces for the future of Europe, but on a more fundamental
level, they related one man's experience and celebrated the
common Man, the paragon of Anglo-American democratic myth.
While he reported the latest military and political
gleanings, his most memorable broadcasts recounted how the
war touched the people of Britain.
Murrow's listeners learned what it was like to be in
London as the bombs fell, how exhilarating, how lonely, how
random the destruction could be. By listening to his words,
they were transported to the streets of the city. "One
night," Murrow reported after a tour of a bombed-out
neighborhood, "I stood in front of a smashed grocery store
and heard a dripping inside. It was the only sound in all
London. Two cans of peaches had been drilled clean through
by flying glass and the juice was dripping down onto the
floor . "''4
"Bombs," he calmly explained one night, "behave in the
most unpredictable manner. ""^^
A bomb may explode at an intersection and the
blast will travel down two streets, shattering
windows for a considerable distance, while big
windows within a few yards of the bomb crater
remain intact. The glass, incidentally, generally
CBS network, September 13, 194 0; Murrow, This is
London, 173.
CBS network, August 18, 194 0; Murrow, This is
London, 14 4.
345
falls out into the street, rather than beingblown inwards
.
The broadcasts are filled with such precise and homely
observations. This war, listeners soon learned, was more
than a geopolitical struggle among nations. By reducing the
war to human scale, Murrow made it understandable
Most of all, Murrow described the people of London,
creating in the process a new prototype, a petit bourgeois
descendent of the sturdy British yeoman who peopled
Shakespeare's histories. Murrow brought his listeners with
him to the pubs and bomb shelters, the shops and air fields
of England where the Common Man refused to yield to the
Nazi threat. In the fall of 1940, as the blitz was at its
worst, Murrow described buying flashlight batteries at a
shop near the BBC studios in the Strand.
I bought three. The clerk said: "You needn't buy
BO many. We'll have enough for the whole winter.
But I said: "What if you aren't here?" There were
buildings down in that street, and he replied:
"Of course, we'll be here. We've been in business
here for a hundred and fifty years. ""^"^
These, Murrow understood, were the real stories. As he had
told the FCC chain broadcasting inquiry eighteen months
before, "we are trying to give people an opportunity to
hear the sort of thing they would hear if they were
actually with us." These humble events, small enough to
"^^ CBS network, August 25, 194 0; Murrow, This is
London, 14 6.
"^"^ CBS network, September 13, 194 0; Murrow, This ie
London, 174.
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make Benee of in a world dominated by issues beyond
comprehension, brought the war home. "The little incidents,
the things the mind retains, are in themselves
unimportant," he said from London one night in 1940, "but
they somehow weld together to form the hard core of
memories that will remain when the last 'all-clear' has
Bounded. ""^^
The method seemed so simple. "Just provide the honest
news, and when there isn't any news, why, just say so,"
Murrow told Eric Sevareid when he hired the young
Minnesotan in 1939, "I have an idea people might like
that. "79 Murrow and his colleagues covered the news, but
the broadcasts most remembered, the dispatches which had
the greatest impact at home, were those which brought the
telling details of everyday life home to America. These
broadcasts shared a powerful subtext. The British people
were just like us, decent, hard-working men and women who
hoped to live their lives in peace, but who were willing to
CBS network, September 13, 194 0; Murrow, Thie ie
London, 174.
Quoted in Eric Sevareid, Not So Wild a Dream (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1946, 1969), 107. Sevareid worked
for the PariB Herald, the French outpost of the New York
Herald Tribune, before joining Columbia. In a letter
confirming the job offer, Murrow promised a salary of $250
a month but cautioned, "the matter of terms of employment
and the salary paid are normally matters of strict
confidence, even between colleagues." Murrow the reporter
was still first and foremost management's representative in
Europe, responsible for protecting the company's interests.
Murrow to Sevareid, August 16, 1939, box Al
,
personal
correspondence folder, Eric Sevareid Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
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endure any hardship when confronted with the totalitarian
war machine
.
While Murrow was the master of the style, his
colleagues used the same tricks. Speaking from Paris at the
outbreak of the war, Sevareid combined official
announcements, foreign press reports and personal
observations to describe the scene in the French capital
during a Columbia broadcast. so with nothing new to report
from government sources, Sevareid relied on personal
observations to communicate the reaction of the people of
Paris to incipient war. "I saw a woman crying," he began,
recalling the price the French paid for the First World
War. As the government debated how to respond to the German
attack on Poland, the French people pondered the personal
cost. Rather than simply summarizing the reaction of the
French press, Sevareid incorporated the latest news into a
tour of Paris. As he strolled the avenues, he told his
audience, he saw groups gathered around kiosks. They were
scanning the front pages of the latest newspapers "and
these are some of the headlines they read. " While they
awaited their government's decision, Sevareid said, "many
of the ordinary people you speak to" were resigned to war.
A skeptical listener might wonder just how many "ordinary
people" Sevareid had canvassed before reaching his
so Eric Sevareid, CBS network, September 3, 1939,
recording in Motion Picture, Broadcasting and Recorded
Sound Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
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conclusion, but the broadcaster insisted he was simply
conveying the facts as he discovered them. With the French
government threatening censorship, it would likely become
increasingly difficult in the days ahead to determine the
facts, he admitted. "News may dry up and we'll be limited
to a few official communiques." He would continue to do his
best, he implied, to bring the whole truth to the American
people. Now, it seemed, France was preparing for war. This
conclusion was not personal opinion, Sevareid assured his
listeners, it was the result of disinterested reporting.
"It's not for me to plead the case" for a French
declaration of war, he said, "but the truth has to be
told.
"
Sevareid correctly reported that there was in fact no
news to report as the French cabinet caucused behind closed
doors. Additionally, he had no doubt accurately related the
fear and uncertainty many French men and women felt in the
final hours before war was declared. Did the people
Sevareid described represent prevailing opinion among the
French public? There is no way to know, but his listeners
surely recalled the images he described of the crying woman
and the crowds pressing around the sidewalk kiosks,
awaiting word of their fate. Columbia's listeners also as
they turned off their radios understood that the French,
reluctantly perhaps, were prepared to fight.
Kaltenborn would have put it more bluntly, basing his
statement on his knowledge of world affairs and his
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asseBsment of his discussions with high-level contacts and
relying on his personal standing to persuade the audience.
Murrow and his proteges used a different technique which
took advantage of the unique virtues of the radio.
Archibald MacLeish, the poet and radio dramatist who in
1938 had pointed out what a useful dramatic device the
announcer's voice had become, understood when he paid
tribute to Murrow in 1941:
You spoke, you said, in London. Sometimes you
said you were speaking from a roof in London
looking at the London sky. Sometimes you said you
spoke from underground beneath that city. But it
was not in London that you spoke. It was in the
back kitchens and the front living rooms and the
moving automobiles and the hotdog stands and the
observation cars of another country that your
voice was truly speaking. And what you did was
this: You made real and urgent and present to the
men and women of those comfortable rooms, those
safe enclosures, what these men and women had not
known was present there or real
.
MacLeish understood the magical power of word and sound. He
understood that by making what was happening in London
"real and urgent and present," Murrow was setting the stage
for the predictable human response. Something had to be
done to ease these people's pain. Murrow and his colleagues
understood as well.
®^ Archibald MacLeish, "A Superstition is Destroyed,
"
radio address, CBS network, December 2, 1941, in MacLeish,
William S. Paley, Edward R. Murrow, In Honor of a Man and
an Ideal ... Three Talks on Freedom (New York: Columbia
Broadcasting System, 1941), 7.
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Columbia's broadcasts from Europe in the first years
of the war cemented the network's standing as the leading
news network and added immeasurably to the network's
prestige. Listeners were eager to hear about the war, and
Columbia and its affiliates gave them what they wanted to
hear. Paley, concerned as always with building a prosperous
and secure empire, was overjoyed. NBC and underfunded
Mutual scrambled to match Columbia's success, ending their
reliance on official statements from government spokesmen
and interviews with newspaper reporters and sending their
own correspondents overseas to provide exclusive on- the
-
scene reports written and read with a radio audience in
mind. They never caught up. "This was the first thing that
put CBS ahead of NBC in anything," Sevareid recalled years
later, "That's what gave the Columbia Broadcasting System
its first real leg up after the war."®^
By 194 0, Murrow and his kind of personalized radio
news had become the new model for broadcast journalism. The
networks continued to broadcast round table discussions and
offer speeches by distinguished guests, but "the news"
increasingly came to mean the latest reports from the
network correspondents. Commentators such as Kaltenborn
continued to be heard, but they were pressed to limit their
expressions of personal opinion and offer instead
background information and analysis. A few, notably Davis
^2 Eric Sevareid, interview, "CBS: The First 6 0
Years," Broadcasting, September 14, 1987, 88.
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and Raymond Gram Swing, offered thoughtful and timely
broadcaete which equaled the best newspaper columns.
Increasingly, however, the most popular and financially
successful commentators were seen as quirky and colorful
personalities, entertainers whose success stemmed from
their ability to share their lives and interests with the
audience rather than journalists concerned with the rapidly
changing state of the world.
In practice, the line between opinion and analysis
remained difficult to define, but commentators noted that
when their analysis led to conclusions at variance with the
prevailing public mood of the moment, they were likely to
be accused for peddling their personal opinion. As the
nation became increasingly fixated upon the worldwide
struggle for democracy, broadcasters like their listeners
The prototype of the commentator-as
-entertainer was
NBC's Walter Winchell, a one-time vaudevillian who gained
fame as a gossip columnist and broadcaster. He routinely
mixed show business notes with crime news and attacks on
Hitler and the "Ratzis." See Bliss, Now the News, 57-8 and
Walter Winchell, Winchell Exclusive (Englewood Cliffs, New
Jersey: Prentice
-Hall
,
1975). For a delightful profili of
Mutual 's Gabriel Heatter, see Philip Hamburger, "The
Crier," The New Yorker, January 20, 1945, 23ff. While
Heatter invariably reported the latest headlines to his
audience. Hamburger noted, his success was a credit to
other things. Heater's "major interests are the final
defeat of Fascism and the formulation of a workable,
democratic peace," Hamburger wrote, "but historians may
someday record that he reached his peaks of eloquence and
insight while speaking of dogs. Heatter feels about dogs
the way Churchill feels about the British Empire. No man
more staunchly supports those dogs who have laid aside
their muzzles and gone off to war." Similarly, ABC's Paul
Harvey was the most widely listened- to radio commentator of
the 196 0s, but his broadcasts are largely ignored by
chroniclers of journalism.
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increasingly spoke with one voice. The broadcasting
industry became, in social historian James Baughman's
phrase, "a voluntary propagandist", proclaiming as always
its role as a bulwark of democracy, eagerly portraying
itself as a partner with government and the public in the
great struggle.
The triumph of objectivity was not absolute. Both the
chains and local stations across the country continued to
broadcast discussions of "controversial issues" as well as
live coverage of events as they happened. Such programs
continued to stir controversy, especially when speakers
questioned the extent of the United States' involvement in
the war or argued that pressing domestic issues were being
ignored
.
The FCC under its new chairman and the industry seemed
to have struck an accord on program content with the NAB
Code and the agreement on responsible war coverage, but
broadcasters suspected they were enjoying only a cease-fire
in their traditional battle with the regulators. The FCC
was completing work on its chain broadcasting report, and
powerful critics of the industry continued to control the
levers of government. Chairman Fly was a presidential
appointee, and the Roosevelt administration was tilting
increasingly toward intervention. Senator Wheeler, chairing
See James L. Baughman, The Republic of Maee
Culture; Journal i em
,
Filmmaking , and Broadcasting- in
America since 1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1992)
.
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the committee responsible for broadcast legislation, was an
outspoken isolationist. The potential for conflict,
broadcasters nervously noted, was immense.
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CHAPTER VI
"THE VITAL NECESSITY FOR OBJECTIVITY "1
As Europe went to war in 1939, the American
broadcasting industry appeared to have withstood another
challenge. The National Association of Broadcasters' new
Code was in place, and the industry's voluntary agreement
on war coverage had received the blessing of the Roosevelt
administration's new chairman of the Federal Communications
Commission. Self
-regulation, radio's first line of defense
against federal interference, had, it seemed, deflected
another challenge to the American system of broadcasting.
In exchange for serving the public interest, commercial
broadcasters - which increasingly by the end of the 1930s
meant the ever more powerful national networks - would be
allowed to profit.
1939 and 194 0 were very good years for the radio
networks. The economy was finally beginning to show signs
of real recovery, thanks in large part to industrial
production related to the war in Europe. 1938 had seen a
sharp economic slump, but that year's disappointing time
^ Paul White to "Dear Gang" [CBS European staff]
,
[May
25, 1940] , Edward R. Murrow Papers 1927-1965 (Sanford,
North Carolina: Microfilming Corporation of America, 1982)
,
reel 15, folder 164, frame 0062. The letter was received
and dated by Mary Marvin Breckinridge, a CBS reporter in
Paris
.
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sales were forgotten as the new numbers were totaled. Gross
advertising sales for the four nationwide chains jumped
sixteen percent between 1938 and 1939 and soared another
sixteen percent to $96 million 1940. NBC, thanks to its two
networks, remained atop the list with income of more than
$50 million, but CBS had become the single most profitable
chain, grossing over $41 million in 194 0, a whopping
nineteen percent increase over 1939 and nearly two million
dollars more than NBC Red.^
The war had indeed been good for the radio business,
because Americans were tuning in to keep up with the most
exciting continuing drama they had ever heard. Each of the
networks logged its share of scoops and spectaculars, but
Columbia had become in fact what the network's publicists
had long claimed it was: the leader in news and
information. "If any single radio job since radio began
could unanswerably justify the business of broadcasting as
now conducted," proclaimed Time in 1941, "CBS's news
coverage since 1938 might well be it."^ Across the country,
listeners sought out the latest information from the front.
They tuned in for live coverage of important events, talks
and forums featuring prominent newsmakers and the nightly
commentaries of Elmer Davis and H.V. Kaltenborn, but the
2 "Four Major Webs Grossed $96,000,000 in 1940, 16%
Rise for New Highs," Variety, December 18, 1940, 1.
3 "From Brick Dust to Bouquets, " Time, December 15,
1941, 50.
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most memorable broadcasts were the on-the-scene reports
from Columbia's growing stable of reporters overseas.
Network correspondents such as Eric Sevareid in Paris and,
especially, Edward R. Murrow in London bore witness to
history in the making. They offered an immediate emotional
connection which neither the newspaper's columns of print
nor the newsreel's pictures could match. "Radio's quick
telling of the whole story," Variety boasted, "the fabulous
incident of the radio-described scuttling of the Graf Spee,
the actual sound (via oceanic short-wave) of gunfire and
explosions over London have all combined to produce a saga
of new style journalism."'*
Despite their triumphs, the industry's leaders
remained uneasy about the future of commercial
broadcasting. The broadcasters had managed to defuse the
potential crisis of re -regulation in 1939, but the
"quarrelsome year" of 194 0, as Variety described it, was
rife with the signs of future "clash and struggle. "^
Broadcasters anticipated confrontations with their
regulators over lingering questions of monopoly and
economic power. While the particulars had changed over the
years, both the industry and the state continued to wrestle
with what radio reformer Charles Siepmann would call "the
Robert J. Landry, "Radio's Quarrelsome Year,"
Variety, January 8, 1941, 87.
^ Landry, "Radio's Quarrelsome Year," 87.
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basic paradox with which radio stands uncomfortably saddled
- how far can a system built entirely on private profits
function adequately in the public interest, to which it is
also theoretically committed?
The industry was proud of its financial success, but
in their public statements, its leaders always emphasized
its service. The networks had written a spectacular story
of economic success despite the depression, but their image
of choice was that of responsible stewards of the people's
air. "The year 194 0 brought to radio broadcasting in
America opportunities for public service hitherto
unparalleled," Columbia's William Paley proudly told his
stockholders in March of 1941. Radio helped Americans
"become intelligently aware of the reality of world
events," he said, and had become "an essential component of
the American democratic way of life.""^ A vital factor in
the network's service to democracy, Paley continued, and
one which had won the network "a vast audience," was
"Columbia's consistent and determined effort to present the
essence of the news, both national and international, in a
^ Charles Siepmann, "Radio's Big Chance," The New
Republic, January 12, 1942, 46.
William S. Paley, Annual Report of the Columbia
BroadcaGting System, Inc. for the Fiscal Year ended
December 28, 1940 (New York: Columbia Broadcasting System,
1941), [1].
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strictly factual and objective way, devoid of bias, and at
the earliest possible moment following its occurrence
8
Despite Paley's self-congratulatory words, radio, an
industry barely two decades old, was preparing for a major
battle over the FCC
' s monopoly probe of chain broadcasting.
As the commission staff prepared its long-anticipated
report and order under the guidance of chairman James
Lawrence Fly and general counsel Telford Taylor,
broadcasters became increasingly certain that bad news was
in the offing. Preliminary reports issued in June and
November of 194 0 indicated that the Commission was ready to
mount a full-scale assault on the financial underpinnings
of network radio. The June subcommittee report to the full
FCC all but declared NBC and CBS illegal monopolies,
concluding "that National and Columbia, directed by a few
men, hold a powerful influence over the public domain of
the air and measurably control radio communication to the
people of the United States." Such domination "presents
inherent dangers to the welfare of a country where
democratic processes prevail" and was clearly not in the
public interest.^
8 Paley, Annual Report, [5]
.
^ Federal Communications Commission, "Memorandum of
Submittal Accompanying Report of Committee on Chain
Broadcasting, and Conclusion of the Committee's Report,"
June 12, 1940, in Federal Communications Commission, Report
on Chain Broadcasting- (Washington: Gtovernment Printing
Office, 1941) , 99
.
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The CommiBGion-s subeequent call for oral arguments
targeted the heart of the network system, contractual
agreements between the networks and their affiliates across
the country. The FCC
' s laundry list of possible new
regulations suggested ending exclusive contracts between
the networks and individual stations, restricting the term
of affiliation agreements, limiting network ownership and
management of individual stations and strengthening an
affiliate's right to pick and choose among network
offerings, airing those which it deemed to be in the public
interest and rejecting the rect.^°
"There is little doubt," Va^-i ety reported in March of
1941, "that the Government has made up its mind that
drastic changes in status quo are, from the Government's
viewpoint, essential to preserve free competition and check
drifts to either monopoly or powerful concentrations of
control. "11 The financial viability of network broadcasting
was based on the ability to create a nationwide audience
and sell that audience to willing advertisers. If the
networks were unable to guarantee their advertisers access
1° Federal Communications Commission, "Procedures for
Oral Argument on Network Inquiry Report," November 28,
194 0, in FCC, Report on Chain Broadcast ing-, 101-2. The
JReport on Chain Broadcasting- is an invaluable resource for
scholars, providing the best single source of data and
summary of the condition of commercial radio immediately
prior to the Second World War.
11 "Time Limit (One Year) on Affiliates' Ties One of
Expected FCC Proposal," Variety, March 12, 1941, 26.
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to the audience through iron-clad contracts with their
affiliates, how could they continue to reap profits?
Broadcasters feared for two other nascent projects,
television and international commercial broadcasting, each
of which could become tremendously profitable but which
required both FCC approval and the cash flooding from the
networks to proceed.
The industry, with Paley and CBS leading the way,
mounted major public relations and lobbying campaigns in
hopes that the White House would bury the monopoly report
and bring the FCC to heel.i^ Columbia played the most
visible role partly due to Paley s nature, but also because
NBC was reluctant to jeopardize further its plans for
television. Radio was simply one portion of the RCA empire
and no longer the most important. David Sarnoff had been
one of the architects of the medium, but now, Paley
recalled, "he wasn't enthusiastic about radio's future. He
didn't care about radio really. He was a guy who liked the
scientific side of things, the new things that were being
invented. By 1940, the new thing was television. RCA was
already involved in a bitter dispute with Fly and the FCC
12 Landry, "Radio's Quarrelsome Year," 87.
13 See Sally Bedell Smith, In All Hie Glory: The Life
of William S. Paley (New York: Simon and Schuster, 199 0)
,
195-9
.
14 William S. Paley, interview in "CBS: The First 60
Years," Broadcast ing-, September 14, 1987, 68.
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over technical standards for television broadcasting, and
Sarnoff was wary of inviting new antitrust investigations.
He would do most of his fighting behind the scenes,
allowing Paley to carry the flag for radio. 15
While the networks waited for the FCC to act, radio's
critics in Congress feared the Commission would once again
fail to move strongly enough. Radio's opponents saw the
industry's formidable public relations apparatus gearing
up, and recalling how the networks and the administration
had teamed up to block the congressional monopoly report in
1938, feared another FCC cave- in. Republican Senator
Charles Tobey of New Hampshire reminded his colleagues that
Congressional attempts to launch an independent probe of
the broadcasting industry had been turned back by the
promise that the FCC ' s chain inquiry would be sufficient.
Former FCC chairman Frank McNinch had promised Congress in
November of 193 8, Tobey reminded the Senate, that the
report would be ready in sixty days. One year later, in
November of 1939, Fly, McNinch 's successor, again promised
that the report would be ready in sixty more days. Clearly,
the senator fumed, "the whole thing has been a mockery."!^
15 Kenneth Bilby, The General: David Sarnoff and the
Rise of the Communi cations Industry (New York: Harper &.
Row, 1986), 135-7. Sarnoff was busily lobbying both
Congress and the White House on behalf of RCA' s television
system during this period. See Burton K. Wheeler with Paul
F. Healy, Yankee from the West (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday, 19 62) , 42 0-2
.
Congress, Senate, Sen. Charles Tobey, "Report of
Federal Communications Commission on Alleged Radio
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In the House, opponents came within nine votes of cutting
the FCC's 1941 operating budget after a rancorous floor
debate. The "usual barrage of rocks was thrown at the
Commish during debate," Variety reported, "with the
perennial finger-pointers adding a new touch to the attack
by chiding the regulators for slowness in finishing up the
chain
-monopoly inquiry and for failing to crack down on
both CBS and NBC."!^
Committee hearings on the reappointment of veteran FCC
commissioner Thad Brown turned into a summer-long assault
on the Commission's policies.i^ Conservative "finger-
pointers" led by Senator Tobey relentlessly attacked the
Commission and the industry for a variety of past and
present sins. More ominously, committee chairman Burton
Wheeler and ranking Republican Wallace White joined in the
assault with charges that the FCC was still far too
sympathetic toward the industry it regulated and far too
ready to sacrifice the public interest on the altar of
private profit. Both Wheeler and White were stalling
legislation to reorganize the FCC pending completion of the
Monopoly," 76th Cong., 3rd sess., ConofreBBional Record (May
15, 1940), vol. 86, pt. 6, 6145-6.
"FCC's Yearly Congressional Drubbing," Variety,
February 5, 1941, 40.
1® Congress, Senate, Committee on Interstate Commerce,
Hearings . . .on the Nomination of Thad H. Brown on
Reappointment ae Federal Communications Commieeioner, June
12-August 23, 1940, 76th Cong., 3rd sess.
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chain broadcasting report. As the hearings rolled on, each
expressed his fear that the Commission was dragging its
feet on the critical issue of monopoly. Brown's
reappointment was held hostage by Wheeler, and the last
survivor from the old Federal Radio Commission was allowed
to withdraw his name in the fall rather than face the
humiliation of possible Senate rejection.
The congressional assault on the FCC was in no way an
endorsement of the broadcasting industry. Veteran critics
such as Wheeler had long charged that the industry and its
regulators were one in the same, advocates of a potent
radio monopoly bent on controlling the ether and shaping
public opinion in their own corporate, internationalist
image. Revelations of a "radio trust" in the 192 0b and the
headlong growth of the national chains in the 193 0s
provided ample evidence to them that powerful corporations
were conspiring to control both the industry and,
ominously, the flow of information to the people of
America. While liberals condemned the broadcasters for
crass commercialism and pleaded with the government to set
aside frequencies for nonprofit agencies or establish a
competitive state -owned radio network to rescue the medium
from the advertisers, conservatives feared government — or
19 See "Strike at FCC Itself in Grilling Brown; Much
Trade History is under Light," Variety, June 19, 1940, 28;
"Nightmare on Stand for Thad Brown but Another 7 -Year Term
Looks Okay," Variety, June 26, 1940, 41; "Brown Is Left
Dangling," Variety, September 25, 1940, 27.
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more precisely Roosevelt administration - involvement
would lead not to free speech but to even more suffocating
centralization. The thought of broadcasting under the
control of interventionist New Dealers bent on suppressing
free enterprise and dragging the country into war terrified
many in Congress, driving them into an unlikely and
contentious alliance of convenience with the radio
networks
.
"Voluntary sel f
- regulat ion" of the air, Republican
Representative Karl Mundt of South Dakota said in the
summer of 194 0, "has many advantages over the various
proposals for intensified Government regulation and
supervision which are beginning to be discussed informally,
and rather too generally, in the congressional cloakrooms."
While radio must remain "on guard against highly
emotionalized speakers and programs whose broadcasts might
render a disservice to the best interests of America, " the
industry's efforts to police itself were commendable. The
medium, Mundt said, was far too powerful to be placed in
the hands of the New Deal. "Once a political administration
tasted the intoxicating blood of power which would come
from Government radio, " it would surely control what was
broadcast. The administration would stifle free speech and
use the radio to perpetuate itself. The industry's efforts
to regulate itself, especially radio's pledge to cover news
of the war in Europe with moderation and impartiality, were
therefore to be applauded and an activist FCC, a creature
of the New Deal, was to be condemned. Remember what had
happened during the First World War, Mundt cautioned. If
America entered the new war in Europe, he continued,
"private radio would, in all likelihood, be one of the
first and one of the permanent casual ties . "20
Broadcasters appreciated such endorsements of their
efforts to regulate themselves but realized they were
motivated by opposition to the Roosevelt administration
rather than affection for the radio industry, while
conservatives feared administration control of
broadcasting, corporate control was only a slightly more
preferable alternative. Mundt reminded the broadcasters
that they "hold virtual monopolies over favored airwaves
for private profit" and cautioned them that the exercise of
such "rights and privileges" implied "responsibilities."'!
The fundamental bargain struck nearly two decades before
remained in place; Broadcasters could utilize the people's
air if they operated in the public interest. The definition
of that term was becoming increasingly slippery as the war
in Europe intensified.
2° Congress, House of Representatives, Rep. Karl E.
Mundt, "Columbia Broadcasting System Answers Congressman
Mundt ' 6 Open Question to Radio Executives," 76th Cong., 3rd
sess., CongreBsional Record (June 7, 1940), vol. 86, pt.
16, 3644-5.
21 Mundt, "Columbia Answers Congressman Mundt ' s Open
Question, " 3645
.
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Chairman Fly was a partisan Texas Democrat and loyal
New Dealer who rarely found himself on the same side as
conservatives such as Mundt
. Both men shared, however, a
visceral fear of monopoly control of broadcast ing . 22 while
Mundt 's greatest nightmare was a radio system in the hands
of the Roosevelt administration, Fly saw the government as
a defender of the public interest and a necessary
counterweight to excessive corporate power.
The FCC had been created by Congress to protect the
public interest. Fly pointed out soon after taking office,
and must carry out its charge. ^3 Fortunately, the American
system of broadcasting had "in general" served the public
interest because "the best public service is the best
business." It was the role of government to make certain
22 While Fly throughout his career crusaded against
monopoly control of the air, he was delighted when that
crusade also aided his party. When Roosevelt urged the FCC
to study limiting newspaper ownership of broadcast
stations, Fly accepted the job with pleasure. "It's a
natural point of view for a New Dealer to have," FCC
counsel Harry Plotkin later recalled, "because Roosevelt
and the New Deal were catching hell from newspapers all the
time, never got a fair break, and we realized that if there
was going to be any fair electioneering, you'd have to do
it with this new medium. " The fact that newspapers
controlled a third of all radio station licenses could be
interpreted as evidence of an information monopoly, Plotkin
argued. It was certainly a political threat. "Therefore,
this idea really was both a liberal idea, and... it was
necessary for a strong Democratic party, strong two party
system, because the press was one party. " Harry Plotkin,
interview by Sally Fly Connell, n.d., 24-5, in the James
Lawrence Fly project of the Oral History Collection of
Columbia University, hereafter Plotkin, COHC*
2^ James Lawrence Fly, "Some Comments on Current Radio
Problems," radio talk, CBS network, October 26, 1939.
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that tradition continued. While "all of us interested in
the development of policies and rules of conduct should
maintain an open and tolerant mind toward the views of
others as experience accumulates and principles emerge,"
the primacy of the public interest enshrined in the
Communications Act must not be compromised. Beyond that
basic principal, however. Fly continued, "there is...
a
substantial area where industrial self
-regulation should
have a fair opportunity to work."
His enemies within the broadcasting industry feared
Fly was merely voicing free -market platitudes to conceal
his true intentions. "I got along with Fly pretty well -
we were not personally bitter, " remembered NAB president
Neville Miller in 1973, "but Fly wanted to run the NAB, h
wanted to run the industry, and he had a good deal of
power. "24 In fact, the chairman meant what he said. He di
not want to "run the industry." He simply wanted the
industry run with the public's interest in mind. Fly woul
throughout his term continue to prod the industry into
serving what he saw as the public interest, but he would
also oppose with equal ardor any talks of government
ownership. Fly was, in a way, similar to his president.
Roosevelt, first feared by captains of industry as a
traitor to his class, would ultimately be understood as a
24 Neville Miller, interview by Donald H. Kirkley,
September 25, 1973, 24-5, in Miller biography file,
Broadcast Pioneers Library, Washington, DC.
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staunch defender of liberal capitalism with, as his
Secretary of Labor pointed out, "no thought or desire to
impose any overall economic or political change on the
United States. "25 Like Herbert Hoover, Roosevelt sought to
save the system from its basest instincts. Fly, by the end
of his term in 1944, would be seen by many broadcasters not
as the stalking horse for an administration takeover of
radio, but as "their bulwark against Government
ownership an intelligent, careful liberal who believes
in finding and stubbornly serving the facts. "26 The radio
industry would not be nationalized in the Second World War.
Industry self
-regulation carried out under the watchful eye
of the government would remain the foundation of the
American system of broadcasting.
In the last years of peace, however, there was no way
the networks could know that. The industry feared for its
future. To protect themselves from change, the broadcasters
once again wrapped themselves in the banner of public
service and sought to portray their industry as, in Paley's
words, "an essential component of the American democratic
way of life." As in the past, the industry would rely in
large part on its news and public affairs programming to
prove that the American system of broadcasting served the
25 Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York:
Viking, 1946; Harper & Row, 1964), 332.
26 "Battler's Exit," Time, November 13, 1944, 73-4.
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public interest. As Americans debated their nation's role
in the war in Europe, however, the role radio played in
shaping that debate and the way the medium broadcast the
news would become extraordinarily controversial.
As German forces swept across Europe in 194 0 and
threatened both England and the Soviet Union in 1941, no
question more divided the nation than that of American
neutrality. The NAB Code directed member stations to
"provide [free] time for the presentation of public
questions including those of controversial nature" while
refusing to sell air time to advocates of one side or the
other. The Code, however, made an exception for candidates
for office. They would be allowed to purchase as much time
as they pleased when campaigning for election. 27 The Code,
however, was silent on how the industry should deal with a
candidate who also happened to be the sitting president.
The 194 0 Roosevelt campaign was a strategic reprise of
the 1936 effort. The president would act presidential,
ignoring Republican challenger Wendell Willkie until the
final weeks and taking every advantage of his office.
Roosevelt insisted his frequent inspection tours of defense
facilities were not campaign trips, even though he did seem
to be following roundabout routes which took him through an
27 NAB [National Association of Broadcasters] Code
Compliance Committee, "Controversial Public Issues," Code
Manual (Washington: National Association of Broadcasters,
[1940]), n.p.
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improbably high number of cities. When questioned about
Willkie's latest positions, Roosevelt innocently told
reporters, "i don't know nothin' about politics. "28
Roosevelt, of course, knew everything about politics, and
he also knew that as president and commander-in-chief he
had a virtual open invitation to address the nation over
the radio.
While Candidate Roosevelt remained out of sight until
the final weeks of the campaign, President Roosevelt
frequently found it necessary to speak to the country. The
Republicans, of course, protested, but the NAB • s Code
Compliance Committee ruled in August that Roosevelt's
opponents had to prove that the president's talks were
partisan before they could request time to respond. The
Republican National Committee fumed, purchased sixty-eight
hours of nationwide radio time in hopes of competing and
saw the NAB action as additional evidence that the New Deal
had the radio industry under its thumb.
Paley was certainly doing his best to ingratiate
himself with the Roosevelt administration, and the White
House was reciprocating. Each side respected the power of
the other and sought to maintain cordial relations.
28 James MacGregor Burns, Rooeevelt : The Lion and the
Fox (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1956), 434-5.
29 Edward W. Chester, Radio, Television and American
PoliticB (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1969), 43-6. Chester
notes that the Democrats purchased fifty-eight hours of
national time during the campaign.
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Roosevelt, faced with overwhelming newspaper opposition to
a third term, relied on radio to reach the voters. Paley
feared the government's authority to cripple his
corporation by imposing new regulations, in the fall of
1940, as Paley prepared to visit South America, Roosevelt
invited him to the White House and confidentially asked if
as he toured the continent he could assess the impact of
Nazi propaganda efforts in Latin America. Paley later sent
Roosevelt a glowing congratulatory note after the election.
"Few things have meant as much to me, or have given me such
full gratification," he wrote, "as the decision of the
American people to have you lead us during the next four
years . "^o
Paley 's praise should not be interpreted as an
endorsement of the administration's policies regarding
radio. If Willkie had won, Paley would have addressed an
equally fawning compliment to the new chief executive in
hopes of maintaining access to the Oval Office. The
industry was as always deferential to the party in power
while at the same time maintaining cordial relations with
the opposition. The 194 0 platforms of both major parties
contained planks endorsing "free" radio and condemning
"censorship." The Republicans, fearful of an activist FCC
in the hands of the New Deal, stated, "We oppose the use of
^° Quoted in Smith, In All HiB
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Gl ory, 195
.
licencing to establish control . "3i The Democrats also
showed little faith in the FCC as it existed and called for
a new law. "We urge such legislative steps as may be
required to afford the same protection from censorship that
is now afforded the press under the constitution of the
United States. "32 Broadcasting historian Erik Barnouw
observed that the planks, "perhaps intended as anti-FCC
mortar fire," indicated "the close ties" the industry
maintained with both parties. 33 while that is certainly
true, they also indicated the perils broadcasting faced.
Neither party was satisfied with the existing system of
radio regulation or the state of the broadcasting business.
The industry interpreted that dissatisfaction as a
potential threat to stability.
Despite their considerable efforts, the networks could
hardly avoid offending one side or the other during the
election campaign and the ongoing neutrality debate. When
Roosevelt after the election proposed Lend-Lease, criticism
of radio escalated. Looking back at "the great debate" one
month after Pearl Harbor, Variety radio editor Robert
Landry said the industry's "official and mandatory
31 "Text of GOP Platform Pledging Preparedness,
Peace," Boston Herald, June 27, 1940, 11.
32 "Democratic Platform Asserts Party Increased
Economic Efficiency," Boston Herald, July 18, 1940, 12.
33 Erik Barnouw, A History of Broadcasting- in the
United States, vol. 2, The Golden Web (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1968), 143.
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impartiality" insured "free speech for all." Radio "went so
far in fairness," he added, that "broadcasters took
torrents of abuse" from both sides, "conclusive proof that
the ideal of fairness was observed in everyday
performances, not just the speeches of industry
spokesmen"^'*
The networks, by any quantitative standard, did their
best to offer both sides of the neutrality debate
comparable time. Their increasingly popular public affairs
programs - "America's Town Meeting of the Air," "People's
Platform," "People's Forum," "University of Chicago Round
Table," "America's Forum of the Air" - invariably matched
an advocate of intervention with a spokesman for isolation.
The format usually produced both a spirited confrontation
to entertain the audience and a sure defense against
charges of bias. The broadcasters also presented frequent
studio talks on the issue and provided live coverage of
rallies staged by both friends and foes of American
intervent ion
.
Air time was allocated with precision. When the
networks decided not to air an America First Committee
rally at New York's Madison Square Garden in October of
1941, the organization's state chairman called it
censorship. NBC president Niles Trammell denied the charge.
Robert J. Landry, "Bigots Will Be Back After the
War," Variety, January 7, 1941, 109.
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pointing out that the network had broadcast fifteen
isolationist rallies during the year, offering free time to
senator Wheeler eight times and carrying four speeches by
Charles A. Lindbergh, America First's leading celebrity
spokesman. To say that the isolationists were being denied
access to the radio was simply "unfair, unreasonable and
unjust," Trammell said, and he pledged to "continue to
abide by our self-imposed rule of giving equal opportunity
to important groups to express their views over our
facilities on controversial quest ions . "^5
Inevitably, just as isolationists reacted angrily to
speakers advocating immediate aid to the British, listeners
favoring an enlarged American role in the war bristled as
they listened to the America Firsters. "It was irksome to
many citizens," Variety observed after America had entered
the war, "to hear radio time apportioned, minute for
minute, to the anti-democrats, the fascist
-minded, the
haters of progress, the Bundists."^^ clearly, both sides
agreed that radio was a powerful tool for shaping public
opinion and believed they had the right to use the people's
air. The industry was caught in the middle and did its best
to give each side an opportunity to state its case. If
"Broadcasters Deny Prejudice Charges," New York
Timee, October 31, 1940, 3; Alexander Kendrick, Prime Time:
The Life of Edward R. Murrow (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969)
,
236 .
Landry, "Bigots Will Be Back After the War," 109.
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anything, radio broadcasters were too cooperative, too
sensitive to charges of bias to say no. "The usual
complaint of the minority that it does not have an equal
opportunity to be heard is, except in rare instances, ill-
founded, " wrote the general counsel of the American civil
Liberties Union after reviewing the record. "Probably the
minority gets more proportionate time than its numbers
warrant . "^"^
In addition to doling out time with an even hand,
industry spokesmen missed no chance to defend radio's
impartiality against every challenge. When Senator Wheeler
charged bias during the Lend-Lease debate, Philadelphia
station owner Samuel Rosenbaum, head of the NAB ' s committee
of network affiliates, responded "that Senator Wheeler is
not correctly informed. " Station owners were acutely "aware
of public service obligations" and were "eager to bring our
listeners views on both sides of controversial issues."
Those obligations both served the public interest and
created "vital and thought
-provoking programs that increase
our listening audiences, something every station desires."
Arthur Garfield Hays, "Civic Discussion Over the
Air," The Annale of the American Academy of Political and
Social Science 213 (January 1941), 40. Among the few groups
which did not get "an equal opportunity to be heard, " Hays
said, were Nazis and Communists. Even in those cases, he
said, public opinion, not the broadcasters, should be
blamed. "This is because the country does not want to hear
from Nazis and Communists. It is hard to conceive how any
system of broadcasting developed even by those who have the
highest ideals of free speech could bring about any other
result .
"
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Broadcasters, RosenJ^aum insisted, "have no editorial
policies. We do not color the news." if "there is an
overwhelming current of public opinion running one way or
another," radio reports it, but "every listener draws his
own opinions. "38
That was the ideal the industry sought to convey:
Radio was merely a balanced forum for the opinions of
others with none of its own. It was an ideal that appealed
to Chairman Fly's sense of fair play. Convinced that the
public interest required radio to be an honest broker of
opinion, he sought a means to enshrine such balance in the
law. Unsure as how to do it without violating both the
Communications Act's explicit ban on censorship and his own
strong belief in free speech, Fly found what he hoped would
be a solution in a licensing battle over Boston radio
station WAAB
.
Boston department store owner John Shepard had put
WAAB on the air to publicize his business. The station had
in time proven an extremely profitable sideline, and WAAB
had become the first link in the Yankee Network, a regional
chain serving New England. Yankee had been a pioneer of
38 Samuel R. Rosenbaum of WFIL, Philadelphia, quoted
in "Self -Interest Alone is Guarantee of Unbiased Comment,
Sez Rosenbaum," Variety, February 19, 1941, 24.
39 The proceedings would be merged with consideration
of a rival application for WAAB ' s frequency. In re: The
Yankee Network, Inc. (WAAB) , FCC docket no. 564 0 and In re:
The Mayflower Broadcaetincf Corporation , FCC docket no.
5618.
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aggressive and sensational broadcast journalism in the mid-
1930s when the chain refused to acquiesce to the Biltmore
Agreement ending the Press-Radio War. Under the direction
of flamboyant "Editor in Chief" Leland Bickford, the
station covered breaking news throughout the region.
Listeners also tuned in to hear Bickford's increasingly
incendiary editorials.
Fancying himself the voice of the people, Bickford
engaged in frequent reform campaigns v/hich served to
publicize both him and his station. Following the lead of
the yellow journals of the turn of the century, WAAB
combined sensational news stories with populist crusades to
attract an audience. Bickford railed against political
corruption, gambling and dental quackery, inevitably taking
the side of the little guy against the interests. During
the Boston mayoral election of 1937 and the Massachusetts
gubernatorial campaign of 1938, Bickford sought to cash in
on his notoriety by selling both radio time and his
services as Editor-in-Chief to chosen candidates. For a
fee, he would broadcast ringing endorsements of their
candidacies over WAAB and the Yankee chain. When the FCC
held preliminary hearings on the station's license renewal
in 1939, a who's who of Massachusetts politics turned out
to condemn both Bickford and the Yankee Network and to
demand that the FCC silence them.
Former Boston mayor Frederick Mansfield charged
Bickford's attacks were both unfair and untruthful and said
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he was denied free time to respond. How could it be in the
public interest, he asked, for a station to air only one
side of a debate? "Unless I bought radio time at $15 a
minute, or $225 for 15 minutes," Mansfield told the FCC
examiner, "i found I could not answer him. "40
Bickford's campaign broadcasts were remarkable even
for a city with Boston's rich tradition of political
vituperation. Speaking "in the interests of" mayoral
candidate Maurice Tobin on election eve, 1937, Bickford was
at his fulsome best.4i He denounced rival candidate William
Foley as "a masquerader" in the thrall of "Daniel H.
Coakley, the political boa constrictor of Massachusetts
politics." Malcom Nichols, another candidate, "is and
always has been a human pawn for the most vicious gang of
political pirates in Massachusetts" led by James Michael
Curley, whose "services as Mayor of Boston and as Governor
of this Commonwealth have had no equal for political filth
"Former Mayors Blast Bickford, " Boston Herald,
November 11, 1939, 2.
41 Leland Bickford, "Bickford Speaks!" WNAC, November
1, 1937, text in FCC docket no. 5618, record group 173, box
1690, Washington National Records Center, National Archives
and Records Administration, Suitland, Maryland. WNAC and
WAAB were both owned by the Yankee Network which in turn
operated two parallel program services, the Yankee Network
and the Colonial Network. The dual chains were created to
give sponsors a choice of advertising packages and
frequently were heard on the same stations around New
England. WNAC usually originated Yankee programming while
WAAB originated Colonial programming. Bickford was
introduced on the air as "Editor-in-Chief of the Yankee
Network and Colonial Network News Services."
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and degradation." Curley and hie minion, Bickford
proclaimed, must be denied a final chance "to plunder and
loot the City of Boston.
"
Bickford steadfastly portrayed himself as the
crusading editor, the enemy of "gangland, crooked politics
and other subversive agencies." He had been, he said,
"attacked from many platforms in this State ... because of
some of my expressions of fact," but he would continue to
speak out because "an honest man has nothing to fear." To
insure his voice continued to be heard, radio must remain a
medium "of honest and unshackled expression. .. which makes
possible the greatest of God's many blessings, freedom of
speech. "42 Joseph Pulitzer could not have put it better. It
was the kind of testimonial, however, the broadcasting
industry could have done without.
The sincerity of Bickford 's protestations was tarred
by the fact that his "honest and unshackled expression" was
for sale to the highest bidder. Still, his words reflect
a journalistic style that was once highly valued. By the
Leland Bickford, radio talks, November 1, 1937,
September 15, 1938, texts in FCC docket no. 5618.
Gov. Charles Hurley told the FCC Bickford had
threatened to attack him on the air after he failed to sign
a controversial bill Bickford supported. In 1938, Bickford
editorialized on behalf of Hurley's opponent, calling the
governor "a colossal failure ... self -centered and
malicious." See Leland Bickford, radio talk, WAAB and
Colonial Network, September 15, 1938, text in FCC docket
no. 5618; "Hurley Cites Radio Attacks," Boston Herald,
November 10, 1939, 44.
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s were
end of the 1930s, however, the crusading editor was
becoming an anachronism. On the radio, such creature
fast becoming pariahs. Conflict and controversy made for
exciting programming, but stations licensed to serve the
public interest and networks fearful of federal regulation
were retreating from taking the burden of opinion on their
own shoulders. A spirited roundtable discussion among
carefully a balanced group of invited guests could be
justified as a contribution to democratic debate, if,
however, the broadcasters themselves took sides, the
leaders of the industry feared they were vulnerable to
charges that they were seeking to use their facilities to
propagandize and were inviting regulatory retaliation.
When attorneys representing the Yankee Network and its
rival for the frequency, Mayflower Broadcasting, appeared
before the FCC to argue for the license. Fly was clearly
appalled by what he heard. As Yankee Network attorney Paul
Spearman explained how Bickford, who was still the
network's Editor-in-Chief, had given editorials on behalf
of candidates. Fly interrupted.
"Now, wait a minute. Let me get that clear," the
chairman said, "The Editor in Chief of The Yankee Network
made the speech on behalf of the candidate?"
"At the candidate's request, during time the candidate
had bought and paid for, over the station, " Spearman added,
insisting that Bickford was acting on his own behalf and
not in his network capacity.
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Fly failed to see the distinction.
"I must say, Mi-. Spearman, that I am unable to say
anything as an individual person in this industry, however
much I would like to, some times."
Spearman conceded that, yes, Editor-in-Chief Bickford
had made campaign speeches in favor of candidates during
time purchased on the station by the candidates and was
indeed introduced on the air as Editor- in Chief.
"Now, then," he said, "I will get back to the case in
hand .
"
"Well, we needn't be confused by that, Mr. Spearman,"
Fly interjected, "I think we have got the case right here,
BO far as your client is concerned, and if you have
anything more to say on this subject, I think you should
say it . "44
Spearman explained that while Bickford was still on
the air and still called Editor-in-Chief, he now simply
read the factual, unbiased news summaries. WAAB had stopped
broadcasting editorials when its license was challenged,
and the station's president had promised to air none in the
44 Federal Communications Commission, Official Report
of Proceedinge Before the Federal Communicatione Commiceioxj
at Washington
,
DC, in the Matter of the Mayflower
Broadcasting Corp. and the Yankee Network, Inc.
,
FCC docket
nos
.
5618 and 5640, July 25, 1940, 26-33, in record group
173, box 1696, Washington National Records Center, National
Archives and Record Administration, Suitland, Maryland.
During a recapitulation of Bickford 's campaign editorials.
Fly noted that former Gov. Hurley had been his landlord
while the chairman attended Harvard Law. Proceedings , 6.
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future. Fly, however, remained focused on the station's
past performance.
"Did the Network put forward a man for each of the
candidates," the chairman asked, "to lend the influence of
the Network to that candidate?"
"It did not put one forward for anybody," Spearman
protested, "I tell you, Mr. Chairman, the man was acting as
an individual, and was approached as such."
Fly was clearly not satisfied.
"Let me ask you this: Do you approve of that? Do you
approve of what happened there, and do you think your
client approves of that?"
"I don't think my client does now," the chastened
Spearman confessed, "He hasn't had any of those for two or
three years, and I think I know that there will never be
any more of them; and he has indicated as much by, years
ago, taking off all of those editorials . "^5
Fly's message had come through loud and clear. As a
steward of the public's air, WAAB had grossly abused its
license and thus assaulted the public interest. Yankee's
attorneys subsequently filed an affidavit from Yankee
Network president John Shepard III swearing the station
"has no intention to and will not broadcast any so-called
editorial hereafter." Yankee would "comply fully" with the
NAB Code and "refuse to present controversial questions
'^^ Proceedings , FCC docket nos . 5618 and 564 0, 33.
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unless equal and fair opportunity is given for the
presentation of both sides or viewpoints . "46
Shepard's apology - and Mayflower's failure to
assemble adequate financing to operate the station - saved
WAAB-s license. However, neither the station nor the
industry escaped the Commission's wrath. Fly seized the
opportunity to announce a new policy. WAAB
• s management,
the FCC stated, "has revealed a serious misconception of
its duties and functions under the law."
"Radio can serve as an instrument of democracy only
when devoted to the communication of information and the
exchange of ideas fairly and objectively presented," the
Commission's order continued. "A truly free radio cannot be
used to advocate the causes of the licensee. It cannot be
used to support the candidacies of his friends. It cannot
be devoted to the support of principles he happens to
regard most favorably.
"
"In brief," the Commission announced, "the broadcaster
cannot be an advocate." Every broadcaster using "the public
domain" of the air had "the obligation of presenting all
sides of important public questions, fairly, objectively
and without bias." While it was up to the individual
"Affidavit of John Shepard, 3rd re: present and
future policy with respect to broadcasting of so-called
editorials," sworn August 7, 1940, filed September 11,
1940, FCC docket no. 5640, box 1701.
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station operate within these standards, "the ultimate duty"
to enforce them "is vested in the Commission. "47
The Mayflower Doctrine, as the Commission's dictum
came to be known, was firmly rooted in the regulatory
tradition which had evolved over the preceding two decades.
The air was "the public domain" and, therefore, the
Commission argued, "the public interest - not the private
- is paramount. These requirements are inherent in the
conception of public interest set up by the Communications
Act as the criterion of regulation. "48 In practice,
however, it would be up to private interests, the nation's
radio stations, to make sure that the public interest
prevailed. Only if the industry failed to regulate itself
would the government step in.
The core principle of the Mayflower Doctrine, that
"the broadcaster cannot be an advocate," was not simply the
result of a New Deal effort to use the licensing system to
enforce its political will on radio. It was also rooted in
the broadcasting industry's attempt to avoid government
regulation by regulating itself. Paley in 1938 had proposed
virtually identical limits on the industry's freedom of
speech when he stated "we must never have an editorial
47 Federal Communications Commission, Decieion and
Order in re: The Mayflower Broadcasting Corporation and the
Yankee Network, Inc., January 16, 1941, 8 FCC 333,
quotation at 339-40.
48 FCC, Mayflower decision, 34 0.
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page." if broadcasters did not voluntarily remain "wholly,
honestly and militantly nonpartisan" while always defending
the right of others to express their views, "I do not
believe it would be amiss for the Commission if it has the
power or the Congress, if the Commission does not have the
power, to make adherence to these principles a prerequisite
of having and holding a broadcasting license. "49
The Mayflower Doctrine would survive until 1949 when
the FCC enunciated the Fairness Doctrine, permitting
licensees to editorialize if they allowed time for replies
from representatives of the opposite side.^o no station was
ever stripped of its license for violating the Mayflower
Doctrine, and, because it summarized an emerging consensus
within the industry, its actual impact on how broadcasters
went about their business is difficult to ascertain. ^1 The
William S. Paley, CBS network, April 5, 1938, text
published as "Minimum Interference Asked by Paley,"
Broadcast iiiff, April 15, 1938, 15.
^° For an excellent summary of the evolution of the
Fairness Doctrine, see Hugh Carter Donahue, The Battle to
Control Broadcast News: Who Owns the First Amendment?
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1989), 33-51. For an insider's view,
see Fred W. Friendly, The Good Guye , The Bad Guys and the
First Amendment : Free Speech vs. Fairness in Broadcasting-
(New York: Vintage, 1977) . The FCC report which struck down
the Mayflower Doctrine and established what became the
Fairness Doctrine is Federal Communications Commission,
Report of the Commission in the Matter of Editorializing- by
Broadcast Licensees , docket no. 8 516 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1949) .
For discussions of the legal ramifications of the
Mayflower Doctrine, see "Radio Editorials and the Mayflower
Doctrine," Columbia Law Review 4B (July 1948), 785-93; "The
Mayflower Doctrine Scuttled," Yale Law Journal 59 (1950),
386
doctrine, as critics would later point out, was a clear
restriction of free speech and probably a violation of the
Communication Act's prohibition of censorship. The
Commission, historian Hugh Carter Donahue argued, "exceeded
statutory provisions in the Radio and Communications acts,
neither of which specified public affairs programming or
mentioned broadcast editorials."" when the doctrine was
repealed in 1949, the NAB ' s president excitedly compared
the action to the John Peter Zenger case as a landmark in
the history of free speech.
The Mayflower Doctrine was of dubious legality, but it
was important. It represented Fly and the FCC • s response to
the widespread belief that radio was a powerful propaganda
tool which was subject to potentially calamitous misuse.
Recalling the Yankee Network case, long-time FCC counsel
Harry Plotkin saw it as "a germ" of the Fairness Doctrine
but admitted, "in retrospect, most of us think it was a
mistake.
. . .Probably what should have been done was to go
after them for unfairness." But how could the Commission
determine what was fair? Plotkin suggested "it was
easier... to say to a station 'You shan't editorialize at
all' rather than to say 'If you're going to editorialize
759-70; Emlyn I. Griffith, "Mayflower Rule — Gone but Not
Forgotten," Cornell Law Quarterly 35 (1950), 574-91.
52 Donahue, The Battle to Control Broadcast News, 36.
5^ NAB president Justin Miller, no relation to Neville
Miller, quoted in "The Mayflower Doctrine Scuttled," l^On.
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you've got to be fair about it.." On balance, Plotkin said,
the Mayflower Doctrine limited vigorous discussion of the
issues and "the cure was worse than the malady. "54 m the
incendiary climate of the times, however, fairness and
balance were becoming increasingly problematic terms.
Opinion and propaganda were becoming synonymous.
Fly and his colleagues based their action on the broad
powers of program review which the Commission had gradually
assumed - and the courts had upheld - in the past. These
powers stemmed directly from the "public interest" clause
of the Communications Act and, Fly believed, gave the FCC
far-reaching responsibility to determine how broadcasting
could best serve the people. The Commission, he believed,
could not only assess what a station had actually put on
the air, it could measure an applicant against its ideal of
what a station should put on the air. As FCC assistant
general counsel Joseph Rauh had explained during the chain
broadcasting inquiry, "the Commission's licensing function
is to be exercised so that the radio stations operate in
the public interest, and this includes the power in my
judgment, to see that the licensee stations give the public
the service of which they are capable." That implied more
than "determining whether the service of a station is
satisfactory as compared to other stations, that is
determining what is black and what is white." The FCC, in
54 Plotkin, COHC, 25
388
other words, could in its role as protector of the public
interest go beyond what a station was to what it could
become and consider "the potential service it could render
freed from contractual restrict ions 55
An important part of that public interest ideal as
conceived by Fly and the FCC was fairness and impartiality.
Yet in the period immediately before Pearl Harbor, as both
the leaders of the industry and the FCC sought, in the
words of the Mayflower Doctrine, to impose on the medium
"the obligation of presenting all sides of important public
questions, fairly, objectively and without bias," broadcast
news and commentary was becoming increasingly personal and
opinionated. Despite repeated claims of absolute
impartiality from network executives, the men and women who
were producing the daily news broadcasts heard on the air
were displaying grave doubts that disinterested, factual
reporting served the greater goal of maintaining democracy.
Many of radio's leading journalists were promoting American
intervention in Europe.
Raymond Gram Swing, the most thoughtful and
intellectually stimulating of the era's radio commentators,
had described the professional crisis which confronted
55 Federal Communications Commission, Official Report
of Proceedings in the Matter of CowmiBBion ' b Order No. 37,
Investigation of Chain or Network Broadcasting, Monopoly in
the Broadcasting Industry and Related Matters, docket no.
5060, vol. 74 (December 2, 1940), 8736, record group 173,
box 1425, Washington National Records Center, National
Archives and Records Administration, Suitland, Maryland.
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broadcast journalists in 1939. In a speech delivered at the
New York World's Fair, where visitors in a time of
international conflict marveled at the perfect world of
tomorrow, Swing spoke of his profession's dilemma.
"In the good old days," Swing remarked, a reporter had
been expected to be "a living camera, registering
impressions accurately, and saying nothing about what they
meant." As war approached and fascism threatened the
foundations of democracy, such reporting was no longer
enough. "Today everybody has to be concerned about the
meaning of news," Swing argued, "Here is a time where the
correspondent who is indifferent to what things mean just
isn't a good correspondent."^"^
A reporter must honestly say what things mean, rather
than simply report disjointed actions as they occur.
Because they understood the importance of explaining what
events meant, and said so, the best reporters had been
accused by those who disagreed with them of editorializing,
coloring the news with "what used to be condemned as a
strong personal bias." This, in the superheated political
atmosphere of 1939, was a serious charge, but those who
feared that this kind of journalism was polluting public
Raymond Gram Swing, "Writing Contemporary History,
"
address delivered at the Hall of Music, New York World's
Fair, Flushing Meadows, May 10, 1939, text in box 1,
Raymond Gram Swing Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, DC.
^"^ Swing, "Writing Contemporary History," 4-5.
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discourse with dangerous propaganda were in error. What
critics called bias, Swing said, was actually "a strong
Bense of historic truth." Disinterested objectivity, the
camera-like recording of actions, no longer served the
profession, the nation or, ultimately, the truth, he
concluded, "because there is more truth in judgment than
there is [in] mere momentary accuracy. "^8
Swing did not call for his colleagues to abandon their
search for the truth. He simply reminded them that if
journalism was to fulfill its proper function in a
democracy, reporters had to remember what that function
was. Journalists were to provide the information that
informed public debate. For that debate to be fully
informed, he implied, reporters had to be certain that the
participants understood the possible results of their
decisions. Fascism was a threat to democracy, and that
truth had to be expressed. As the situation in Europe
deteriorated, radio journalists increasingly and explicitly
shared that truth with their listeners.
In March of 1941, Edward R. Murrow told his American
listeners of spring in England. As always, he carefully
observed the segment of history he was assigned to report,
but he also explained what things meant. "There's good
fighting weather ahead," he predicted, "In four days' time
^® Swing, "Writing Contemporary History," 5-6
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the moon will be full again and there's a feeling in the
air that big things will happen soon. "59
The British, standing alone after the collapse of the
French in June, had the year before withstood the brunt of
the German blitz. The courage of the outmanned Royal Air
Force and the stoic fortitude of London's citizens were
admired across the Atlantic by millions of Americans who
had heard Murrow and his colleagues describe it in
intimate, searing detail. The United States was still
sharply divided over whether or not the nation should go to
war, but with the passage of the Lend- Lease Act the month
before, the United States had cast its lot with the
British. As Murrow noted that Sunday afternoon, "This
island lives by its ships, and the ships will be carrying
supplies from America."
Murrow' s broadcasts had as Archibald MacLeish would
observe later that year brought the war home to the United
States. Now, he told his audience, the fate of democracy in
the Britain and the United States were intertwined. "The
course of Anglo-American relations will be smooth on the
surface," Murrow predicted, "but many people over here will
express regret because they believe America is making the
same mistakes Britain made." It would be up to Americans,
the government and people of the United States, to make the
5^ CBS network, March 9, 1941; Edward R. Murrow, This
IB London, ed. Elmer Davis (New York: Simon and Schuster,
1941) , 231-7
.
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necessary decisions "in the full light of publicity and
debate," he continued, "and no mere radio reporter has the
right to use the weight of monopolized opportunity in an
effort to influence those decisions ." so To Murrow, of
course, the decision was clear. Fascism had to be resisted
and democracy defended. If that required American military
intervention
- and he was convinced by 1941 it did - so be
it. Although he larded his report with the terminology of
objective reporting - prefacing his remarks with "many
people over here
. . . bel ieve
. .
.
" and "British statesmen are
fond of repeating..." - and explicitly stated that "no
mere radio reporter" should attempt to "influence" public
opinion on such a vital issue, his point of view is
obvious. Reading his text today, and imagining how it was
heard by his audience in 1941, the message is clear: The
focus of the conflict was shifting to the United States.
Appeasement and failure to stand ready to defend ourselves,
"the same mistakes the British made," would lead only to
war
.
Murrow was explaining to his audience what the events
unfolding before them meant. His views were shared by most
of the nation's leading radio news broadcasters including
virtually all of the network correspondents in Europe. The
changing climate of opinion was noted in the White House.
Robert Sherwood, who had joined the administration as a
60 Murrow, This ib London, 23 6
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speech writer for the 194 0 campaign, observed that radio
was building support for the Roosevelt administration's
increasingly interventionist policies. "The great American
foreign correspondents had for years been warning of the
menace of German and Japanese imperialism," he recalled.
"The voices of Edward R. Murrow and Fred Bate from London,
William L. Shirer from Berlin, Elmer Davis from New York,
Raymond Gram Swing from Washington, among many others, did
much to strengthen Roosevelt's position. "Si
Those few remaining isolationist broadcasters who did
not agree with the prevailing opinion, Murrow believed,
deserved only scorn. "Someday - perhaps before long if
things go on as they are," he wrote to Elmer Davis in the
fall of 1940, "I propose to say some pretty hard things
about American commentators and this war. "^2 ^e was
thinking, no doubt, of isolationists such as Mutual
• s Boake
Carter and Fulton Lewis, Jr. To fail to realize that the
future of democracy in the United States was inextricably
linked to the fate of Britain was, Murrow believed, simply
wrong
.
Murrow explicitly exempted Davis from his criticism
because, as Sherwood had noted, his fellow broadcaster had
^1 Robert E. Sherwood, Roosevelt and Hopkins: An
Intimate Hietory (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948), 165.
S2 Murrow to Davis, September 15, [1940],
correspondence folder, 1940-42, box 1, Elmer Davis Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
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become an increasingly outspoken advocate of American
intervention." Always strongly antifascist, Davis was
among those who were appalled by the British concessions at
Munich. The Chamberlain government's surrender to Hitler
confirmed his worst suspicions of the moral rot which
afflicted class-bound Britain. Certainly, Hitler presented
the greater threat to American democracy, but should the
United States fight to preserve England? Davis' evolution
from opponent of American military involvement to ardent
interventionist followed a path taken by many liberals in
the years before Pearl Harbor.
Davis analyzed the European crisis strictly in terms
of American self-interest which, broadly defined, he
equated with political democracy and liberal capitalism. ^4
How could the cost of another war to the United States be
balanced against the possibility of a German victory? In
February, 1939, Davis knew the question had to be asked,
but he was unsure of the answer. "We had better make up our
minds, in case anybody ever asks us, " he observed, "just
what there is in the present distribution of power in
See Alfred Haworth Jones, "The Making of an
Interventionist on the Air: Elmer Davis and CBS News 1939-
1941," Pacific Historical Review A2 (February 1973), 74-93
and Culbert, News for Everyman, 12 5-48.
Elmer Davis, "We Lose the Next War," Harper's
Magazine, March 1938, 338-42.
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Europe
... that is worth our fighting for. "65 ^^^^ ^^^^^
^
with the Allies giving ground on the battlefield, Davis
took a more activist position but still stopped short of
endorsing intervention. "To those who say that we must shun
involvement no matter what happens," he wrote, "it might be
said that whenever we judge that direct American interests
are threatened we are damned fools if we leave defense of
those interests to Providence." For the time being,
however, material aid to the Allies was commitment enough;
"anything else, at present, would accomplish no good at all
commensurate with its coBt."^^
In the spring of 1941, as Murrow warned of coming
German offensives and reminded Americans of their role in
deciding the fight, Davis went to London. p^j. fi^re weeks,
with Murrow as his host, he revisited the city and
countryside he had kno\'m thirty years before as a Rhodes
scholar at Oxford and broadcast his Columbia commentaries
from the bombproof basement studios of the British
Broadcasting Corporation. When he returned to New York,
Davis made his case against isolationism and on behalf of
increased American involvement. "This war can be won,"
^5 Elmer Davis, "Is England Worth Fighting For?" New
Republic, February 15, 1939, 35.
66 Elmer Davis, "The War and America," Harper's
Magazine, April 194 0, 4 82.
67 See Elmer Davis, "Journey to England, 1941:
Footnotes for a Future Gibbon," Harper's Magazine, August
1941, 225-36.
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DaviB told his network audience, "but it won't be easy. m
fact, he said, "unless the American people want to win it
badly enough to work at it - harder than we are working
now, which is to say that unless we produce more war
material than we are producing now and see that far more of
when we produce gets to England, the war may be lost. "68
It was no longer enough for the United States to be
the arsenal of democracy, Davis explained. The British
could no longer transport food and munitions across the
Atlantic alone in the teeth of the German submarine wolf
packs. "We shall have to help see that the stuff gets
there," Davis continued, "That means convoys, which may
mean shooting, but if Hitler should win this war, there's
likely to be some shooting afterwards which would no longer
be on the other side of the Atlantic. "^9 By the early
summer of 194 1, Davis had become, as historian Alfred Jones
observed, "an advocate of belligerency in all but name.""0
By any standard, this was a controversial view, going well
beyond the declared policy of the United States government.
Davis' broadcasts seemed to violate both Columbia's
internal policies and the industry's voluntary agreement on
68 Davis broadcast "a digest and conclusions" of what
he had observed in England over the Columbia network. The
"greater part" of the broadcast was published as Elmer
Davis, letter to the editor, Saturday Review of Literature,
June 14, 1941, 9.
69 Davis, letter to the editor, 17.
'^^ Jones, "The Making of an Interventionist," 92.
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on or
war coverage which pledged that no news analyst would "be
allowed to say anything in an effort to influence acti
opinion of others one way or the other, "^i However, both
propaganda and objectivity are subjective terms. Davis
would argue that his conclusions were based on careful
reporting and analysis, the basic tools of the independent
journalist. Isolationists such as Wheeler and Mundt saw
signs of underlying bias and willful distortion of the
facts in order to reach a predetermined end. Those who
hoped to keep the United States out of the war agreed with
Sherwood's assessment of radio's impact. The reports from
Murrow, Davis, Swing and the others were building support
for Roosevelt's policy, and isolationists took frequent pot
shots at the same news broadcasters the White House
praised. As the lend-lease vote approached, Wheeler,
explicitly invoking the principles of the Mayflower
Doctrine, charged network commentators were "not only
editorializing, but in many instances propagandizing" for
war. He fired off letters to each of the networks asking
them "to furnish me with a list of commentators, together
with the names of their sponsors, and if the sponsor is a
corporation, to give me the name of the president of the
company, and the members of the Board of Directors ." "^^ Left
71 "Memorandum of European War Coverage," NAB
[National Association of Broadcasters] Reports 7 (September
15, 1939) , 3717-8
.
"72 Quoted in "Isolationist, Bitter, Turns on Radio,"
Variety, February 19, 1941, 24. While attacking
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unsaid was the implicit threat of letter-writing campaigns
and consumer boycotts against companies sponsoring
"propaganda .
"
The secretary of the New York chapter of America First
said radio had failed to balance "interventionist"
commentators such as Davis, Kaltenborn and Dorothy Thompson
with "non-interventionists" and was guilty of unfairness . 73
Mundt, expressing concern over what he called "emotionalism
and hysteria" on the radio, singled out Kaltenborn-
s
"frequent extremes in excitation." Radio had acted to tone
down radio drama after the "War of the Worlds" broadcast,
he said, and he hoped radio executives would not need
"legislative stimulus or restraint" to convince them to
"use equal discretion in not permitting factual reporting
to be colored by hysterical and emotional commentators
whose inflections and intonations can well induce emotional
upsets and develop panicky thinking if they carelessly or
deliberately engage in all the histrionics of their art
instead of functioning simply as reporters of the news.""^^
Mundt ' s comments, of course, virtually paraphrased the
networks
' memorandum on war coverage
.
commentators in general. Wheeler's main target appears to
have been Mutual ' s Raymond Gram Swing.
73 "Mary Hiller Charges 'Interventionists' Get Breaks;
Sneers at Wheeler Praise," Variety, April 16, 1941, 28.
"^^ Mundt, "A Question Radio Executives Should Ponder,"
3547
.
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Broadcasters groped for a practical way of meeting
this standard. By offering balanced amounts of free time to
advocates of controversial causes, radio could present
quantifiable, defensible evidence of its evenhandedness
. By
refusing to sell time for the promotion of controversial
issues, the industry could deflect charges that freedom of
speech was available only to those who could afford to buy
it. By refusing to editorialize in their own names,
networks and stations could argue they were not abusing
their privileged positions as guardians of the public's
airwaves. By pledging to harness opinionated commentators,
broadcasters could present carefully crafted statements of
good intentions to truculent critics.
While these policies provided some measure of
protection to the industry, radio's increasingly
sophisticated coverage of war news was threatening to
create an especially difficult problem. That in war, truth
is the first casualty is a commonplace, but it is one which
deserves analysis. "^^ Certainly military censorship and the
fog of battle present formidable obstacles to even the most
well-intentioned observer. Add to that the burden of social
and cultural assumptions any reporter brings to the story.
Phillip Knight ley, The First Casualty: From the
Crimea to Vietnam : The War Correspondent as Hero,
Propagandist , and Myth Maker (New York: Harcourt Brace
Jovanovich, 1975) is a jaundiced chronicle of war
correspondence. Knightley credits the title phrase to Sen.
Hiram Johnson of California in 1917.
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and the search for truth - if such a thing exists -
becomes a fool's errand. For radio, which because it was
primarily emotional was fundamentally irrational, the
search for objective truth was especially futile.
When Murrow spoke of the resolute Londoner enduring
the terrors of the blitz or of the shopkeeper's
uncomprehending response to the suggestion that his store
might be bombed before winter's end, he was reporting
facts, but he was more importantly conveying emotions. The
search for the telling detail which would bring the
atmosphere of a city far away to a listener at home led
inevitably to what Cesar Saerchinger, Murrow' s predecessor
as European representative for CBS, called "a surfeit of
impressionism.
" Eyewitness accounts were factual in that
they recorded events which had occurred but necessarily
emotional, "and for the American public to be told for the
nth time from Paris that the French were resolute, and from
London that the British were keeping their chins up, was
apt to sound like propaganda, whether intentional or
not . "'s
Critics of the Roosevelt administration's domestic
policies were equally convinced that the content of news
reports was tainted. They remained certain that the
combination of the FCC ' s licensing power and the
"^^ Cesar Saerchinger, "Radio, Censorship and
Neutrality," Foreign Affaire 18 (January 1940), 344.
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adminiBtration's formidable publicity machinery would
strangle freedom of the air. The broadcasters were not
really at fault. Republican Representative George Bender of
Ohio said. It was the politicized FCC that was to blame. No
broadcaster. Bender said, "knowing full well that his
license is subject to termination is going to invite that
kind of penalty by not opening his microphones to 'official
news' which has been signed, sealed, and delivered by the
recognized authority, ""^"^
Radio's dilemma was furthered by the reaction of its
listeners. The broadcaster's words were shaped by the
audience's preconceptions. A study of a thousand New York
area listeners conducted in the winter of 1940-41 revealed
not only overwhelming sympathy for the British and
hostility toward the Germans but a strong tendency to
believe news reports citing British sources while
disbelieving news from Germany. One implication to be drawn
about. the typical radio listener, Variety reported, was
"that because of this predisposition — or mental pattern —
"^"^ Quoted in "Congressmen Divide on Party Lines
Concerning 'Censorship' Menace; Deny Mel let Rap of Fulton
Lewis," Variety, April 2, 1941, 23. During the budget
debate concerning the Office of Government Reports,
Republicans charged OGR director Lowell Mellet had "cursed"
Mutual ' s conservative commentator Fulton Lewis, Jr. and
threatened to have him "heaved off the air." Lewis would
remain on the air for years to come, but the fact the
charge was made — and earnestly denied by Roosevelt
partisans — indicates that administration opponents
believed such allegations would resonate among
constituencies fearful of New Deal domination of the radio
industry.
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he could perhaps be propagandized
... within certain
limits. "78 Listeners predisposed to support the British and
oppose the Germans, or support intervention and oppose
isolation, would hear in a radio report, no matter how
carefully balanced, the news they wished to hear.
As the elusive nature of objectivity became more and
more evident, and the interventionist tilt of network
coverage more apparent, the industry as a matter of policy
clung to its stated credo of unbiased reporting more and
more tenaciously. At CBS, the news leader, the network's
analysts, as Columbia insisted on describing its
commentators, remained a particular problem. "^^ The
politically acute Paley remained constantly concerned about
his news programs and how the analysts' comments and the
reporters' dispatches would play in Washington. Murrow, the
jev/el in Columbia's crown, remained largely above the fray.
His frequent statements of impartiality, both on the air
and in public appearances, placed him solidly on the record
Edgar A. Grunwald, "Schwerin Survey Timely in Light
of Isolationist's Newscast Issue," Variety, February 19,
1941, 24. The survey was conducted by market researcher
Horace Schwerin of Specter Advertising in cooperation with
WOR.
Columbia's difficulty in coming up with an
appropriate title for its broadcast journalists became a
running joke among the network's staffers. Murrow in 194 3
referred to himself in a letter to Davis as "reporter,
commentator, analyst or whatever circumlocution Columbia
has now dreamed up to describe its wage slaves." Murrow to
Davis, December 15, 1943, "Correspondence 1943-46" file,
box 1, Davis Papers.
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as supportive of the network's policy whatever private
doubts he had and however his listeners understood his
words
.
The voluble Kaltenborn proved especially troublesome,
but by May of 1940, he was no longer Columbia's problem.
Kaltenborn's sponsor switched the commentator's broadcasts
from CBS to NBC. Despite his popularity with listeners,
Kaltenborn had long been an irritant due to his insistence
on voicing his own opinions, and Paley made no real attempt
to keep him. 80 shortly after his departure, when
Representative Mundt attacked Kaltenborn for his "frequent
extremes of excitation," Columbia vice-president Harry
Butcher was assigned to placate the congressman. In a
telephone conversation and subsequent letter, Butcher
restated the network's policies and explained, according to
Mundt, "how certain radio commentators had been
discontinued because their methods were on the side of the
hysterical rather than the factual" and how "radio was
constantly watching its programs to keep them in harmony
with the best interests of the country. "^^ Butcher
apparently mentioned no names — Mundt mentioned none — but
80 See David G. Clark, "H.V. Kaltenborn and his
Sponsors: Controversial Broadcasting and the Sponsor's
Role," Journal of Broadcasting- 12 (Fall 1968), 309-21 and
Culbert, Newe for Everyman, 76-80.
81 Butcher to Mundt, June 5, 194 0 in "Columbia
Broadcasting System Answers Congressman Mundt ' s Open
Question to Radio Executives," 76th Cong., 3rd sess.,
CongreBBional J?ecorc?( June 7, 1940), vol. 86, pt . 16, 3644-5
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the network had within the past two years shed both Boake
Carter and Kaltenborn. Kaltenborn felt compelled to send a
letter to the congressman for publication in the
ConcfreBBional Record restating his position that the move
to NBC had been solely a business matter and any suggestion
that he had been "dismissed" by CBS was "unfounded. "^^ That
Butcher would tell Mundt the network had discontinued
hysterical commentators - and Columbia did not challenge
Mundt ' s account of the discussion - reflects Columbia's
eagerness to portray itself as a responsible public servant
which could be trusted to keep its own house in order
without government intervention.
Davis, too, caused CBS concern. The commentator spoke
each evening from 8:55 until 9:00, in the heart of
Columbia's prime time schedule. His talents and visibility
brought him praise and wealth, and Columbia profited as
well, directly by the advertising revenue Davis generated
and indirectly by the audience he attracted which remained
tuned in. He was radio's highest paid newsman, and the New-
York TinteE called him "the Mount Everest of commentators,
towering in serenity and grandeur over the foothill
®2 Kaltenborn to Mundt, June 12, 194 0 in "More About
Radio in Wartime," 76th Cong., 3rd sess., CongreBsional
Record (June 18, 1940), vol. 86, pt . 16, 3992-3. While the
evidence shows that CBS was not upset that Kaltenborn
switched networks, the commentator's claim that his sponsor
was pleased with his work is valid. Pure Oil, which picked
up Kaltenborn' s broadcasts in 1939, continued to sponsor
him until 1953.
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Caseandras of hie time. "83 Davis' grandeur made him an
inviting target for critics, however, as did his penchant
for frankly stating his beliefs. Paley would meet Davis for
lunch at least once a month and, Columbia's president would
recount years later, caution the commentator that he was
straying from the network's policy of neutrality, often
appearing to "get too much viewpoint in" to his nightly
broadcasts. 84 Any potential showdown was averted because
Davis resigned in 1942 to head the Office of War
Information. Tension seems to have lingered. When the war
ended, Paley expressed no serious interest in rehiring
Davis, sending a staff lawyer to deliver a perfunctory
offer to Davis' agent while the presidents of NBC, ABC and
Mutual each personally courted the commentator
.
Paley '6 concern over maintaining the appearance of
objectivity was passed down the ranks through White and on
to the network staff, apparently with some frequency. In
May of 1940, as the German Army rumbled through the low
countries and into France, White wrote to his European
correspondents. "At the risk of sounding like a phonograph
record, I should like to stress again the vital necessity
®^ Quoted in Bernard Roshco, "A Giant Named Elmer,
"
WaBhington tlournalism Review, December 1991, 35. Davis was
making $53,000 a year in 1942.
84 Quoted in Smith, In All Hie Glory, 192.
85 Smith, In All His Glory, 233-4. Davis signed with
ABC.
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for objectivity." He cited no specific violations of the
network's policy instead praising William L. Shirer
'
s
reports from the front as positive examples of objective
journalism. The broadcasts, he said, "stand out as
masterpieces of reporting and created an excellent
impression here."^^ ghirer had covered the offensive from
the German side, traveling through Belgium with the Sixth
Army. All of his broadcasts were carefully vetted by
mil itary censors
.
®^ White to "Dear Gang" [European staff], [May 25
1940], Marrow Papers, reel 15, folder 164, frame 0062.'
William L. Shirer, 20th Century Journey: A Memoir
of a Life and the Times, vol. II: The Nightmare Years,
1930-1940 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1984) , 491-516. American
broadcasters maintained a curious relationship with German
censors until American reporters were banished from Berlin
in 1941. Shirer observed in his memoirs "that you could say
a great deal if you were not too careless in how you said
it." Frequently, German authorities were quite helpful.
When the invasion of the low countries began, Shirer was
awaJcened by a telephone call from a state radio staffer
informing him of the offensive and asking, "You want to go
on the air soon?" After arranging transmitter time, censors
refused to allow Shirer to refer to "an invasion" in his
opening sentence, but agreed to allow him to say the army
had "marched into" Holland and Belgium, a compromise Shirer
found acceptable. When the armistice was signed at
Compiegne June 22, Shirer and NBC's William KerJcer
described the ceremony in a joint broadcast over a special
high-quality line installed by German radio. Shirer, 20th
Century Journey, II, 395, 490, 494, 531-43. When NBC's
Hjalmar Baukhage broadcast from Berlin in the first month
of the war, state radio provided not only facilities but a
staff announcer to heartily deliver the commentator's
standard opening cue: "Let's listen to Baulchage ! " NBC
networlc, September 14, 1939, in Motion Picture,
Broadcasting and Recorded Sound Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, DC. Both sides realized the
importance of radio in shaping American public opinion and
did their best to present a positive image to listeners in
the United States.
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In July of 1941, White and Eric Sevareid engaged in
heated argument over a Sevareid dispatch from Washington
which White insisted had crossed the line dividing analysis
and opinion. 88 After reporting to his listeners that
President Roosevelt had returned to Washington ready to
"take up again the thread of defense preparations,"
Sevareid criticized the way the nation's journalists were
covering the neutrality debate. Broadcasters and writers,
he suggested, were carrying the idea of balance and
fairness too far at a time when the nation was in a state
of emergency. Every statement by the president would be
countered by a predictable response, pro or con. "You know,
for example that Representative Bloom will applaud the
President's speech, and that Senator Wheeler will frown
upon it." This did nothing to advance democratic debate,
Sevareid continued. It merely encouraged pointless argument
and dangerous delay. "Is there not grave danger," he
concluded, "that continued talk is becoming a substitute
for action, in a world where we know that action alone can
save a people?"
Sevareid had carefully phrased his comments as a
question, a common rhetorical technique for sheltering a
point of view, but White was not deceived. He believed the
broadcast was a direct slap at the network's policies.
88 WJSV and CBS network, July 5, 1941, script in
"Broadcasts 1939-42" folder, box Dl, Eric Sevareid Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.
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"With reference to your script of July 5," White wrot
"the more I read it the less I like it."
It is essential in a democracy that anyone and
everyone should have his say at all times. Thus,
I cannot agree with you that there is any
journalistic problem at all. I grant you that you
said you were not certain of the answers to the
questions you raised, but it seems to me that
your very raising of the questions was a sort of
answer in itself.
"Briefly," White concluded, "it seems to me that you
ventured into a dangerous line of territory.
Four days later, Sevareid replied with a thoughtful
defense of his original broadcast and critique of how the
press in general and Columbia in particular was covering
the neutrality debate. 3° "To my mind," he wrote, "there are
irresponsible men in this country who [are] dividing and
confusing the people." While he "would not for one moment
deny them access to the press or radio," a journalist "must
daily exercise judgment on these things." This is "our
problem and our responsibility.
"
"I am not suggesting that gentlemen like Wheeler and
Lindbergh be silenced or denied access to the means of
reaching the public," Sevareid wrote. Given "the present
crisis," however, journalism's commitment to balance and
White to Sevareid, July 7, 1941, in "Personal
Correspondence, 1941" folder, box Al, Sevareid Papers.
5° Sevareid to White, July 11, 1941, corrected typed
draft in "Personal Correspondence, 1941" folder, Box Al,
Sevareid Papers.
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fairness had gone too far. The industry had become a
prisoner of its ovm rhetoric. Editors, Sevareid suggested
"have a downright sensation of guilt" every time they give
Wheeler and Lindbergh publicity. "But they are buffaloed!
They do not want to contribute to confusion and disunity,"
he said, "but they are afraid of being accused of denying
freedom of speech.
" Radio was especially reluctant to
silence the isolationists, Sevareid suggested, because the
industry was liable to retaliation. "Wheeler keeps us all
frightened by his attacks on radio commentators and his
strategic position in the Senate."
"In brief, Paul," Sevareid concluded, "I think we have
reached the point in this country where we face the old
problem of a democracy where we have to decide what is free
speech and what is filibuster."
White's response to Sevareid' s letter was somev/hat
more temperate than his first letter, but he remained as
strongly committed to the network's policy as ever. "I will
grant you there is a journalistic problem, " he conceded.
Continually quoting the same few sources "is tired and
perhaps lazy journalism." On the other hand, he wrote, "I
don't believe that you have any more right to discuss your
private opinions in the guise of a reporter than I would
have to instruct CBS correspondents to plead for a
negotiated peace."
White made no reference to Sevareid's charge that the
industry was "frightened" by Wheeler. By the summer of
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1941, perhaps no response was needed because the record was
BO clear. White was enforcing a network policy which had in
large part been shaped by the industry's attempts to
regulate itself rather than be further regulated by the
Btate
.
The FCC in May had finally issued its report on chain
broadcasting, and the recommendations had confirmed the
networks' worst fears. NBC and CBS, the Commission
concluded, were through long-term, exclusive contracts with
affiliates across the country unfairly limiting
competition. Both chains were ordered to loosen their hold
on their affiliates, and NBC was ordered to divest itself
of one of its two networks, Both CBS and NBC claimed the
FCC was jeopardizing their ability to do business and filed
suit to block the new regulations. The Commission had
anticipated the networks' response and included a warning
to the broadcasters in its report. If the networks could
not in fact thrive under the new regulations, the
Commission concluded, "we must frankly concede that
broadcasting is not properly a competitive industry. " In
that case. Congress must create a new regulatory structure
^1 Federal Communications Commission, "Commission
Order in Docket No. 506 0, In the Matter of the
Investigation of Chain Broadcasting," May 2, 1941, Report
on Chain Broadcasting, 91-2. Rather than seek to directly
regulate the networks, the FCC attacked through its power
to license individual stations, stating, for example, that
"no license shall be issued to a standard broadcast station
affiliated with an organization which maintains more than
one network .
"
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"appropriate to a noncompetitive industry with adequate
safeguards to protect listeners, advertisers, and
consumers. "92 The debate over radio regulation, it
appeared, was far from over.
Sevareid's broadcast and his subsequent letter reveal
a strong disagreement between respected broadcast
journalists over the ideal of balance so strongly promoted
by the network. Perhaps, as a relatively junior member of
the CBS news department, Sevareid lacked the sophistication
to conceal sufficiently his views and the standing to avoid
a direct reprimand. Murrow and Davis enjoyed greater
prestige and listenership and had mastered the artful
disclaimer. It is not difficult to imagine how Murrow, for
instance, would have framed Sevareid's original script with
references to "members of the diplomatic corps," "concerned
Congressmen" or "administration sources." The message would
have remained the same, but it would have been couched in
the terminology of objective journalism.
Radio's growing emphasis on factual, reportorial
journalism as the Second World War approached was neither
the inevitable result of journalistic maturity nor
advertising pressures. As the possibility of American
intervention in the war became a matter of debate,
broadcast journalists became less and less certain of their
ability to discern the truth and more and more convinced
92 FCC, Report on Chain Broadcast incf, 88-9.
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that the impending crisis was such a fundamental challenge
to democracy that, like all Americans who understood the
gravity of the moment, they were obliged to sound the
warning. They could most effectively do this, as Davis had
candidly admitted, while adopting the objective style of
factual reporting.
Advertisers as always sought programming which
attracted attentive audiences and showcased their messages
in a complimentary frame. If audiences tuned to news,
advertisers would follow. The nightly reviews of popular
commentators such as Davis, Thomas and Kaltenborn were
sponsored, but the majority of news programs were
sustaining programs. While a few advertisers such as Ford
sought to advance their own political agendas, most were
content to follow the ratings, drawing the line only when
their product was attacked.
The primary impetus for the increasing emphasis on
factual reportage was network policy, best documented by
Columbia's repeated claims of absolute impartiality. The
question then becomes: Why did the networks insist they
demanded objectivity even if their programs contained what
can only be described as expressions of personal opinion?
Some advertisers were more tolerant than others.
Columbia's Arthur Godfrey, for instance, made a habit of
kidding his sponsors. A few were upset, but most, notably
Lipton Tea, egged him on, realizing that his jibes were
merely additional advertising.
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The answer can be found by examining the political climate
of the time.
The broadcasting industry's fear of damaging federal
regulation played a vital role in shaping what Americans
heard on the air. The late New Deal's renewed attention to
monopoly, personified at the FCC by Chairman Fly,
crystallized that fear, but more profound cultural
influences were also at play. From the beginning, radio was
synonymous with freedom: freedom from the physical
constraints of space and time, from the boredom of everyday
existence, but also more fundamental freedoms. The new
medium promised freedom of information which could mean
political and economic freedom, too.
By allowing every American immediate and equal access
to information, by freeing information from corporate and
governmental control, radio promised to fulfill the promise
of democracy. As radio the industry became increasingly
centralized, the democratic promise of radio the medium
seemed to many to be slipping away. Opponents of
centralization, governmental or corporate, sought to save
their medium from monopoly. Unable to agree on how best to
achieve their goal, they could develop no coherent policy
to challenge the American System of Broadcasting.
The motley amalgam of New Dealers, prairie populists,
social conservatives, liberal reformers and political
opportunists who attacked the industry was far too diverse
to reach agreement. The leaders of the broadcasting
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business, on the other hand, were fighting to protect an
industry which had in the space of two decades grown into a
wealthy and much loved institution. The builders of the
industry felt their rewards were well worth the sacrifice
of their right to speak out on the issues. Let that be
someone else's job. They would be content to provide the
platform and collect the fees.
Ironically, radio could not escape the burdens of
citizenship. The medium, despite its protestations, helped
shape America in the years between the wars, economically
and politically. And in the final years of peace, as radio
cried the loudest that it was not in business to promote
one point of view rather than another, it played a crucial
role. Radio broadcasts brought the conflict home and made
the world war that many Americans hoped to avoid a reality.
It was oddly fitting that when the debate over America's
participation in the war ended on December 7, 1941, most
Americans first learned of the attack on Pearl Harbor from
their radios. The first bulletins that Sunday afternoon
were models of objective, factual reporting, but, like
Murrow's equally objective accounts of the London blitz,
the dispassionate statements of facts unleashed a torrent
of emotions. It was the nature of radio that these hopes
and fears ultimately created a far more accurate truth than
mere facts could construct.
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EPILOGUE
"OBJECTIVE NEWS REPORTING IS NOT ENOUGH"^
After Pearl Harbor, the neutrality debate which had
divided the nation crashed to a halt. The question of what
role the United States would play in the conflict and how
radio would address the controversy was suddenly moot. Now,
Americans overwhelmingly agreed, there was only one side of
the question worth hearing. Radio rushed to enlist in the
war effort, becoming "a voluntary propagandist" in the
great struggle to defend democracy. 2 Radio boosted morale
on the home front with flag-waving entertainment and
publicity. Across the Pacific and into Africa and Europe,
the Signal Corps set up scores of radio stations to
entertain the troops with recorded programs from back
home . ^ Network correspondents accompanying Allied forces
^ Paul White, editorial broadcast, "KFMB Editorial
Page," June 1, 1951, text in Edward R . Murrow Papers 1927-
1965 (Sanford, North Carolina: Microfilming Corporation of
America, 1982) , reel 21, folder 287, frame 0016.
2 See James L. Baughman, The Republic of Mass Culture:
Journal i em, Filmmaking, and Broadcasting in America since
1941 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).
^ The best contemporary account of the broadcasting
industry's war effort is Edward M. Kirby and Jack W.
Harris, Star -Spangled Radio (Chicago: Ziff-Davis, 1948)
.
Some network broadcasters including John Houseman of
Columbia's Mercury Theatre of the Air and many refugees
from European radio studios joined the new Voice of America
which beamed programs to occupied territory behind German
lines. They, too, would discover the problems inherent in
objective journalism. See Holly Cowan Shulman, The Voice of
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brought the story of the war home with gripping reports
from the front. The most memorable - such as Edward R.
Murrow's description of a bombing run over the
"orchestrated hell" of Berlin in 1943 and the eyewitness
account of the Normandy invasion in 1944 by George Hicks
aboard the Ancon - featured vivid, first
-person reportage
replete with telling details, hallmarks of the objective
style of factual reporting which had become the networks'
standard in the late 1930s.
^
Disputes over opinionated news broadcasting were rare
in the first years of the war. Broadcasters willingly
cooperated with voluntary censorship guidelines developed
by the government, and no commentator could hope to attract
an audience by opposing the war effort or by jeopardizing
the lives of our boys overseas. As the tide turned in the
allies' favor and the question became when, not whether,
the war would be won, however, government leaders began to
turn their attention to the coming peace. So, too, did
radio commentators
.
America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941-1945 (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press^ 1991).
^ Throughout the war, the networks stubbornly clung to
their policy forbidding recorded news programs. There were,
however, exceptions to the rule. Radio reporters who
attempted to capture the sound of battle for later
broadcast were forced to rely on cumbersome and
temperamental technology. Hicks' description of the
Normandy landing was recorded on a "portable" machine which
transcribed sound on movie film and weighed seventy-five
pounds. Magnetic sound recording tape was developed in
Germany and did not fall into American hands until later in
1944 .
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In 1943, Columbia's Cecil Brown charged on the air
that allied leaders were failing to rally the public behind
a vision of a truly democratic postwar world. Brown's
broadcasts created a furor, and CBS reacted. News director
Paul White again defended the precepts of objectivity and
impartiality that had been enshrined in the network's
memorandum on European war coverage and became embroiled in
a public controversy over biased news and the right of
radio commentators to offer their opinions.
^
Brown was one of Columbia's wartime stars, albeit one
with a history of alienating both sponsors and co-workers.
"Of all the people who came up in those days," William L.
Shirer later said, "he had the most swelled head of
anybody." Brown himself admitted the point, saying he had
been "one of the first prima donnas" and never considered
himself "part of the team. He had been aboard the H14S
Repulee when she was sunk by the Japanese in 1941, and he
had covered the fall of Singapore. While the British were
fighting the Japanese, the hot-tempered Brown was fighting
the British censors. White was concerned enough about his
correspondent's "crusading" attitude to telegraph a
warning: "Please exercise caution regarding faultfinding
5 The best account of the Brown affair is Craig D.
Tenney, "The 1943 Debate on Opinionated Broadcast News,"
Journaliem History 7 (Spring 1980), 11-5. For White's side
of the story, see Paul W. White, News on the Air (New York
Harcourt, Brace, 1947), 198-207.
6 Quoted in Tenney, "The 1943 Debate on Opinionated
Broadcast News," 13.
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except where it is necessary in any objective news
reporting Public will feel you are paying off old
debts . "7
As Roosevelt and Churchill parlayed at Quebec in 1943,
Brown criticized them for a failure in leadership. People
across the United States, he suggested, were no longer sure
what they were fighting for. Like Wilson and Lloyd George,
the allies were winning the war, he said, but they might
lose the peace unless they rallied their nations in support
of a just future. White responded with a stinging reprimand
describing the broadcast as "a statement of what Cecil
Brown thinks, of what Cecil Brown would have done had he
been President Roosevelt, disregarding the very obvious
truth that the people did not elect Cecil Brown but did
elect President Roosevelt. After a confrontation with
White, Brown resigned and went public, claiming he had been
victimized by censorship.
The resulting controversy reignited the battle over
objectivity in broadcast news. Brown claimed his assessment
of the nation's mood was based on conversations he had had
during a recent nationwide speaking tour and was every bit
as valid and as unbiased as Davis' heralded reports on the
mood of the British people aired by Columbia two years
Quoted in Edward Bliss, Jr. Now the News: The Story
of Broadcast Journal i em (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1991) , 124
.
8 Quoted in Tenney, "The 1943 Debate on Opinionated
Broadcast News," 13.
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before. H.V. Kaltenborn and NBC commentator John Vandercook
were among those who rallied to Brown's defense. Kaltenborn
insisted that "no news analyst worth his salt could or
would be completely neutral or objective.
. . .Every exercise
of his editorial judgment constitutes an expression of
opinion. "9 Vandercook shared a CBS microphone with White on
a broadcast devoted to discussing the controversy and said
the network suffered from a "basic fallacy." How, he asked,
could CBS say with certainty what was true? "Only self-
appointed censors and only those of a dictatorial trend of
mind,
" Vandercook said, "have ever been so vain as even to
claim that they could make that fine distinction. "^0
Brown, Kaltenborn and Vandercook were all expressing a
modern, practical view of journalistic objectivity which
had been evolving through the interwar years. It was
impossible, they believed, for any reporter to discern the
absolute truth. Given that, journalists should attempt to
be factual, fair and balanced while sharing their
interpretations with the audience. This, they believed, was
a better measure than the unattainable standard of absolute
impartiality the networks had established. White disagreed.
"The Golden Rule is unattainable, too, " he wrote in 1947 as
s Quoted in White, News on the Air, 204.
1° Quoted in White, News on the Air, 2 05. That CBS
would devote a program to airing its dirty linen is further
evidence of the network's stubborn commitment to its
policies, in this case, the promise to offer free time for
the discussion of controversial issues.
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he recalled the controversy, "but it has been the
cornerstone of Christianity for close to two thousand years
- and who would discard it as a precept even if mankind is
so frail it can't live by it?"ii
Impartiality had also been a cornerstone of the
broadcasting industry's defense of its stewardship of the
air. In the aftermath of the Brown affair, Columbia
restated its belief in radio's neutrality, white
distributed a new policy statement to his staff, reworking
Edward Klauber's 1939 memorandum to emphasize the ban on
editorializing. The network then proudly published the
complete text as a full -page advertisement in the New York
TimeB
.
"First off, let it be emphasized that Columbia has no
editorial views except in regard to radio itself," White
began, mincing no words, "By extension, those men selected
by us to interpret or analyze the news must also refrain
from expression of editorial opinion or our non-editorial
policy becomes an empty shell."
The heart of Columbia's argument as presented by White
recapitulates familiar themes. Radio frequencies are a
11 White, NewB on the Air, 2 04.
12 "Why Neither CBS News Broadcasters nor CBS News
Sponsors 'Opinionate' the News." display advertisement, New
York Times, September 20, 1943, 40. Klauber had by this
time been forced out at CBS after an internal power
struggle with Paley and Paul Kesten. Klauber's role would
be filled by Dr. Frank Stanton, who would remain Paley'
s
chief administrator until he, too, was forced to retire in
1973 .
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finite public resource and CBS, as a steward of that
resource, must not create "a powerful and one sided
position on serious issues." The network must not, in other
words, create an information monopoly. By setting aside
time for balanced discussion of public controversies and
refusing to sell time to advocates, the network had proved
its commitment to freedom of speech. That good work would
be undone, White wrote, "if a small group of men, some
thirty or forty news analysts who have nationwide audiences
and have regular broadcasting periods in which to build
loyal listeners, take advantage of their 'preferred
positions' and become pulpiteers."
To permit these men to preach their own views
would be to create for CBS news a super-editorial
page, instead of no editorial page at all. Then
freedom of the air, within the genuine spirit of
democracy, would be merely a hollow phrase. There
is no sense to the idea of erecting a barricade
that will protect public opinion from one-sided
assault and then drilling holes in that defense
whereby men in our own employ are permitted just
such assault
.
"CBS recognizes that 100 per cent achievement of these news
ideals is not possible," he added. "The great importance of
these policies, we feel, lies in their resolute direction,
not in minor human deviation.
"
Commentators had long understood that their audiences
expected to hear not only the latest headlines, but their
points of view on what it all meant as well. They also
understood that absolute objectivity was an unattainable
goal. Was White, as he claimed, simply a true believer in
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the quest for impartiality despite human weakness? Or did
Columbia and its news director have different goals in
mind?
Clearly, White, the old United Press man, wanted his
reporters to get it fast and get it right. He also
understood that "it" was meaningless unless his reporters
placed events in context. Did he not see, as so many of his
colleagues argued, that interpretation inevitably included
opinion? He was far too good a newsman and too aware of the
power of the medium to believe that random facts expanded
public knowledge. White, however, was more than a newsman.
He was part of the administrative structure of his network
and industry.
By 1943, Columbia had established itself not only as
the leader in broadcast journalism but as the leader of the
industry's efforts to define itself to the public and the
government. Whether the issue was drug advertising,
children's shows or public affairs programming, CBS had
been quick to declare its commitment to broadcasting in the
public interest. The network's public response to Brown's
commentaries should be seen as another part of its ongoing
campaign to protect itself.
The battle between the broadcasting industry and the
government had escalated following the FCC ' s announcement
of new network regulations in May of 1941. NBC and CBS had
sued to block the new rules, and the Justice Department had
responded by filing antitrust suits against the networks.
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In May of 1943, the Supreme Court had upheld the FCC.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Felix Frankfurter
declared that the FCC had acted within the scope of its
powers as defined by the Communications Act, and the chain
broadcasting regulations represented "a proper exercise" of
governmental power. The Supreme Court's affirmation of
the FCC's authority cleared the way for implementation of
the chain rules and, by declaring that the FCC had been
acting within the law, made it clear that future battles
over the basic shape of American broadcasting would be
decided in the pol it ical arena
.
Although domestic politics took a back seat to the war
effort following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the collapse
of the New Deal legislative coalition continued. The 1942
elections saw more gains by Republicans and anti-New Deal
Southern Democrats in both the House and Senate. The nation
was veering to the right and retreat ing from the act iv ism
of the New Deal. Representative Martin Dies of Texas
intensified his crusade to unearth "subversives" in
government and charged the FCC had become a hotbed of un-
American activities. Soon after the Supreme Court ruled on
the chain broadcasting case in 1943, a special House
committee chaired by Representative Eugene Cox of Georgia
also launched an investigation of the FCC^"*
1^ National Broadcast ingr Co., Inc. et aJ . v. United
States et al . 319 US 190 at 227 (May 10, 1943).
14 See Robert D. Leigh, "Politicians vs. Bureaucrats,"
Harper's Magazine, January 1945, 97-105, and Erik Barnouw,
The probes were more than attacks on the FCC and
chairman James Lawrence Fly. They were part of a growing
Congressional reaction to the activist regulatory
philosophy of the Roosevelt administration. Although the
Cox investigation was discredited when it was revealed that
the congressman had accepted a $2,500 payment to intervene
in the case of an Albany, Georgia radio station and Dies
failed to discover any card-carrying communists at FCC
headquarters, the FCC ' s most aggressive period of broadcast
regulation was coming to an end.^^ The agency would
continue to hector broadcasters with criticisms of
programming practices for years to come, but the basic
structure of commercial broadcasting would remain
unchal lenged
.
Herbert Hoover and those like him who had embraced
American individualism in the 1920s had been chastened by
the First World War and the Russian Revolution. They sought
to insure stabil ity and order in the ir world through
A History of Broadcasting- in the United States, vol. 2, The
Golden Web (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 174-
81
.
1^ FCC investigators had informed both the Justice
Department and Speaker of the House Sam Rayburn that Cox's
actions appeared to be in violation of a federal law that
barred members of congress from accepting payments for
lobbying regulatory agencies. When neither Justice nor the
House took action and Cox intensified his attacks, newly-
appointed FCC Commissioner Clifford Durr photocopied the
incriminating check and left a hundred copies on the press
table at FCC headquarters. Cox resigned as committee
chairman four days later. Barnouw, The Golden Web, 175-6,
179 .
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rational liberal reform. After the Second World War,
Americans who had endured more than a decade of depression
and war only to confront a Soviet empire which they saw as
a threat to freedom as great or greater than Hitler's
Germany also sought to restore stability and order to their
world. Something had to be done, as Thomas E. Dewey bluntly
told Dwight D. Eisenhower, to "save this country from going
to Hades in the handbasket of paternal ism- social ism-
dictatorship
.
"1^
For the leaders of corporate America, including the
leaders of the broadcasting industry, the goal became the
creation of what historian Robert Griffith has termed "the
corporate commonwealth," This ideal of a "noncoercive,
self -discipl ined, and harmonious corporate society" closely
resembled the associat ionist ideal of the 1920s. Its
advocates hoped that "by limiting the New Deal state,
forging cooperative relations between business and
government, promoting social harmony and consensus at home,
and by maintaining a stable and Western-oriented
international order abroad, " they could assure the future
of 1 iberal capital ism and democracy. ^"^ In the corporate
commonwealth — "in which," historian Alan Brinkley
observed, "commitment to mass consumption and full
1^ Quoted in Robert Griffith, "Dwight D, Eisenhower
and the Corporate Commonwealth, " American Historical Review
87 (February 1982) , 99-
Griffith, "Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Corporate
Commonwealth, " 100.
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employment had superseded older concernc about economic
power and control of production" - there was no room for
the concerns over monopoly which had driven criticism of
the radio networks and the broadcasting industry in the
years immediately before the war. 18
The broadcasting industry flourished in the new
environment. The industry had since its beginnings
advocated cooperative control of the air, and broadcasters,
seeking to solidify their right to stewardship of the ether
through public affairs programming, had helped create the
ideology of consensus. The commitment of the networks to
mass consumption could not be questioned. They had been
created to bring the nation together into one vast,
attentive audience. Radio profits had soared during the war
years and continued to climb in the late 1940s. Television
soon proved the economic and cultural giant forecasters of
the 1930s had expected it to become.
As pillars of the culture of consensus, the leaders of
the broadcasting industry understandably endorsed
programming which reflected and ratified the existing
order. Broadcasts which promoted "social harmony and
consensus" won favorable time slots and lucrative
advertising contracts. Programming which executives
considered negative or controversial was first marginalized
18 Alan Brinkley, "The Antimonopoly Ideal and the
Liberal State: The Case of Thurman Arnold," Journal of
Anierican History 80 (September 1993), 579.
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and then eliminated. As always, when critics accused them
of ignoring the public interest, network executives
defended themselves by denying any motive other than a
desire to provide the public with what the public demanded.
Success in the marketplace, they said, was the ultimate
evidence that the industry served the public.
Broadcast journalists were no more immune to the
culture of consensus than their employers. As the
profession matured and techniques evolved to keep pace with
changing technology, most agreed that the credo pronounced
by Frank Cobb, editor of Joseph Pulitzer's World at the
dawn of the radio age, was equally appropriate for
broadcasters. "The first duty of a newspaper to public
opinion," Cobb had written, "is to furnish the raw
materials for it and the tools for its formation. "-^ The
idea that journalists should "furnish the raw materials" of
public opinion remained unchallenged. The major debate
within the profess ion was over which " tools " were most
appropriate. Cobb never doubted that newspapers must help
Students of the industry after the Second World War
should not ignore William L. Shirer, Strangfer Come Home
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1954), a roman a clef presenting,
the publisher announced, "the story of a veteran foreign
correspondent turned radio commentator who returns to his
native land and meets head-on the political pressures of
today," Shirer's Sunday evening news program was canceled
in 1947. The network insisted it was a business decision.
Shirer maintained his opinions were no longer acceptable in
Cold War America.
20 Quoted in "The White House and the Press," The New
Republic, February 24, 1973, 5.
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shape public opinion by expressing their own. The "utter
partiality" which marked his editorials reflected the
certainty of his times. 21 By the end of the 19306, that
certainty seemed out of place in a society assaulted by
doubt and wary of propaganda. Leading journalists
increasingly came to adopt the cooler, measured tone of
Cobb's successor at the World, Walter Lippmann, which
acknowledged that the truth was not always so clear cut,
the enemies of democracy and freedom not always so obvious.
The transition, however, was not absolute. Journalists
continued to see themselves as molders of public opinion.
The factual style which appealed to the rationality of the
educated middle class of the progressive era and had become
the favored technique of broadcast journalists in the late
1930s was, as Elmer Davis admitted in 1939, simply a more
efficient and persuasive means of communication.
That the objective style of broadcast journalism was,
in fact, a style rather than an ideology can be seen by
examining the careers of its architects. White, the man
most responsible for the content of the news broadcasts
listeners heard on Columbia during the 193 0s and early
194 0s, left CBS after the war. He resurfaced as executive
news editor at KFMB in San Diego where he started a new
21 James Boylan, The World and the 20 'b, (New York:
Dial, 1973), 6.
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career as, of all things, the station's crusading
editorialist .22
"We take very seriously our responsibility to inform
the public through news programs," White told his
listeners, "but we think that objective news reporting is
not enough - that interpretation is called for." He did
not, he said, insist that his opinion was always correct
and pledged to allow the other side to be heard, but the
station, "from now on, intends to speak its mind on public
issues . "23
"White is a refreshing editorial radio breeze" for
staid San Diego, observed The Nation. He "speaks his mind
on local issues; wages editorial campaigns; and wins more
often than he loses. "24 it seemed a radical change for a
man who had so long argued for absolute impartiality on the
air. The irony was not lost on White who, when he sent a
copy of his first editorial to a former colleague at CBS,
asked him to "show the script to Ed the Murrow when you're
finished with it. I know he'll get a kick out of it, in
22 See Bliss, Now the News, 183-5, Sally Bedell Smith,
In All Hie Glory: The Life of William S. Paley (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1990), 291-2, and A.M. Sperber, Murrow:
Hie Life and Times (New York: Freundlich, 1986), 263-5.
23 Editorial broadcast, "KFMB Editorial Page," June 1,
1951, text in Murrow Papers, reel 21, folder 287, frame
0016 .
24 William Sommers, "Around the U.S.A.: Whitecaps on
San Diego's Airwaves," The Nation, October 10, 1953, n.p.
[inside front cover]
.
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view of the
-no editorializing- slogan I was forced to
follow for so long. "25
The times had changed, White implied, and "the golden
rule" which had been appropriate for network radio in the
past should not be imposed on broadcast journalists of the
present. In 1943, when he defended Columbia's policies in
the wake of the Cecil Brown affair, he said eleven years
later, "I also thought that Soviet Russia was a valuable
ally, that nuclear fission was impossible and that, after
the war... steaks would be plentiful and cheap. "26
Davis, who publicly praised the Columbia's memorandum
on war coverage in 1939 and then used the factual style to
advance the cause of preparedness and intervention, also
admitted that the industry's fetish of impartiality was a
product of the times. When in 1947 legislation was
introduced in Congress to incorporate Columbia's policies
into the Communications Act, Davis, who joined ABC
following the war, fought the bill. "In view of the
hysterical fear of 'propaganda' which prevailed in August
19 3 9 it was sound network policy" to demand impartiality,
Davis wrote Murrow, by then a CBS vice-president.
"It would be unseemly for an employee of a competing
organization to offer any opinion as to how far CBS news
25 white to "Ted" [Wells Church] , [June 1951] , reel
15, folder 287, frame 0015, Murrow Papers.
26 Paul White, "Favorite 'Bleeding Head'," letter to
the editor, Newsweek, April 12, 1954, 14, 18.
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analysts live up to it at present," he demurred, "but I
venture to recall your attention to the fact that when I
worked there that policy, in its strict and literal
interpretation, was violated several times a day - not
least by one Edward R. Murrow.
"
"I don't think that policy statement did any harm to
CBS," Davis continued, "though it might have, if any
attempt had been made to enforce it in literal stringency."
Both Davis and Murrow knew the network was more concerned
with the appearance of impartiality than the reality. As
long as journalists who understood that objectivity was a
style and strategy were deciding what went on the air,
Davis implied, such policies were likely harmless. "But if
it should be embedded in the statutes of the United States
it could do a lot of harm, " he warned, "especially if the
FCC's administration of the act were watched over. . .by
Congressional committees some of whose members would
certainly dislike what some of us say on the air . "^"^
To both Davis and White, the CBS policy had served its
purpose at a par t icular t ime in the industry ' s and the
Davis to Murrow, June 29, 1947, reel 15, folder
169, frames 0301-2, Murrow Papers . Davis also offered
Murrow his opinion on the source of the legislat ion . While
Wallace White of Maine, "who, as you doubtless know, is an
excellent person," was the Senate sponsor, "it was of
course Burt Wheeler's work." Wheeler had been upset in the
1946 Montana Senate primary, a defeat which Broadcasting,
acknowledging Wheeler's influence on broadcasting,
suggested would "have a far-reaching effect upon radio
regulation, administration, and legislation." "Radio Will
Feel Effect of Wheeler Defeat," Broadcasting, July 22,
1946, 15,
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nation's history. Even Murrow by the early 1950s believed
his network should adopt "an open and overt editorial
policy." When he made the suggestion to his superiors
however, he wrote White, "I was kicked soundly in the
teeth. "28
The CBS hierarchy realized the truth that Davis had
acknowledged. While the FCC remained the administrator of
the nation's broadcasting laws, the real power now rested
in Congress. In the age of the Cold War, the era of Red
Channele and blacklists, broadcasters grew increasingly
timid. The industry with the coming of television was more
prosperous and influential than ever before, but it
remained bound by the agreement it had reached decades
before: The broadcasters' access to the air was contingent
upon their submission to the licensing authority of the
government. Unabashed opinion remained dangerous, not
simply because it might anger certain advertisers and some
of the audience, but because it could offend those in
power. Journalists, including Murrow, were fully aware of
the dynamics of the industry. "A telephone call or letter
from the proper quarter in Washington, " Murrow reminded his
fellow broadcast journalists, "is treated rather more
28 Murrow to White, July 11, 1951, reel 21, folder
28 7, frame 0 015, Murrow Paperg.
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seriously than a communication from an irate but not
politically potent viewer. "-^
Objectivity provided a protective shield for the
industry, but the factual style was also continued to be
embraced by journalists who steadfastly claimed their
professional allegiance to shaping public opinion. In the
years before the Second World War, factual reporting
produced dynamic broadcast journalism which helped align
public opinion behind the democratic crusade against
fascism. In the 1950g, when the mass audiences who once
listened to network radio turned to television, Murrow
continued to see those years as the model for broadcast
journalism. "In order to progress," Murrow said, "it need
only go backward. To the time when radio was, . .proud, alert
and fast," when he and his colleagues had the time to
report and analyze and comment upon the news in depth and
detail and to crusade for what they considered progressive,
humane 1 iberal ism.
Murrow' s television series of the early 1950s, ^ee It
Now, provides an example of the kind of j ournal ism he had
in mind . The program was factual , as were Murrow' s radio
broadcasts from London, but it is best remembered for the
powerful point of view it expressed. When Murrow turned his
29 Edward R. Murrow, speech to the Radio-Television
News Directors Association, Chicago, October 15, 1958^
quoted in Sperber, Murrow: Hic Life and Timee, 539.
^0 Quoted in Sperber, Murrow: Hid Life and Times, 539
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attention to the excesses of the ant i
-Communist crusade led
by Senator Joseph McCarthy, he remarked, a colleague
remembered, that "this show may turn out to be a small
footnote to history in the fight against the senator. "^i
While Murrow's personal opinion was clear to his viewers,
just as his opinion had been clear to his listeners in the
years before America entered the war, he continued to
insist he was "just doing a job of reporting. .We leaned
over backward to be fair."^^
Perhaps Murrow never saw the contradiction and never
lost his faith. Others were not as sure. A quarter
-century
after he joined CBS, Eric Sevareid admitted he had lost the
certainty of youth, and "this has bothered me." He was, he
confessed, "not so sure on any point, any more." The search
for fairness , balance and accuracy, the rituals of
objectivity which both he and Murrow had followed, had led
him to agree increasingly with Lippmann that the work of
journalists should be considered no more than "notes made
by puzzled men. "^^ Many of the pioneers of broadcast
Quoted in Fred W. Friendly, Due To Circumstances
Beyond Our Control. . . (New York: Vintage, 1967, 1968) , 4.
Murrow was referring to the October 20, 1953 See It Now
program devoted to the case of Milo Radulovich, an Air
Force Reserve officer who was discharged as a security risk
because his father and sister were allegedly leftist
radicals
.
32 Quoted in "Murrow Calls It 'Reporting'," Newsweek,
March 29, 1954, 51.
3^ Eric Sevareid, This is Eric Sevareid (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 19 64)
, 3, 9.
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journalism in the 1930s and 1940s who came to dominate
television in the 1950s and 1960s found they had lost,
Sevareid said, "not only their thirst for but total faith
in human betterment," which had carried them "straight from
those exhalting New Deal days, through the war and through
this cold war.
In the 196 0s and beyond, as the consensus of the
corporate commonwealth was challenged from both the left
and right, so too was the notion of objective journalism.
Yet objectivity survived because the culture of broadcast
journalism which emerged in the years of the Second World
War was maintained at CBS and the other networks until well
into the 1970s. The reporters may have become, as Sevareid
said, less sure of themselves, but their admissions of
fallibility did not appease their critics. While the
solutions to society's problems seemed less clear than they
had in the heady days immediately before and after the war,
their core values remained unshaken.
Before Peggy Noonan, a conservative Republican who was
the author of many of Ronald Reagan's most memorable
presidential speeches, went to Washington, she was a news
writer for CBS. "When I got down to the network," she
recalled, "the older people from whom you'd learn weren't
just anybody, they were the Murrow Boys, the last of the
Sevareid, This is Eric Sevareid, 2.
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gentlemen broadcaGters . "35 The legacy of Murrow perconified
by Sevareid, Charles Collingwood, Dallas Townsend and their
contemporaries remained a powerful force. They respected
the written word and the communication of the voice. Always
uncomfortable with the tyranny of camera images, they never
fully made the transition to television. Most importantly,
they represented the tradition of factual reporting as a
means of advancing what they saw as the humane intentions
of 1 iberal ism.
"CBS," Noonan recalled, "drew people with a mission
[who] thought of themselves as modern people trying to be
fair." They considered themselves neither liberal nor
conservative in the partisan sense — "to label was to
confine, to admit one is unalive to the complexities" —
but decent and thoughtful , too thoughtful to settle for
simple answers to complex social problems. Within the
political definitions of the 1970s, however, their opinions
reflected those of the liberal establishment which had been
at the forefront of the postwar corporate commonweal th
.
Significantly, Noonan believed, "they also thought their
views were utterly in line with those of the majority of
Americans . "^^
35 Peggy Noonan, What I Saw at the Revolution : A
Political Life in the Reagan Era (New York: Random House,
1990) , 22
.
36 Noonan, What I Saw at the Revolution, 24.
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ThiG wao the culture of CBS, the newc leader, until
well into the 1980d. It wao the culture in which Edward R.
Murrow, Elmer Davie and their colleagueo, all of whom oaw
themoelveo ac decent, thoughtful men and women, had
flouriohed nearly half a century earlier. They, too,
believed their internationalist viewc and faith in the
efficacy of government programo to promote democracy were,
if not in line with majority opinion, attuned to the
opinion the majority would hold if it wao properly
informed. Ao Murrow'c boyo departed, the economic growth
which held the corporate concenouo became leoo certain and
the prooperity of the network and broadcact televioion in
general were undermined by new technology, the tradition
waned
.
Fairneoo , balance and impart ial i ty remained the
Dtated goalo of the network, but thooe goalc, if a growing
choruD of criticD wao to be believed, ceemed increaoingly
out of reach.
Juot ao a new form of journal iom began when radio wao
born, then re invented at the ctart ot the Second Worl d War
and again when televio ion emerged, radical ly new forme of
See Ken Auletta, Three Bldnd Mice: How the Tl^
Networko LoBt Their Way (New York: Random Houoe, 1991),
Peter J. Boyer, Who Killed CBS?: The Ulidoing- of Aiuerica*o
Nuwber One Neuro Network (New York: Random Houoe, 1988),
Marvin Barrett, ed.. The Alfred J. DuPont -Columbia
Uhiveroity Surveys of Broadcact iJournaliani (New York:
Groooet k Dunlap, 1969-71; Crowell, 1972-80; Evereot,
1982) . For a particularly apt caoe otudy of CBS Newo in the
1980c, Dee Renata Adler, Reckleco Disregard: Weotworeland
V. CBS et al . ; Sharon v. Time (New York: Alfred A. lOiopf
,
1986) .
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disseminating information are being invented today. The
next incarnation of electronic journalism remains unknown,
but parallels may be drawn with first days of radio.
Corporations today seek to control the new media just as
they did seventy years ago. Inventors, investors and
entrepreneurs bicker and bargain to gain advantage or form
alliances which will allow them to profit from the new
technology. Once again, both the emerging industry and
consumers anxious to take advantage of the wonders they
have been told to expect look to the government to regulate
competition but fear that any government strong enough to
bring order to the chaos is strong enough to dominate the
new media for its own ends. Government, both regulators and
elected representatives, also remains conflicted as it
seeks to balance order and freedom. Certainly as well, the
new technology will itself be turned in unexpected
directions, just as radio broadcasting so suddenly and
surprisingly emerged in the 1920s.
Communication will continue through whatever
electronic extensions are devised, and news of events and
issues of public concern will continue to have a place on
the information highway. Men and women will continue to try
to mediate those events, and they will be the new
journalists. Like their predecessors, they will have to
learn how to use the new technology and reconcile the new
technology with their notions of what a journalist does.
439
Despite its clear debt to the traditions of print
journalism, radio with its immediacy and intimacy was
immediately seen by the people as a truer source of
information. Listeners believed they could finally hear for
themselves rather than rely on the corrupted institutions
of the press. Journalists of the 1920s quickly discovered
this new perception. Gradually, the audience came to
understand that radio and television did not, in fact,
present reality. Instead, the new medium like the old
mediated and distorted reality, presenting just one
contested version of the truth, and we found that was not
enough.
Proponents of today and tomorrow's media — video,
computers, whatever the future will bring — speak the
language of the early days of radio . The leaders of the
corporations which seek to control the new technology speak
of the public interest and the freedom of the marketplace.
Informat ion and entertainment wil 1 be available in
abundance for all Americans . The information highway, they
assure us, will lead society to a better place.
Their vision of the future is not, however, shared by
all. This time, the others insist, the new media will not
be plundered for profit. This time, they predict,
^® See Daniel J. Boorstin, The Image or What Happened
to the American Dream (New York: Atheneum, 1961) for an
inf luent ial cr it ique of democracy in the age of mass media
.
Boorstin' s concept of the pseudo-event has thrived over the
years
.
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technology will bring us a decentralized, democratic media
which will allow both individuals and society to reach
their potential. To them, the information highway inspires
images of traffic cops enforcing authoritarian rules and
regulations and carefully located exits leading us to
commercial centers where we discover what the corporations
have prepared for us. Their image of choice is a boundless
cyberspace, where every traveler can voyage to his or her
own destination as he or she sees fit.
That our faith in technology remains so strong after
all these years is additional evidence of the stubborn
optimism which has for so long been part of the national
character. It may also be seen, more cynically, as proof of
our inability to learn from history. More importantly,
however, the dream that we will all some day have access to
the information we need to determine the truth reflects our
collective faith that the truth does indeed exist, and it
can make us free.
We continue to seek the truth in different ways. The
new media now emerging are being shaped by the media which
now exist. Just as radio news was influenced by newspaper
canons, and radio traditions helped form television's
professional culture, the new media of tomorrow will
incorporate aspects of today's journalism. Just as
Americans in the past believed their new media would allow
them to discover for themselves the truth, the new media of
today and tomorrow will offer the illusion of reality
through unblinking cameras and digital networks which allow
us to believe we are more than passive observers of the
world around us. Just as Americans in the past sought
opinions from those who assured them they knew the truth,
Americans today seek explanations of an increasingly
disorienting society in which the traditional rules seem no
longer to apply. The new media like the old will be eager
to present these prophets, both true and false.
The journalists of the new media will no doubt try
their best to present an undistorted picture of the reality
they perceive. Like their predecessors, they will be both
lionized and damned. They will develop standards and
practices which allow them to understand what they are
doing and explain themselves to the rest of us. While
nothing is certain, they will most likely tell us they seek
to be fair and accurate and balanced. And they will tell us
they are doing the best they can.
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